What really happened to the Russians in 1941

[JasonC]

"The men who fought and died in the first months of Barbarossa, stupid or not, never had a chance."

That is what I deny. They had a chance, and they blew it big time. Oh, not all of them - there were some in Western district who were toast whatever they did. But there was nothing fated about not stopping the Germans in November and instead stopping them in December, and the same can be said clear back to August. They didn't because they were stupid and did stupid things and paid hell in consequence. They didn't have to, and they did. Just as the Germans didn't have to invade without even mobilizing the economy for war, and they did. History is vastly less deterministic than the excuse factory explanations after the fact try to pretend.

Yes they lost half their tanks in one battle, repeatedly, all over the front. And they simply did not have to. They could readily have prevented losing entire mech corps to swamp monsters, by being ten times as careful about CSS as they were, but they weren't and so they did. And I don't think they had to rectify ten years of mistakes, I think they just had to not make 3 months of honking big new ones, that nearly lost the war.

And it is not just those 3 months, though I believe they made enourmous unforced errors during them, perfectly avoidable oncs. The officers in charge of the Russian mech arm in 1941 did not land from Venus the day before the invasion. They were responsible for the state of their arm, they were responsible for the defense of their country, they were responsible for the lives of their men. Not welcome facts, not things I'd wish on anybody, but true. And they screwed the pooch. It can't be excused. Losing entire mech corps in under a week through non-combat failures is utterly inexcusable in any army, in any age, under any circumstances.

In case everybody forgot, the infantry did not fall apart in a week in combat, the economy did not fall apart in a week in combat, etc. A specific body of men dropped the ball, and they don't need any defense on the subject. They fully merit condemnation as officers, and are a standing example of everything not to do.

[ April 19, 2005, 05:54 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[blue division]

Originally posted by Soddball:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by blue division:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Soddball:

A fair assessment would be that whilst it might have been geared for warmaking, it was not geared for war-winning - the total warfare that was required - until mid 1944, by which time it was far too late.

In Hitlers version of reality, it was equipped for winning the war. The Army was big enough to defeat France and UK combined.

As for the Russians (and the US too, to a lesser extent), they were racially inferior and therefor would be defeated by will alone.

So to Hitler, he had the right Army. </font>

[blue division]

Originally posted by jacobs_ladder2:

The illusory world of Moscow allowed for this to happen, but my problem is understanding how the illusion came to be. Why did the regime choose to destroy the Red Army from the inside? Was Stalin just a wingnut? If so, how nutty was he? Why did military men like Zhukov and Timoshenko back him when they had to know how damaging his actions really were? It is impossible for me to really get at the issue without understanding the players.

Cheers

Paul

Try reading Stalin The Court of The Red Tsar by Simon Sebag for an excellent view into the mindset of the Politburo and Stalin in the late '30's.

Stalin wasn't mad, he was just about the most paranoid person you can imagine, as well as being a complete Communist zealot and ultra - vindictive s-o-b.

Stalin didn't think Hitler would be stupid enough to attack the USSR in 1941. He expected it to happen later on, by which time he would have rebuilt the Red Army to its former strength. He was totally shocked by the collapse of France in 1940 - like everyone else, he believed the French Army was the best in the world and it would drain Hitlers power over the course of years. He was then left with the prospect of having to build the Red Army up very quickly in late 1940 - early 1941.

To Russian minds, Hitler attacking Russia was really killing the goose that layed the egg for Germany. Nazi Germany obtained large parts of its industrial resources from the USSR (fuels and minerals). This was done I believe by bartering German goods. Why would Germany be so stupid to attack Russia when it was getting so much out of the existing relationship, as far as war - making potential?

The main reason he purged the Army was to get rid of all elements that he suspected weren't totally with him. After all, a lot of Red Army officers in the '30's had been with the White Russian forces in the Civil War, or part of Trotsky's or some other dissident faction. They all had to be removed, and for Stalin killing people was the quickest and most efficient way of doing this.

Stalin was afraid that the Red Army could not be relied on without the removal of these elements.

So put all this together and you can see the logic behind the destruction of the old officer class of the Red Army.

As for famous respected Generals standing up to Stalin - forget it. You would end up being murdered by Stalins GPU assassins - most likely in a 'road accident', one of their favourites - or invited for a meal where you would be poisoned by your host. Anyone with half a brain and a desire to stay alive would keep their mouth shut.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Glider:

Even today, even privately-owned Russian websites are often reluctant to admit mistakes and crimes that were committed by their side.

