What really happened to the Russians in 1941

[blue division]

The Germans weren't ahead in terms of mechanising their army, were they? I was given to understand that 90% of the Landser walked to battle, even later on in the war. [/QB]

I was thinking of the complete package of Army and Air Force, with industry providing it with munitions to keep operations going. All of this requires machines - that is what I meant, rather than motorizing the Army.

I don't think that there was another country - other than Japan maybe - that was quite so geared up for warmaking as Nazi Germany in 1941.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Also, in all fairness, I would like to offer a few numbers in connection with the purges.

(All quotes taken from Stumbling Colossus)

"The roster of purged commanders included two deputy commissars of defense (Tukhachevsky and Egorov); chiefs of the Red Army training, air defense, intelligence, air force, artillery, signals, mobilization, education and medical directorates; all 16 military district commanders; 90% of the military districts' deputy and assistant commanders, chiefs of staff and chiefs of arms and services; 80% of corps and division commanders; and 91% of regimental commanders, their deputies and chiefs of staff.

This grisly total amounted to 3 of 5 marhsals of the Soviet Union, 2 of 4 army commanders first rank, 12 of 12 army commanders second rank, 60 of 67 corps commanders, 136 of 199 division commanders and 221 of 397 brigade commanders. Even the NKVD did not escape the wrath of Stalin, for more than 20,000 of these select men were purged, including 10,000 men from the internal and border forces."

Given that the vast majority of these purges took place starting in 1937 and continued right through the initial period of the war, one can only imagine the effect they would have had.

Here is one example:

"So serious and rapid were the losses that the Voroshilov General Staff Academy class of 1937 had to be released early to fill command and staff vacancies. Of the 138 man class, 68 were assigned to key command and staff positions; another 60 were purged and shot."

Also, it must be remembered that while all of this is happening, the Red Army is attempting to double in size. In fact, the rate of growth of the Red Army is matched only by the ever-expanding reach of the purges.

"For example, Air Force commander Army commander 2nd rank Ia. I. Alksnis was executed in 1938, and his successor, Colonel General A.D. Loktionov, was arrested in 1939. His successor, Lieutenant General P.V. Rychagov, was also arrested and the two were shot without trial in October 1941."

Horribly, this example is hardly abnormal.

Readers may draw their own conclusions about the effects of the purges.

Cheers

Paul

[Soddball]

Originally posted by blue division:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />The Germans weren't ahead in terms of mechanising their army, were they? I was given to understand that 90% of the Landser walked to battle, even later on in the war.

I was thinking of the complete package of Army and Air Force, with industry providing it with munitions to keep operations going. All of this requires machines - that is what I meant, rather than motorizing the Army.

I don't think that there was another country - other than Japan maybe - that was quite so geared up for warmaking as Nazi Germany in 1941. [/QB]</font>

[Andreas]

It was also geared up for the wrong kind of war.

[blue division]

Originally posted by Soddball:

A fair assessment would be that whilst it might have been geared for warmaking, it was not geared for war-winning - the total warfare that was required - until mid 1944, by which time it was far too late.

In Hitlers version of reality, it was equipped for winning the war. The Army was big enough to defeat France and UK combined.

As for the Russians (and the US too, to a lesser extent), they were racially inferior and therefor would be defeated by will alone.

So to Hitler, he had the right Army.

[Brent Pollock]

Originally posted by jacobs_ladder2:

Readers may draw their own conclusions about the effects of the purges.

Cheers

Paul

My conclusion is that since Stalin survived the war and did so as Head Honcho, he probably thought he did the right thing...and (literally & figuratively) hang the rest.

[chiavarm]

This is my general consensus of the early German success:

From my reading, while the Russians had a huge number of tanks many were outdated and the relatively few new models only a quarter of them were operational.

The purges left commanders timid and unsure of themselves, so as not to under perform or over perform. Avoid a great loss. Do not become popular to draw the wrath of Stalin

The factories were pressed to produce numbers of parts and quality suffered.

During the First World War soldiers were fed up and just left the trenches and went home.

During the Civil War, coercion was used on the communities to participate. Their Civil War was unlike that of the US, in that the combatants were willing to fight for the cause. In Russia they were apathetic. A common recruiting method was to ask for recruits. If none volunteered, Shoot someone! Ask again, if none Shoot ten! Repeat if necessary.

The Bolsheviks, the ruling party, were not in power by popular public sentiment, but by force and slight of hand.

I am sure the common soldier was weary of combat before hostilities broke out between Russia and Germany.

The original placement of the Russian units allowed them to be gobbled up whole.

The Germans on the other hand knocked out the Russian Air Force, so they had air superiority. While Germans had a numerical disadvantage of armor, they had experience and the ability to have the right number of tanks they needed at the right time.

Hitler had every reason to be confident. His generals had painted bleak pictures in the past and the German forces came shined through.

All this led to the early success of the Germans in Russia.

[bigred]

wow....simply superb reading here. What a goldmine!

[jacobs_ladder2]

Did some more reading over the last few days and decided I should clarify something.

The purges were not entirely responsible for anything. They did contribute to the disaster, but were not the absolute determining factor.

One also has to take into account several other factors and realize that the picture is still blurry in many places.

For example, the purges themselves would not have been so devastating if the army had not been in the midst of a massive expansion. How massive? From 1939 to June 1941 the ground forces increased from 98 to 303 divisions and from 1.6 to 5.3 million men.

Imagine trying to coordinate this while losing well over half of the most capable officers are being arrested and, in many cases, shot or imprisoned.

