Captured tanks

[SpitfireXI]

With the plethora of captured vechicles in the game what would be their appropriate use? Did both sides capture enough of a certain vehicle to form whole squads? Or did they operate alone in conjunction with other tanks. Anyone know of a scenario that uses them in a historically accurate way?

[Aco4bn187inf]

In terms of ammunition supply, crew training and maintenance, at least, it would have made sense for captured tanks to operate as platoons or larger units. In some cases enough of certain types were captured to refit, modify, or base whole new vehicles on them in a standard way. There's a discussion of the SU-76i somewhere in these forums, for example. I think the Germans fitted a fairly standard cupola of their own design onto T-34's. Others will know more...

[Mattias]

I don’t think there was any intentional deviation from standard tactics when it came to deployment of captured armour, it too would be deployed in concentration if possible. Then again, the number of vehicles available would obviously influence how large those concentrations could be.

What you would see in some numbers in Russian could be French tanks used for security tasks, some Russian tanks with the same mission, some French tank based SPG conversions (the majority of those serving in France though). Add to that some French and Russian armoured cars. And the odd medium and heavy Russian tank.

The SU-76i mentioned above, along with the French SPG conversions, along with French tanks and armoured vehicles, were probably among the largest examples of deployment of captured materiel in combat service.

The most common use of captured armour in Russia though appear to have been as ”castrated” artillery tractors and all terrain transports.

The Germans were strained to the limit just trying to keep their own tanks running. The time and energy to keep large numbers of captured armoured vehicles, with the predictable added difficulties involved, just wasn’t there. French vehicles being somewhat different in this context as, I assume, they were easier to support.

M.

P.S.

I guess you could argue that Czech tanks should be included in the term captured tanks but at the time of Barabarossa they were fully integrated into the German forces. From production to training to deployment.

D.S.

[ May 24, 2004, 04:24 PM: Message edited by: Mattias ]

[Andreas]

For the French vehicles there would presumably at least have been the chance to produce spares at the original factories.

[Mad Russian]

There are several notable instances of enemy equipment use. The 3rd SS Panzer Grenadier Division had a unit of captured T-34's that they operated for months. They even took them into the Kursk fighting IIRC.

The Russians operated "several Soviet tank units were equipped entirely with captured German Panther tanks" according Steven Zaloga.

There was an American Infantry Division the 87th or 89th IIRC that operated with large amounts of captured German equipment.

Panther Commander

[Tom Murphy]

Panther Commander... Funny you mention Kursk. I was working on a Kursk scenario tonight where 8 T-34s(two Platoons) from Das Reich III sitting on the high ground above a valley attacked a Soviet tank column while it was moving south through the valley.

According to the Das Reich Unit history, the T-34s were new ones they seized from a factory in Khar'kov.

[JasonC]

"an American Infantry Division the 87th or 89th IIRC that operated with large amounts of captured German equipment"

Wouldn't have been the 89th. It arrived very late, was only in action from the end of March 1945 to the end of the war, and was fully equipped. The 87th wasn't particularly short of US weapons either. It saw heavy action in the Bulge and thereafter.

There is a period when the statement is recognizably true, though, where it might overlap with the 89th. When Patton's 3rd army stalled out after the initial Lorraine fighting (in September), supplies went north to Market-Garden and later to Hurtgen. And were low after that - particularly 105 shells, also gasoline. In October and November the shortage, created by a "concertina" in the supply chain from beaches to units, and competition among units for the available supply, was at its height.

They had captured a lot of German equipment and more importantly supplies in the dash across France. They put it to use. They had their own tubes but US ammo was strictly rationed in this period. Captured German stuff wasn't. There are short periods when most of the ammo fired by 3rd Army was German rather than US made.

I can find other units that used German artillery in particular in up to battalion sized formations elsewhere. But not more than that typically, and not in a unit with the numbers you give. But the 87th was in 3rd Army. Maybe you read something about them in this period.

For what it is worth.

[Mad Russian]

Jason,

I have seen several references to the American Infantry Division but of course since we are talking about them I can't lay my hands on any of them at the moment.

The Infantry Division in question used enough German AFV's to be jokingly refered to as an "American PG Division". They also had a nickname like "the zoo" or something similair IIRC.

Once again, if memory serves correctly, and the older I get the less it serves at all, they used German equipment for a period of months.

Edited to add:

The American ID wasn't using German equipment to make up for a shortage of US equipment. It was using it because they could get Stug's, tanks, etc. that they wouldn't have normally gotten. And the tanks and Stugs were usually better than the ones they were issued by the US Army. If one broke down they simply canablizied from any German equipment at hand or abandoned it on the spot to pick up another one later on.

After about July 44 most German vehicle losses were due to breakdown or lack of fuel. So if all that was the matter was a lack of fuel the Americans could usually fix that in 10 seconds or less. Then all at once you have a new tank or assault gun to help you attacks.

They did have the recognition problem that goes with all instances of using the enemies equipment. IIRC there was a problem with their neighbors most of the time and they had to be careful how they employed their wealth of German equipment.

Panther Commander

[ May 25, 2004, 09:43 AM: Message edited by: Panther Commander ]

[With Clusters]

Hey, in the film Kelly's Heroe's, Oddball traded his Sherman for Tiger tank. That's based on a true story, right?

