Was the Wehrmacht stuck in 1941?

[Jasper]

There are a number of facts that make me wonder if the Wehrmacht ever really stayed with the times during WWII.

I read that one of the fundemental flaws of the Ardennes Offesive (or Battle of the Bulge) - was that the German high command didn't realize it was 1944. OR another way to look at it: a good plan in '41 was a bad plan in '44.

The Luftwaffe didn't seem to realize that the Stuka wasn't the perfect ground-attack aircraft for all time, and seemed to be asleep at the controls.

Contrast that to the German 'Storm troopers' of WWI - a fundamental change of warfare using existing technology.

I know little about the East Front and was wondering:

Were the Wehrmacht operations in say '43 any different than in '41? The personnel and equipment might be different - but was the application the same?

Thanks in advance for any input.

[Major Tom]

Actually, the Stuka WAS the perfect Ground attack aircraft, it was just VERY easy to shoot down in the air Its design was perfect for a Dive bomber, it inspired terror wherever it went. The only drawback, one suffered by all dive bombers, is that it is easily shot down from fighters.

The Ardennes offensive, if supplied better and given an extra punch (ie. more tanks suited for mobile warfare) it was probably the best option availible to the Germans. Sending tanks to the Eastern front will make little difference. But, if Antwerp could be captured, the British would have to pull another Dunkirk, and the Americans might have to retreat back to the Brittany peninsula. It might have even brought about a negotiated peace with the Allies.

The German, operation in the East (Kursk) differed little from earlier German tactics. They concentrated massive numbers of Tanks against a combined force of dug in Infantry well supported by Artillery. The best option left to the Germans in 1943 was to have created a HUGE armoured reserve to smash any Russian offensive (ie do what the French and British almost did in 1940, cut off the head of an attacking pincer). If this plan was successful, it would have cut off and destroyed a large number of high quality Russian troops and AFV's, instead of if Kursk succeeded, would have resulted in cutting off primarily infantry forces. It was only during the Battle of Kursk when the Luftaffe lost total air superiority, so a counter attack could be supported from the air. This was one of the options proposed to Hitler, but, he perferred an 'active' plan.

[Wayne]

If you can find a copy, look up "The Russo-German War 1941-45" by Albert Seaton. It may answer some of your questions.

In 1941 the Germans had the worlds best tactical air force in the world, the best armored force in the world and the best trained infantry in the world. They lacked the air power in 1944 and though their armor and infantry was some of the best in the world, still, there was'nt enough of it.

The Stuka was a very good ground attack aircraft, but it was slow and needed to be protected from enemy fighters. In 1941 the Luftwaffe had complete control of the air over the battlefield so the Stukas were effective. In the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe did not have complete air control over the battlefield and therefore the Stuka had to be withdrawn from the fight. By 1944 the Allies on both fronts had fighter domination so the Stuka was by that time obsolete.

I think the Germans tried to use the same tactics in 1943 that they used in 1941, the problem was that the Russians had learned how to counter those tactics and developed some new ones of their own. The German army was forced by circumstances to go over to the defense and so offensive tactics were given a back seat. You also had the problem of increased battlefield attrition and therefore a decrease in efficiency. In other words, the Germans were being ground down and bled to death by the Russian Front.

Though you see better German tanks in 1944, such as the Mk IV 75s, the Panther and the Tiger, there was'nt enough of them and the allies just had more of everthing else. As Napoleon said, "God is on the side of the big battalions".

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Blessed be the Lord my strength who teaches my hands to war and my fingers to fight.

[Doodlebug]

Were German operations different later in the War than earlier? IMO - no! The German Army wrote the rule book with regards to Blitzkrieg. They adopted the teachings of the interwar theorists about the use of combined arms formations, tactical air support and as the name implied Lightning War and thoroughly thrashed all their early opponents who had expected a refight of the Great War. The increase in pace of operations that the Germans introduced totally overwhelmed their opposition who could not react fast enough to developments as they occurred. The principles that served the German Army so well in their early War triumphs held true to the end of the War and indeed to today. They lost effectiveness only when the Allies learned and adopted the same rules albeit with their own national interpretations thrown in.