All of which was symptomatic of the regime in charge of Russia at the time. The purges were not officially happening, so efforts to compensate for them were few and far between. Command training remained essentially unchanged from 1932 to 1939 despite the massive loss of personnel and the concurrent expansion.

New officers needed to be found, but from where? Hundreds of thousands of educated men were hard to come by in the Russia of the 30s. How would the hundreds of new divisions be brought up to establishment? The answer is, they would not. Most remained dismally understaffed.

And of course, this led to a score of smaller, yet equally debilitating, problems which plagued the RKKA, in some cases, throughout the entire war.

The illusory world of Moscow allowed for this to happen, but my problem is understanding how the illusion came to be. Why did the regime choose to destroy the Red Army from the inside? Was Stalin just a wingnut? If so, how nutty was he? Why did military men like Zhukov and Timoshenko back him when they had to know how damaging his actions really were? It is impossible for me to really get at the issue without understanding the players.

Cheers

Paul

[Soddball]

Originally posted by blue division:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Soddball:

A fair assessment would be that whilst it might have been geared for warmaking, it was not geared for war-winning - the total warfare that was required - until mid 1944, by which time it was far too late.

In Hitlers version of reality, it was equipped for winning the war. The Army was big enough to defeat France and UK combined.

As for the Russians (and the US too, to a lesser extent), they were racially inferior and therefor would be defeated by will alone.

So to Hitler, he had the right Army. </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Returning to Jason's thesis with which he began this thread, I admit that I had not previously given much thought to the problem of immediate rear area logistics for the Soviet army in the early months of the war, but the picture he presents is quite plausible to me. One question I wish to present to cognoscenti, in addition to the staffing shortages referred to, which would certainly be a—if not the—critical element, I am wondering if that were not aggravated by a physical lack of necessary transport. How well supplied with motor transport was the logistic echelon in the Red Army and especially the mechanized corps? My impression is that by and large, once supplies were offloaded at a railhead, they were mostly moved by horse & wagon. If that is the case, it comes as no surprise to me that they would have insurmountable problems in moving supplies forward to support any offensive operations and would have difficulties even in static or fluid defensive operations. So did they or did they not have the necessary number of trucks to support their mobile formations? And did those numbers hold up during the campaign?

Michael

[JasonC]

"Why did the regime choose to destroy the Red Army from the inside?"

Acres have been written about the perverse logic of ideological regimes. Start with Arendt if you just don't get it. It is not that complicated once you see the point. Appalling, but not intricate. It isn't like they only did this to the army. They did it to every institution in the entire society, including the party and the secret police within it, which were the agents doing it.

An ideological regime is one in which agreement to some changing daily "line" completely replaces merit. Right thinking people are qualified, wrong thinking people are unqualified. Anyone may denounce wrong thinking wherever they encounter it, and the accusation suffices. (Ask the president of Harvard how that works).

The ideal of merit is a rational bureaucracy in which places of responsibility are possessions owned by their occupiers on the basis of demonstrated skill or qualification, in a hierarchy that reflects the technical subordination of coordinated tasks. Means are sought to sort personnel to get the most qualified to the positions where they can make the largest difference, etc.

The thesis of such rational bureaucratic system is that intelligence or expertise is rare, always valuable, and increases its benefits with increasing scope or command. Notoriously, they also suffer from lethargy, particularly when penetrated by personnel more interested in the safety and rewards its middle and higher positions typically bring.

The Soviets just didn't think that was their problem - outside a few technical subjects like economic planning or large scale engineering projects etc. They weren't maximizing the impact of intelligence on standing technical problems, they were maximizing the impact of scarce loyalty to the regime and ideologicial commitment, on the problem of transforming the society to an obediant mass of indoctrinated communists.

They operated by the methods of capos, not the methods of rational bureaucrats. They detected tendencies to rest (a favorite Stalinist barb, directed at older functionaries). If someone was willing to falsely accuse a superior to take his job, it showed he had potential. If someone denounced the injustice of harming upstanding men, he was insinuating that a man could be upstanding without the party's approval, which is very bourgois thinking.

The countryside was purged most thoroughly, and the result was a great standing crime in which all in the party were complicit. There was no loyalty problem, in the sense of active resistent. There was lack of enthusiasm. And an ideological regime does not want mere outward obediance, it wants commitment and enthusiasm - because anyone but a committed activist requires constant watching and there aren't enough cynical watchers to go around. There was the tendency to rest. There was lamenting of excesses, and making of distinctions between one's own behavior and that of the regime. Was the regime still true to revolutionary ideal, etc.

Can't have any of that. So the party is purged next. The secret police decimates the old ideological communists who remembered Lenin etc. Trotsky is hunted down in exile and assassinated. The point of this is to advance a standing offer to the lower ranks of the activists. Off your superiors and take their places. All you have to do is show you get it, prefer our capo system, and their bureaucratic seats are yours. The faster you denounce those around you, the faster you rise. It shows commitment and it shows brutal cynicism - very promising attributes for command, in such a system.

When the party is thoroughly purged the heads of the secret police are crowing about how big they are, that all the old professors have to take orders from them. Gangster style. So Stalin offs them next. Nobody is supposed to think they have power. Stalin has power, the regime has power, commitment and cynicism bring power. But nobody else has it, as a possession. Any tendency to rest and somebody else takes it.

It is not designed to bring safety to policemen any more than it is meant to bring safety to party members - it is designed to eradicate safety. Jump, today. Develop keen nostrils for the whims of the high command and jump to the new position as soon as it is articulated, enthusiastically and recklessly implimenting those whims and smashing anyone trying to stop them or even moving slowly.

