How Germany could of defeated the S.U. during Barbarossa?

[JasonC]

Encirclement is a tactic, but not a new one. (How did the Germans win the Franco-Prussian war?)

Moving to flanks first requires that there be flanks, which since 1914 has been the trick. Breakthrough, on the other hand, isn't encirlement. The breakthrough at Sedan, as an example, had to be created by infantry because tanks couldn't cross the Meuse until somebody friendly held the far bank.

Last, plenty of powers used massed tanks but conspicuously failed with them, because that isn't actually a winning formula. It is trumped by gun fronts. Knightsbridge may serve as an example. It was actually a good way to lose a whole armor brigade in one afternoon.

The Germans did have an organizational and doctrinal innovation - motorized combined arms support for tanks, subordinated to the tanks. Instead of tanks operating on their own, or combined arms tank support of largely infantry formations.

Actually the French did that too, but only with a modest portion of their force (the light mech divisions), with others very tank heavy and others supporting infantry.

If you go to the critical bits of the 1940 campaign, though, you find things like French armor brigade attacks German infantry division, result nothing. While German tank regiment attacks French infantry division, result breakthrough. It isn't explained by what the higher ups thought they were trying to do. Parallel efforts do not give parallel results.

This reaches an extreme in 1941 Russian, where German mech corps hits Russian infantry, result Russians evaporate and German mech corps is loose in the operational rear, while the reverse - Russian mech corps with 1000 tanks hits German infantry division, result Russian mech corps evaporates in less than a week.

[LongLeftFlank]

Very nice, crisp recap of the Iraq campaign, Jason, although I'd hate to explain it to someone who just lost their kid there.

But isn't that the key question though, irrespective of whether our army can be defeated or even bloodied in the field? It would seem that the West puts a lot higher premium on the blood of our soldiers than we ever did before.

And that -- as always -- is the theory that the West's enemies has counted on:

(a) That their troops are more willing to die than ours.

( Kill a bunch of US troops at one time -- a short sharp shock -- and their squeamish politicians pull the plug. Witness Beirut 1983, Mogadishu 1991... Arguably, Tet 1968, Chosin 1950.

In WWII of course, only assumption (a) turned out to be true in practice...

In 1941, Germany and Japan were convinced that Sturm und Drang / the Bushido code, plus Morgenthau bankers (or was it "Jew-communist" labour unions) stabbing the so-called arsenal of democracy in the back at home, would force the inept, decadent Yanks to sue for peace after the first reversals. The popularity of the America First and other communist and noncommunist backed peace movements seemed to confirm this belief.

Pearl... Bataan... U-boat "Second Happy Time".... Kasserine.... Schweinfurt. Hmm, inept, cowardly Yanks haven't caved yet. Bummer.

Of course, American authorities were worried enough about public morale that it wasn't until Tarawa that pictures of American dead were allowed to be shown in the press. And there were also the "Why We Fight" and related agitprop, just to make sure we all knew why it was worth it.

Contrast today, where every drop of blood spilled -- however tiny from a military history point of view -- is meticulously tallied, and where possible, photographed in real time for the consumption of our profoundly visually-motivated species.

And a US administration which has been unable to articulate/sell a "why we fight" either domestically or internationally in spite of its: (Insert Your Bias Here) [ clearheaded and honorable / hopelessly naive / evil and corrupt / controlled by Nazi aliens and the Illuminati ] intentions. But that's politics... Let's stick to the Lessons of History.

[Andreas]

Back on topic, I rather enjoyed Valeri Popatov's spirited rebuttal of that Rezun non-sense.

The failed Historian

All the best

Andreas

[Bigduke6]

I am of the opinion Rezun's entire literary career, such as it was, was financed by the CIA and/or MI-6. He defected, and the spy agencies made him into a samizdat sausage-making machine. What a creep.

Originally posted by Andreas:

Back on topic, I rather enjoyed Valeri Popatov's spirited rebuttal of that Rezun non-sense.

The failed Historian

All the best

Andreas

[Dandelion]

Originally posted by LongLeftFlank:

[snips]In 1941, Germany and Japan were convinced that Sturm und Drang[---][snips]

Aherm. Not wishing to lend the impression that I failed to identify the actual point of your post, I still feel the term Sturm und Drang is given no justice in this use, thus warranting the rewarding of this minute detail with a trifle further attention.

That term, taken from classical German literature as it is, is a liberal term not at all in very much favour in Germany of 1941, in spite of it's martial ring. The "Sturm" does not mean assault, but storm. And the "Drang" has another meaning (namely stress) than the same word in "Drang nach Osten" (inner drive, or perhaps urge or longing, to and for the East).

It refers to a movement among authors of the 18th century, characterised by youthful rebellion against accepted standards, and rather vehement rejection of convention and authority. Although the movement included such German lionised icons as Goethe and Schiller - and the Nazis revered all national icons as a matter of principle - the notion of rebellion and uproar was viewed upon with notorious suspicion by the Nazis once they had obtained power.

In colloquial language, refering to a persons Sturm und Drang would normally mean somebodys youthful and unruly years, when he or she acted against convention and norm, intentionally or not. Most middle aged people, in Germany at least, flatter themselves by stating they have had such a period of their lives. Perhaps since the alternative might too much resemble the Untertan - another excellent piece of German literature.

Sincerely

Dandelion

[Andreas]

More debunking of Rezun:

In closing, the following should be said. Soviet history is rich in events requiring in-depth analysis and in some instances a critical review. A researcher who raises such questions assumes a great intellectual, political, and moral responsibility. In addition to a deep understanding of the subject of study, he should possess an analytical mind and elementary decency. In his book Ledokol, Viktor Rezun has shown none of these qualities.

