How Germany could of defeated the S.U. during Barbarossa?

[NameUsedBefore]

UDF, Jason is saying that Germany knew of all the existing Soviet forces. What they didn't expect was the civillian population to come to arms so quickly.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by NameUsedBefore:

UDF, Jason is saying that Germany knew of all the existing Soviet forces. What they didn't expect was the civillian population to come to arms so quickly.

they were not just civilian population suddenly called to arms, they were already trained actual units.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

ok, just to make sure my memory wasn't playing tricks on me i did a quick check. it's already 3AM so just these two quotes from quite different authors have to do.

"Later events proved that the German intelligence analysts had over-emphasized the degree to which the Red Army was concentrated in the forward area, in part due to deliberate Soviet deceptive measures to deter German attack by portraying greater strength forward that was the actual case. In particular, these analysts were totally unaware of the reserve group of armies being formed east of the Dnepr River."

Glantz, When Titans Clashed, p. 33

"The Soviet Army radio security was poor and by the time of the attack in June the German intelligence services had a fairly complete order of battle of all the Soviet units in the frontier area. German communications intelligence, however, could not pick up the Soviet reserve units deep in the interior of the country. This led to a gross miscalculation of the Red Army’s strength. The Germans estimated Soviet strength at 200 divisions a month prior to the attack. In the first six weeks of the war, the Germans already encountered greater than 360 divisions."

Clark, Barbarossa, p. 211

regarding the nature of the mobilized forces:

"By 1 December 1941, the Soviet mobilization system had deployed 97 existing divisions to the west while creating 194 new divisions and 84 separate brigades from the mobilization base. Ten of these new divisions were "People's Volunteers," militant urban workers who, in some cases, lacked the physical stamina and military training necessary to be effective soldiers."

Glantz, When Titans Clashed, p. 68

so total of 10 divisions out of the 291 mobilized divisions and 86 separate brigades might in some cases have consisted of civilians.

[ January 08, 2006, 05:29 PM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]

[JasonC]

Germans knew Russian industrial production, which was no higher than their own.

"whole scale of Soviet tank production totally blew their minds"

The Russians produced more tanks because they bothered to try. When the Germans fully mobilized their own economy, they produced just as many tanks per month as the Russians did. They just didn't get around to doing so until 1944. Why?

Because they were overconfident and dumb, and did not bother pulling out the stops until after Stalingrad, after which it took them some time to ramp output.

Russian industrial production was no higher overall than German industrial production. The myth otherwise is part of the general excuse making German officers in particular have indulged since the war. They try to present the war as one of their stellar quality against overwhelming Russian quantity, and speak of being outnumbered 10 to 1, inflicting 5 to 1 losses on the Russians regularly, but still being overwhelmed.

The problem with this convenient rationalization is that Russia is not ten times as large or as powerful as Germany. In manpower it was larger by a factor of 2 on the day of the invasion, and by no more than 1.5 once they lost the Ukraine. In industry it was no larger, at any time, and in fact smaller once 40% of the country was occupied. Lend lease helped the Russians but only about as much as imports from the rest of Europe helped Germany, each accounted for about 7% of production for each side.

Russia mobilized more manpower and fielded more tanks through mid war, by actually bothering to try as hard as possible. Germany did not exert her full strength until it became clear, as a result of Stalingrad and the losses in 1943, that she would otherwise lose the war.

You are correct that at many times in the 1941 campaign, and even as late as the eve of the Russian counterattack at Stalingrad, the Germans underestimated overall Russian strength and thought they must be running out of forces. This was purely due to measuring Russian performance against their own, not taking into account the fact that they were not exerting themselves. They knew they were inflicting far more losses than they were incurring, and they assumed the Russians must therefore be running out of everything much faster than they were themselves. The possibility that Russian input from mobilization equalled their high loss rate was incredible to them, because they had no high mobilization rate on their own side to compare it to or measure it against. Germany mobilized men and machines about as rapidly in 1944 as Russia did in 1942, producing an army as strong at their own borders as the one they lost in White Russia and France. Fielded forces equal previous minus losses plus newly formed. Since the last was nearly zero for the Germans themselves through mid-war, they overlooked its importance.

As for Germany's "pre-made mobilization plans", there weren't any to speak of, not in economic terms. Speer improvized some plans after replacing Fritz Todt with the latter died in a plane crash. Full implimentation did not happen until 1943. The first full mobilization speech came in February 1943, over 2 months after the initial defeat at Stalingrad. The delay was mostly a matter of command shock.

