Tank gun test, extreme ranges. (Warning: large pics inside)

[tss]

JonS wrote:

two categories for the 'lost' shells could be "used in training", and "lost in the supply chain".

One more catagory: shots fired at targets that were supposed to be enemy tanks but were actually something roughly tank-shaped. Many an innocent barn or pile of logs got a cruel AP shell through it. Not very common occurrence while defending in open steppes but quite prevalent while attacking in covered terrain.

One data point: Finnish Stug-IIIG no 531-24 at Kuuterselkä. The vehicle had 54 rounds of ammo, 6 of whom were HEATs and the rest mix of HE and AP, the exact ratio not known. It knocked out three enemy tanks (2 x T-34-85, 1 x KV-1 (or possibly IS-II)). I can't remember how many shots the T-34s demanded, but I'd guess that 2-4, on total. (It was practically a melee, the ranges were so short (15-200m) that a vehicle missing two shots could be considered dead). The KV needed two hits, one HE (fired by mistake) and one AP. Now, the interesting thing is that the AP round that knocked it out was the last round left in the Sturm.

So, in the battle, 531-24 (Halonen, Vuorela) fired somewhere around 30 AP and HEAT shots, and at most 5-6 of them were actually aimed at enemy tanks. Where did rest of the rounds go? I don't know, but I'd guess that there were roughly 20 tank-shaped objects with big holes in them along their route. There's also the possibility that many AP rounds were wasted because a HE shell was needed and the quickest way to clear the barrel was to fire the AP way. [One confirmed case of the latter: Ps.531-6 (or -19, I'm not sure) fired an AP round into a barn filled by Soviet infantry and followed it by few HE rounds].

One of my friends served his military term as a T-72 driver. They had once a lecture given by one of the Stug gunners who had participated in the Kuuterselkä battle (probably Olof Lagus, I don't know for certain). The old veteran confirmed that the basic response to any threatening shape was to shoot first, investigate later.

- Tommi

[Holien]

I think Tommi has hit it on the head here.

I play paint ball and I know even the best player’s waste ammo on possible targets, slips of fingers and firing in the dark (even during the day).

Could it be that tank crews suffer the same psychology and let off rounds without real targets to fire at?

Nighttime is good for this and I am sure that even during the day there could be wastage through these sorts of incidents.

"Was that a tank in that bush moving forward?" I know we on the forum are conditioned to playing a game where everything is clear cut and obvious.

IRL I know from Paintball and other activities that things are never really clear and mistakes are made frequently.

H

[rexford]

The German penetration drawings and graphs were based on some assumptions that were not valid in the field. T34 front hull and turret armor was extremely hard and brittle, and could lose 25% or more of its resistance when hit by 75mm or larger ammo.

Sherman front hull armor was usually flawed, was often cast and usually had a large number of weak weld lines for the multi-piece welded glacis.

Calculated penetration ranges do not consider cast armor, flaws, hard brittle overmatched plate, etc. We compared German penetration data to the published penetration ranges, and all armor is assumed to be roughly equal to German penetration test plate. Not true.

In actual practice, T34 and Sherman armor would be penetrated well beyond the calculated ranges that show up on those German publications and tanker aids.

Office calculations that assume no one shoots at over 2000m could also be far different from what tankers actually practiced, especially if the tank crew had good luck at long range shooting, felt confident and there was a real benefit to getting kills at that range compared to the expected ammo expenditure.

Just cause penetration range data is published doesn't mean it matches reality.

[ 10-02-2001: Message edited by: rexford ]

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by rexford:

Office calculations that assume no one shoots at over 2000m could also be far different from what tankers actually practiced, especially if the tank crew had good luck at long range shooting, felt confident and there was a real benefit to getting kills at that range compared to the expected ammo expenditure.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That is exactly my point about the usefulness of training material in this sort of debate. It is certainly not pointless to use it, but IMO on its own it makes for pretty weak evidence.

[rexford]

Actual reports from many different sources suggest that tank shots at 2000m or greater did occur, and hits were generated. We have pictures of an early IS-2 that was pierced by a Nashorn at over 2000m.