[Major Tom]

Actually, Blitzkreig tactics were originally developed by the British. During the 1930's, the British went through a series of wargames with their 'Mobile' Division (later the 1st Armoured Division), in which Vickers Mark III tanks along with other fast vehicles enacted armoured and mechanized lightning attacks. British theorists proposed that the North African desert would be the prime area for Tank vs. Tank battles, as, the lack of intervening landscape obstructions would result in Armoured warfare resembling more a naval engagement. The French also produced some very interesting theories on armoured warfare.

The problem with the French and British was that their High Commands were less interested in these forms of warfare, as, they won the last war without them. The Germans had the luck to have their high commander willing to take some risks, at least early in the war...

Had the First World War lasted into 1919 the Allies would have been the first military force to launch a blitzkrieg-like attack, with medium and fast tanks being directly supported by tactical bombers in the offensives planned to invade Germany. The Armistace stopped this, and the plans were forgotten.

[Doodlebug]

Bad choice of wording on my part but the fact is that the German Army was the first to put this style of warfare to practical use. The British well may have conducted such manoeuvres in the Thirties and been the first fully mechanised army in the World but they had not adopted them as doctrine nor recognised the implications stemming from the adoption by others of this style. Many may have imitated but the Germans innovated in this area.

[Major Tom]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Doodlebug:

Bad choice of wording on my part but the fact is that the German Army was the first to put this style of warfare to practical use. The British well may have conducted such manoeuvres in the Thirties and been the first fully mechanised army in the World but they had not adopted them as doctrine nor recognised the implications stemming from the adoption by others of this style. Many may have imitated but the Germans innovated in this area.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Exactly

A theory is only a theory until someone puts it into practice. The Germans took a theory, refined it, and did it, to good effect.

[Doodlebug]

I think this rather neatly brings us back to where we started this thread. Ardennes '41 - good plan. Ardennes '44 - bad plan. The same principles governed both. The intention? To sunder the opposition and isolate portions before serious resistance was met. The difference? First time round such a move was thought impossible. Second time around it was almost stereotypical. I think that if blame attaches anywhere then it is principally not to the German High Command but to Hitler as supreme commander. His was the guiding(dictating? to avoid the pun)hand throughout the War.I most certainly contend that throughout the War the field commanders fought to someone else's script ie. Hitler's and were not able to adopt more original or flexible tactics.

[Tiger]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Ardennes '41 - good plan. Ardennes '44 - bad plan.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think you're forgetting that as the war dragged on, Hitler interfered more and more with the army, almost always against the wishes of the "real soldiers", the military men who he should have listened to from the outset. But that's what being a homicidal meglomaniac is all about.

john

[Shadow 1st Hussars]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Tiger:

But that's what being a homicidal meglomaniac is all about.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Understatement

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No bastard has ever won a war by dying for his country. They won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country.

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Doodlebug:

I think this rather neatly brings us back to where we started this thread. Ardennes '41 - good plan. Ardennes '44 - bad plan. The same principles governed both. The intention? To sunder the opposition and isolate portions before serious resistance was met. The difference? First time round such a move was thought impossible. Second time around it was almost stereotypical. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