POL shortages at the front in Russia were local and temporary, and frequently maintenance issues

(insufficient motor oil leading to higher engine wear) caused by pushing the tanks as hard as possible, trying to win as rapidly as possible. They were not absolute shortages of diesel. In the far south in 1942, because they had advanced several hundred miles beyond all railheads in a short period of time, they did face some absolute fuel shortages, which were transport related. Trucks simply ate up a lot of the fuel they could carry, moving stuff such long distances. The same thing happened to the western allies in France during the breakout. No fuel supply system in history has ever kept up with advances so rapid, without temporary shortages of fuel at the farthest tips of the advance. That is all it was, and it cleared up as soon as the front stabilized for a month or so. Tanks fighting in Stalingrad had no fuel difficulties, for example (until surrounded that is).

I notice you do not answer the question, why couldn't the Germans match the Russian logistic achievement?

That they didn't, we all know. That they could have, we know by looking at their own 1944 production achievements, even under heavy bombing and collapsing fronts.

Between the ability and the achievement, falls the execution. As well as the prior judgment that it will matter. The Germans screwed the pooch on both.

[ January 09, 2006, 10:17 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JasonC]

URD - hopeless misreading. Glantz says reserve armies *forming* east of the Dnepr. They weren't forming before the invasion, they started forming them after. Before that they did not know they were going to be at war.

If you go through Glantz's actual narrative, you will find the Russians are forming fresh armies monthly and deploying them right in their zones of formation, ahead of the main German lines of advance. This was not some missing army of the interior in the Russian order of battle on the day of the invasion, that the Germans did not know about. On the contrary, they were entirely new formations created from scratch between the collapse of the first line positions and the arrival of the Germans at their formation points.

Clark says "in the first six weeks". The extra armies the Germans did not know about formed in those six weeks. Russia mobilized 1 million men per month throughout the 1941 campaign. A month and a half is 1.5 million men. The whole force was a flow not a stock, that was the German misunderstanding.

People's this and that and worker brigades were close defense groups for urban areas. Lots of others worked on digging trenches and the like. But the millions of men mobilized throughout the late summer and fall were civilians on the day of the invasion, and soldiers when they faced the Germans.

The way you go from one to the other is you are put on a train, sent to a depot, issued a uniform and a rifle and given the most cursory training over the course of a week or two, then railed to the front. Those reserve armies in the interior formed at a rate of a million men per month, remember? They weren't going through 6 month training routines.

When the Germans had to produce fresh armies to hold at the edge of Germany and in Poland after the twin collapses of White Russia and France, they pulled out their rear area manpower stops. Naval personnel, Luftwaffe ground crews, workers previously given exemptions, and teenagers were whipped through training courses, given MPs and fausts, and shipped off to the fronts.

They had more training than the Russians of 1941 did. But that is what real mobilization does - it unlocks a continual stream of civilians becoming soldiers, in millions, and throws that stream into the fight. That's on the manpower side. On the production side, it means every factory in the country that can, makes armaments and nothing but armaments, running 24 hours a day to do so. Which equip that stream of civilians and make whole armies.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Germans knew Russian industrial production, which was no higher than their own.

they certainly did not know their military armamed production levels. it was a huge surprise. you can try to spin this all you want, but that is the basic fact.

The Russians produced more tanks because they bothered to try. When the Germans fully mobilized their own economy, they produced just as many tanks per month as the Russians did. They just didn't get around to doing so until 1944. Why?

because they didn't know full Soviet strength.

Because they were overconfident and dumb, and did not bother pulling out the stops until after Stalingrad, after which it took them some time to ramp output.

their self-confidence was warranted, as was proven both in 1941 and 1942. their failure laid in the fields of strategic intelligence and logistics.

Russian industrial production was no higher overall than German industrial production. The myth otherwise is part of the general excuse making German officers in particular have indulged since the war. They try to present the war as one of their stellar quality against overwhelming Russian quantity, and speak of being outnumbered 10 to 1, inflicting 5 to 1 losses on the Russians regularly, but still being overwhelmed.

totally irrelevant. it has nothing to do with what i have written.