The army was one of the last institutions so purged. Around the same time as the police, which was the actual instrument of most of it. Maybe some capo in the police would have the bright idea of stopping the purges and stabilizing the regime as police rule, by offing Stalin and shifting power from party to army. So, churn the officer corps. No rival will be able to keep up and have men loyal to himself rather than the regime, in place.

You have to understand that Stalin took power in Russia through his understanding and control of the personnel system within the young party, back in civil war days and the immediate aftermath. He staffed the party boss hierarchy. Shuffled his men into the necessary positions. When the time came, he had all the supporters he needed to beat any rival as Lenin's successor - even to beat Lenin if he had to. Because he had anyone not a personal crony removed, and his own men inserted. Capture of a bureaucracy by control of the flow of personnel to its upper positions was his stock in trade.

The way he prevented anyone else from using the same means against him, was by throwing the competitive doors open and letting so many play (at the game of denouncing rivals to advance personal cronies, I mean) that no one could accumulate a serious following. And by staying in that game himself, despite being at the top already. The net effect is that a nominal position is meaningless, even a party hierarchy position. Only close personal usefulness to a leading capo matters.

Incidentally, the Germans did quite similar things, with one twist. Instead of killing the office holders they just made a new parallel office and shifted all the real functions to it - or reached down 2-3 levels ignoring the nominal chain of command and responsibility, and lifted whole sub-bureaucracies in real responsibility terms, without changing the formal set up. Each major capo did so. The result was a sprawl of personal fiefdoms all squabbling over actual power and resources, with the dictator mediating their conflicts through personal favor thrown this way and that.

Now, this approach wreaks havoc on meritocratic bureaucracies. It puts toadies in the command positions, ruthlessly selected for cynicism and brutality but for little else. Party secretaries in Russia in the 30s were mostly uneducated thugs, three quarters hadn't gone beyond grade school. Think Bloods and Crips in charge of California.

The regime understood the need to cultivate pockets of technical merit, but dealt with that by separating areas where such technical expertise was clearly vital from the positions of line command. In the army, that meant the general staff system. In the economy, it meant the central planning bureaus. Line commanders had actual formations in the former, district party functionaries had actual regional responsibilities in the latter. Both selected primarily for loyalty. Staffers did the technical work that these then signed off on and had implimented. Those staffs could be somewhat insulated from political storms, merit could play a larger role inside them.

(In Germany, the army as a whole was such a place - though that led Hitler to feud with it violently, and he encouraged parallel institutions in the SS and Luftwaffe as a result of his mistrust of it. Eventually he staffed OKW with toadies, leaving OKH to the old army. In the economy there was chaos until Speer created a similar shelter for merit within it).

While there is no doubt ideological regimes make for poor bureaucratic performance compared to merit, this is not enough to explain the Russian mech failure in 1941. They successfully insulated war economy and mobilization from its ravages, for instance, when they had to. They also eventually mastered logistics for tank armies etc. The lag on the latter is what we are talking about.

Certainly part of the wartime improvement was just shutting off ideology and letting merit run, under conditions of very rigorous selection in wartime, with losses and expansion both shooting the successful up the chain of command etc. Part of it was organizational - abolishing the 1941 mech corps as unwieldy in favor of independent brigades until those were mastered etc. Some of it may have been getting better equipment - a T-34 is a more reliable machine than a T-26, in every respect - better mobility etc. Some of it may have been fielding more trucks. I will look at that question next.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Returning to Jason's thesis with which he began this thread, I admit that I had not previously given much thought to the problem of immediate rear area logistics for the Soviet army in the early months of the war, but the picture he presents is quite plausible to me. One question I wish to present to cognoscenti, in addition to the staffing shortages referred to, which would certainly be a—if not the—critical element, I am wondering if that were not aggravated by a physical lack of necessary transport. How well supplied with motor transport was the logistic echelon in the Red Army and especially the mechanized corps? My impression is that by and large, once supplies were offloaded at a railhead, they were mostly moved by horse & wagon. If that is the case, it comes as no surprise to me that they would have insurmountable problems in moving supplies forward to support any offensive operations and would have difficulties even in static or fluid defensive operations. So did they or did they not have the necessary number of trucks to support their mobile formations? And did those numbers hold up during the campaign?

Michael

It was pretty bad. The infantry divisions were stripped of their trucks in favour of the need to equip the 29 new mechanized corps (each with two tank and one motorized division).

Remember that the original 9 mech corps (ordered in July of 1940) were a huge stretch for the resources on hand. When 20 more were ordered created (in February of 1941) the RKKA went from the realm of the monstrously difficult to tooth fairy land.

Look at the sacrifices Germany had to make to expand their panzer divisions. Now imagine that you are in the process of making those sacrifices and Hitler orders you to create another 10 panzer armies. Worse, he orders you to do so when you are fairly certain that war is right around the corner. Still worse, while you are doing so he is arresting, shooting and killing your officers.

In terms of shortages you can throw a lack of trucks onto the pile. There were severe shortages in everything (including manpower). According to Glantz, 2 corps were overstrength (in older model tanks), 2 more were at around 75% of the required newer models and the remaining 25 averaged around 53% (mostly older models). In fact, on June 22, there were only 1,861 of the newer model tanks. Unfortunately, 1,475 of them were distributed all over the western military districts and were destroyed in the first two weeks of Barbarossa. The Red Army had managed to fill 19% of the required heavy tanks and only 11% of the mediums. An additional 16,500 newer model tanks were still required to reach establishment (not to mention that only 20% of personnel had even minimal time training with the new tanks and that many of the new models had not yet been bore-sighted). In the meantime older tanks filled the gaps. On 15 June 1941, 29% of the older models required capital maintenance and 44% required lesser maintenance.