The main question is how many shots to get those 2000m+ kills, and what kind of accuracy per shot. The statistics I provided earlier in the post are consistent with the British experience firing from a Tiger using bracketing and 25% average range estimation error.

For really good crews (from the commander who estimates range and chooses target, to the gunner who has to line up gun with a tiny visual target, and to those responsible for keeping the gun and sights in top condition), hit probabilities beyond 2000m are not zero.

[M Hofbauer]

tss,

interesting to observe that the turretless StuGs performed so well in such a close melee. apparently crew experence (together with quality of ergonomics vs the lack thereof) is more important than basically inherently flawed (for this knife-fight situation) design layout (lack of turret) even in such a stark example.

I wonder though if even elite StuGs will perform similarly in a close knife fight with regular T-34s in CMBB....

[M Hofbauer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Of course not. The training drawings for the gunners that I have seen do though. You probably know the ones that have black for the vulnerable areas and indicate the distance to which the armour can be defeated for various types of shell. In Piekalkiewicz he has a print of these for T-34, KW-2, Churchill, Sherman etc. and they never go beyond 2,000m. I post this here tomorrow.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I can spare you the effort, they are probably similar to these:

(quick translations:

"Seite" - side, flank

"Heck" - rear

"Ich werde abgeschossen" - I will be killed

"Antigötz - Du kannst mich, doch Du mich nicht abschiessen" (a play on the famous quote in goethe's Götz von Berlichingen work, where he says "you can kiss my a**") - anti-Götz, I can (kill/cream) you, but you can not shoot me

"Das Betreten des Kleeblattes ist T-34 verboten" - intruding into the clover-leaf is prohibited for T-34)

btw those images of the T-34 are corresponding to the actual size they will have in the sight at the respective range relative to the aiming / measuring triangles

I will simply list the rest so as not to clutter up the thread:

[http://www.esatclear.ie/~godot/ChurchillChart.jpg]

[http://www.esatclear.ie/~godot/ShermanChart.jpg]

[http://www.esatclear.ie/~godot/KV1Chart.jpg]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

I am perfectly aware that the Tigerfibel was an official document. I am however also perfectly aware of some of the comments I have read about training in the German army during the war and its relationship to reality. Just because it is in the Tigerfibel does not mean it is the Ultimate Truth.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

true. the comment wasn't aimed at you, obviously I wouldn't question your knowledge about something as mundane and popular as the Tigerfibel, but at anyone less groggy who might have caught the impression from the talk here about how the style was too jovial etc.

anyways, it's the best we can work with so far. I was under the impression that training in the german army was very thorough in the pre-war years, and carried over with that system well into the war, and degenerated only in the last years of the war, but the more rapidly in decline, though. and since general assumption regarding the Tiger I (which, after all, wasn't really a 1944's thing) was manned with better than average crews, and crews weren't created on the spot, I find it believable when the Fibel expects them to perform in the way it describes.

The argument about crass disparity between what was expected and what little training the crews actually got carries much more weight with the later war design tanks like many Königstiger units. Here Jeff's intriguing natural-fighters-theory-transferred-upon-individual-tanks-within-a-unit - theory applies IMO.

but that is just my personal opinion, and I am *not* going to dig up any data on crew training lengths per timeperiod and vehicle type, or something, and I might even very well be wrong with my above shooting-from-the-hip - gut-feeling (what a metaphor!)

cheers,

M.Hofbauer

[ 10-02-2001: Message edited by: M Hofbauer ]

[M Hofbauer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>JasonC: (elaborate thesis on long-range gunnery)With less than one ammo load, leaving half for HE and saving some AP for close defense, a single platoon of Tigers could kill 20 tanks in 5 minutes. A company of Tigers could destroy a tank battalion in the same period of time. In other words, Tigers in position could easily prevent the approach within 2 km of even superior bodies of tanks, with little danger to themselves.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

as much as I am clamoring for increased long-range accuracy of certain guns, the fault in your reasoning is that you are stretching this onto moving vehicles.

