Two historical questions on German units/OOB’s

[Abbott]

The recoilless rifles contained in CMBO, what was their availability to which units and how often were they used?

Strumkompanie’s availability and historical use?

How often would these weapons and units be seen in battle?

Thank you for taking the time.

[Pvt.Tom]

I'm at work so I don't have any figures here but I think the recoilless rifles were very rare, i.e. most people probably never saw one. Anyone have any production figures handy?

[von Lucke]

Don't have exact numbers either, but here's what I do know:

The Germans first issued recoilless guns to their Fallschirmjaeger regiments in 1941, after which they were used extensively by them, and later by the Gebirgsjaeger regiments as well.

Unfortunately, the ammo for recoilless guns used about 3 times the amount of propellent that a regular shell did, and this led to the Germans stopping production in 1944.

[Panther131]

I would be interested in the availability of the Strumkompanie’s. They certainly are a deadly fighting infantry force.

[JasonC]

"The recoilless rifles contained in CMBO, what was their availability to which units and how often were they used?"

Both the 75mm and 105mm were rare over the course of the whole war. They were used in the Fallschirmjaegers and in the Gebirgsjaegers, places where the weight of alternative forms of field artillery were a serious obstacle. Around 650 of the 75mm model were made, and around 525 of the 105mm version. Whole war.

The times are also different. The 75mm was used on Crete, airdropped and flown in by glider and transport plane. (A mountain division was involved too, incidentally, not just FJ). Production of the 75s trailed off in 42-43, and revived somewhat in 1944, probably due to the expansion of the Luftwaffe ground forces (Goering's empire burgeoning and barging). More ammo was made in 1944, but none in 42 or 43, for the 75s.

Also, more 75mm mountain guns were made than 75mm RRs, around 1200. The weight savings for the 75 were not that great (it weighed ~200 lbs). Relatively little ammo was made for the 75s too, around 220 rounds per tube for the whole war, compared to ~2900 round per tube for 75mm mountain guns.

The likely place for 75mm RRs, then, would in the FJ units in place of regimental 75mm infantry guns, and they would be rare for that role. None were present in Normandy for instance, where 4 FJ divisions and 1 LW field division fought.

The 105mm was more heavily used in the mid war. Particularly, more ammo was made for them in 1942 especially, and a moderate amount in 43. They were used most often in place of artillery pieces in divisional artillery battalions; and, rarely, in place of regimental infantry guns (instead of 150mm SiG, essentially). There were a small number of these 105s in Normandy - 26 that I've found in other's OOBs. 12 in one FJ division as its artillery support (it lacked other guns completely), 14 in another in addition to 12 regular 105mm howitzers. (3x3 RR "batteries" in div arty, 5RRs in place of regimental guns in one regiment). The other two FJ divisions in Normandy, and the LW field division, had none.

The usage of the 105s is more clearly like tube artillery, in that around 850 rounds of ammo were made for each piece. The 220 /tube for the 75mms is the kind of figure you see for anti-tank guns. The 850 for the 105s is low for an artillery piece, but in the range of what mortars had. (For comparison, 105mm mountain guns - 420 made - had 2750 rounds per piece made for them - and the ammo was still quite scarce in 1944).

Gebirgsjaegers are more likely to use mountain 75s than the 75RRs (FJ the reverse). (Why? There are enough 75mm mountain guns. There aren't enough 105mm mountain guns). Either GB or the FJ may use the 105s in place of artillery. But used as field guns (in place of regimental infantry guns) they would be rare again in either place.

Both infantry types were liable to be understrength in supporting artillery, compared to regular infantry.

"Strumkompanie’s availability and historical use?"

That is much harder to say, because they are an ad hoc unit. They are not a seperate branch of the army or anything. Instead, a battalion or regiment about to attack forms one, by designating men out of its sub-units - like a "detail". Sometimes they would be formed around one existing company, often around pieces from several.

They were common in urban fighting, when attacking. The high casualties of house to house fighting required a large, full strength unit rather than a bunch of understrength ones, depleted by losses. So they would reorganize beforehand, into this sort of formation. In other attacks, it would vary with length of the preparation and state of the forces assembling for the attack. By no means every attack. But e.g. a night raid planned two weeks in advance? Sure. On defense they would be rare, except holding ground they had just taken or something.

I hope this helps.

[Abbott]

Thank you Jason, very interesting read.

[Juju]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

I hope this helps.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hey, if that isn't Jason-with-the-incredibly long-username-that-has-re-registered-under-a shorter-one! The length and depth of your posts are kind of a give-away, even if your name weren't Jason.