[coldmeter]

Originally posted by With Clusters:

Hey, in the film Kelly's Heroe's, Oddball traded his Sherman for Tiger tank. That's based on a true story, right?

Well it was in colour so it must be!!

Mark

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by With Clusters:

Hey, in the film Kelly's Heroe's, Oddball traded his Sherman for Tiger tank. That's based on a true story, right?

If it's not true it should be! I certainly would have...

Panther Commander

[JasonC]

"The Infantry Division in question used enough German AFV's to be jokingly refered to as an "American PG Division". They also had a nickname like "the zoo""

I'm afraid you will have to actually find the reference, if this is the proposition (rather than using captured arty to make use of ammo stocks and the like). It sounds to me like "German stuff is better" wartime Signal magazine propaganda. I've read all the US army official histories and there is no sign of this in them.

Also, as to the statement that after July most German AFV losses were just out of gas, again it sounds like propaganda. Categories like "abandoned" do not cover this, since a damaged tank not towed away because there is no time to repair it - even if originally put into that state by a 17 pdr hole - will be so categorized.

Certainly the hundreds of German AFVs lost in the Lorraine counterattacks were not just abandoned due to running out of gas. Some formations lost significant numbers of AFVs that way in the Bulge, because their supply lines were cut e.g. (Peiper). But lots of others were shot to pieces (2 Panzer).

Also, even in Normandy, the AFV losses mostly occurred in the attrition fighting before the breakout, not in the pursuit aftermath. 2500 AFVs were sent to Normandy, and only about 600 were left by the time of Cobra. Only 300 were left after Mortain failed.

[tar]

Also, any equipment that is presumably not abandoned in undue haste will generally be destroyed as effectively as possible -- just to stop it from falling into the hands of the enemy to be used against you. Presumably running out of fuel will give you enough time to do at least a partial demolition of key operating equipment.

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by tar:

Also, any equipment that is presumably not abandoned in undue haste will generally be destroyed as effectively as possible -- just to stop it from falling into the hands of the enemy to be used against you. Presumably running out of fuel will give you enough time to do at least a partial demolition of key operating equipment.

Any equipment prematurely not abandoned in due haste?

When would that be when the Germans were trying to get out of the Falaise Pocket? Or running for their lives to get to the Siegfried Line? Or pulling back out of the Bulge?

From August 44 on the Germans on the Western front were in reverse mode with few stops for R&R. IIRC and once again my memory gets worse with age...

Panther Commander

[Mad Russian]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I'm afraid you will have to actually find the reference, if this is the proposition (rather than using captured arty to make use of ammo stocks and the like). It sounds to me like "German stuff is better" wartime Signal magazine propaganda. I've read all the US army official histories and there is no sign of this in them.

Also, as to the statement that after July most German AFV losses were just out of gas, again it sounds like propaganda. Categories like "abandoned" do not cover this, since a damaged tank not towed away because there is no time to repair it - even if originally put into that state by a 17 pdr hole - will be so categorized.

Certainly the hundreds of German AFVs lost in the Lorraine counterattacks were not just abandoned due to running out of gas. Some formations lost significant numbers of AFVs that way in the Bulge, because their supply lines were cut e.g. (Peiper). But lots of others were shot to pieces (2 Panzer).

Also, even in Normandy, the AFV losses mostly occurred in the attrition fighting before the breakout, not in the pursuit aftermath. 2500 AFVs were sent to Normandy, and only about 600 were left by the time of Cobra. Only 300 were left after Mortain failed.

Ah, Jason, try not to put words in my mouth. 600 were left at the time of Cobra. When was Cobra Jason? Was that after July? No, I believe that the start time was, 1pm, 24 July 1944.

What happened after that in the war on the Western Front? Falaise, the long retreat, the Ruhr Pocket, the Battle of the Bulge? Do those count for situations the Germans had their supply lines cut? I didn't say that all of the German tanks were lost to lack of fuel. I said that most of them were lost to lack of fuel or mechanical breakdown. "or mechanical breakdown"

These figures aren't from German sources. How would they know why their vehicles were lost? These statements come from Allied sources.

Now tell me Jason...how many Medal of Honor winners were there in the 11th Armored Division? How many Silver Star winners? How many of those were awaarded postumously?

There was one Medal of Honor winner, Herbert H. Burr.

There were six Silver Star winners that lived to recieve them... Bahr, Earl A., Fraley, Edwin J., Frisby, Elwood D., Saunders, Harry C., Stem, William E., Van Dyke, Wayne E.