The Tigerfibel's section on calculations for hitting moving targets suggest that you should not shoot at moving targets beyond 1200m because that would be nothing but awaste of ammunition. Mind you, this is the same manual that others like germanboy suspect of being overly optimistic about hitting things.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by M Hofbauer:

The Tigerfibel's section on calculations for hitting moving targets suggest that you should not shoot at moving targets beyond 1200m because that would be nothing but awaste of ammunition. Mind you, this is the same manual that others like germanboy suspect of being overly optimistic about hitting things.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, once it is actually quoted in full it somehow sounds more reasonable. I extended that comment only to the 'If you observe the rule, you can't miss up to 1,200m'. I have read it in full a long time ago, and I do not own it.

[Thomm]

Didn't a FlaK once kill a tank from 14 kms in the desert?!?

[M Hofbauer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Well, once it is actually quoted in full it somehow sounds more reasonable. I extended that comment only to the 'If you observe the rule, you can't miss up to 1,200m'. I have read it in full a long time ago, and I do not own it.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

you can read it online here http://tiger1e.com/fibel/index.html

and on a series of other sites (to which I can't find the links right now).

IMO it's pretty detailed about how to guesstimate ranges, etc.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by M Hofbauer:

you can read it online here http://tiger1e.com/fibel/index.html

and on a series of other sites (to which I can't find the links right now).

IMO it's pretty detailed about how to guesstimate ranges, etc.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks, that is very helpful.

[tss]

Correcting myself:

The vehicle had 54 rounds of ammo, 6 of whom were HEATs and the rest mix of HE and AP, the exact ratio not known.

Actually, there were 70 rounds since the crew loaded extra ammo. The gunner's account identifies the targets of 5 or 6 AP rounds:

- 1 AP into a barn (it was, after all, the same vehicle and not a different one to do the "barn thing")

- 1 AP or HE at an AT gun (The gunner says it was an AP, the TC that it was a HE).

- 1 AP at another AT gun.

- 1 AP knocked out a T-34-85.

- 1 AP knocked out another T-34-85

- 1 AP knocked out KV-I (or IS-II).

Note that only three rounds were aimed at tanks (though at the moment of firing that one sure AP round against the second AT gun, the gunner didn't know the identity of his target, yet). All three hit and knocked out the targets (it has to be remembered that the ranges were extremely short).

That leaves 30-40 AP (or HEAT) rounds that weren't fired at enemy vehicles. So, in that particular case, less than 1/10 of AP rounds were used as intended.

I once again emphasize that Kuuterselkä was not exactly the average tank battle so it is not certain how well that figure generalizes. The initial part of the battle was basically a meeting engagement fought along a forest road with poor visibility both due the trees and dusk.

- Tommi

[Diceman]

Stupid question. Is their any data for any WWII tank gun, for the gun's minute of angle (MOA)? I.e. Is there any data available which shows the shot spread of a tank gun at a specific distance. If you had that, you could calculate the expected spread of a shot at any distance. Adjust the bench test moa (to use a rifle sighting term) by various factors such as windage, human error, fatuige, stress, training, movement, experience,etc, and calculate for the distance of the shot - you've got yourself a shot spread. Adjust the shot spread by distance calculation error - valued by experience, sight capability, fatuige, training, etc, you can adjust the shot spread on the verticle plane. Devide the surface area of the tank which falls in the shot plane (after verticle adjustment)by the area of the shot spread, and you've got yourself a % chance to hit. Simple geometry, well except the part about knowing the moa of the gun in question, and determining the ruleset for error adjustment, but those are just details.

[Jeff Duquette]

tss

Great series of posts…as usual.

Marcus:

The following is a partial list of reference material utilized by Janusz Piekalkiewicz in his book “The German 88 Gun In Combat, The Scourage of Allied Armor”, Schiffer 1992. Could you translate what the tittles of these manuals are. Also what is your thinking as to what these references are. Thanks much.