Thanks, man! When you give an answer you really give an answer!

[lcm1947]

As far as the American gun went can't say for WWII but in my day (1966 - 1969 ) they were mounted on jeeps. They were 105MM if I'm not mistaken. You didn't see many of them and I agree that few were used or seen in WWII also. Just a point of interest plus I just wanted to say something.

[Keith]

The Strumkompanie was part of a larger battalion formation specifically tasked for assaults. In Normandy/Cherbourg there was a distinct Sturm battalion that counter attacked the paratroopers in St. Mere Eglise. It was definitely not an ad hoc unit. They were issued a high percentage of automatic weapons.

The U.S. first used the recoiless rifle in the airdrop over the Rhine in 45. In fact I think Wild Bill made a scenario about it.

[Abbott]

Here is a bit of information I was sent regarding the issue. It comes from a respectable source and seems to agree with the above post completely…

Sturmkompanien AS CM models them are Army assets. Each German Army

had 1 Sturm Battalion attached. These were organised along identical

lines in different theatres etc and were the hard core of an Army's

attacking force ( along with the usual organic Tiger Abteilung).

What most people are referring to are "Sturmgruppe". THOSE were ad

hoc and formed by Bns, Regts and Divisions etc. Sturm Battaillon and

Kompanien were formations directly subordinate to Armees and were

entirely different.

One was present on the Cotentin alongisde von der Heydte's

Fallschirmjaeger after D-day. It doesn't get much mention but it was

present and did some sterling work.

[JasonC]

"Sturmkompanien AS CM models them are Army assets. Each German Army

had 1 Sturm Battalion attached."

I can't verify that is true, and I rather doubt it is. Certainly, armies formed sturm battalions. That it was a permanent establishment in every army I rather doubt.

"These were organised along identical

lines in different theatres etc"

There was a standard TOE for a sturmkompanie as of 1943, certainly.

"and were the hard core of an Army's

attacking force ( along with the usual organic Tiger Abteilung)."

Um, Tigers were hardly present in every army. Panzer corps were supposed to have 1 Tiger battalion, and didn't always.

"What most people are referring to are "Sturmgruppe". THOSE were ad

hoc and formed by Bns, Regts and Divisions etc."

Um, there is certainly plenty of confusion over the different uses of "sturm". But there is at least equal confusion over the term "gruppe". The first just means "assault" and the second just means "squad", and was used as a synonym for a "detail", as we'd say in the U.S.

Incidentally, a "sturm" was also a name of all company-sized units in the SS earlier in its history, before they adopted standard Heer unit size names. Which is reflected in their rank names, which did not change over. Just to get that possible confusion out of the way. Also, pioneers used for assaults were often called sturm-pioneers, to distinguish them from bridge builders and what-not.

"Sturm Battaillon and Kompanien were formations directly subordinate to Armees"

Sometimes, I am sure. That the level under which they were subordinate was always "army", I rather doubt.

"One was present on the Cotentin alongisde von der Heydte's Fallschirmjaeger after D-day."

Certainly, that was the 7th Army Sturmbattalion. The fact that it was so designated, may have lead people to believe that every army always had 1 sturm battalion. There is no evidence for this that I am aware of. The designation simply means it was formed as part of 7th army reserve before D-Day as a counterattack unit. It had the particular mission of counterattacking any air landings that might occur.

To see the process, one has to look at 7th army operations before D-Day. Reserves were formed all along the German position in France. In the case of 7th Army, the 243rd infantry division was pulled out of the line into 7th Army reserve. It was probably chosen for this role because the majority of its infantry was bicycle mounted; it was also at full strength, and with 3 infantry regiments was one of the largest divisions in the corps. It had full amounts of equipment, unlike many other divisions in the area.

The 243rd Infantry was organized on the old pattern, with 3 regiments each of 3 battalions, plus an engineer battalion. But, on D-Day, the 920th regiment (the 1st of the 3) had only 2 infantry battalions present, not 3. Also, the engineer battalion had only 2 companies, not the usual 3. The division had a large field replacement battalion, with 4 companies and a full compliment of MGs (though not of mortars).

Where was the 3rd battalion of the 920th regiment? And the 3rd company of the pioneer battalion?

If you look at other divisions deployed on the penisula, the 91st and the 709th, you find that neither of them had a field replacement battalion. The 91st, however, had a fusilier battalion forming (called up in March) that was not present on the situation maps of 7th army. It was probably consider not ready. It also could act as a sort of virtual field replacement battalion for the 91st. The 91st's engineer battalion also had only 2 companies.