Other shortages included the lack of 39% of vehicles and 44% of artillery tractors. Corps manning ranged from 22-40% fill in enlisted personnel and 16-50% fill in junior officers. Shortages in experienced and senior officers were worse.

Glantz offers a few examples of the results. Major General Shestapolov, commander of the 12th Mechanized Corps reported after the first few days of Barbarossa that:

1. After the 1st day's march and especially after the 1st day's battle, entire "tens" of tanks rapidly broke down. Because of the absence of reserve units, both on the march and during combat actions, these vehicles were not restored, and, if they were restored, it had to be on the field of battle since the lack of tractors did not permit their towing to the damaged vehicles collection points.

2. The AA battalions were poorly supplied with shells. On 26.6.41 enemy aviation destroyed and burned 17 combat and around 20 transport vehicles.

3. Shells for the 152mm guns are completely lacking...

4. Command and control of forces was weak because of the lack of radios. Radio communications almost completely did not work. The only means of communication during the operation were liaison officers.

The 21st Mechanized Corps went into battle without tanks and having only "mixed groups formed from the tank and motorized divisions".

By the 11th of July, 3rd Mechanized Corps had only 400 men and 1 BT-7 tank and 12th and 1st Mech Corps were down to less than a hundred tanks.

As far as the Western Front is concerned, forget about it. The end result was the complete destruction of 11th and 14th MC and the reduction of 6th, 17th and 20th MC to rifle formations. The 20th MC, for example, by the 27th of June, was essentially operating without tanks or vehicles of any kind. 17th MC was reported to have been in the same boat.

To the south the situation ended up the same way although, admittedly, it took longer to get there.

The list of reasons for the disaster go on and on but all harp on the same points. Lack of rear service units, no ability to evacuate damaged vehicles from the battlefield, poor command and control and absolutely no defence from enemy aviation.

In total, lack of transportation was a significant part of the picture, but thrown into the mix of the many other critical shortages it was almost overlooked.

Cheers

Paul

[JasonC]

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weapons/tank_state.htm

Not great, but does not fit the picture of simply zero readiness at the time of the invasion.

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weapons/tank_number.htm

For distribution of types. A few hundred moderns, lots of BTs and T-26s, many varieties.

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/formation/mechcorps/mk_strength.htm

The western military district mech formations are woefully undermanned, basically half strength. But that sort of thing is limited to that military district. There are certainly shortfalls elsewhere, but many formations in the north and in the south are three quarter strength or better in manpower.

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weapons/primemovers.htm

Something I'd never have thought of - many of their guns were towed by farming tractors (12k), with another batch of "trucks" used that are so slow they barely count as trucks rather than horse teams (5k). Only 8k of the artillery prime movers are trucks with speeds you and I would recognize as "motorized", when hitched.

There are some detailed studies of particular mech corps -

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/formation/mechcorps/1mk.htm

"The 1st Mechanised Corps was ordered to attack Ostrov. For this the 3rd Tank Division had: 28 T-28, 10KV, 148BT, 30T-26, 42HT (OT-26 or/and OT-130 (?)) (Total:258 Tanks). Some tanks were not operable (e.g. T-28 had only 7-8 units ready). After a short aerial attack two tank battalions of the 6th Tank Regiment passed through the troops of the 111th Rifle Division and attacked the 1st German Panzer Division in Ostrov. One tank company managed to reach the bridge. At the end of the day, all troops retreated to their initial positions."

Notice - the division has 258 tanks, but the attack is delivered by 2 battalions only. The limit of what they can coordinate and support, is my diagnosis. Not cobbled together from every operational tank, as though all the others are broken. Piecemeal commitment, presumable the highest readiness regiment, only.

The next day -

"For the attack on Ostrov, the 5th and 6th Tank regiments were used, the 3rd Howitzer Regiment of the 3rd Tank Division with two infantry regiments and a Howitzer regiment of the 41th Corps. During the battle for the town the 6th German Panzer Division arrived and prevented the capture of the town. The newly arrived division kicked all Soviet troops out of the town. The losses for the 3rd Tank Division amounted to about 50%. Then German troops began a counterattack after a massive artillery and aerial bombardment. The Soviet troops were forced to retreat."

That is more like the entire formation engaged. The aftermath - 5th Tank Regiment: 1 T-28, 14 BT-7, 6th Tank Regiment: 2 KV, 26 BT-7. That is what is left - 3 companies of BTs and a couple of KVs.

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/formation/mechcorps/2mk.htm

Now look at 2 Mech - they have full equipment tables. Over 3000 trucks - not out of transport. Losses to 20 July are trivial, not yet seriously engaged.

But notice the * for BTs operable. Only a third are. This is well after invasion shock and before serious combat. But it is right after an operational movement to the battle area. Diagnosis - lots of the BTs broke down on the road march to the battle zone.

Look at the early engagement losses 22 and 23 July - a handful of tanks per day. That is what you expect from a mech unit. But look ahead to 27 July, after a week of fighting. Now they have 19 heavies, 94 lights, and 154 armored cars. The armored cars haven't dropped at all, really. (Why not? Easier maintenance, use less gas, less heavily engaged). The heavies have fallen by 2/3rds. The lights have fallen a comparable amount, 250 tanks lost.

Tank strength reports cease thereafter. By 1 August they are surrounded and the tanks are gone - 1 operable tank and 8 T-26s, immobile and without functionary MA, being used as MG nests.