Ah well, who isn't? Most everybody who is interested in the war tries to at least accentuate the positive in their own nation's performance and to downplay the nasty parts. It isn't a good practice if you want to know history, but nearly everybody does it.

Michael

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by JasonC:

"The men who fought and died in the first months of Barbarossa, stupid or not, never had a chance."

That is what I deny.

Oh, that's what I thought. Well, I think you are quite mistaken, but you are entitled to your opinion.

There are several points which I think should be stressed.

1. The mech corps fell apart disastrously, almost in their entirety, in two weeks. Not three months. By the second week in July they were a memory. In all of my reading and research I have never heard a single author, even Suvorov, suggest this could have been avoided once Germany invaded. Then again, maybe they all missed something in their twenty of thirty years of in depth study.

2. The few tank divisions and corps which survived the early slaughter only did so because they were positioned farther from the front. By the time they arrived they were facing a German army operating several hundred kilometres from their railheads. Yet, still, they were decimated in a few days of fighting. In some cases, they effectively ceased to be a presence after a single battle. They had time to prepare. What happened? Did they all choose exactly the worst tactics imaginable at exactly the wrong time? Maybe it was a case of bad luck?

3. Considering the size of the Red Army, the size of the German Army and the scale of the front, I find it interesting that 29 corps went the way of the dodo in exactly the same manner in a matter of weeks. Does anyone truly appreciate the magnitude of this disaster?

4. The infantry did collapse. Entirely. Reserve armies fought the battles after the front armies were eaten up and entirely new armies were mobilized to take their place when they were gone. The Red Army that started the war was destroyed. A new one had to be drafted to replace it.

5. There are several reasons for the lull in the fighting in October that have nothing to do with the Russians suddenly learning to shine on the battlefield.

Cheers

Paul

[JasonC]

"What happened?"

What happened is, every time any part broke on any tank, they threw away that entire tank. When 500 tanks out of 1000 each had 1-2 parts break, they lost 500 tanks. When the same number of parts break in German tanks or anybody else's tanks later on, with real CSS, all it means is one tank per company is cannabalized for juggled spares by well organized men who know how their equipment works, and all the rest are running by the next morning.

What happened is, every time a snafu prevented fuel and vehicles from being in the appointed place and time, a whole subformation of vehicles was effectively lost. When such snafus occurred in other armies, or in the Russian army later on, it meant a subformation was slightly delayed and plans rejiggered on the fly, but nothing was irretrievably lost.

What happened is, every time a battalion was ordered to attack, a company with the most tanks working moved off with no idea where the enemy was because no infantry scouted ahead of them, until the lead platoon was blown apart at a German gun line, and the rest wallowed in confusion, then tried to take out towed guns without supporting artillery.

What happened is, every time the Germans got to a new unexpected location, some middling commander ordered a large formation to move to another spot and then another spot, until his units were in locations that he did not know, and that made no sense given more recent intel, and half of them were out of gas, and none of them were where they needed to be.

And every one of those whole categories of mistakes is an fearsome stuff up created by REMFs with their peacetime heads up their anatomy, perfectly avoidable and perfectly criminal. Competent men do not lose entire mech corps in days to swamp monsters, and the Russian mech officer corps of 1941 was among the least competent bodies of men with serious responsibilities, in human history.

[Glider]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

...Ah well, who isn't? Most everybody who is interested in the war tries to at least accentuate the positive in their own nation's performance and to downplay the nasty parts. It isn't a good practice if you want to know history, but nearly everybody does it.

Michael

You are telling me?! I come from a country where every grudge is remembered and every sin is conveniently explained away or forgotten

But... WWII was a long time ago and many truths about our magnificent freedom fighters and millions of German pillaging fascists they killed have become public knowledge and they are even generally accepted.

Somehow, with many of the Russians I know it is different, their reactions to attempts to question the obviously gilded official version of WWII events is almost violent.

It will take some time for them, I think... just remember, that fellow captain Marinesko that sank the Goya and the General Von Steuben within 10 days in 1945, killing over 10,000 people, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union in 1990... although by that time everyone knew that most of the drowned were civilians.