On D-Day, the 6th Fallschirmjaeger regiment, in the area in advance of the rest of its division, was subordinated to the 91st infantry. The 91st was a 2-regiment division, but with the 6th FJ attached it was the size of a 3 regiment division.

I consider it likely that the 7th Army sturmbattalion was formed from the 243rd infantry, with perhaps some pioneers taken from the 91st as well. This battalion was then on alert as it were against paratroop landings. The rest of the 243rd remained the army-level reserve formation (it was deployed on the west side of the penisula on D-Day). The fact that one battalion was thus missing from the 243rd's organization was partially made up, by the presence of its full strength field replacement battalion.

Here are a few additional examples of sturm battalions (and other sizes) formed in the war.

For the attack on Crete, the 7th Flieger division at first formed a KG-type sturmbattalion out of its 1st battalion, under an officer named Koch. It was originally called "Sturmbattalion Koch". Before the invasion, this unit was expanded to an entire 4-battalion regiment, and redesignated the "Luftlande Sturmregiment". Koch remained commander of the 1st battalion. Notice, this is a temporary organization for a particular mission, but is an entire regiment, subordinated directly to a division.

The Herman Goering panzer division formed a permanent sturmkompanie after Tunisia. In 1944 the division was expanded into a korps, splitting the division into a panzer division and a panzergrenadier division. Normally for infantry a Pz Gdr division had 2 regiments each of 3 battalions, whereas Pz divisions had 2 regiments each of 2 battalions. The HG divisions each had 2x2. A single motorised sturmbattalion was formed at the korps level. Each division also had a fusilier/recon battalion and an engineer battalion. Thus the total infantry-type battalions was 13, compared to 6 + 8 on the normal Pz and Pz Gdr TOEs. Notice, this is a permanent sturmbattalion at corps level, not army. Previously (between Tunisia and the split into two divisions) there was a permanent sturmkompanie, at the division level.

Sturmkompanies were quite common in the fighting inside Stalingrad. I have never seen anything to suggest that 6th army only had one sturmbattalion.

The 78th infantry division in Russia was called a Sturm Division for a while. It was later redesignated a Grenadier division.

There were a number of Sturm Brigades in the Waffen SS. Some of them were formed from foreign volunteers. Here the designation harks back more to the early names of things in the political organizations, rather than having any particular "assault" meaning. They were, in turn, named for the assault units of WW I.

It may also help to understand just how far back the idea of selected men formed into special assault units goes. It was a common enough thing back in Napoleonic times. The grenadier companies of various units could be formed into special assault units. This was a standard practice among the Russians of that era, who of course worked closely with the German armies in the wars of liberation in 1813.

When I say that I think they were ad hoc units, I do not mean to imply that it was not a regular practice. It certainly was. And units once so formed, would certainly exist as seperate units until "used up", or subordinated to a lower level parent again.

The 7th army sturm battalion was subordinated to the 709th division during the Cotentin fighting. The 709th lost 4000 men by 16 June. It later retreated to Cherbourg and was destroyed there. But some KG were formed out of units of the 709, 243, 91, and 7th Army Sturmkompanie along the way, so it is not certain the sturmkompanie guys retreated into Cherbourg instead of out of the penisula.

The 243rd lost 55% of its infantry by June 24, and almost all its pioneers; the 91st lost even more heavily in the infantry by that date. The 91st was disbanded on 10 August. The 243rd was supposed to be rebuilt, but that was never carried out and it was formally disbanded on 12 September.

In sum, I do not think the presence of the "7th Army Sturmbattalion", which is certainly accurate, means that every German army had a permanent sturmbattalion, that such units existed at no other levels as permanent units or temporary ones, or that the line between such sturmbattalions when they were present and other sturmkompanies, was so clear.

I am certainly willing to be corrected if someone has additional, more definitive information on the subject.

[Terence]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

[QB

I am certainly willing to be corrected if someone has additional, more definitive information on the subject.[/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I believe there's not much chance of that, Jason.

Excellent post as usual.

Would you (or anyone else) happen to know if the German army had a standard operating procedure when withdrawing -- regarding a rear guard?

What units would take part?

Were there "Fight to the last man" stands or did the units try to stop the allied pursuit with small counter attacks, then disengage and run?

Kind of a nebulous question, I know, but I'm feeling nebulous today.

[Panzer Leader]

Not to step on Mr.C's toes, but I would find a source describing Manstein's withdraw from the Caucasus. He is said to have performed a series of miraculous withdraws, feints, counter-feints, and counter-attacks while allowing the majority of Army Group South to withdraw safely to the coast.

I would be interested in hearing what Mr.C has to say about THIS!

