jacobs_ladder2

Thanks, guys. Good information. I just wanted to be clear about my question. I need to know which rounds were commonly used in late 1942 (or basically from Stalingrad through to the end of the Russian offensives). Cheers Paul [ November 20, 2005, 10:31 PM: Message edited by: jacobs_ladder2 ]

Hello Just doing some research into ammunition used by the Red Army in 1942. I have found several lists of HE, HEF or F projectiles, but have been completely unable to figure out which ones were actually used or when they were introduced/used? For example: The 76.2mm Model 1927 Regimental Gun used the: OF-350M (HE Frag) O-350A (Frag) F-354 (HE) F-354F (HE) OF-343 (HE Frag) I do not know if this is an exhaustive list. Does anyone know which of these were commonly used? Or, can anyone suggest sources? Cheers Paul [ November 20, 2005, 10:19 PM: Message edited by: jacobs_ladder2 ]

I have a few that I think are must haves, but they are mostly the ones that I find the most valuable when designing scenarios. Any list of mine will always start with David Glantz. "Stumbling Colossus" and "Colossus Reborn" will give anyone a pretty decent insight into the RKKA. After that would come any one of a dozen works by the same author. "Panzer Leader" and "Lost Victories" are two of the better books I have read. Georg Tessin's "Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1939-1945" is one hell of a piece of research. Leo Niehorster and George Nafziger are good sources for the same kind of information, but Tessin is the king. I find Niklas Zetterling's "Normandy 1944, German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness" tremendously useful. Max Hastings has some real winners including "Das Reich" and "Overlord". "Overlord" is the first book I ever read on WWII. I still love it. Incidentally, Hastings wrote an excellent book on the Falklands War which is a must read. Cheers Paul

I'm sorry. I should have thanked you as well Jason. Very interesting post. Much appreciated. BTW, on your reccomendation I'm reading The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. It's a good read. I have paid money for stuff and not gotten half as much information. Cheers Paul

LOL I'm stunned into silence. This is the BFC forum, right? Cheers Paul

I'd like to get your thoughts on this: After much thought and discussion this is what I have come up with. First, there are a few conditions. A. Dug-in troops are almost invariably better off staying put and riding out the barrage. If the barrage is big enough to dislodge entrenched infantry it is probably too big to run from. The only exception to this that I have found is the German system of preparing backup positions allowing them to escape the worst of artillery falling in a predictable pattern. B. Troops assaulting are going to continue to assault unless obligated to stop. Reversing direction is a last resort which can lead to as much trouble as it is trying to avoid. C. Troops not in close proximity to the enemy are far more likely to try to evade a barrage. These are the steps that apply to troops not dug in. 1. Troops caught on the move must decide how to deal with every situation as it presents itself. The problem is that you never know what you are facing because arty can come in a hundred shapes and sizes. There is no way to know what direction to run or even if running is necessary until the barrage has started. This fact alone necessitates hitting the ground as an initial response. You get down and, if it is available, get to the best cover you can find. Incidentally, experienced soldiers hit the ground faster than green soldiers. Inexperienced troops can make the mistake of running to cover or freezing. Lying down reduces the danger by a factor of around ten. The best way to go is to hug the earth and then worry about getting to better cover. 2. The next step is determined by the experience and leadership of the troops and the intensity/accuracy/density of the barrage. Simply, you decide whether or not to bug out, stay put or continue the advance. Generally speaking, experience can make all the difference. A barrage that seems deadly to a green soldier may not even be taken seriously by a vet. Experience (and morale to a certain degree) will not only determine what decision is reached, but how long it takes to make that decision and how long it takes to get the appropriate orders out. 3. Ultimately the barrage itself is the chief factor. No matter what, the fire has to be violent enough to produce a strong or irrational reaction from the men it is aimed at. The more violent the barrage the more extreme the reaction to it and vice versa. Experience will act as a buffer, but at some point sufficiently dense fire will force any troops to react to save themselves. Of course, the violence of the barrage is determined by a number of factors including shell calibre, density, duration and accuracy. 4. Reactions may vary, but the single factor governing them all is the degree to which those reactions are controlled and organized. Generally speaking, the more irrational the reaction the more unlikely it is that the unit will recover on its own. A unit which recognizes the need to bug out and does so in good order will be able to quickly reorganize and get back into the battle. A unit which breaks and routs from the field will probably not return to fighting shape for a long while (if ever). Similarily, a unit which is overwhelmed by enemy fire, may suffer from battlefield paralysis and simply refuse to move. Generally, the longer a unit remains paralyzed the harder it will be to get it moving again (even after the barrage has ended). 5. Casualties can cause an irrational reaction, but they are more frequently the result of one. 6. Artillery does not need to inflict casualties to be effective. Fatigue and loss of organization can remove a unit from the battle just as easily. 7. Getting up and running is always preferable to staying down and dying. Cheers Paul