There were 22 Silver Stars awarded postumously to the following soldiers:

1st Lt. Nelson P. Roberts (22TKN) - Lorraine Cemetery, France

Capt. Robert L. Ameno (41TNK) - Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg

2nd Lt. Harry W. Foote (41TNK) - Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg

Capt. George A. Scott (41TNK)- Lorraine Cemetery, France

Capt. Gene E. Sucharda (41TNK) - Ardennes Cemetery, Belgium (Wall of the Missing)

Capt. Chester D. Wilkins (41 TNK) - Netherlands Cemetery, Netherlands

PFC Arden R. Evans (42TNK) - Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg

Sgt. Nelson E. Sommerlad (42TNK) - Netherlands Cemetery, Netherlands

PFC Julius La Rosa (21AIB) - Henri-Chapelle Cemetery, Belgium

2nd Lt. Vincent J. Mulvaney (21AIB) - Lorraine Cemetery, France

Sgt. Andrew T. Banka (55AIB) - Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg

S/Sgt. Elwood G. Cashman (55AIB) - Lorraine Cemetery, France

S/Sgt. John B. Day (55AIB) - Lorraine Cemetery, France

2nd Lt. Ernest S. Kruchten (55AIB) - Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg

1st Sgt. Cecil J. Cantrell (63AIB) - Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg

1st Lt. Christopher O'Brien (63AIB) - Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg

T/Sgt. Merlin Roberts (63AIB) - Netherlands Cemetery, Netherlands

PFC Deairl J. Rogers (63AIB) - Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg

PFC William E. Stem (63AIB) - Henri-Chapelle Cemetery, Belgium

Pvt. Peter Maheras (81MED) - Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg

Pvt. Herbert I. Meyer (81MED) - Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg

2nd Lt. Hadley Neff (490FAB) - Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg

My point is, that, as you pointed out to me, since you have read all of the Official Histories, you should have, according to you, known that. Or, maybe since you didn't know it, then these men weren't awarded these medals?

Here is the site for your verification, since, now you seem to want me to quote you chapter and verse, although in another thread you didn't like that.

http://www.11tharmoreddivision.com/i_citations.html

Yes, I have read books too.

I also know a bit about the ground the war was fought on. I served on some of it myself.

I don't claim to know every detail of the war or to have all the answers. I'm glad that you do. And I knew, that you could quote, EXACTLY, how many medals were issued to the 11th Armored Division, because you have read the official histories. I never doubted you for a moment.

**Edited my terrible punctuation. As bad is it is now, it was a lot worse before.**

Panther Commander

[ May 26, 2004, 11:46 PM: Message edited by: Panther Commander ]

[s3333cr333tz]

Keep up the good work Panther Commander ;p Nothing I like to see more than Mr "600 paragraph responce to a 6 word question" run tail firmly tucked from legs.

[JasonC]

Red herring. I never said word one about the 11th AD or medals awarded to members of it. I asked you to provide a citation of the alleged US infantry division that used a zoo of captured German AFVs, so many that it was called a US Panzergrenadier division. You instead give me a list of medals awarded to members of a US armor division. No statement of any relation between the two subjects. Just a bizarre red herring, pretending a dispute where their wasn't one.

As for AFV losses, your claim was that most AFVs lost in the west after July were non-battle. Did you mean to limit this to the fall of France period, or all the way to the end of the war?

If the second, I am waiting for the evidence for it. If you only meant that most German AFVs lost "after July" through the fall of France were non-battle, it is perfectly believable. But it would apply to a small portion of their AFV losses in France, because most of the AFVs sent west for that battle were already lost before then.

That does not contradict your statement because you specified, "after July". But your statement could easily leave the erroneous impression that the cause of losses "after July" and the cause of losses, period, were similar. They aren't. I just clarified when the bulk of the tanks sent west actually died. 3/4ths in the attrition fighting before Cobra, 1/8th in the course of Cobra and the Mortain attempt, only 1/8th (at most - a handful did survive) at Falaise or in the long retreat out of France. In other words, the idea someone might have that the tanks were pretty much all still intact but had to be abandoned when the front line moved, is simply false.

Of course non-battle losses are concentrated in periods when the front moves rapidly against one side, because that is what turns non-runners into losses. Battle losses are obviously overrepresented in periods of intense attrition fighting.

Less obviously, they are also overrepresented during attempted counterattacks, which tend to lose armor much faster than positional defense does. (Epsom in June, Lehr vs. the US in July, Mortain, Lorraine, the Bulge, etc). Other than being outmaneuvered and getting whole units cut off as a result, there is no obvious reason for out of gas losses to be concentrated in such periods. They might be, due to aggressive doctrine pushing until they are lost or what not, but they needn't be.

If however you meant the loss statistic to apply to the whole war, then I doubt the statement itself, not its importance. Most of the losses in Lorraine were not breakdowns or fuel, they were battle. The majority of tanks in whole fresh brigades were lost in single afternoons, or at most over a few days each. To battle. The Bulge saw large units lost to either and I'd expect to run about even, battle vs. non.

[Mad Russian]

Jason, relax. Things get so personal here, so quick...all I'm doing is trying to discuss with you. Not attack your reputation. I believe if we really try we can have just a discussion with

no-ones toes getting stepped on. Let's try and see if we can.

The point I was making, that went very far over your head apparently, is that just because you read all of the US Official Histories, doesn't mean that you know everything about the US Army, in Europe in WWII. I was trying to make a parallel here. I obviously wasn't successful in getting you to see, that reading a lot of books, doesn't mean you know every detail of WWII.

I am searching through my library for the missing reference. You will excuse me if it takes me awhile, my own personal library, has more than 2,000 books in it. And yes I have read them all. That sometimes causes me to forget which book I read it in. So it might take me a few days to locate offensive text for you.

I am thinking that the nickname was something like the Circus or something like that.