[K_Tiger]

The german soldiers did not love the rr guns due to the smoke production after shooting...also they must place it mostly in the open..due to the backblast (see Panzerfaust`s)

After 1-2 shoots they must change her postition..

[JasonC]

"I believe there's not much chance"

Thanks, but I really meant it. I think it is quite possible somebody has much more detailed information - not about the 7th in Normandy (LOL) but perhaps about regular practices elsewhere (e.g. 43-44 Russian front), that might lead me to revise my opinion. If so I'd be all ears, because it is an interesting question.

My sense of it is based on my sense of the sort of operational flexibility the German army typically showed. The way they would scrape together stop gaps, comb reserves out of a line that looks like it has nothing to spare, etc. There are lots of instances of that sort of thing, and on its own it can explain the "sturm" formations I've run across.

But they may have gone to a permanent establishment of some sort in addition, somewhere along the line. I'd just need evidence of a different kind to think so (like, a dozen army reports over 2 years on the eastern front, with always 1 sturm-battalion per).

On your rear guard question, I don't have much to go on but the same general sense of things. In the case of infantry, I'd expect a reinforced infantry-type battalion "block" staying behind while the heavier stuff pulls out, then the rest of the foot sloggers. Last, the "block" evacuates at night.

"Reinforced" means it would have supporting guns, maybe an added company mixed in sometimes (pioneers to blow down trees behind the withdrawl, e.g.). A block means they are in place, dug in if possible, not moving, while the rest of the division column snakes away. Then they "bound" back to a new blocking position at the new tail of the column.

With mobile troops (meaning Panzer divisions etc), I'd expect a bigger kampgruppe, more like a tank or TD/AT battalion plus a panzergrenadier regiment (or the recce battalion), with some supporting artillery. You rarely hear about single battalion forces from the Panzer divisions. And they would use a more continuous fighting withdrawl rather than a fixed blocking position.

Less likely to lose 1 battalion that way, to an aggressive pursuit, since it is a stronger force and keeps moving. That depends on the rest of the division being able to get clear faster. See, the infantry version is ready to sacrifice one battalion to get the rest away, if pressed too hard. If not pressed hard they all get away.

But would it always be like that? No, it would vary all over. It was done that way sometimes, and it seems it worked pretty well. But just because something is sensible doesn't mean it was always done. And in the east, often they weren't acting as rationally about it as they might, because of short-sighted "hold at all cost" orders. For the infantry in particular.

Those resulted in seperated company or battalion level strongpoints strung along a line, that could quickly get cut off from each other. Then they'd either hold out long enough to sneak away some night, or for a counterattack to reach them (rare), or more commonly, the Russians would bring up enough arty or assault guns to pulverize them. Sometimes after failed infantry attacks, though.

That was called the "hedgehog" defense, really meaning "porcupine". So called because the front line units had an all-around deployment, rather than a continuous front line. If attacked with enough strength (and they didn't bug out), that was very dangerous for the defenders (for the obvious reason - nobody gets away), but it could break up weaker attacks. The gaps between the "hedgehogs" get hit by the artillery.

Incidentally, I second PzLdrs recommendation about Manstein's book, or a book about that campaign. It has been a while since I read about it, but the same impression he has remains with me. I can describe the little I remember about it.

What was most striking is that he did not spread the men out to cover the whole frontage. Instead, he formed more concentrated positions out of e.g. 4 infantry divisions side by side on more or less normal frontage for them. With both flanks wide open. Then he'd have their supporting artillery behind that "shield", and their PAK and FLAK ready to reinforce wherever they were hit. But all this was set up out of contact.

Then the Russians, not quite knowing where everybody is, would run into them. They didn't sit still, but pushed back, or withdrew a bit and sidestepped slightly, etc. The idea was to give the Russians trouble finding the flanks of the "shield", and to make them hit either air (missed the shield, ground lost but nobody dies), or hit the line (hit the shield, Russians get a bloody nose because the Germans are deployed "tight", with arty support and PAK able to rush up). Then the whole shield was picked up and retreated as soon as the Russians did find a flank of it and started coming around. Back off ~50 miles, breaking contact completely, and repeat.

Meanwhile, what intact armor he had would refit farther back, jump up to hit Russians that got too far ahead of the rest, throw in local counterattacks to help units get away, them pull out again themselves. The whole thing turned on the fact that the Russians would not know exactly where the Germans were and weren't, advancing into the gaping hole. Naturally, the Germans had to backpeddle "net", too, or the Russians would have found flanks and come around. But backpeddle they did, fast enough to avoid that, but slow enough to give the guys in the caucausus time to get away. Which depended on administering several bloody noses along the way.