[edited for clarity]

[ April 20, 2005, 03:09 PM: Message edited by: Glider ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Glider:

Somehow, with many of the Russians I know it is different, their reactions to attempts to question the obviously gilded official version of WWII events is almost violent.

I will keep your testimony on this matter on file. For the record, I don't know much that would contradict it.

It will take some time for them, I think...

Yes, you are probably right. Could be that what you observe is an aftereffect of deeply ingrained and officially enforced dogma. I suppose there may have been some of that in your own country, but could it have ever been so ruthlessly pressed for so long and so thoroughly as is the case of the USSR?

Michael

[JasonC]

Just to distinguish as clearly as possible what I am talking about from the latest round of the ever popular nationalist flame wars among no necks trying to start the war all over again, my putting responsibility for the failure of the Russian mech corps of 1941, squarely on the shoulders of the officers of the Russian mech corps of 1941, is purely a matter of professional diagnosis of their achievements as officers, or the lack thereof. And of the effects of such failures - and their avoidability - as standing Lessons To Be Learned. By any officer with brains, rather than cabbage, between his ears.

Many an officer thinks CSS is boring, stuff for clerks, of no possible importance, to be slighted or got around in any way possible, to get to the exciting stuff. It is an object lesson for them, that entire mech corps can simply evaporate on contact, if they screw that stuff up. And get millions of people killed, nearly lose a war, etc. Nationalist chest thumping idiocy has absolutely nothing to do with what I am talking about.

[JasonC]

jacobs-ladder2 - Your problem understanding my position would appear to be, you simply accept it as a historical given, perhaps to be explained but not to be thought of as a variable that could have been otherwise, that a German formation with list of equipment XYZ shall outperform a Russian formation with list of equipment XYZ, to arbitrarily large orders of magnitude.

And I simply don't. The equipment could do it, we know because we see smarter men accomplishing it, Russians later on accomplishing it, etc. (Guderian has plenty of broken down tanks by the time of Smolensk and tough logistical problems from the length of his advance etc. But swamp monsters do not eat his panzer army). If the men could not, so much the worse for my opinion of the men.

I do not hold them to the standard, how rapidly did they fall apart. I do not listen to their excuses, though I acknowledge the circumstances they operate under and factor them in to expectations (can they keep their formations intact, slow one breakthrough, attrite the formations they collide with, etc).

But the overall standard I hold them to, is simple this. The best in the world. What is the best possible performance any disciplined and organized body of men, could achieve with what they were given. If they aren't there, and the enemy is, and they lose because of the difference - then shame (and worse) on them.

[Glider]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

...Yes, you are probably right. Could be that what you observe is an aftereffect of deeply ingrained and officially enforced dogma. I suppose there may have been some of that in your own country, but could it have ever been so ruthlessly pressed for so long and so thoroughly as is the case of the USSR?...

Well, we had a less malignant form of communism here, that is certain. And, at least as far as WWII propaganda is concerned, it relied mostly on positive image campaigns, countless films, textbooks, anniversaries etc... there was no "believe this or else" attitude.

But (and I am far from thinking that I am well-informed about the issue, these are just my impressions) it seems to me that the Russian perception of WWII stems more from the trauma of this (and earlier) invasion that almost killed their society. I don't think that any kind of state-sponsored propaganda is capable of producing such effects.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

i totally respect (nay, i adore it) the desire to have discussion that aims at objectivity (and especially if it contains wild speculation as well), but now that the discussion appears to have waned, i'd like to point out that some of the strong claims made about the Soviet commanders + the desire to isolate the issue from greater context of WW2 (and even beyond) are very similar to the typical claims made in "nationalist flame wars" and Western Allied revisionism in general.

the basic stereotypical claim is that Germans weren't superior, that their some specific opponent was just criminally incompetent and truly inferior at that specific period of WW2. to say something else means that one is a simpleminded Nazi fanboy, clueless of actual realities of the art of war and totally ignorant of the many failures of the Germans.

here, on this thread, one is given the picture that Soviet commanders of the early war were criminally incompetent, the worst of the worst and that by standards they should have fared a lot better against the Germans and failed only because they were Galactically stupid. this is of course totally out of larger context and the realities as experienced at the day back then. it's not that the Soviet commanders were criminally incompetent and totally sub-STANDARD. they were not that much worse than the Poles, French, British etc, it's just that the Germans were truly superior by the standards of the day and they didn't fall much short from revolutionizing the application of operational art of war. no, the Soviets performed pretty much as was the standard of that day. of course that standard had to change fast under the evolutionary pressure caused by the Germans. and indeed it did change and by the end of the war the Soviets had become what the Germans were during the first half of the War.