In, reference after reference, you read how the Germans in the later stages of the war lost large numbers of their vehicles, to breakdown and lack of fuel.

Here is another one for you to take a look at. I have never disputed the Lorraine campaign losses, that you so heartily put forth, as your evidence that the Germans were in fighting trim late in the war. But you quote one campaign, and I am talking about from the end of July 1944 until May 1945, as the German Army disintegrated.

As it was harried, surrounded and hammered.

As it fought for it's life while it tried to get out of France, raced across Germany, tried to stay out of the Ruhr pocket, tried to keep from getting caught up in the slashing Allied attacks of early 1945.

That is the time period I am talking about.

Those same, US Official histories, that you refer to, are full of references of captured German vehicles, that were broken down and/or out of fuel.

"Of course non-battle losses are concentrated in periods when the front moves rapidly against one side, because that is what turns non-runners into losses. Battle losses are obviously overrepresented in periods of intense attrition fighting." Quoted from your post.

Is this not exactly what was happening from July 1944 through May 1945? Was the front not moving rapidly against one side more often than not? And at times forwards and backwards over the same terrain. Which gives multiple opportunities for the loss of vehicles. The Germans lost vehicles in the offensive and defensive phases of the Bulge. Yes, to loss of fuel and mechanical breakdown. See how I group the two of them together? I have done that continuously in my posts as you have tried to only discuss the losses due to fuel. I know your position on Germany's fuel situation from another thread. That may be why you concentrate on that part of the arguement. ??

Now what does bother me at times about your posts are comments like this one...

"In other words, the idea someone might have that the tanks were pretty much all still intact but had to be abandoned when the front line moved, is simply false." Quoted by you.

You make these open ended statements, that you purport as facts, but with no reference to anything. Just that they are " SIMPLY FALSE". You do this on a regular basis. But when you disagree with any of my positions, I have to produce my references. Which I am willing to do. Now, I have seen Andreas produce his references during some or our discussions. I have seen Michael Dorosh produce his references. I have seen Rune produce his references as well.

What I have NEVER seen, in any of these forums, is you, produce a single reference. You have in this post, for the first time, said that you read all of the official histories. I would count that as a reference, but, you just throw that out in passing. I realize that I haven't been on these forums a long time, and I am a relative new comer, so maybe I have missed all the posts where you have defended your positions in the past. Maybe, you are tired of new people coming in and rehashing old arguements...if this is an old arguement, I apologize, as I am not aware of it.

As Andreas put it one time, I don't need your assessment of what you think happened. I'd like to know what really happened. So, I would like it very much if, you, Jason, would start quoting some of your references. See, that would allow some of us to go and check, to see for ourselves what it says. Without having to take your word on it, or your interpretation. I simply like to decide things for myself. I know I am not a rocket scientist, and I don't have a PhD behind my name, but I still like to decide for myself how the pieces of the puzzle fit together.

That's just the way us "good ole country boys" are.

Thanks.

Panther Commander

[ May 28, 2004, 10:01 PM: Message edited by: Panther Commander ]

[JasonC]

No, the front was not moving rapidly from the end of July 1944 until May of 1945.

And the Germans did not have many AFVs in the west to lose, over most of the period. You can't lose what you don't have. The Germans sent 2 large waves of armor west. An initial one to Normandy, and a second one in the winter for the Bulge and Alsace counterattacks. They sent a smaller mini-wave west in the September crisis, trying to restore the front. But that bunch did not last long.

The front was stable in June and July, and again from September to mid December. For a month after that it see-sawed, no net movement, with the counterattacks and their defeat - again basically stable. It broke again in February. In pure passage of time terms, the front was not moving significantly about two thirds of the time. And those naturally include the periods when the German AFV fleet in the west was at its strongest. Because a stronger fleet held the line, and a weak one couldn't.

If you want data on German AFVs in Normandy look at -http://home.swipnet.se/normandy/gerob/gerob.html

You have to go through every mobile unit. But if you do, you can clearly establish when the bulk of the first big wave was lost. And it wasn't due to the breakout. On the contrary, the breakout was due to the loss of the AFVs (and of infantry, certainly).

Similar in the other big wave in the Bulge, the front is not moving rapidly against Germany while they have all the tanks. It is moving against the Allies. It stops moving when the Germans lose a lot of the tanks. It moves the other way when they've lost most of them and had to ship others east to fight the Russians.

Why do I keep mentioning Lorraine? Because it was the other mini-wave that sent serious amounts of armor west. Around 500 fresh AFVs. Most of them were gone in a month. The Germans did not send all that many AFVs west, you know. When they did send a serious quantity it shaped the fighting immediately afterward. Not always effective, but it is one of the major determinants of the operational tempo and shape of the overall campaign.

When they were there and how long they lasted is obviously relevant to when and how AFV losses occurred. 2500, last 2 months. Nothing, left or sent. 500, last a month. A trickle. 2500, last a month and a half, with some of the remainder sent east. A trickle. That is the story of German AFVs sent west. The high points are Normandy summer and the Bulge+Alsace winter, with a smaller bump for the Lorraine period in September. They lose them after they get them. They don't lose lots at the times they have practically nothing left to lose from.