22 Mech has only half the transport of 2nd Mech - 1380 trucks rather than 3000, for a formation that still has 700 tanks. The history is "omitted". We get a snippet at 10 July, stating that the corps was already down to 30-35 tanks by then.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Not great, but does not fit the picture of simply zero readiness at the time of the invasion.

No, it does not. There are other factors, but it does seem clear that large numbers of Russian tanks were operable. Glantz quotes 29% requiring capital maintenance and 44% requiring "lesser" maintenance. These two sources put operational vehicles somewhere between 70 and 80%.

The problem with these numbers is the subsequent high breakdown rate suffered and the uneven distribution of that rate. Some divisions seem to have suffered severe losses before ever reaching the battlefield while others did not. This leads me to believe that a higher number of tanks were qualified as "combat ready" before the war, but did not last long under combat conditions. Also, some corps were much better prepared than the majority.

For distribution of types. A few hundred moderns, lots of BTs and T-26s, many varieties.

These numbers pretty much agree with other sources. However, they do not give an accurate representation of the true state of readiness of the armoured forces. The distribution of these tanks (and other resources) amongst the various corps is interesting.

By military district:

Leningrad---1st MC---1,037 tanks---4,730 vehicles

------------10th MC---469 tanks---1,000 vehicles

Baltic---3rd MC---651 tanks---3,897 vehicles

---------12th MC---749 tanks---2,531 vehicles

Western---6th MC---1,131 tanks---4,779 vehicles

----------11th MC---414 tanks---920 vehicles

----------13th MC---282 tanks---982 vehicles

----------14th MC---518 tanks---1,361 vehicles

----------17th MC---63 tanks---607 vehicles

----------20th MC---94 tanks---431 vehicles

Kiev---4th MC---979 tanks---2,854 vehicles

-------8th MC---898 tanks---3,237 vehicles

-------9th MC---298 tanks---1,067 vehicles

-------15th MC---749 tanks---2,035 vehicles

-------16th MC---482 tanks---1,777 vehicles

-------19th MC---453 tanks---865 vehicles

-------22nd MC---712 tanks---1,226 vehicles

-------24th MC---222 tanks---229 vehicles

Odessa---2nd MC---517 tanks---3,794 vehicles

---------18th MC---282 tanks---1,334 vehicles

A few things are apparent from these numbers. First, the Western Special military district was badly understrength and, second, tanks and vehicles were distributed in an extremely uneven fashion (much less so in the south) with one corps receiving the bulk of the tanks at the expense of the others.

A more easily understandable way to look at these numbers is to calculate the percentage of establishment. For example, taking the Western and Kiev Special Military Districts as counterpoints:

Western---6th MC---110% tanks---93% vehicles

----------11th MC---40% tanks---18% vehicles

----------13th MC---27% tanks---19% vehicles

----------14th MC---50% tanks---26% vehicles

----------17th MC---6% tanks---12% vehicles

----------20th MC---9% tanks---8% vehicles

Kiev---4th MC---95% tanks---55% vehicles

-------8th MC---87% tanks---63% vehicles

-------9th MC---29% tanks---21% vehicles

-------15th MC---73% tanks---39% vehicles

-------16th MC---47% tanks---34% vehicles

-------19th MC---44% tanks---17% vehicles

-------22nd MC---69% tanks---24% vehicles

-------24th MC---22% tanks---4% vehicles

Obviously the Kiev Special was far better equipped than the Western, but still badly lacking in transport (4-55% of establishment). And look at the variation amongst corps (6-110% in the Western and 22-95% in the Kiev). Predictably, the better equipped corps were amongst the original 9 formed in 1940 while the newer 20 formed in 1941 had hardly even begun to fill out their requirements.

In terms of newer models, the numbers are fairly convincing. There are 2 corps, the 6th and 4th, having 82% and 75% newer tanks. Later, 4 of the corps have between 10 and 30% newer models. The rest, for the most part, have no newer tanks except for a few scattered exceptions having a maximum of 5%. Once again, the 6th and 4th were formed in 1940.

The western military district mech formations are woefully undermanned, basically half strength. But that sort of thing is limited to that military district.

These numbers are accurate, but they do not tell the whole story. If we look at the makeup of those men we find that the vast majority are enlisted men. Some corps have up to 130% of their establishment in enlisted men. Generally, the average corps has around 30-50% of their fill in command and junior officers. There are variations, but they fit the same pattern. The newer corps have more and better personnel at the expense of the others.

In terms of training the pattern is predictable. Older corps have some degree of preparation while the newer ones range from completely untrained (with large numbers of conscripts never having fired a shot let alone having laid eyes on a T-34) to having rudimentary skills.

Something I'd never have thought of - many of their guns were towed by farming tractors (12k), with another batch of "trucks" used that are so slow they barely count as trucks rather than horse teams (5k). Only 8k of the artillery prime movers are trucks with speeds you and I would recognize as "motorized", when hitched.

This is an interesting point. The use of tractors was actually planned from an early stage and it was well-known that production could not hope to meet requirements. In the event of war the corps were ordered to requisition large numbers of vehicles from the civilian population. Unfortunately this did not work out very well. Farm tractors were not good at hauling artillery and the numbers of trucks available were not nearly as high as anticipated. I have to assume that this severely limited the maneuver capability of the corps.

The performance of the various corps is another topic entirely. Certainly the older, better trained, better equipped corps fared better than others, but generally, even those that arrived on the battlefield in strength suffered remarkable attrition.