Military Thought Journal

BTW - when the expression 'Sturm und Drang' is used in the way Dandelion describes it in his last para, it is often meant in an ironic way. Just to make that clear to our Danish readers.

All the best

Andreas

[LightningWar]

I didnt have the time to read all 11 pages but one thing that is interesting about a possible Soviet Invasion is what would the British and Americans do if it happened in 1943 and the Soviets were successful in pushing the Germans around?

I dont think we were in a position to invade Western Europe and could we possibly broker a peace with the Nazi regime and fight alongside them?

Or would we allow the Soviets to take up all of Europe and put up an Iron Curtain? Would we stand for that? Especially if France changed occupiers from Nazi to Communist?

These topics are interesting and fun to dicuss because of the whatif mentality.

And I apologize if this topic was brought up earlier in this thread. I dont have the time to sit down and read 11 pages

[JasonC]

If Hitler invaded hell, I'd find something nice to say about the devil in the House of Commons. Said Churchill. There was no prospect whatever at any time, not even remotely, of the western allies ever siding in any way shape matter or form, with Hitler. If the Russians win bigger they win bigger, but Germany loses. Frankly, the Russians won pretty darn big as it was. And nobody batted an eye.

[Corvidae]

Can we finaly close and lock this absurd topic ?

It has gotten to the point of being just sad ,,

Its not even pathetic anymore , just sad

[Grimly Fiendish]

Jason, sorry I didn't read any of your responses until just now. I went skiing and then I kind of lost interest. But I think I have to answer if for no other reason than that you seem to think the way to win an argument is by shouting, and I will not be shouted off a thread. I remain firmly convinced that Barbarossa and OIF share enough similarities for a superficial but useful discussion of the whys and hows, and that only partisan blindness could prevent one from acknowledging this. I'll respond to each of your posts individually.

(1) You complained that I have introduced politics into the discussion. Naturally, there are always political considerations when you seek to invade and control another country, and so political questions were present in this thread from the beginning. Yet you, not I, were the first to mention contemporary politics and political parties outside a strictly operational context: "Dems pathetic attempts to make mountains out of molehills . . . ."

Your own politics were predictable from your previous posts, especially because of the way you argue. In fact, I think you argue this way because you think political arguments are won that way, and that this is a political argument, as though politics are always irrational and military planning is always objective. That's not a very productive approach to any topic, as you rightly point out, especially a thread about a historical military operation with uniquely perverse political goals.

By the way, I don't really accept the desire to conquer as "normal." Invasions can only be justified by political ends, and I originally sought to question Hitler's, rather than simply accept them.

Plenty of big-name conservatives think Iraq is lost. Stick your head up and look around and you'll see. But what I was hoping to get here in response to my hypothesis was an objective, apolitcal analysis, and I still haven't seen it.

(2) Your summary of events since 2003 strikes me as fairly accurate. However, I find it curious that you introduce your remarks as "military matters" and then focus almost exclusively on media matters. In any case, your post serves only to highlight differences between Barbarossa and Iraqi Freedom, while ignoring every single one of my questions about the similarities. Bravo!

(3) Again, accurate but irrelevant. I never mentioned defeat. I pointed to evidence of lack of planning. Yes, casualties were low and remain low, although the media only count fatalities and much of the reduction in fatalities is owed not to superior military prowess or technology but to better medical technology: all those amputees would have been dead 60 years ago.

Also, casualties should properly be compared with the number of people needed to complete an operation, not worst-case scenarios based on hype and poor—or skewed—intelligence. For example, sending 500,000 men into Russia expecting 250,000 casualties and at the same time to win would be, uh, a little optimistic, I think, unless you hopelessly outnumber your enemy. That's the arithmetic you should be doing. It's also possible to actually determine the cause of casualties and whether they were avoidable. The difference here is between casualties under as-good-as-can-be-expected conditions vs casualties from simple criminal failure to properly supply or plan.

Note that, even had Barbarossa succeeded, the Germans would still have had to occupy the pacified areas and continue operations in unpacified areas—IN WINTER. You don't patrol even a peaceful Moscow without a coat. That's the kind of hopeless optimism I am pointing out.

(4) Your fourth post sees you foaming at the mouth again. I'd be happy to see Iraqi vets vote. It has been observed (wish I could remember where) that American military fandom decreases in direct proportion to actual American exposure to the military "way of life." Just give them a few extra tours and they'll be softened up real nice.

I have one more similarity to add to my list, and this time I'll let a British ex-SAS officer make my point for me:

"Mr Griffin said he believed that the Americans soldiers viewed the Iraqis in the same way as the Nazis viewed Russians, Jews and eastern Europeans in the Second World War, when they labelled them "untermenschen".

"As far as the Americans were concerned, the Iraqi people were sub-human, untermenschen. You could almost split the Americans into two groups: ones who were complete crusaders, intent on killing Iraqis, and the others who were in Iraq because the Army was going to pay their college fees. They had no understanding or interest in the Arab culture. The Americans would talk to the Iraqis as if they were stupid and these weren't isolated cases, this was from the top down. There might be one or two enlightened officers who understood the situation a bit better but on the whole that was their general attitude. Their attitude fuelled the insurgency. I think the Iraqis detested them." "

http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/03/12/nsas112.xml

[Tagwyn]

"Yawns!!" Hi Nancy. Tag