As for the US Pz Gdr division, you say you will find it. All I asked for. Until you show me I remain unconvinced.

[Mad Russian]

Jason, where in all your commentary is anything to do with how the vehicles were lost? Just because the Germans lost a particular number of vehicles in any campaign doesn't tell how they were lost. Both the German sources and Allied sources that I have site large numbers of those vehicles lost to lack of fuel and mechanical breakdown. Not a single source. Almost all of them.

One thing you have said that rings true for me is your very last statement..."Until you show me I remain unconvinced." You have danced all around the issue of German vehicle losses in the later stages of the NW European campaigns. You have said that my assumptions and research over the years is "simply false". But you bring forth nothing but your vast knowledge to dispute anything. No, the gold standard for WWII knowledge is Jason, and every other person's knowledge is to be judged against that. What are you going to do when I find what I am looking for? My guess is, to deride the author whomever that may be. If so that would be a shame. That is however conjecture on my part. I do not know you at all well enough to know how you will react to any given situation. So we'll just have to see what happens when I find it. My best guess is that it is in a book written by either Charles McDonald or Charles Whiting. It is the kind of little trivia that they like to include in their writings. It fits their style.

Facts are facts. The Germans lost their armor in the waning months of WWII. They lost them in a series of combat operations either of their design or the Western Allies. We are only talking about the Western Front here... We know that they were not lost in great numbers during periods of no activity. That we both agree on. What we don't seem to agree on is HOW those vehicles were lost. You seem to think that there was a great and powerful panzer force that the Allies had to destroy and yet you point out that there were in most cases not many tanks at all.

The situation when the Germans lost most of their vehicles whether in contoled combat or in fluid situations was what? Was it a 75/76/90mm AP round? Was it lack of fuel? Was it a broken transmission or an engine that quit running? According to the sources that I read, the largest reason for German vehicile loss from August 1944 to May 1945 was not by being knocked out but by mechanical failure or lack of fuel. Both the Germans and Allies make this claim. I don't care if that Panther was attacking Foy Notre-Dame with the 2nd Panzer Division when they met the 29th Armored Brigade and they had to leave the tank because the engine died. That is a combat loss. But what was the cause? The cause was that it was in combat. If it had been sitting in a motor pool it wouldn't have been lost. BUT why was it lost? Was it do to a 76mm AP round through the turret? There are no statistics that I know of that show EXACTLY howmany of what types were lost to EXACTLY what action. There are some studies that were done after major actions like Falaise. They break the causes for loss down as best they can. BUT then there is a large portion that fall under the unknown category. So as you say you are unconvinced.

I read the histories and see what they say. Not just the numbers but the men too. We've all heard that "figures don't lie but liars can figure". When you have German biographies that lament the poor quality of their armor force in 1945 is that just an excuse for losing OR is there actually something to it? We know that the German forced labor forces did sabatoge on the lines. We know it was hard for the Germans to get replacement parts. We know that say in the Battle of the Bulge there was so little fuel and this is December 1944 that the Germans left most of their tube artillery behind and that they required three train loads of fuel a day and were given two. We know that the 2nd Panzer Division sat in front of the Meuse River crossing out of fuel.

Those are facts that you have read Jason. You have formed your opinions on what you have read the same as I have. I appears that nothing I tell you is going to change your perspective. That may be true about me as well. I would hope not.

Thank you for taking some of the sting out of your posts. I appreciate it.

Panther Commander

[JasonC]

Ok, for those in Rio Linda, here is the Signal magazine version of the end of WW II.

The glorious panzer force could never be defeated because its men were indomitable and its equipment completely invincible in battle. Nevertheless, somehow the Germans lost the war, which hadn't figured in to the Signal narrative. So it had to be patched to accomodate this overwhelming falsification of the myth.

The patch is, "it was all Goering's fault". Loss in the air, destruction of industry at home, lack of fuel, being carpet bombed, etc. Occasionally the Russians - who could not possible have punched their way out of a paper bag alone - are described as wearing down the Germans somewhat while losing 15 to 1 exchange ratios. How this is supposed to happen from a 2-3:1 production ratio is not quite covered, but under remaining odds it is allowed. Implicitly, only dregs of the German panzer force are supposed to be left.

So, some tanks are lost when they just run out of fuel (Goerings fault), and some are lost after heroically KOing 15 Russian AFVs (allowed attrition by Mongol Hordes). German tanks were never destroyed on the battlefield unless they had already KOed scads of enemy ones. This is the Signal magazine propaganda tale. And it is demonstrably false, nothing to do with wanting to know what actually happened, purely a matter of vindicating past lies and upholding nationalist myths.

Now, the reality is most German AFVs over the whole war were made in 1944 and 1945, or already in existence at January 1 1944. 22,700 AFVs were made, roughly half the whole war's total. Throw in the existing fleet at the start of 1944, and there are around 30,000 German AFVs to account for, from 1944 to the end. They don't still have them. Massive facts like the loss of 30K supposedly superior AFVs in 16 months are sort of important to the history of WW II.

Part of the explanation is simple that all of them weren't superior. Only a portion were, about a quarter of the whole flow (but longer lived, so more like a third at any one time). Part of the explanation is that the huge claims about achieved kill ratios are simply false. Own side claims usually are, typically by a factor of 2.