There are a lot of other differences between 40 and 44 in the Ardennes, some of which were touched on by other posters. The first is air superiority -- in 40, the Germans had it and primarily used it on enemy artillery and logistics, to great effect. Anyone with even a vague familiarity with the Bulge knows how important US artillery was in this battle. The second aspect is also air superiority -- the Allies had it and could use it to mess up German logisitics (air superiority counts double; once if you don't have it, and again if the other guy does). A third aspect is simply logistics. Leaving aside the US air attacks, there simply wasn't enough *stuff* to go around. In '40, the Germans were only fighting France, and could put all of their resources there. In '44, things were different. A fourth aspect is weather -- December is not ideal attacking time (it was necessary to attack in December, of course; even Hitler realized that he couldn't wait until next May. A fifth aspect is the troops; by 12/44, US troops were, by and large, veterans. This was not true of all units, especially some of the units holding the very front lines, like the 106th div., but a large number of veteran troops were available in the theater, such as the 82 Airborne to hold Bastogne, and Patton's men when the time came to counterattack. The sixth aspect, as Doodlebug pointed out, was doctrine. Unlike the French in '40, the Allies knew what to do if there was a threatened armored breakthrough. (I'm not sure that all the allies had the same doctrine, however). The US doctrine was to jam up the shoulders of the breakthrough to keep it as narrow as possible, while attempting to slow the forward penetration (without getting getting completely ground up). After the penetration has been (ideally) blunted, or (at least) clearly identified, you counterattack.

I don't really think that there was ever much hope for the Bulge. The Germans never really came close to Antwerp at all, and it's never been clear to me (nor, I suspect, to the German commanders whose last name was not Hitler) how the German heavy tanks (or the light tanks, for that matter) were going to cross the Meuse and the other major river before Antwerp.

If the Germans had managed a Bulge-type attack on Normandy in, say June or July, there may have been more of a point (although of course there are lots of reasons why *that* wouldn't have worked, including a much longer German supply line (and they had enough trouble in Belgium), much better flying weather, 14" naval gunfire, and, for that matter, Operation Bagration). Without something like the 1. SS Schwebepanzerdivision , there wasn't much hope.

[Jasper]

PS My first attempt to see if the HTML coding works. I apolgize should it fail.

"By 1944 the Allies on both fronts had fighter domination so the Stuka was by that time obsolete."

My response: It was obsolete a lot sooner than 1944. The Russians came out with their Il-2 ground attack aircraft in 1942. With (pay attention now) RETRACTABLE LANDING GEAR! What a concept! So where was the next German ground attack aircraft?

"The principles that served the German Army so well in their early War triumphs held true to the end of the War and indeed to today. They lost effectiveness only when the Allies learned and adopted the same rules albeit with their own national interpretations thrown in."

My response: Principles have long legs - from Sun Tzu to "Get there fastest with the mostest". It's the implmentation that I'm curious about. You further my point, the Germans where being beaten at their own game. And by the time they woke up and smelled the coffee it was too late.

Issue: The Luftwaffe never sent it's aces to teach 'fighter school'. So then the highly skilled German aces with 100+ kills where themselves killed or captured - they took their knowledge with them. Allied air forces rotated their most expirenced pilots out of combat to teach their skills.

Good short term - Bad long term.

Along with letting their aircraft get obsolete - didn't the T-34 catch the Germans with their pants down around their ankles? Wasn't the Panther was a response to the T-34?

[Los]

Just a quick observation...

The JU87 Stuka was superceeded by both the Henschel HS129 ground attack aircraft (which did much execution on the Eastern Front), and the FW190A8 and F8 ground attack close support aircraft. There were very few Stukas left in service by 1944. (Most of those being R-model Ju87s serving in specialist Night attack groups or G model tank busters serving quite efficiently in specialist tankbuster groups on the Eastern Front.)

Virtually all the Sturzkampfgeshwader were either amalgamated, disbanded and reformed as Schlactgeschwader transitioned to these two and other aircraft.

Second, the training issue was not a matter of rotating aces back to training schools, it was a matter of the training cirriculum being cut drastically short as the years went on. German pilots at this time were showing up at their geschwaders with under 40 hours total time while Brit and US pilots were showing up to their groups with 250-350 hours.

As to the rest of your points, you need to go do some more reading....

Los

[This message has been edited by Los (edited 01-01-2001).]