My opinion is that the corps lack of preparation, trucks, tractors, etc. added up to an inability to maintain vehicles in combat. Therefore, the more successful corps were able to put up a fight for a short period, but sooner than later found themselves losing the battle of endurance with their far more prepared enemies.

Taking into account the horribly uneven distribution of tanks amongst corps and the severe shortage of trucks and tractors I think it safe to say that the Russians, in reality, possessed a small portion of their paper strength. The few mech corps (4-6 of them) prepared for war, were able to hurt the Germans, but were unable to maintain themselves under the stresses of combat operations. Certainly the accelerating rate of losses bears this out.

The uneven distribution of tanks, both geographically and amongst corps, exacerbated by poor command and control, probably prevented the Russians from massing their tanks in all but exceptional cases. This allowed the Germans to easily obtain local superiority and to destroy smaller numbers of tanks piecemeal.

Cheers

Paul

[ April 17, 2005, 02:22 PM: Message edited by: jacobs_ladder2 ]

[JasonC]

I don't buy the idea that it is a distribution problem, with some performing well and others poorly. The best perform abysmally. The weakness, whatever it is, is systemic. Even in corps with high percentage staffing, with 3000 trucks, with plenty of tanks still on strength in mid July.

The best performance I've seen for any Russian 1941 mech corps is evaporation a week after entering combat, after being effective offensively for at most a few days. One can cite unevenness, but there is no reason to expect more evenly distributed anything would have made any difference, since the best of them dropped like stones.

Moreover, the shortage of tanks argument is not convincing because even the weakest, even with large readiness "haircuts", dwarf German PDs, which they match in formation number. There is simply no getting around the fact that they sucked, even for what they had. They did not even cause large scale attrition in the process of being destroyed.

I think they were systematically unable to maintain tanks in the field, that large numbers fell out on every tactical march and were permanently lost wherever they stopped, that others were abandoned for lack or fuel or ammo because they got absolutely nothing in the way of service and support, once in combat conditions. Even in a mech corps with 3000 trucks to supply them, a simple road march rendered 2/3rds of the BTs in the formation unservicable.

That is just abysmal readiness and performance both, and its screams "cluster fun". That they stuffed up so royally was not deterministically in the cards, in my opinion (other systems at least as stressed, like the rail network and war production, performed vastly better), but stuff up royally they did. Anyway, interesting stuff.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I don't buy the idea that it is a distribution problem...

I don't buy it either as a prime factor. I do think the poor deployment of the corps played an important role, but it was not critical. Good commanders could probably still have gotten it together in time for battle. Unfortunately there were not many of those.

Poor distribution mixed with worse command and control did prevent effective concentration of tank forces. In most cases, not all, the Germans managed local superiority in both men and machines. Once again, not a critical factor, but one which played a part.

I just wanted to add a little depth to the numbers and to highlight how poorly equipped the vast majority of mech corps actually were.

The best performance I've seen for any Russian 1941 mech corps is evaporation a week after entering combat, after being effective offensively for at most a few days. One can cite unevenness, but there is no reason to expect more evenly distributed anything would have made any difference, since the best of them dropped like stones.

True enough. The 1940 corps seemed to be somewhat more resilient but they eventually folded as well (usually after a single large scale engagement). Even the ones brought in from Moscow for the Battle of Smolensk were chopped up in short order.

Moreover, the shortage of tanks argument is not convincing because even the weakest, even with large readiness "haircuts", dwarf German PDs, which they match in formation number. There is simply no getting around the fact that they sucked, even for what they had. They did not even cause large scale attrition in the process of being destroyed.

I know what you mean here and agree with you, but the statement is misleading. The weakest, and there were many of them, after everything is taken into account, are hollow at best. They do not even compare to a panzer division, or if they do, only do so in numbers of tanks. In fact, this was my point. The numbers are misleading.

Despite the large quantities of tanks, the Russians really only had a handful of effective formations. These were indeed huge, but they were not many. Also, the numbers of these large formations with sufficient support is even smaller.

Bad distribution of tanks was not only present at the corps level but also at the divisional and even regimental level. Inside corps, tanks and equipment would be massed in a single division at the expense of the other two. Not always, but more often than not. This lead, along with other factors, to the oft-quoted "piecemeal" deployment of tanks.

I think they were systematically unable to maintain tanks in the field, that large numbers fell out on every tactical march and were permanently lost wherever they stopped, that others were abandoned for lack or fuel or ammo because they got absolutely nothing in the way of service and support, once in combat conditions.

That is my opinion as well. In fact, I think you've basically summed up the current general consensus. Both German and Russian reports seem to agree on what happened if not the scale of what happened.

I think it is difficult to nail down a single, or even two or three, critical factors which spelled out the fate of the mech corps once war began. It is a complicated question. I like to point to the effect of near absolute German air superiority (namely in air reconnaissance) but I know many will disagree with me. A more important factor would likely have been numerous conflicting orders or horrible logistics, but I just can't get past the fact that the Russians were operating almost blindly while the Germans knew where their enemy was at all times. The 5th and 7th Mech Corps, for example, were bombed from the moment they arrived at Smolensk even though the Germans previously had no idea they existed.

Most of what I have added to this discussion has been in the interest of looking at how the RKKA was arranged before the war and how that lead to 1941.

It is a great topic. I definitely agree with you there.

Like I said before, I would really like to get into the personalities of the major players and try to see who these men were and what made them tick, but I don't have a clue where to start.

Cheers

Paul

[JasonC]

They concentrated. Dubno is perfectly concentrated. Some of the efforts around Smolensk have thousand tank corps working in tandem. They knew where the Germans were, large scale - the operational moves on the map are fine, good enough that they would have completely changed the outcome of the campaign if the mech corps had performed half as well as a 1943 counterpart of similar scale.