Omaha Beach, for example. Good point made by Jason there about the inability of a formation to know how much arty is coming. I can't see it being effective to simply bug out at the first sign of arty. Like he said, you have no idea how much, how long or in what pattern the shells will fall. I can't see assaulting infantry simply giving up and running to the rear without at least waiting to see what they are dealing with. Cheers Paul

That's basically my impression as well. Interesting. Cheers Paul

OK, well let me try a slightly different twist. Take a company of men and subject them to a barrage from a single battery of 105mm guns (real life here). How hard would it be to get the entire company moving in the right direction? Now, let's say you can't get the order to everyone. What do you do? Do you get as many men as possible to move together out from under the barrage and leave the rest to their own devices? Are the men even waiting for your order or have they already acted on their own? Do you see what I'm getting at? If you are assaulting and come under arty fire, I don't see everyone just running off in whatever directions they see fit. The end result could be chaos and a lot of displaced squads (if not worse). I would think the last thing you would want would be everyone making judgement calls and running 100 metres or more in whatever direction appears to be the best. Cheers Paul

There's something I don't understand here. Does it all depend on terrain then? Is the best option always to run as fast as possible out of the targetted area? What if you have decent cover right where you are? So, in WWII, how do men generally react? And, when do they run? Cheers Paul

One thing I have a hard time understanding is the intensity of artillery. I mean, it seems to me like it should be nearly impossible to get everyone onto the same page and moving in the same direction while being deafened, blinded by smoke and dust, rocked by concussion, etc. Cheers Paul

I know there are a thousand variables here, but what can be done to get out from under a barrage? I am not talking about dug-in or armoured units, but rather exposed infantry. Generally speaking, once caught by artillery, are you stuck for the duration? Cheers Paul

Far out. That must have been a real pain in the ass. Cheers Paul

Field telephone. Flares (Very lights). Colored smoke (rarely; it was more common in air-to-ground). In a pinch, a runner. Michael </font>

Interesting. Much appreciated. Incidentally, anyone know of any good reading on signals technology in WWII? I have never taken the time to really have a look at commo stuff from the era and it's about time I did. Cheers Paul

So, the only issue here is mobility? Are FOs without radios limited as to what kind of fire missions they can call? I mean, if you are tied to a field telephone, how do you move around to observe from different positions and still call and adjust fire? Cheers Paul

I'm not sure what you mean here. Could you explain a bit further? Cheers Paul

I was playing CMAK last night and I realized that I have no idea why the game includes FOs with and without radios. Feeling pretty dumb, I slept on it, but the new day didn't bring enlightenment. How does an FO without a radio do his job? Does he send someone running back to battalion HQ with coordinates written on a piece of paper? Or does he simply limit himself to targets that are not likely to move much? Cheers Paul

Why would you change it?

I'm not entirely sure, but I find it hard to believe the French could assemble a big enough force in anything less than 3-4 weeks. I mean, in numbers alone, they had an army of some capability, but those forces were deployed in various places. Grouping them together, even after mobilization was complete, would not have been so simple. My guess is they would have been hard-pressed to come up with 50 divisions for an invasion of Germany. Also, on the subject of Czechoslovakia, I see it being a sitting duck. Look at a political map of Europe in 1938. Germany has no need of blazing a trail of glory through the mountains. The border gave more than enough routes of access. They could have cut the country in half in a day or two (three at the absolute most) and simply ground up what was left at their leisure. The Czechs, unlike the Poles, could not expect help from any greater powers. Cheers Paul

What did Dunn write? The name rings a bell, but I can't place it. Cheers Paul

I've never heard of most of these. Could you say a bit more about them? Cheers Paul

Just out of curiosity I thought I would see how you guys would answer a question posed in another (possibly less informed) forum. What books, covering any and all aspects of WWII, should be considered "must haves"?

I don't know who Paul is, but it isn't me. </font>

Right. That's what I thought. As I responded to you at the time, you didn't understand my post. I was not telling you to go home. My statement was intended to be ironic. I was saying that "if, by Zalgiris' argument, there was blitzkrieg in Poland, then there must also have been one in WWI." By all means, voice your opinion. I certainly don't want anyone to think I am telling people to simply "shut up". Cheers Paul