The problem with this convenient rationalization is that Russia is not ten times as large or as powerful as Germany. In manpower it was larger by a factor of 2 on the day of the invasion, and by no more than 1.5 once they lost the Ukraine. In industry it was no larger, at any time, and in fact smaller once 40% of the country was occupied. Lend lease helped the Russians but only about as much as imports from the rest of Europe helped Germany, each accounted for about 7% of production for each side.

it has absolutely nothing to do with what i have written. Germans did not know full Soviet strength.

Russia mobilized more manpower and fielded more tanks through mid war, by actually bothering to try as hard as possible. Germany did not exert her full strength until it became clear, as a result of Stalingrad and the losses in 1943, that she would otherwise lose the war.

exactly.

You are correct that at many times in the 1941 campaign, and even as late as the eve of the Russian counterattack at Stalingrad, the Germans underestimated overall Russian strength and thought they must be running out of forces. This was purely due to measuring Russian performance against their own, not taking into account the fact that they were not exerting themselves. They knew they were inflicting far more losses than they were incurring, and they assumed the Russians must therefore be running out of everything much faster than they were themselves. The possibility that Russian input from mobilization equalled their high loss rate was incredible to them, because they had no high mobilization rate on their own side to compare it to or measure it against. Germany mobilized men and machines about as rapidly in 1944 as Russia did in 1942, producing an army as strong at their own borders as the one they lost in White Russia and France. Fielded forces equal previous minus losses plus newly formed. Since the last was nearly zero for the Germans themselves through mid-war, they overlooked its importance.

yes, Germans did not know full Soviet strength.

As for Germany's "pre-made mobilization plans", there weren't any to speak of, not in economic terms. Speer improvized some plans after replacing Fritz Todt with the latter died in a plane crash. Full implimentation did not happen until 1943. The first full mobilization speech came in February 1943, over 2 months after the initial defeat at Stalingrad. The delay was mostly a matter of command shock.

there were pre-made mobilization plans and Germany shifted to total war mobilization before 1943. mobilization was however half-hearted until Germans realized that they had underestimated Soviet strength and USSR was not about to run out of forces.

POL shortages at the front in Russia were local and temporary, and frequently maintenance issues

(insufficient motor oil leading to higher engine wear) caused by pushing the tanks as hard as possible, trying to win as rapidly as possible. They were not absolute shortages of diesel. In the far south in 1942, because they had advanced several hundred miles beyond all railheads in a short period of time, they did face some absolute fuel shortages, which were transport related. Trucks simply ate up a lot of the fuel they could carry, moving stuff such long distances. The same thing happened to the western allies in France during the breakout. No fuel supply system in history has ever kept up with advances so rapid, without temporary shortages of fuel at the farthest tips of the advance. That is all it was, and it cleared up as soon as the front stabilized for a month or so. Tanks fighting in Stalingrad had no fuel difficulties, for example (until surrounded that is).

German logistical system almost collapsed in 1941. more tanks would only have made it worse. the problem was not insufficient production but insufficient strategic transportation.

I notice you do not answer the question, why couldn't the Germans match the Russian logistic achievement?

i didn't answer it because it seemed to me you were being nothing but anal, as through this whole thread my point has been that the greatest German failure was on the field of logistics, especially strategic transportation and more specifically railroad transportation.

the single most important reason why Germans failed to achieve their plans regarding Russian railroads was that they didn't capture as many Soviet trains that they had calculated and because troops responsible for converting railroads etc were not strong enough and they weren't given enough priority. the problem was made worse by the fact that Germans didn't know how to run trains in the extraordinary weather of winter 1941 - many of their trains simply broke or blew up. there were other screw-ups related to this, especially the actual bottleneck of moving supplies from "German trains" to "Soviet trains", but the above is enough for now.

Germans screwed it up gigantically. logistics was their great weakness thru the war.

That they didn't, we all know. That they could have, we know by looking at their own 1944 production achievements, even under heavy bombing and collapsing fronts.

production had nothing to do with the failure of their logistics in 1941.