My own theory of the basic process is attrition. The Allies overall outproduced the Germans by some ratio. The Germans killed more AFVs than they lost, but by a lesser ratio. Eventually that subtracts out almost the whole German denominator, and the fielded AFVs remaining therefore rises. Once it rises far enough the front cannot be held and collapses. This is accurate overall. But with some unexpected twists.

For instance, the evidence is that the US probably outscored the Germans in AFVs. I haven't seen data as good on the Brits and French, to be able to extrapolate that to the west as a whole. But then US faced most of the German armor sent to the west - contrary to the usual Normandy only story about the Brits facing it all.

In Normandy the US faced as much armor as the Brits and KOed at least as much - but at different, more favorable times. The Brits faced it at its strongest and with a static front. The US faced about as many AFVs, but about half of it only committed late (trying to stop the breakout, and Mortain).

In the fall the bulk of the new wave of armor sent west faced the US in Lorraine, but some went to Holland and some to the Aachen and Hurtgen battle. The Bulge targeted the US. In Alsace, the US had some help from the French but took the brunt again. There was a minor wave sent to Remagen late, likewise focused on the US.

And we know US AFV losses in the whole campaign quite accurately. They are under 5000 mediums (including TDs). In Normandy they matched the Germans, losing about 1000 and identifiably KOing 1000 to 1200. In Lorraine they accounted for at least 350 at lower losses. In the Bulge the US lost only 1000 - and only 3600 to that date (end of Bulge, January 45) counting TDs.

The Germans probably still outscored the Allies, with the Russians included. They did most of the job, and lost 25,500 AFVs in 44 and 45 combined. But the overall ratio is quite close for that period. It can't be even 1.5 to 1. In the west it is probably unity and in the east it is under 2 to 1 and probably under 1.5 to 1. Being on the losing side in overall strategic terms, in a period of overall collapse, is not good on achieved kill ratios. Moreover, the ratio is moving over the course of this period, at least in the east. It was still quite favorable on the Russian front, to the Germans, in the summer of 1944, for instance. It must be correspondingly worse in the west and later on in the east.

The main story is that the much larger Allied force was used sufficiently well in the west to drive the loss rate to unity, and in the east was not above the fielded forces ratio. Combined those give a strong version of the attrition logic explained above. Subtract roughly equal numbers from numerator and denominator, and the ratio soars. 200 vs 100 becomes 100 vs 10.

So much we can tell just from a top down look at the "macro war" in the last year or so. We can see more by examining the internal tempo and the problems the Germans faced. They were able to stabilize the western front whenever they sent enough armor together in a bunch - Normandy, Bulge. Sending smaller amounts made no appreciable difference and wasted tanks (the fall wave devoured rapidly, failure at Remagen e.g.).

But to continually supply that much armor - waves of 2500 AFVs to hold for a time scale of a month or two - was beyond Germany's capacity, for both fronts. Her entire strength could have done that in the west (average production for 44-45 works out to 1400 per month). But only at the cost of leaving nothing in the east.

Notice also that if the claims of 5 to 1 exchange had been accurate and sustainable, the 30K Russian fleet and all her 25.5K losses could have been handled with only half of Germany's new production (55.5k vs. 11K). German AFV production in 1944 was really quite high. If they had multipled it by any large exchange ratio, in practice, they could have held. But in the west they were getting "one". And in the east they were not consistently getting 5, let alone 15.

As for the how killed dodge, I consider it just that, a dodge. We have some surveys for particular periods after large moves of the front that use vague and not mutually exclusive categories with plenty of wiggle room and large unknowns.

A tank is "blown up by crew". Ok, why? Out of spite? Or because it isn't running? OK, because it isn't running - but why isn't it running? No gas? Threw a track or broke an oil line from hard driving? Or has a 76mm hole in the side - or track? Or, had a 76mm hole in it, got patched up, but broke down again when the repair failed on a road march? We are not told, so we don't know. We have no idea how many tanks in that category are battlefield kills and how many are maintenance or fuel losses.

"Abandoned". OK, why? Because it was out of gas, or cut off, or broke down? Or because the crew left it during an air attack? Or because it was at a maintenance depot it had been towed to after a 17 pdr punched 3 holes in it, and it hadn't been repaired? We aren't told, so we don't know. The categories are largely arbitrary and not mutually exclusive. Even the ones that *aren't* listed as "unknown".

A better source would be own side maintenance records. There what we get is TWOs, long term repair, short term repair, and running. With lots of movement to and fro. We see immediately that full strength units thrown into combat drop to half running in a matter of days. This is not a sign of a fuel shortage. But many of the AFVs that drop into repair categories that way, linger there for a long time, or pass back and forth as others move in the opposite direction. We generally do not have data on the gross flows, only on the net. When the front moves a long way, runners are all that is left - the rest become TWOs. Abandoned? No doubt. But because under repair, many of them because of damage.

But here is what we do not see. We do not see 2500 runners, in action for two months dropping to 2000 runners, then the front moves a long way and only 200 survive. If battle had little to do with losing tanks and fuel everything to do with it, that is what you'd see. Similarly, if maintenance alone were the culprit you'd see steady subtraction (or slow exponential decay) whether in serious fighting or not.