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Los:

Second, the training issue was not a matter of rotating aces back to training schools, it was a matter of the training cirriculum being cut drastically short as the years went on. German pilots at this time were showing up at their geschwaders with under 40 hours total time while Brit and US pilots were showing up to their groups with 250-350 hours.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The reason for this was a lack of petrol, and the huge increase of strategic demands in 1943-4.

The Allied bomber offensive against the German refineries and synthetic fuel plants was shockingly effective. No point rotating your aces back to school when all they can do is twiddle their thumbs and chat up the Blitzmädels there.

The General der Jagdflieger, Adolf Galland (who later helped build up the Argentinian Air Force) tried to husband fighter resources for 'Der grosse Schlag', a major defensive operation aimed to destroy a large number of Allied bombers over the Reich in a very short time, thus crippling the morale of the bomber crews, and leading to the abandonment of the offensive. While that might have worked (read Middlebrook's books about the bomber war), we will never know, since the fighter squadrons so carefully built up were thrown away following the invasion in Normandy to no effect.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Jasper]

Yea but didn't the allies only daylight bomb targets in Germany after 1942? They started early 1943? I mean fuel is always in short supply in modern war, but that it didn't become a <U>critical</U> issue until much later (say 1943?)

I've found the site: http://vectorsite.tripod.com/indexav.html

to be incomplete, but a solid source of good information. For example: I find that the Germans did try and rotate their aces back to training. Oops. That's one against me.

It doesn't list the Focke-Wulf 190 but the Bf 109 section seems excellent. I found the discussion of "Wilde Sau" (or "Wild Boar") night fighting tactics very interesting (I'd never heard of it before).

<HR>

to the rest of your points, you need to go do some more reading....

Actung Panzer says "When in June of 1941, Germany invaded Russia, Panzertruppe encountered KV series and T-34/76 tanks which were far superior (firepower and armor protection) to any Panzer at the time. It was then decided (because of the constant reports from the Eastern Front) to design a new more powerful medium tank, which could be quickly put into production. "

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/pz4.htm#panther states

. . . and that it took them until 1943 before Panther's actually showed up. That suggests to me that the German tank guys took a military development break between 1939 and 1941, while everyone else was putting the pedal to the metal. What will be interesting is to see what tanks the Russians were introducing in 1943.

As a result I wonder if they ended up fielding designs that were dated - so losses mounted - production is increased - development is slowed to allow production to rise - and downward the spiral it goes.

It'll be interesting (and harder to find) how long the air craft guys took a break. I suspect the same period, but much more interest in tanks than aircraft, so less material out there.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jasper:

That suggests to me that the German tank guys took a military development break between 1939 and 1941, while everyone else was putting the pedal to the metal. What will be interesting is to see what tanks the Russians were introducing in 1943. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

While you have a point here in some respects, the Tiger was introduced at Mga in the area of Heeresgruppe Nord in 1942. Other than that, I believe Germany decreased military production in 1942-3, according to Wilmot 'The Struggle for Europe'

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Los]

Not that I want to rehash a rather extensive T34 discussion that we just had not to long ago, but despite popular myth, the T34 was not the end all of WW2 tanks. It seems that the Germans were make necessary adjustments and regularly defeating the T34s when first encountered and continuing doing so throughout the period leading up to and beyond introduction of the Panther and the Tiger. Not that the initial encounters with the tanks didn't cause concern, but the tanks and how they were handled by the Russians ensured that they had no significant impact on the outcome of fighting in 1941. By early 1942 the German upgrade porgramme in weapons ensures that tanks from the two sides were in an equal footing (T34 vs Mk IV).

Also, you seem to discount the Pzkfw Mk IV which in fact remained the main german tank (numerically) nearly throughout the war. All German vehicles (and weapons for that matter) were in a constant state of upgrading. If anything your statement about german designers being "on break" is exactly the opposite of reality. They were constantly fiddling with designs to the point that it drew resources away from production!