[ January 09, 2006, 02:21 PM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by JasonC:

URD - hopeless misreading. Glantz says reserve armies *forming* east of the Dnepr. They weren't forming before the invasion, they started forming them after. Before that they did not know they were going to be at war.

dear Jason, you must be well aware that Soviets had been mobilizing these reserves already months before the German invasion. that the mobilization wasn't fully complete by the time of German invasion is totally irrelevant. and it is not just these mobilized reserves that Germans didn't know about. perhaps most revealing is that Germans knew only about 3 of the 16 Soviet Mechanized Corps. like Glantz writes, the surprise that Soviets had such units must have been almost as big surprise to the Germans as the existence of such Soviet tanks like T-34 and KV.

it is a well documented fact that Germans didn't know full Soviet strength. that you keep arguing against it is nothing but silly. that you do it consciously just to cling to your own thesis "Germans lost because they didn't bother to try" is frankly quite pathetic.

If you go through Glantz's actual narrative, you will find the Russians are forming fresh armies monthly and deploying them right in their zones of formation, ahead of the main German lines of advance. This was not some missing army of the interior in the Russian order of battle on the day of the invasion, that the Germans did not know about. On the contrary, they were entirely new formations created from scratch between the collapse of the first line positions and the arrival of the Germans at their formation points.

yes, i am well aware of this, thank you. i have already explained this myself earlier in this thread. it was not only the full Soviet mobilization strength that Germans did not know, they also did not know the full strenght of fielded Soviet units.

that you try to "point out" this as some kind of counter-argument is beyond me. it's not as if this Soviet mobilization capacity was not part of their military strength.

Clark says "in the first six weeks". The extra armies the Germans did not know about formed in those six weeks. Russia mobilized 1 million men per month throughout the 1941 campaign. A month and a half is 1.5 million men. The whole force was a flow not a stock, that was the German misunderstanding.

yes, they did underestimate Soviet capacity to mobilize their reserves and this was in the end more crucial than the underestimation of the initial Soviet divisions. however the extra armies were not all formed in those six weeks.

People's this and that and worker brigades were close defense groups for urban areas. Lots of others worked on digging trenches and the like.

yep.

But the millions of men mobilized throughout the late summer and fall were civilians on the day of the invasion, and soldiers when they faced the Germans.

you totally miss it that Soviets had begun mobilizing their reserves already before German invasion. not all of these had yet been completed or deployed by the time Germans invaded, but it is has nothing to do with this.

[JasonC]

"Germany shifted to total war mobilization before 1943"

Just plain wrong, like most of what you say. The first calls from the government to civilian industry for it were made in February 1943. You can look up the speeches.

Why did the Germans fail so dismally, logistically? Because they did not allocate the resources to it, did not call for them, did not plan on a long war, etc.

When you expect the campaign to be over in 3-6 months, you don't bother investing in increased thruput for transport links that will only operate for the last 2 of those months. You don't think it will matter, and push everything forward. When instead you correctly estimate the war will last years, you invest in things that pay off 6, 9, or 12 months later as a matter of course.

There is nothing magical about a Russian freight car. Germany made freight cars just fine. Any number could have been ordered beforehand, if they thought the war was going to last long enough to make it worthwhile to have them. You'd have to give up something else - like a pre-war civilian standard of living and short working hours for men only. But you'd get them.

On mobilizations, the Russians did have men being called up from May onward, but at only half the rate they reached once the war started. The main flow is after the invasion.

In July they formed 7 new armies, all on the Moscow axis. In August they formed 12 new armies - 4 for the Leningrad axis, 2 for the southern end of teh line in front of Moscow, 5 for the Ukraine, and 1 for the Crimea.

That August surge to 12 armies came from accelerating the training to practically none, and was effectively borrowed from September and October. September saw 3 new armies formed, 2 for Leningrad and 1 for the Ukraine, while October added 4 more, 2 for Moscow and 2 for Ukraine.

In November and December the rate was back to normal, with 11 armies over the two months combined, 3 to make a new line east of Leningrad, 1 for the far south, and the rest all in front of Moscow.

In all there are 37 new armies in the field July to December, average 6 per month. There were 7 in process of formation from the May wave at the time of the invasion. The overall process was simply a flow not a stock - emphatically not a one-off bump from pre-war mobilized manpower the Germans didn't know about.

If the Russians raise 44 armies after the German decision to invade to the end of the battle of Moscow, where are the 22 new German armies to match them, even supposing they can only mobilize half as many from a lower population base? The Germans knew sooner, they had more lead time. They had lower losses and less disruption.

Want to talk about logistical difficulties? Try fielding 44 armies in 6 months while losing half your country and your whole pre-war force. The Russians would have crawled on their knees to have only the logistical difficulties the Germans faced.

