To respond to JasonC's comments:
1. Quoting from "Russia's War" by Overy: "The result [of the purges] was the triumph of military illiteracy over military science, of political conformity over military initiative....This stifling of military independence left commanders demoralized and execessively cautious, since anything judged by the political officers to be an infringement of the Party line carried the risk of the Lubyanka, not just for the commander concerned but for his wife and family. Officers were inclined to stick by the rule book. Any talk of 'deep operations', or massed tank attack, with its echoes of Tukhachevsky, was by association deemed to be counter-revolutionary. In this sense, the purges left an indelible mark on the Soviet armed forces, which were once again, as they were in the early 1920s, officially regarded by the Party as an instrument of the people's revolutionary will. Military professionalism was suspect as 'bourgeois expertise'."
Whether referring to the pre or post-Finnish state of the Red Army, it was stifled, in no small part, by the influence of the Party (read: Stalin) and initiative, risk and creative thought was not just discouraged, but actively suppressed with a continuation of the terror. What I have drawn from this is that the Party's (read: Stalin's) political considerations outweighed military. A return to the pre-Tukhachevsky orientation laid the Red Army bare to the technical and operational skill of the Germans in 1941.
2. I was not suggesting that the state of Red Army communications was good even in 1944-45. But in 1941 it was almost non-existent.