The time placement of the losses is the best clue we've got as to the role of real processes in loss of tanks, as opposed to loose accounting entries. Losses concentrated when the front is moving suggests "gas" - and some loss of damaged or maintenance loss vehicles will be *recorded* then, while having occurred earlier. There would be some weighting this way even if fuel wasn't a big factor, because under repair cases get written off at these times. But in fact, there is no strong weighting of losses to such times. They preceed the big front moves.

Some of that will be maintenance. Tanks are pushed harder in combat. There is less time to repair them. But it also gets progressively harder to repair them because they get damaged. If the movement out of "runner" into "under repair" were evenly spaced over periods in action, then it would make sense to think breakdowns unrelated to battle damage (but related to lack of time for maintenance, and to heavy use) could account for many of them. There is some of that. But it is also noticable that fresh units crash to half runners very rapidly when committed to action. Then linger there, by returning some to service. And pause to recover to a higher portion of runners, by not fighting for a few days.

The unit data, in other words, says "contact with the enemy is what moves tanks out of runner status". What moves them out of repair status to TWO is different - that can move around in time and its much more gradual.

All of this is compatible with some role for logistics and maintenance losses. But not enough to support "all Goerings fault" myths or to support inflated kill claims. Some of this is obviously also going on for the other side. Less from logistics. A lot more from losses to non-AFV battle causes (PAK, infantry AT, mines, etc).

Suppose half of all German AFV losses are to allied AFVs because the others aren't even "battle". And that half of all Allied AFV losses even in battle are to PAK infantry mines etc. The ratio of AFV to AFV losses doesn't move. Only one entry accounting can make it look like it moves - counting half of German AFV losses against all of Allied ones, effectively. But that is just supporting a busted myth with bad accounting. The myth remains busted.

As for the US panzergrenadier division, I am still waiting. I'll wait as long as you like. You can iterate a dozen times if you want, before you look it up. But nothing is going to help except the citation, on that one. If you have such a citation I am all ears. It would be interesting. Especially to see what the overall scale of the thing is, whether it is handfuls of vehicles, dozens-companies, many score-battalions, etc.

An anecdote I might expect, just because men use captured material when they can. Anything that is supposed to matter for processes of the scale, "lose 30,000 AFVs in 16 months", I very much doubt.

[ May 29, 2004, 03:27 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Mad Russian]

"As for the US panzergrenadier division, I am still waiting. I'll wait as long as you like. You can iterate a dozen times if you want, before you look it up. But nothing is going to help except the citation, on that one. If you have such a citation I am all ears. It would be interesting. Especially to see what the overall scale of the thing is, whether it is handfuls of vehicles, dozens-companies, many score-battalions, etc."

Jason, I can tell you that the scale is just more German vehicles than was normal. They didn't run whole battalions of vehicles to my knowledge. They were simply known as having more than anybody else and that they actively used them.

Don't worry I'll find your quote for you. I want to see what you do with it when it shows up on your doorstep.

Panther Commander

[Mad Russian]

Here you go Jason.

ASL Scenario 306 The Rag Tag Circus reads...

"GI's of the 83rd Infantry Division took particular pride in tier use of captured German vehicles. So extensive was their "used car lot" appearance that the news correspondents nicknamed this unit the "Rag Tag Circus". The GI's of the 83rd preferred the nickname "83rd Armored Division". Using their captured AFV's to lead each attack, despite the perverse tendencies of the infrequently maintained monsters..."

Then of course there are the internet sites that post references to the Rag Tag Circus, complete with quotes and a couple of books written on the subject...

My dad's story ends here, but the 83rd's does not. They fought through the Ardennes in the bitter cold and snow to beat back the German Bulge. Then they raced through Germany. The 329th lead the way most of the time and gained fame as the "Rag-Tag Circus" as they rode through the German provinces on tanks, motorcycles, jalopies, and any other means of transportation they could find. The 331st sped along not far behind on the flank. They raced across the German countryside until they were ordered to stop less than 60 miles from Berlin. The 330th, detached from the 83rd, helped clean out the Harz Mountains, a pocket of resistance that had been bypassed by the fast riding 329th and 331st.

http://www.ncweb.com/~davecurry/brothers/

"The Rag Tag Circus From Omaha Beach To the Elbe" by Edwin B. "Buckshot" Crabill. Crabill was the commander of the 329th IR. His book is a very outspoken account of 329th and the 83rd Division. Published by Vantage Press, 1969. Out of print.

http://www.ncweb.com/~davecurry/brothers/links.html

http://www.ameribytes.com/329thInfantry/Bookp.htm

The dash of some two hundred and eighty miles we made in thirteen days.