just to put things in perspective even further, look at the later blunders (considered important victories by many Western Allied revisionist fanboys) of Western Allies, like the July 1944 Operation Goodwood. in Operation Goodwood the fresh 2nd Army attacks German lines, trying to push thru, the British VIII Corps with three armored divisions spearheading the attack (the largest British armored operation to still this very day?). the British have the numerical odds, and the armored arm of the VIII Corps is not just numbers on the paper but real armored divisions. and unlike the Soviets early in the war, the Western Allies by now have air superiority and huge air arm and thus the German lines receive unimaginable beating served by hundreds of heavy bombers and the like. what happens? you get the supply problems, you get the counter-productive anti-reality reports of victory, you get fatally wrong interpretation of intelligence data and most of all the British VIII Corps gets mauled pretty much like the Soviet Corps on this thread. the armored divisions of the VIII Corps lose about half of their tanks already on the first day of the operation and by the third day it's all over after having managed to advance seven miles. this while having numerical superiority and absolutely mindblowing air arm - both something the Soviets did not have. and of course it's 1944, so you don't have the "excuse" of early war unpreparedness etc and you don't have half of the tanks of your Corps breaking down already before the battle due to technical problems.

the reason why the Poles, the French, the British, the early Soviets etc, or even the Western Allies in 1944, had such vanishing Corps is not because they all would have been substandard: it was because their performance was standard while by the standards of the day the Germans were truly superior.

[Abbott]

Losing trade with Russia did not worry Hitler; he planned to take what he needed. Supplying his economy with all the raw materials and labor needed for continued campaigns. The breadth of the country, the weather and the overwhelming numbers of enemy troops put the goals beyond reach.

Operationally the German army was so far advanced it was scary. Not to discount in anyway the toughness of the individual soldiers from each side. The Russians probably being tougher individuals themselves due to their harsher environmental conditions, tougher conditions breed tougher men. Training strives to improve on that toughness which is where the German military excelled.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Abbott:

Not to discount in anyway the toughness of the individual soldiers from each side. The Russians probably being tougher individuals themselves due to their harsher environmental conditions, tougher conditions breed tougher men.

In my view, not necessarily so. Tougher conditions might as well mean poorer levels of nutrition, which means poorer physical and psychological performance (especially if this malnutrition has been experienced during childhood). I doubt the men of 6th Army became any tougher by the harsh conditions in Stalingrad...

[Abbott]

Originally posted by Sergei:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Abbott:

Not to discount in anyway the toughness of the individual soldiers from each side. The Russians probably being tougher individuals themselves due to their harsher environmental conditions, tougher conditions breed tougher men.

In my view, not necessarily so. Tougher conditions might as well mean poorer levels of nutrition, which means poorer physical and psychological performance (especially if this malnutrition has been experienced during childhood). I doubt the men of 6th Army became any tougher by the harsh conditions in Stalingrad... </font>

[Hunter]

These Soviet assaults with 1000 tanks that 'disappeared' over the course of a week...

- Where would I find some maps and oobs?

- Over what kind of front were they conducted? And how deep?

I am interested in maybe reproducing them as a campaign.

Cheers,

Hunter

[Krautman]

Originally posted by Glider:

It will take some time for them, I think... just remember, that fellow captain Marinesko that sank the Goya and the General Von Steuben within 10 days in 1945, killing over 10,000 people, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union in 1990... although by that time everyone knew that most of the drowned were civilians.

[edited for clarity]

BTW, he was also the one to sink the Wilhelm Gustloff, a former KDF ship. My Grandmother was rescued from it. Meanwhile, the Wilhelm Gustloff tragedy is well known in germany, because Günther Grass, a (here) famous novelist, has written a book on that topic.

[Zveroboy]

According to Glantz in "The initial period of war on the eastern front", the Soviets had 17,000 tanks on the eve of the war, 15,000 of which were old tanks (T26s, BT5s, T28s and T35s ...)