Air power did not destroy them - the total sorties available to the Germans compared to the size of the front make that clear. Moreover, the Russians had plenty of air operating over German exploitation forces later on - e.g. when Guderian heads south for Kiev, with no German air bases nearby. Stalin wants to believe the air power excuse and thinks now that he is the one with air, he can order Guderian's entire panzer army destroyed in an air strike. Why wouldn't he think so, listening to his mech commanders and their excuses? But it is poppycock, Guderian doesn't even notice.

The problem is simply that they evaporate in days. There are lots of other excuses and even some other reasons, but they only reduce the sample size, they don't explain the real effect. All the cases where none of the other excuses are operating so intensely (best manned, most trucks, located enemy, reasonable op order, concentrated, etc), still fail catastrophically within a week.

Zero CSS can explain that perfectly. Zero CSS would make any mech force in the world evaporate in a week, even one with M-1 tanks, fully manned, with perfect intel, etc. No gas, no maintenance, combat, tanks go to zero, deterministically. It works as an explanation, and bumps the question to, why did they have zero CSS in combat? There the bag of reasons can help explain it, but can't excuse it.

You have to be galactically stupid to lose entire thousand tank mech corps inside of a week, repeatedly, because you don't arrange for or execute any workable CSS. And to me, all the evidence screams, the leaders of the Russian mech arm in 1941 were galactically stupid enough to let this happen. That stupidity is beyond the scale that can be "explained" by hardship excuses. It remains a standing fact, they royally screwed the pooch.

Thing is, some of the Germans thought it was them being brilliant, instead. When the Russians stopped being so dumb, the world turned, and the Germans didn't quite get why. They were left with the lack of economic mobilization their arrogance caused. The Russians were dumb as bricks in 1941, where it counted. But they got better. The Germans didn't.

[jacobs_ladder2]

I agree with almost all of your points, Jason, but I would like to offer an addendum to the well-stated "galactically stupid" theory.

I believe the purges played a massive role. The problem may be far less one of intelligence and more one of fear and intimidation. The Russians, despite killing most of their talented commanders, still had a few competent and creative people (Timoshenko or Rokossovsky) or, at the very least, a few men with the will to get things done no matter the cost(Zhukov). Yet these men had their hands tied through most of the 30s.

The fateful decisions were made before the war when Stalin was busy undoing all of the improvements made by the men he was purging. Some of these decisions led to, amongst other things, the late arrival of a decent anti-tank rifle, the later arrival of ammunition for that decent anti-tank rifle, the delayed arrival of the PPd SMG, the failure to produce an effective infantry AT weapon, the abolition of the original mechanized corps and the failure to improve officer training programs during the expansion of the 1930s. In the twilight land of Moscow these decisions were useful and necessary. For Stalin, the threat from the west was still not serious.

The German successes in Poland and especially France changed everything. Suddenly not even Moscow could ignore the truth. This is when we start to see the end of the purges and the first examples of military men being allowed to make wholesale changes. Starting with the Timoshenko reforms the poor decisions of the purges are reversed one by one.

The situation is not unlike the Japanese gambit. Theose who know, know how bad things really are, but are limited by politics, resources and time in what they can accomplish. Attacking the United States postpones inevitable defeat just as reforming the Soviet mech corps in 1940 was far too late. Those who had the power to change things were given authority to do so but in too limited a way and without the necessary time or materials.

In fact, there is evidence supporting this. Several high-profile members of the military attempted to alert Moscow to the state of the Red Army. All of them were removed, arrested or shot. Some of them would survive and be rehabilitated during the war. Some of those would become extremely effective commanders. Faced with destruction, all was forgiven. The men Stalin had ruined became some of his best soldiers.

You see, the smart men were there. They were just not calling the shots. It took the Germans rampaging all over Europe for Stalin to realize how deep a hole he had dug himself. His actions after that point are pure desperation or lunacy or both.

Basically, if there was colossal stupidity, then it was at the highest levels of Soviet government, not necessarily in the RKKA. One can hardly blame the soldier or even his officer. Neither played a role in destroying the Red Army and neither had any training, ability or freedom to save it. No, IMO, ultimate responsibility lays with Stalin and very few, if any, others.

Cheers

Paul

[JasonC]

There was stupidity in the ranks of the army, particularly in the mech arm. I don't have to forgive it, and I don't. I don't see any cause served by making excuses for them or glossing their failures. Russians operating under the same nasty regime performed much better in many other areas, but were collosally let down by the mech officer corps, and its their fault, not anybody else's.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by JasonC:

There was stupidity in the ranks of the army, particularly in the mech arm. I don't have to forgive it, and I don't. I don't see any cause served by making excuses for them or glossing their failures. Russians operating under the same nasty regime performed much better in many other areas, but were collosally let down by the mech officer corps, and its their fault, not anybody else's.

Of course there was stupidity. There always is. On all sides. But how would things have been different with brilliance? It wouldn't have been is the answer. The mech corps would have crumbled in perhaps a slightly longer timeframe.

These were crippled hollow formations manned by men who had little or no idea how to control them receiving orders (two or three contradictory ones a day in some cases) from higher up the ladder. The few massed counterattacks you refer to are perfect examples of the Stavka screaming for a decisive counterattack when one is not possible or advisable.

The men had little or no say in the matter. Stalin had killed or arrested tens of thousands in pursuit of absolute obedience and he got it. Unfortunately, when the ludicrous orders started coming down, there was no one either willing or capable to stop the madness.