"Der Reichsnninister der Luftfahrtund Oberbefehlshaber der

Luftwaffe, Einsatz, Verwendung und Kapoffuhrung der Flak-

artillerie", LDv 400/10, Teil III, Berlin, September

1942

"Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaber der

Luftwaffe, Ausbildungsvorschrift fur die Flakartillerie", LDv

400/10, Teil V, March 1943

"Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt und Oberbefehlshaberder

Luftwaffe, Ausbildungsvorschrift fur die Flakartillerie", LDv

400/10, Teil IV, April 1943.

========================

Diceman

This information is available in firing tables for specific weapon type and ammunition employed. Typically WWII firing tables for armored piercing ammunition will detail:

<UL TYPE=SQUARE>1)Range (entfornung…in the case of German firing tables)

2)Projectile velocity at range (endgeschwindigkeit)

3)Probable error at range…this is typically subdivided into lateral and vertical spread of the dispersion pattern at range (breite, hohe)

4)Projectile trajectory is also typically somewhat laid out in the form of max height of trajectory as well as angles of decent.

If you return to page 4 of this thread and look at Rexford’s postings he has laid out a series of hit percentages relative to range. These are based upon modeling of projectile trajectory as well as probable error (round dispersion relative to range) and is based upon information derived from firing tables. In addition, he has taken the process a step further and introduced the effect of range estimation error on the part of the crew and introduce this critical factor into the “to hit” function. The increasing “to hit” percentage relative to multiple shots reflects the bracketing process, and a diminishing range estimation error as a gunner “walks” his fire onto a target.

[ 10-02-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]

[Diceman]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Diceman

This information is available in firing tables for specific weapon type and ammunition employed. Typically WWII firing tables for armored piercing ammunition will detail:

<UL TYPE=SQUARE>1)Range (entfornung…in the case of German firing tables)

2)Projectile velocity at range (endgeschwindigkeit)

3)Probable error at range…this is typically subdivided into lateral and vertical spread of the dispersion pattern at range (breite, hohe)

4)Projectile trajectory is also typically somewhat laid out in the form of max height of trajectory as well as angles of decent.

If you return to page 4 of this thread and look at Rexford’s postings he has laid out a series of hit percentages relative to range. These are based upon modeling of projectile trajectory as well as probable error (round dispersion relative to range) and is based upon information derived from firing tables. In addition, he has taken the process a step further and introduced the effect of range estimation error on the part of the crew and introduce this critical factor into the “to hit” function. The increasing “to hit” percentage relative to multiple shots reflects the bracketing process, and a diminishing range estimation error as a gunner “walks” his fire onto a target.

[ 10-02-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thank you for pointing that out. I missed that particular post. So the data is available to establish benchmark accuracies. This gives me a better feeling of the possibility to accuratly model long range engagements in CM. I still wonder which nations at what times drilled bracketing into the minds of gunners. For instance, the German Army was not impressed by the performance of it's tank gunners in France 1940, and took steps to improve gunner performance. Whether that was the beginning of the practice of "bracketing" in the German Army, or a reinforcement of that principle I have no clue.

When and which crews would be allowed to effectively adjust fire via bracketing, and therefore get better consecutive to hit chances than crews who did not use the bracketing technique, is a legitimate gaming question. I would sugest (to keep things simple) that only "regular" or better crews be allowed to be modeled as practicing "bracketing". Too many examples of gunners not using methodical targeting technique to make substancial increased concecutive shot bonuses universal.

Cheers

Eric

[Gen-x87H]

Bah I give up. I tried to setup a test range with Shermans at 1500,2000,2500,3000, and 3500 meters. Took all the ammo and smoke away from the shermans but they seem to still be able to drop smoke whenever they need it.

The only test that actually worked was at 2000 meters and the Pak 43 took the sherman down on the 3rd shot.

Bah!

Gen

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Gen-x87H:

Bah I give up. I tried to setup a test range with Shermans at 1500,2000,2500,3000, and 3500 meters. Took all the ammo and smoke away from the shermans but they seem to still be able to drop smoke whenever they need it.

The only test that actually worked was at 2000 meters and the Pak 43 took the sherman down on the 3rd shot.

Bah!