Back to the T34, you should see what the Russians thought of how their own original design stacked up to it's German counterparts. The Russains bought a pair of Pzkfw III before the war and put them in head to head trials against the T34-76 and found that the T34 was inferior in every category to the German tank save gun strength and armor. (And yes their are many other factors which make a good tank besides those two things.) It was enough of a shock that they suspended prodction of the T34 until a new design could be made but this in fact did not occur before the war started and they had to put the old design back into production. Design flaws in the T34 negated much of the tanks supposed superiority while many design aspects of German armor (Crew ergonomics, optics, communications, reliability and mobility, not to mention better tactics and organization) allowed german tanks to compete with and master the T34.

(By the way check out the details of Russian tests here: http://history.vif2.ru/t34_76_2.html )

The upgraded version T34-85 did not see widescale operational use until 1943, which, of course, was when the Panther and the Tiger both came into operational use. In fact it was soviet tank design which stagnated until nearly 1943 as freezes in designs were put in place because the russians needed numbers. (Red Army Handbook 39-45 S.J. Zaloga) German tank design and upgrades continued in a more or less steady and constant stream with the Pzkfw Mk IV alone being upgraded TEN times (8 of those upgrades before or in early 1943) and the Pzkfw III being upgraded ELEVEN times.

With regards to german aircraft designers again a rudimentary knowledge of the Airwar and you would be well aware that in particular in 1942 and 1943 the bf109f and Fw190 early marks were superior in most aspects to anything put up against them performance wise including the spitfire. (much to the discomforture of RAF pilots duringthat period) And the me262 was well along in developmentby that time too.

I'm not trying to take anything away from any of the good Russian or anyone's tank designs but your laughable observation that german designers were "on break" do not hold up to anything past a cursory knowledge of the subject. Hence my remark to go read some more.

War, particularly as it drags on, is all about development/counter development of weapons systems and design upgrades.

Los

[This message has been edited by Los (edited 01-02-2001).]

[CavScout]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Doodlebug:

Were German operations different later in the War than earlier? IMO - no! The German Army wrote the rule book with regards to Blitzkrieg. They adopted the teachings of the interwar theorists about the use of combined arms formations, tactical air support and as the name implied Lightning War and thoroughly thrashed all their early opponents who had expected a refight of the Great War. The increase in pace of operations that the Germans introduced totally overwhelmed their opposition who could not react fast enough to developments as they occurred. The principles that served the German Army so well in their early War triumphs held true to the end of the War and indeed to today. They lost effectiveness only when the Allies learned and adopted the same rules albeit with their own national interpretations thrown in.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Germans may have wrote the book on "Blitzkrieg" but they failed to use it. Only in France was "Blitzkrieg" really used. In Poland, and later Russia, the Germans fell back on the old doctrine of the "cauldron battle".

Cav

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"Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, 'Wehrmact penis envy.'"--D. Bolger

Co-Chairman of the CM Jihad Brigade

"AS far as Steve and BTS (mostly Steve) are concerned, you are either a CM die-hard supporter, or you are dirt. If you question the game, implementation, or data models they used, you are some kind of neo-Nazi wanna-be, and become an open target for CavScout, SlippySlapDragon, and all the other sycophants who hang on Steves every word."-- Jeff Heidman [comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical]

[Major Tom]

Actually, only the Spitfire V was rendered obsolete by the arrival of the FW-190. The Spitfire IX was quickly developed and was considered to be the equal, and most probably the superior to the German design. As in any war, technology proceeds at leaps, with one side gaining the upper hand through a development until the other side trumps them with their own counter.

[Los]

Exactly.

Los

[PeterNZer]

back to the tactics discussion..

I remember reading in Guderian's "Panzer Leader" that one of the death-knels of the German army was the eastern front battle where the army tried to encircle a Russian saliant. (I can't remember the name of the operation)

Apparently the Russians were so used to this kind of move they planned for it and heavily forified all areas of the salient. The end result was severely battered german force that was ripe for the counterattack which came next.