As for Russian mech, it was worse than useless. Every mech corp evaporates on contact within days. Leaving gapping holes, because it was unexpected and other units relied on them.

[NameUsedBefore]

JasonC is right. Look at the production around 1944. You have factories that have been or being flattened still reaching and going past qoutas that were substantially higher than the ones in 1940/1941 (or ones at all, as some factories were only recently switched to military production).

[NameUsedBefore]

" As for Russian mech, it was worse than useless. Every mech corp evaporates on contact within days. Leaving gapping holes, because it was unexpected and other units relied on them. "

I remember reading somewhere about an entire mech division getting lost into some marshes because of an inept commander. Eventually the entire division was completely terminated wandering about through German lines. Isn't there some memoirs of some of the commanders commenting on how they'd send a mech division then ask for its status and then learn, after mere days of sending the division forward, that it had already been anniahlated (sp)?

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Just plain wrong, like most of what you say. The first calls from the government to civilian industry for it were made in February 1943. You can look up the speeches.

i believe Overy et al have shown that German government indeed made calls for civilian industry already before Göring gave his speech and Speer took control of economy.

Why did the Germans fail so dismally, logistically? Because they did not allocate the resources to it, did not call for them, did not plan on a long war, etc.

yeah they did not expect USSR to be as strong as it turned out to be.

btw, again, i think Overy has shown that Germans indeed did plan for a long war. just not with USSR.

i realize that you must be the blood enemy of Overy's since his stance is the opposite of yours: Hitler thought of war mostly from viewpoint of economics.

regarding logistics you again give non-concrete idealistic reasons for Germany's performance. you ignore actual known historical reasons why their plans failed and pretend they didn't have any plans at all. just like you pretend that Germans would have known full Soviet strength but just didn't care about it.

There is nothing magical about a Russian freight car. Germany made freight cars just fine. Any number could have been ordered beforehand, if they thought the war was going to last long enough to make it worthwhile to have them. You'd have to give up something else - like a pre-war civilian standard of living and short working hours for men only. But you'd get them.

it were not the freight cars that caused the problems, it were the locomotives (or whatever the proper english term).

On mobilizations, the Russians did have men being called up from May onward, but at only half the rate they reached once the war started. The main flow is after the invasion.

this is totally irrelevant. why do you keep on writing again and again this same stuff? it's not like i would disagree with it or that it would be a counter-argument to my point. i have expressed this very idea from the very beginning of this thread.

[NameUsedBefore]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

[QB]

Look into the Finnish campaign...?

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by NameUsedBefore:

Look into the Finnish campaign...?

what do you mean?

it is a well established historical fact that Germans did not know the full Soviet strength. JasonC is just being anal and doesn't want to admit that his revisionist version of history is based on a fundamental logical error.

[NameUsedBefore]

I'm saying that the Germans had a pretty good idea of what the Russians had, but after the Finnish campaign/debacle, they took it with a grain of salt. Also note the purges which took out most of Russia's outstanding officers and the military-reformation.

[Kapitanherr]

I once wrote a report as a military reservist concerning the logistical and supply issues on the Eastern Front. My inescapable conclusion after reading all of the sources mentioned in the various threads, the diaries of commanders in each of the three major attack fronts and recent commentary, was that the blitzkrieg, under any circumstances, couldn't succeed in Russia. Some of the German military leaders appreciated this fact. Admiral Rehder was extremely outspoken, and nearly lost his job early on. Hitler had already purged other perceived dissidents such as Fritsch and Blomberg, and kept more compliant Army leaders. Paulus, who would later command the 6th Army in defeat at Stalingrad, had authored a report that the Germans would exhaust supplies at Smolensk, and another Army report, startingly accurate, indicated there would be 250,000 German casualties at that point. (No one predicted that there would be 500,000 more by the end of 1941.) All of this was ignored by Hitler who baffled and thwarted his few remaining protagonists. Guderian himself had a better comprehension of Russian capabilities when he announced in the Fuhrer's presence that there were 10,000 enemy tanks on the border, but this too was discounted. Furthermore, it had already been startling to find that some French tank armour had already defeated German tank and antitank guns. Hitler knew this and had ordered the armour to be upgunned; however, this had not happened because of inefficiency and short timetables for which the Fuhrer himself can only be blamed. Ammunition shortages were occasioned by the number of hits (sometimes over 100 on a BT-7 tank) required for a kill, and tungsten HEAT or HEAP shells (which would allow a 37mm AT gun to easily defeat a T-34) were often in short supply. In the Center and South, the inability to easily defeat Russian armour was decisive.