Gen<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Those are smoke mortars, but you just have to choose a tank that did not have them.

[JasonC]

The suggestion of training is a fine one, but quite limited. It might account for 10% of the missing rounds. It would be silly to use half or more for that purpose, as combat power could be increased substantially just by shifting a little of the training to on the job, if the wastage there got to high.

The supply channel explanation will account for some portion overrun, which I already allowed half for. But it cannot account for the bulk of the ammo, for reasons I think are obvious if you think it through. The shells are produced in a steady stream over a period of years. Some early portion stock the channel, certainly. But after that, the regular flow in from new production, and that out from firing, have to more or less balance. The stock of shells in channel can't be increasing by leaps and bounds endlessly.

It is not like it took 2 years of all out ammo production just filling the channel, before anything could be fielded at the front line and fired. Certainly it is unreasonable to expect that shells produced in 1943 never reached the front merely because they were stuck in channel. As for the particular numbers offered, the proposer himself admits he is just making them up, so there is nothing even to address there.

As for the typical uber finn distraction, there are several problems with it. First, 200m firefights are not the subject under discussion, long range accuracy is. Second, the terrain was woods, not open enough for ranged fire in the first place. Third, the actual AP rounds expended per target engaged was actually around 6, as is shown by the AFV being out. Fourth, the statement that only 2-4 were fired at each AFV is pure speculation by the poster, not anything in the actual report, based on nothing more than his inability to believe 6 were fired per target engaged. Fifth, the actual hits are obviously what are reported in the "1 AP vs. this" "1 HE vs. that". This is typical of AARs - the effect of fire is the focus of the reporting, not accounting for every round. Only 6 out of the 30+ are actually reported as fired. Sixth, it is still just one report of one fight at short range in a particular theater with high crew qualities on one side, etc, and hardly merits conclusions about hundreds of thousands of other engagements over whole continents for whole years. 6 shots per reported target at 200m with uber-Finn crews hardly supports the idea that all kills took only a couple of shots.

On the idea that a few highest quality crews were doing a large portion of the firing, especially of the long range firing, I find it fairly plausible, but its proposers do not seem to notice the problems it raises and the direction it points about conclusions for average accuracy. If most of the shots being fired are above average in accuracy, the others are even more below that average - by the definition of accuracy. And the kills per round would be increased, which still leaves the problem of not enough kills to go around.

To see this, take it too an extreme for a second and imagine that the top 10% of Panther and Tiger crews are getting kills with every 3 shots even at the longest range, and despite their low numbers are doing half of all shooting. Then we have have the expended ammo killing 1 AFV per 3 shots.

Even if the rest of the ammo all uniformly misses, regardless of range, the result is a prediction of ammo use only 6 times dead AFVs. Even with liberal 2x allowances for overrun ammo and overkill (each), and 10-20% of all ammo for training, you still only get up to 55-75 AP produced per fielded AT weapon. Which remains low by about a factor of 5, compared to what they actually provided.

The more the shooting was concentrated on accurate cases, whether close range or high crew quality, the larger the mysterious gap between ammo provided and results actually achieved, becomes. The high ammo loads provided can only be accounted for by somebody, somewhere, missing a lot. Just not firing cannot account for it.

The point about long range accuracy being significantly degraded against moving targets may well have merit. But moving or not, plenty of long ranged fire certainly occurred, and we have the AARs to show it did kill tanks.

What nobody else seems to have accepted, however, is that high hit % per round is simply unnecessary in order for range AT fire to be effective. The ammo simply wasn't that limited. The number of shooters available is close to the number of targets to engage. The rate of fire is uniformly high enough to run through significant amounts of ammo without use of long periods of time, as long as targets are visible.

Why -shouldn't- a company of tanks blaze away contentedly for 5 minutes at any range where hits are both possible, and can kill if achieved? The initial reaction that sparked the whole subject was that expending anything like 40 rounds to get a kill is "unacceptable" ammo expenditure. Unacceptable to whom?