The few corps able to pull together large numbers of tanks were sent tearing into battle with little or no support. Predictably they were destroyed. Where is the stupidity? These men fought to the best of their ability. They simply had no idea what they were doing or, if they did, were so badly hobbled that it didn't matter anyway.

No, the stupidity, if it ever existed, was concentrated before the war either before, during or after the purges. The men that allowed the RKKA to be gutted and left for dead are the ones guilty of idiocy. Even Stalin can be accused of stupidity. Depends on how you view his actions.

The point is that the RKKA, in its entirety, was in a dismal state of readiness when the Germans invaded. This is the reason it was destroyed. How did it get that way? The purges and poor leadership. The men who fought and died in the first months of Barbarossa, stupid or not, never had a chance.

Cheers

Paul

[JasonC]

I simply deny it. Western would have collapsed regardless, but the fight in front of Smolensk was a different story. The fight at the Dvina was a different story. The entire campaign in the south was a different story. They were all winnable, or "drawable" which would have been enough, given what the mobilization side was doing.

The first time the Russians went a month without losing a million men, they stopped the Germans. That could have been October, it could have been September, it might even have been August. The main reason it wasn't is that the mech corps did not perform half as well as their German counterparts, even taking into account all allowable differences in equipment etc.

There is no reason a Russian mech corp had to evaporate in a week, while a German panzer army ran border to Smolensk to Kiev to Tula in the same time frame, smashing entire armies.

Grasp that. No reason. Except the better performance of the officers in one, compared to the officers in the other. Both of them under criminally insane leaders, both of them subject to relief by tantrum (Guderian was sacked, Rundstadt was sacked, Vatutin wasn't, Zhukov wasn't).

That they did perform entirely differently is obvious. And I insist that a large part of the reason why, the largest part in fact, was not inevitable but perfectly evitable, was not blind fate but was human failure.

It was galactically stupid of the Germans to attack a country as powerful as Russia without mobilizing the economy, and entirely evitably that lost them the war. And it was galactically stupid to throw away a potentially magnificant mech arm with nothing to show for it, because nobody could be bothered to arrange any kind of realistic and achievable CSS. And that meant the Russians didn't stop the Germans until December, when the might have done so half a dozen times earlier, if the men had been served by better command.

[jtcm]

There is scope here for a great war novel, re. Russia July 1941, along the lines of chaos, incomprehension, blindness etc that JasonC sketches out. Something like Mailer, The naked and the dead, trasposed to the E. Front.

Or you can just play CMBB and dream of such a novel.

[Glider]

There is, indeed, enough incompetence and stupidity redeemed by courage and sacrifice to tax the talent of Solzhenitsyn. Somehow, and don't take me wrong, I don't think that our friends Russians still have it in them to produce such a book.

Even today, even privately-owned Russian websites are often reluctant to admit mistakes and crimes that were committed by their side.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I simply deny it.

Deny what? The Russian mech corps are not still running around in August. They are mostly vapour by the second week of July. The Lepel counterattack was over by July 10th and the last remnants of the participating corps (5th and 7th) were encircled and destroyed two weeks later. Hard to imagine what could have been done to produce a markedly different outcome.

It's not like they "almost" won except for a few tactical blunders. They were wiped out. Look at the combat histories and find where the mistakes were made. They were ordered to go to Smolensk, they went, they attacked, they lost half their tanks in one battle and then lost the rest trying to save Vitebsk. There was no "turning point" or "close calls". They went into battle blind and unprepared and got smacked.

I think you are trying to make the argument that the Russian mech corps were strong enough to make a stand, but due to a widespread epidemic of idiocy (that apparently left no survivors) they were unable to. You are entitled to your opinion but you are running against a great deal of evidence.

The anemic tank corps of 1940-41, except for a very few exceptions, were about as effective as Patton's wooden army in 1944. They did inflict considerable losses (most notably on the 7th Panzer Division), but were unable to sustain themselves in combat.

Your position seems to be that they could have somehow rectified all of the mistakes made over ten years of purges in a month of combat. They could have somehow overcome everything that had been done to them and still managed a draw by August or September. With all due respect, this view is incomprehensible to me.

If we accept that the mech corps greatest failings were in command and control and support units then I wonder how they got as bad as they were. And if they were bad enough to produce the failure of the entire Red Army (in addition to the 200 or so rifle divisions) how could they possibly have been fixed in a matter of weeks?

If you are maintaining that things could have been different I would like to hear how you propose the mech corps could have been utilized. Should they have ignored their orders and not counterrattacked? How would they have overcome their gigantic CSS problems to be able to draw by August or September? Who would have been the men to perform this miracle?

The mech corps were paper only. They did cause some grief but in the end were a blink. They played a minor role in the early part of the war and had little or nothing to do with what happened later.

In fact, if we really want to understand what happened in 1941 we need to look at the forces that actually participated in stopping the Germans. Namely, the rifle forces. This entire discussion is fascinating, but it is almost, I repeat, almost irrelevant to the question posed by the title of this thread.

...but the fight in front of Smolensk was a different story. The fight at the Dvina was a different story. The entire campaign in the south was a different story. They were all winnable, or "drawable" which would have been enough, given what the mobilization side was doing.

The Battle of Smolensk was never winnable. To say different is to be unaware of what happened there.

I'm not sure what you mean when you point out the Dvina River but I am aware of no close battle fought on the Dvina until much later in the war.

As far as the south is concerned, it is the same story as everywhere else. The Russians made life difficult for the Germans, but winning would have required counterattacking, and doing that with a realistic expectation of success was simply impossible.

Cheers

Paul