As for the german generals and interference from the top, remember that by late in the war most of the general staff was well removed from the battles their men fought and furthermore were, as a rule, Hitler's toadies, ready to nod and agree with anything he said.

anyway

PeterNZ

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"I can be quite pleasant, you know" - Andreas

"WHERE'S THE MOAT?!" - Jon

[Keith]

The Ardennes Offensive failed because of the following reasons in order of importance:

1) Insufficient means to execute a too ambitious objective. In short, the plan was too grand in scope and beyond the capabilites of the German Army at this time. In fact Rundsted and Model argued strongly for the "small solution" which involved cutting off troops around Achen. The Germans never had a chance to reach the Meuse.

2) Logistics. During the battle the Germans supply system completely broke down and simply could not get fuel and ammo to the fighting troops. At the high water mark of the offensive the Germans were siphoning fuel from the heavy panzers just to keep a portion of their forces mobile. Most of the Germans tanks were not knocked out by enemy fire but simply were abandoned.

BTW it is myth that the Germans had insufficient fuel. The truth is they had enough supplies but it was stock piled on the wrong side of the Rhine and it was impossible to bring it forward given allied air superiority and the condition of the clogged roads.

3)Weather. It is one thing to blitz through the Ardennes during high summer and quite a another attack along muddy dirt roads in several inches of snow. During the opening phase of the offensive the German panzers were literaly locked in gigantic traffic jams on road that had been churned into mud soup.

4) Allied air superiority. Self evident.

5) Low quality of troops. The average quality of the german soldier at this time was low with insufficient training. In addition many of the divisions (even Panzer Divisions - particularly Panzer Lehr) were badly understrength before the battle even began. Some "moterized" units were riding bicycles into battle! A great deal of the infantry came from surplus Naval and Luftwaffe replacements with virtually not combat infantry experience.

Finally I would have to say the Germans never had a chance and they were merely prolonging the inevitable. The failure in the Ardennes cause the EF to collapse like a house of cards in January 45'.

[Los]

I'd like to echo Kieth's point number Five, anyone who reads Ardennes account with a careful eye will see that despite having this or that vaunted SS divison here or there, they just didn't have the talent and articulation at the small unit level, both in leadership or grunt/crew level that they had in the past. Two many prior losses, two much scraping the bottom of the barrel, toomuch cutting corners in training. That, to me, is the crux of the thing.

Los

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PeterNZer:

I remember reading in Guderian's "Panzer Leader" that one of the death-knels of the German army was the eastern front battle where the army tried to encircle a Russian saliant. (I can't remember the name of the operation)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Fall Zitadel (Operation Citadel), the attack on the Kursk salient.

Some prominent German military figure (now it's my turn not to remember who ) said that after Stalingrad it was no longer possible to win the war; after Kursk it was no longer possible to avoid losing it. A bit of an over-simplification perhaps, but it does stick in the mind.

Michael

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Major Tom:

Actually, only the Spitfire V was rendered obsolete by the arrival of the FW-190. The Spitfire IX was quickly developed and was considered to be the equal, and most probably the superior to the German design. As in any war, technology proceeds at leaps, with one side gaining the upper hand through a development until the other side trumps them with their own counter.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

At the most I would say it was the equal, British super charger design was a step below the Germans in that the supercharger was always on, vs the superchargers fitted to ME109 and FW190 which only came on at full power. The 'Blower' (British) Superchargers were never as reliable as the ones in the German opposition, to much overheating.

Also most of the Spit IX were of the HF type with Merlin 61 or 63 which could not deal with the FW190 A-4s and A-5s below 2000ft and at 14000ft to 20000ft plus they were still carburettor fed with the ensuing problems in negative G manouvers. The Spit IX LF with its Merlin 66 injection carburetor was a much better mount vs FW although the performance gap at 140000ft - 20000ft still existed and that the side effect of extra cooling through the old carburettor fed Merlins was lost making the problematic 'blower' even more of a chore than before, which ment of that one could not run at full tilt for as long as the FW190.