They had that much ammo. They had something like it with each weapon, and enough over the long term to restock such expenditures for the next outing. It can be fired off in minutes. With many guns firing, significant tactical effects can be achieved even if each shooter doesn't score even one kill, in a single engagement. Why in blazes -wouldn't- they shoot, at ranges with say 3-5% chances to hit?

Saving the mere shells at the expense of endangering an AT weapon or letting an enemy AFV get away safely is not economy. For the nth time, the shells were not scarce, the weapons were. It is not like every round had to be "made to count", as though there were only 3 times as many friendly AP rounds available as enemy AFVs to deal with, or something. What needed to be "made to count" was a chance to kill exposed enemy AFVs within range of friendly AT weapons.

[Jeff Duquette]

Eric

For your further edification here is a copy of a firing table for the Flak 88.

http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/stuff4/88FT.html

Bracketing was indeed part German Tank Gunnery practices. The German War time equivalent of the US Army’s Tank Gunnery Manual FM 17-12 was “SchieBanleitung und SchulschieBungen”…”Gunnery Training and Firing Exercises” elaborates on bracketing and how it is typically only required when engaging targets in excess of 1200m. A large portion of this manual can be found at the end of “PanzerTaktik” by Wolfgang Schneider.

Bracketing is also discussed in FM 17-12 US Army Tank Gunnery -- both the 1943 and 1944 iterations.

You can also pop over to John Salts web page and leaf through some the summarized British War Office reports detailing British Army bracketing techniques.

Obviously the ultimate goal in tank gunnery is rapid target acquisition and a first round kill. But realistically that doesn’t always happen. Bracketing is really just a logical method by which a tank crew hones its initial range estimate in order to put a round on its target. WWII Operational studies conducted on the subject of accuracy in tank gunnery indicate that at longer ranges, crew range estimation was the chief source of error. Following the war most Western MBT’s weapon systems -- with the notable exception of the British Army -- were designed around optical range finders. The Soviets appear to have been content with stadiometric based range estimation for a fair number of years after the war (although I am still digging into this).

Interestingly the Panther II’s main gun was being founded around an optical range finder. The layout of the Panther II’s range finder is very reminiscent of how the M48 Patton’s range finder ended up looking…with the objective windows of the instrument protruding -- like Frankenstein’s neck bolts – from the sides of the turret.

Ultimately many direct fire techniques employed by tankers can be traced back to field artillery gunnery practices\experiences, or even Naval Gunnery techniques. Obviously the Worlds navies have been punching holes in armored targets long before tankers were shooting it out with other tankers. But in the case of naval gunfire you are potentially talking about Cruisers and Battleships blasting away at each other over ranges of 10,000 to 15,000 meters. Check the ranges over which KG-V and Rodney were plugging away at Bismarck. ..or the ranges over which Jutland was fought. But this is way off track from this thread (A great study on the subject of naval gunnery is: “Naval Ordnance”, Annapolis Textbook, 1922 or the latter edition 1939).

[JonS]

oh - another thing I thought of - Jasons model assumes that all engagements ultimately end in the target being destroyed. I think this is a false assumption, and therefore the rounds fired in inconclusive engagements are being lumped in with those that were. Similar to the reporting of extremly long range hits cf more normal range hits, I imagine the reporting of inconclusive engagements ("yeah, we fired three rounds at it at ~1200m, but then it reversed around the back of a hill, and we never saw it again") I would predict to be lower than the reporting of successful engagements ("Yay! We hit it!").

BTW, my point about the supply chain wasn't to account for a specific number of shells, but rather to point out where a not insignificant portion of them may have gone.

Jason, I don't think there is anything basically wrong with your reasoning, just applying of little nuances, as it were.

Regards

JonS

[tss]

JasonC wrote:

As for the typical uber finn distraction, there are several problems with it.

Yes, there are. First, it suggests that a significant number of AP rounds may have been fired at targets that actually weren't enemy tanks. This has the problem that it disturbs the average of the number of rounds spent firing at real targets and thus casts doubts on validity of using AP production data to draw conclusions on gun accuracy. I agree that it is a serious problem.

First, 200m firefights are not the subject under discussion, long range accuracy is.