I also analyzed the relative balance of forces. By totalling the German units that had to be shifted to other sectors to stave off Red Army counterattacks, it was possible to estimate that Moscow could have been taken by sustained effort, if 175,000 more troops and approximately 900 more tanks had been available. However, it likely would only have been enveloped, and the inevitable Russian counterattack would likely have broken into the city once again. The major benefit to the Germans would have been the capture of the major rail crossings which lay some 100 kilometers to the east, and this would have disrupted supply shipments from Murmansk and troop movements about the Moscow area. This would have prolonged the war,in my view, but would not have been decisive. The increased numbers of troops could have been obtained with sufficient time for training from Goehring's ill-fated Luftwaffe divisions, which wound up fighting useless battles after the turning point had already been reached. However, there was no way to increase the number of AFV's since Hitler (supposedly to avoid tipping off Stalin) refused to order the economy to war footing.

Additionally, Manstein's tanks, after taking the Dvina bridges, should have been directed eastword toward Veliki Luki, which would have removed the pressure from the north on Bock's sector. As it was, Manstein's Corps was hopelessly bogged in swampy terrain and forest, doing little during the crucial parts of the campaign. Leaving two battalions of tanks to act as Kampfgruppe would have sufficed in the North.

However interesting, these analyses do not resolve the German's dilemma, the lack of logistical and support systems for such a conflict. The other major conclusion I reached was that the German General Staff, in many ways ahead of its time and essential in the conduct of combined arms warfare, was an utter failure in planning Barbarossa. It had lacked the resolve to oppose the leadership changes ordered by Hitler, which were improper, scandalous and violated protocol. It failed in its duty to itself to prepare to conduct a military operation in a way that maximized the chances for success, and it failed in its feeble efforts to oppose Hitler's naive war schemes.

[Krautman]

Originally posted by JasonC:

When the Germans fully mobilized their own economy, they produced just as many tanks per month as the Russians did. They just didn't get around to doing so until 1944. Why?

Because they were overconfident and dumb, and did not bother pulling out the stops until after Stalingrad, after which it took them some time to ramp output.

Probably it was not only overconfidence and stupidity. Götz Aly characterises NS Germany as a "Gefälligkeitsdiktatur" (~"dictatorship of accomodation"), meaning that Hitler based his reign on keeping people at bay by offering a limited amount of luxury, social security etc. Therefore the late shift to wartime production had a certain reason from Hitler's perspective.

Greetings

Krautman

[JasonC]

the number of hits (sometimes over 100 on a BT-7 tank) required for a kill,

Almost certainly a mis-Ided T-34. The Germans did not know about them, so ID would be difficult. They look close enough, besides overall size. And it is utterly unbelievable that 100 AP rounds would hit a thin tin can like a BT-7 and not wreck it. While it is perfectly believable that a T-34 might be hit that number of times, from hail fire from a panzer company e.g.

“and tungsten HEAT or HEAP shells (which would allow a 37mm AT gun to easily defeat a T-34) were often in short supply.”

Easily? Horsefeathers. If it were easy, they would have stuck with 37mm PAK all war. The 37mm PAK was nearly useless, and that had almost nothing to do with ammo. It took long 50s with APCR to hurt T-34s reliably, or long 75mm with plain AP.

“In the Center and South, the inability to easily defeat Russian armour was decisive.”

Nonsense. All the pre-war mech formations evaporate on contact, usually within days. The longest delay they occasioned was about 3 days for AG South at one point. By the end of July, the net contribution of the entire Russian mech arm to the war is negative. They would have been better off not relying on such formations to plug holes etc, and sending infantry formations instead.

The disfunctionality of Russian mech in 1941 was not a matter of technical specs, but of technical readiness and combat service and support. The Russians were simply utterly unable to operate large 1000 vehicle mechanized corps, to plan or coordinate their movements, to keep them supplied, to do ordinary maintenance on vehicles with the most minor defects.

Later in the fighting on the approaches to Moscow, one can find single incidents that held up a lone panzer division or corps, for a few days to a week. While all the others galloped ahead. Even those eventually went the same way, as Germans turned positions and the Russians were unable to sustain armored forces in action, above brigade size, - and usually less than even that.