In those thirteen days the Thunderbolt Division threw away the books and improvised. We became a weird caravan. We picked up vehicles of any kind - and kept moving. Some of us drove deep into the Harz Mountains. Some of us dashed toward the Elbe. Our eyes ached, our backs were sore - but there was no let up. At times we were so tired we did not know what we were doing.

http://www.geocities.com/searchlight352/Thunderbolt/thunderbolt2.html

Sandini, Louis R. "Rag Tag Circus." Marlborough: Louis Sandini, 1992.

http://gateway.ca.k12.pa.us/memorial/biblio.html

Dubbed "The Rag Tag Circus" by the press, the 83rd commmandered cars, trucks, tanks, motorcycles, wagons, bicycles, in short, anything with wheels, as it drove the Germans eastward.

http://gateway.ca.k12.pa.us/memorial/dadstory.html

And the 83rd Infantry Division was prone to take nearly any running captured German vehicle--from tanks to sidecar motorcycles--and simply paint them olive-drab and then give them Allied white stars, and thus the 83rd was nicknamed the "Rag-Tag Circus"!

http://www.kramerg.com/tircuit/bandofbrothers/messages/714/1838.html?1062295144

Panther Commander

[Mad Russian]

Jason, here is my last post on the fuel and maintenance ideas, that I am holding onto.

Germany could not meet the fuel needs of their armored units in the Battle of the Bulge. Imagine what "normal" the fuel situation was like.

The following quotes are from Danny S. Parkers Battle of the Bulge, page numbers follow the quotes.

"Hitler and his staff had managed to accumulate a sizeable reserve for the last great offensive of the war...On December 15th the 1st SS PanzerKorps could count only a half VS (a VS is the amount of fuel required to take a vehicle 100km.) for it's 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions. An urgent dispatch to Heeresgruppe B that afternoon produced further fuel, but by dark the two SS divisions would only show 1.3 VS available. Even worse, the fuel had been pirated from the IISS Panzerkorps, the second wave assault force for Sixth Panzer Army, based on the rationale that they would not be needing it immediately. As we shall see, this would have dire consequences for the advance of 2nd SS and 9th SS Panzer Divisions into the battle." pg 147

This is the day before the offensive began.

"There had been some hope that on the part of German field commanders that their attack force might advance off fuel supplies captured for the Allies. In actuality, this source failed to materialize." pg 149

"By December 28th the commander of the Panzer Lehr Division grimly noted that not only was he out of fuel, but was short of ammunition as well." pg 151

"There were two distinct phases of the German fuel supply failure in the Ardennes. The first period began with the opening of the offensive when traffic jams, bad roads and poor logistical planning and the paucity of transport lead to local shortages. As early as 18 December, the Fuhrer Begleit Brigade, which had been committed to the battle at St. Vith, could not move in the battle zone for lack of fuel. Meantime, in order to make the fuel situation more secure, Generalfeldmarshall Model requested that six fuel trains be delivered on a daily basis. The quartermaster's report replied that "in the best case situation we can only deliver up to four trains daily." pg 151

In case you should think that trains were the issue here, the conversation centers soley on the supply of fuel. Note that only 2/3 of the fuel could be supplied for the great offensive. Once again imagine what it must have been like "normally".

I have seen your thoughts that Germany never had a fuel problem. I have seen your position stated here, that combat losses were the real reason that tanks were lost.

I'm still not buying it. I served in an armored division. In the 70's. Twenty years later. With all of our modern technology, about a fourth of our vehicles were broke at any one time while we were in the field.

Sorry, I forgot to mention to you I served in an Armored Division. Does that count as a Red Herring?

I would think that an army that is retreating and cannot recover it's broken down equipment would have more mechanical losses than combat losses.

But now we get to your obsession with the Signal folks. I am not nor have I ever been a German Groupie. But I am also not an American or Russian groupie either. All American equipment was not better than it's German counterpart.

Which is what I am seeing from your post ..."It sounds to me like "German stuff is better" wartime Signal magazine propaganda. I've read all the US army official histories and there is no sign of this in them." News flash German stuff was better. If they had made more of it and put fuel in it we wouldn't have won. Period. But we did win. We did it through a combination of attrition and resources. To put it very simply.

And now I am done with this line of reasoning with you. I am not going to change your mind and you certainly aren't going to change mine with the unsupported arguements that you present.

I hope that there has been some informative value to the other members of the forum that have bothered to read us jousting with each other over this issue.

Good Hunting.

Panther Commander

[ May 29, 2004, 08:15 PM: Message edited by: Panther Commander ]

[JasonC]

Ah, so it was trucks cars and motorcycles. If you ever find a census of the 83rd's captured AFVs I'd be interested. At least now I know the unit, so I can look further myself. Thanks.

As for claiming that I have said Germans never had a fuel shortage, straw man fallacy. I said in another thread, not this one, that they did not have serious oil problems until the USAF smashed their hydrogenation plants. Which they did in the summer of 1944.

By the fall the Luftwaffe wasn't flying. By the end of the year fuel was certainly scarce. They had lost the war by then. In the other thread, the issue was whether oil was a decisive consideration in Russia. It wasn't. Not whether they had all the fuel they wanted at the time of the Bulge (when they had already lost).

And as for the Bulge, notice that the operational scale fuel shortages show up as things like inability to commit an additional corps, or local shortages slowing movements. Not as "then 10,000 AFVs ran out of gas and had to be abandoned". They didn't have that many, obviously.

Just as obviously, they lost whole units only when they were cut off (e.g. Peiper) or plain outfought (e.g. 2nd Panzer). They were still running full panzer corps scale local attacks in mid January, to get time for other units to withdraw from the salient, etc.