I may have misunderstood your argument, but I thought that at some point you stated that tank gun accuracy had to be lower than usually assumed because the difference between the numbers of manufactured rounds and destroyed tanks.

In this context, the number of shots expended on other targets than tanks is, in my highly

egoistical opinion, relevant.

Earlier, you wrote:

A few might have been fired at buildings or bunkers.

So, I dug up one particular case where ~9/10 of AP ammo was fired at non-vehicular targets. I don't know how good representative this is for an average battle, probably quite poor for the reasons I mentioned in the earlier post. However, neither do you. Or, if you do, I have missed the post where you presented it.

What happens to your calculations if you throw that one order of magnitude in somewhere?

Second, the terrain was woods, not open enough for ranged fire in the first place.

It doesn't matter where an individual round is fired. Even if those rounds were fired in the Moon, they would still show up in the total figure of produced 75mm AP ammo that you have been using to support your argument.

Third, the actual AP rounds expended per target engaged was actually around 6, as is shown by the AFV being out.

Once more, the Stug (531-24) saw three enemy tanks during the combat [though, to be precise, the TC did a scout trip on foot at one phase and saw ~20 behind a ridge but that hardly matters here]. The gunner fired a total of 3 AP and 1 HE round against those three tanks. All rounds hit the targets. So, on average, the gunner expended 1.33 rounds per target engaged, if you factor that mistaken HE in.

The rest of the AP rounds were fired in the combat, but at targets that were not tanks, assault guns, trucks, bunkers, or any other usual AP targets. Factoring them into rounds per armored target engaged gives highly misleading results.

The gunner's account specifies that once he fired an AP to clear the barrel for a HE round. Twice he fired a reactionary fire at AT guns that had opened fire at them [first hit and internal armor flaking wounded the loader]. In the first case he had time to notice that the target was an AT gun, but he still fired the round that was in the barrel at the moment [either HE or AP, two accounts differ on this which is quite natural since, after all, the vehicle was hit a moment ago and the situation was quite confused]. In the second case the gunner fired at the muzzle flash of enemy gun before figuring out whether it was a tank or gun.

Fourth, the statement that only 2-4 were fired at each AFV is pure speculation by the poster, not anything in the actual report,

Pray tell me, where have you managed to find an English translation of panssarimies Vuorela's account? I thought that only place where it is published in its entirety is Leppänen's "Rynnäkkötykit isänmaamme puolustajina", that was, at least when I last looked at it, in Finnish. [OK, I admit, it may have been also published in some old issue of "Kansa Taisteli - Miehet Kertovat" magazine.]

Yes, in my first post the figure of 2-4 was a speculation. Then, reading the account again I found out that 2 was the correct figure.

based on nothing more than his inability to believe 6 were fired per target engaged.

No, based on the account of the gunner who actually pressed the trigger and fired the shots.

Fifth, the actual hits are obviously what are reported in the "1 AP vs. this" "1 HE vs. that".

I think that you use a different definition for "obviously" than I do.

This is typical of AARs - the effect of fire is the focus of the reporting, not accounting for every round.

Let's go into the accounts with a little (but just little) more detail:

- First T-34-85. Vuorela knocked it out by a flank hit before it had time to turn its turret towards their Stug. I don't have data on T-34's turret rotation speed, but I'd be quite surprised if the Stug got six rounds off in that time.

- Second T-34-85. At this point, the Stug had a grand total of 5 HE and 2 AP rounds left [they had tried to obtain ammo resupply but failed], so it would have been quite strange for them to use six rounds here.

- The KV-I (or IS-II). When it crested the ridge, there were 2 HE and 1 AP round left. Again, I fail to see how they could expand six rounds to it.

Sixth, it is still just one report of one fight at short range in a particular theater with high crew qualities on one side, etc, and hardly merits conclusions about hundreds of thousands of other engagements over whole continents for whole years.

Sure, as I said in the post.

6 shots per reported target at 200m with uber-Finn crews hardly supports the idea that all kills took only a couple of shots.