The Russian counterattacks in front of Moscow succeed as pure infantry affairs. Their edge came from off road mobility, better ability to adapt to winter, and an increase in the importance of simple manpower numbers as the weather deteriorated and all vehicles broke down. It was skis brigades and cavalry and RDs infiltrating through forests and frozen marsh areas, that cut roads and encircled towns and villages. Tanks had nothing to do with it.

As for Murmansk, if it is cut the supplies take a little longer to get to the front via Iran, but LL still gets there. There was nothing decisive in Moscow or close to it. The Russian army would continue to fight, and if the Germans don’t inflict upward of a million losses per month on it, to grow. There was no prospect of keeping loss rates that high through continued German offensives all winter. (The Russians obviously can pick the loss rate they can handle, if the Germans go over to defense).

As for the statement that “there was no way to increase tank production”, it is utter nonsense. The reason given is “because Hitler wouldn’t order it” – that’s impossibility? Then what does willful choice look like? As for the supposed reason, “to avoid tipping off the Russians”, um, that kinda ceases to operate on June 22. They still didn’t ramp tank production. They were switching factories from army equipment to u-boats in August, because they thought they had already won.

As for the idea that the Germans had to keep civilian production high for political reasons, it is also transparent nonsense. They faced no significant civilian opposition at any time in the entire war. They had the largest police forces in history, willing to do the most horrible things. The populace in fact withstood years of blockade and massive bombing without a murmur. There was political opposition only within the army, and extra consumer goods could not reduce it in the slightest – while actual victory in Russia obviously would help do so.

I do not understand why some people apparently feel compelled to make excuses for Hitler and his mistakes. It strikes me as pathological. The common sense explanation is clear and decidedly simpler – he just got cocky and blew it. End of story.

[Keith]

Kapitanherr makes some excellent points. His analysis of the failures of German planning and the collapse of the German logistical network is spot on and is also supported in the book "War Without Garlands" by Robert Kershaw. These mistakes were made again when Rommel pushed onto Alamein in 1942 and again in the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans had no grasp for getting beans and bullets to their front-line troops. America might not have had the best tacticians, but it had the best logisticans, which ultimately prooved the decisive factor.

[Krautman]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for the idea that the Germans had to keep civilian production high for political reasons, it is also transparent nonsense. They faced no significant civilian opposition at any time in the entire war.

Yes, but why? Hitler was clearly afraid of a situation like 1917/18. Why else would he come up with all this KdF stuff, with the "Schlepperlass", with the "Judenbuße" and all that, if consumer goods weren't necessary in his opinion to back up the morale? The reason why the germans never really opposed him on a large scale is subject to whole generations of historians. Your opinion might be just that, an opinion.

Originally posted by JasonC:

I do not understand why some people apparently feel compelled to make excuses for Hitler and his mistakes. It strikes me as pathological.

Some people here really like alluding to other forum members as Nazi apologists; that's almost becoming a running gag.

I understand from some previous post of yours ("Kursk anniversary" thread et al.) that you are extremely anti-Nazi and get emotional pretty quick discussing these topics. That's ok for you, but here and now you are the one being pathological. Saying that Hitler seduced the Germans with a certain amount of luxury is in no way an excuse for his mistakes. Alluding to Götz Aly as a Nazi apologist is just silly. I went to a lecture of his. He was furiously attacked (verbally) by some old people who felt insulted: To them, they were the poor innocent Germans seduced by a mighty charming Führer (See Hans-Ulrich Wehler's theory of the "Führerstaat"), but then Aly came and said many Germans willingly accepted the darker side of the NS regime so they could benefit from the financial advantages. A sound theory, I would think, and supported by ample evidence, which Aly collected in ~15 years of meticulous research. Would you call that making excuses for Hitler? You said it yourself- the workers in German factories had a good life compared to their Allied colleagues. Women did not work in factories generally. Do you think Hitler ordered this out of concern for the poor workman/-woman? As you know, he was a heartless nihilistic misanthrope, an "un-person" (Joachim Fest).

You know, as is frequently mentioned, your posts are usually interesting and instructive. Discussing with you would be much more enjoyable if you accepted other people's opinion and tried to give evidence for yours (there e.g. is considerable evidence against Aly's theory) instead of something like this:

Originally posted by JasonC:

The common sense explanation is clear and decidedly simpler – he just got cocky and blew it. End of story.