Only 27% of the old light and medium tanks were fully operational and there were simply no spare parts available to fix those that were not (p.33)

The Soviets tended to retain all older models just as they do today. They retained what they had, but in the full expectation that the T34s and KVs would soon come into the inventory.

Soviets have been fairly candid in stating " We let the rest of the stuff [tanks] rot in the expectation that the new tanks would arrive".(p.39)

He also claims that at least half the armored strength of those mechanized corps never made it into combat. They either broke down or never moved in the first place.

Although Mechanized Corps varied greatly in strength (especially new tanks), here is the 1941 version :

1941 Mechanized Corps :

2 tank divisions

1 motorized division

1 motorcycle regiment

1 signal battalion

1 motorized engineer battalion

1 aviation troop

strength:

36,080 men

1,031 tanks

[ April 30, 2005, 11:41 AM: Message edited by: Zveroboy ]

[Hornpiper]

In "Russia's War," Overy makes some interesting points which seem relevant to the discussion. One of the reasons for restructuring the army in the wake of the purges was to return to a proletarian people's army stressing masses over technology. The armor was relegated to the task of infantry support and distributed accordingly.

Another point he stresses is that until American Lend-Lease supplies became readily available, the state of radio communications in the Red Army was abysmal. Lacking the ability to rapidly coordinate and respond to a fluid battle, there was little commanders could do once initial dispositions were made and little frontline feedback was available.

[Hornpiper]

Just to follow up with the proletarian massed army. The emphasis was on attack and attack by massed infantry. Part of Stalin's insistence on not withdrawing in the face of superior enemy forces was to be ready to go over to the offensive. Unfortunately, this played right into the hands of the encirclement operations of 1941, leading to the huges losses.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Hornpiper:

In "Russia's War," Overy makes some interesting points which seem relevant to the discussion. One of the reasons for restructuring the army in the wake of the purges was to return to a proletarian people's army stressing masses over technology. The armor was relegated to the task of infantry support and distributed accordingly.

Which restructuring does your source mean, the one that took place after the purges (and which did away with the mechanized corps in the OOB) or the one which was initiated at the wake of the Winter War debacle ?

Another point he stresses is that until American Lend-Lease supplies became readily available, the state of radio communications in the Red Army was abysmal. Lacking the ability to rapidly coordinate and respond to a fluid battle, there was little commanders could do once initial dispositions were made and little frontline feedback was available.

That disregards the fact the response to fluid situations was never (even in 1944-45) the strong suit of the Red Army during WWII. If the plan failed for whatever reason no amount of radio communications could restore the plan. And deviation from the plan was a strict no-no for the Red Army commanders.

[annihilate_this_week]

[Glider]

Originally posted by Krautman:

...BTW, he was also the one to sink the Wilhelm Gustloff, a former KDF ship... [/QB]

My mistake, as you said, he sank the Wilhelm Gustloff and the General Von Steuben but not the Goya.

[Hornpiper]

To respond to JasonC's comments:

1. Quoting from "Russia's War" by Overy: "The result [of the purges] was the triumph of military illiteracy over military science, of political conformity over military initiative....This stifling of military independence left commanders demoralized and execessively cautious, since anything judged by the political officers to be an infringement of the Party line carried the risk of the Lubyanka, not just for the commander concerned but for his wife and family. Officers were inclined to stick by the rule book. Any talk of 'deep operations', or massed tank attack, with its echoes of Tukhachevsky, was by association deemed to be counter-revolutionary. In this sense, the purges left an indelible mark on the Soviet armed forces, which were once again, as they were in the early 1920s, officially regarded by the Party as an instrument of the people's revolutionary will. Military professionalism was suspect as 'bourgeois expertise'."

Whether referring to the pre or post-Finnish state of the Red Army, it was stifled, in no small part, by the influence of the Party (read: Stalin) and initiative, risk and creative thought was not just discouraged, but actively suppressed with a continuation of the terror. What I have drawn from this is that the Party's (read: Stalin's) political considerations outweighed military. A return to the pre-Tukhachevsky orientation laid the Red Army bare to the technical and operational skill of the Germans in 1941.

2. I was not suggesting that the state of Red Army communications was good even in 1944-45. But in 1941 it was almost non-existent.

[JasonC]

Hornpiper - you are a troll peddling propaganda to get a rise. I don't feed trolls. All the reply you are going to get...