Agreed. But I fail to see how the ratio of all produced rounds per all destroyed tanks supports the idea that all kills took dozens of shots.

There's an interesting table in the end of "Marskin panssarintorjujat" but, of course, that doesn't apply because the figures are Finnish. The table lists all AT gun tank kills of Panssaridivisioona (in 1944), along with ammo usages. I don't have it available right now [so here be inaccurate recollections], but the trend was that 75 mm Paks used around 4-10 shots per kill while 50 mm Paks used 20-30 (with some cases in high 40s). The ranges were relatively short, 400-700 meters.

The caveat here is that the figures are available only for engagements that ended in a tank kill. Draws and those won by tanks are not listed.

What nobody else seems to have accepted, however, is that high hit % per round is simply unnecessary in order for range AT fire to be effective.

I accept that. However, I don't accept your argumentation based on production figures since there are too many unknown variables along the way.

- Tommi

[ 10-03-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

[c3k]

JasonC,

Again, you seem fixated on the idea of ammo production vs. AFV kills as a direct measure of a weapon's accuracy. I would like to direct your attention to the book "Thunderbolt" by Lewis Sorley, a biography on Creighton Abrams. Specifically, there is a section where he is inspecting some tank units in Germany.

Without digging out my copy, here's a synopsis and some historical background. Creighton Abrams ended up as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff (the highest rank achievable). In WWII, one of his assignments was commander of the 37th Tank Battalion, of the 4th Armored Division, under Patton. Creighton Abrams personally led the relief attack on Bastogne. The man knew tank combat. Later, I think in the late 70's, as a senior General, he was inspecting an armored unit in Germany. They picked their best tank crew to take him for a "ride" down the training range. The range had various targets, crews were graded on accuracy and time to complete the course. This crew proceeded to show General Abrams how quickly they could hit enemy tanks and drive through the range. Abrams was furious! He had them do it again, this time making believe that the enemy could be hiding, ready to kill them. Any mistake and they'd be dead. Given that, he helped out. The tank crept along. Any bush, cluster of trees, shelter of any sort, was THOROUGHLY fired on. Using the .50 cal. machine gun, and the main gun, he'd say "Do you know if there's an anti-tank team in those bushes? Fire on it." He immediately instituted dramatic changes in US Army training methods.

The point of all my typing? In combat A LOT of ammo is wasted on non-targets. How much? Who knows. But trying to tie ammo production to actual kills as a measurement of accuracy is faulty logic. You see something that might be a threat? Shoot. Shoot again. Try one more time. Okay, move ahead. Repeat as needed.

[Holien]

JasonC wrote:

"As for the typical uber finn distraction, there are several problems with it."

This is a bit harsh when all people are doing is offering some very plausible explanations for where Ammo has gone and what allowances should be made with your model.

I don't know the history of the "Uber Finn" remarks and calling it a "distraction" is IMO belittling someone who has gone to the trouble of offering information which is useful.

I think C3K made a good point and I would be interested in how that may affect your model of shell usage.

I find your posts really useful Jason and if you realised how casual remarks like those above cause flames when all you had to do was just discuss it.

I mean no offence or attack with this just my opinion.

Cheers

H

[Maastrictian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Holien:

JasonC wrote:

"As for the typical uber finn distraction, there are several problems with it."

This is a bit harsh when all people are doing is offering some very plausible explanations for where Ammo has gone and what allowances should be made with your model.

I don't know the history of the "Uber Finn" remarks and calling it a "distraction" is IMO belittling someone who has gone to the trouble of offering information which is useful.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The "Uber Finn" thing is a running joke on the board. Some Finnish nationalists site examples of whole Soviet divisions being held off by the merest hint of Finnish prowess. The Finns rarely used weapons at all, they considered it unsporting. You get the idea.

As for "distraction," Jason does on for a long paragraph countering the arguements presented and basically saying they are not relevant because the ranges involved are very short as oposed to the long to medium ranges being discussed.

Whether Jason's counter-arguement is valid is a whole 'nother issue. I just don't want the discussion to get side tracked by other concerns.

--Chris