By the way- You actually sound a little bit like Wehler there...

Greetings, and thanks for the Red Army training scenarios

Krautman

[JasonC]

Pretending that Germany lost the war in Russia because it had no choice but to bribe the people and therefore could not have done the elementary thing and ordered economic mobilization - at the latest the day of the attack - is indeed making excuses for stupid leaders who wrecked the country through their arrogance.

Hitler was stooopid. Wrap your mind around the concept. Betting on lipstick as more critical than Panzers the day you attack Russia is stoooopid. Driveling, slobbering, pride rotted the brain idiotic. Your average twelve year old would have shown more sense.

[Richie]

Jason's right.

From what I've read Hitler had a tendency not to listen to advice given by generals and field marshals if the news was bad. Sacking the bearer and installing yes men doesn't inherently change the situation at the front. It proves you're out of touch with reality.

It reaches a point where those around realise. People start to have their own crazy ideas like trying to blow you up with briefcase bombs...

[ January 20, 2006, 06:44 PM: Message edited by: Richie ]

[Kapitanherr]

To Jason,

As I'm sure you have already considered, the ideas was not to confound the German citizenry, but to allow Stalin to think he was safe from attack in 1941. As it turned out, Hitler picked just the right time to attack, before the Red Army had been rebuilt. (By the way, attacking earlier doesn't help -- just gets the tanks stuck in the spring thaw, and still doesn't permanently capture Moscow, etc.) Hitler was also correct in surmising that Stalin had adequate military and economic intelligence that would have hurried his preparations if, for example, he had discovered that Germany had switched to a war economy. Even as it was, Stalin had mobilized 2nd echelon forces and gotten them moving toward the Dnepr in May. (!)

Why didn't Hitler switch to a war economy in June? Because it would have been too late to make a difference in the conduct of blitzkrieg. It was counterintuitive in making his "sales pitch" to his generals to tell them that the war would be over by the end of summer, but to be safe, why not build another couple thousand tanks. I wouldn't have bought it, would you?

[JasonC]

Horsefeather all around. Of course it would have made a difference, that is the whole bleeding point. Germany bet the farm on a walkover and lost the farm. Which was completely and utterly brainless. Every general knows you can hope for the best case, but you don't plan everything on everything going perfectly, or you die. And once again we see no insult to the Fuhrer can pass for 12 hours without another idiot stepping up to the plate to defend his entirely imaginary foresight and brilliance. People think I am making this up. Try it yourself and see. The issue doesn't matter, the forum doesn't matter, they will crawl out of the woodwork and descend from the rafters if necessary (the latest joined here 2 days ago), but never ever for their life admit Hitler did something stupid that lost a winnable war.

[Richie]

Let's look at Hitler prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union.

You are the Maniacle Dictator in a country where the people you like love you. The people you hate are being murdered in a way the people who like you don't notice. The people who love you have all the guns and do your bidding.

You have invaded every neighbour you have and won and subjugated the populace for the most part, bar England and some trouble in Africa. France is now your back yard playground. Despite the fact you didn't beat the English you can send them hatemail till they've had enough and come around to your way of thinking. You're not at war with the U.S. Japan is Allied with you. That leaves the Soviet Union.

Hell, it's a gamble but intelligence tells you they've gutted their armies. "Kick in the door and the whole rotten house will fall down!"

It worked with everyone else... they are Communists after all!

Total domination of Europe and Asia. You're on a crusade. You are building The Thousand Year Reich. It is your destiny...

You cannot lose!

How does that sound? After a while it's going to get to you isn't it? You'd be feeling pretty good! You'd be thinking you can do no wrong. You'd think you really are the man...

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

I believe Krautman makes an excellent point, one getting more and more overt discussion BTW: Hitler deliberately chose not to put the German economy on a war footing, for he feared losing the support of the German people, now accustomed to conquering whole countries in weeks without major impact on themselves personally. Thus, he did in the early 1940s what LBJ did so disastrously regarding the Vietnam War decades later, tried to have guns and butter at the same time. In neither case was the plan successful, and Hitler's delay in properly mobilizing the economy for war cost him and his troops dearly, while Johnson wreaked havoc on the economy via huge deficits (didn't want to raise taxes) and made such a hash of things that he didn't dare run for reelection.

Regards,

John Kettler