By February, he had larger armored reserves being sent to help him. He didn't throw them into the line right away, but kept up the previous game and let them stay "fit" farther back. Then he pulled back farther than a "usual" "bound". The Russians came on more reckless than before, with less in front of them. They got strung out, and then he hit them with his reserve armor in a concentrated, corps-level counterattack. Which went right up the Russian "path", meaning, exactly the way they had come, the axis they were stretched out along. As a result, 2 full strength panzer divisions hit smaller units than themselves, one after another in succession. The "Kharkov counterattack", this one is usually called. Clobbered a lot of units, and the rest pulled back sharply. He had by then stabilized the front.

One of the operational masterpieces of the war. He called the last part fighting the Russian offensive "on the backhand". Incidentally, he proposed to do it again on a larger scale instead of attacking at Kursk, keeping the armor in a defensive reserve for the purpose - but that recommendation was not accepted.

Machiavelli once said, "if you give advice to a prince and that advice not being taken, disaster follows, you will reap great glory". LOL.

[MOS was 71331]

To lcm1947: I was on active duty in the army from May 1966 to May 1968. As I recall, we had a 106mm recoilless rifle. It was a standard infantry AT weapon. I was an engineer, so I'm not overly familiar with an infantry TO&Es, but I'd expect the 106 RR to be part of an inf bn's weapons company, with bazookas used by an inf co's weapons platoon.

One interesting note: the 106mm RR had a .50 caliber rifle attached. The gunner would fire a .50 spotting round and fire the RR if the .50 hit the target.

[Jarmo]

Sturmgruppe is what a squad of Sturmcompany is called.

At least in CM...

[Abbott]

Here is some follow on information I have received:

>German SOP was to have a SturmBattaillon in

>EACH Armee. The SturmBattaillon was the infantry equivalent to the

>Tiger Abteilung. TO&E-compatible SturmBattaillon can be found all

>over the Eastern Front and Italy.

>

>As to "When I say that I think they were ad hoc units, I do not mean

>to imply that it was not a regular practice. It certainly was. And

>units once so formed, would certainly exist as seperate units until

>"used up", or subordinated to a lower level parent again."

>

>Ad hoc/extempore implies that they were not a doctrinal unit. While

>many Sturmgruppe were formed extra-doctrinally on an "as needed"

>basis and named according to their size "sturmbattaillon",

>"sturmkompanie" etc it should also be noted that these units often

>were referred to as "Kampfgruppe X" where X was the senior officer's

>name.

>

>Doctrinal Sturmbattaillon were directly subordinate to the Armee and

>could only be committed or attached by command of the Armee

>commander. Ad hoc sturmgruppe of varying size were subordinate to

>whichever unit scraped together the men necessary to form such a

>group. Sturmbattaillon (as opposed to sturmgruppe of battalion

>strength) WERE Armee assets and were an important doctrinally correct

>asset.

>

>re: the 7th Armee Sturmbattaillon. Certainly its existence and role

>proves nothing conclusive. However the presence of Sturmbattaillon on

>the strength of virtually every Armee in the East or in Italy at this

>time proves their doctrinal role. Apart from that reading the actual

>German doctrine which refers to Sturmbattaillon, their role,

>organisation etc makes things clear.

>

>Re: the etymology of the 7th Armee Sturmbattaillon. Certainly it may

>have arisen in this manner. If it did it was only due to the criminal

>negligence shown by higher HQs in neglecting to give 7th Armee the

>men (and indeed, the calibre of man) required to form a

>Sturmbattaillon. That the CO of the 7th Armee chose to create his

>Sturmbattaillon from the resources available to him merely shows that

>he was a well-trained staff officer ( and we both know that he was).

>German staff training is admirable in that it managed to create men

>of quite different character who would analyse the same situation and

>come up with the same response. The CO of the 7th Armee knew the

>value of a SturmBattaillon directly subordinate to Armee command in

>the Cotentin ( obviously he knew it would quickly be re-assigned once

>landings came but a good staff officer follows doctrine and preserves

>force flexibility ... splitting the Sturmbattaillon from its division

>command and putting it under Armee command creates greater force

>flexibility and allows a given force to perform more missions AND,

>more importantly, to respond to both divisional and Armee-level

>considerations... All of these points make the 7th CO's decision a

>quite elegant staff solution to the chronic force flexibility

>problems faced by the Germans in the Cotentin in particular...

>Obviously most people will miss this particular aspect out but it is

>important.).

>

>re: the following examples:

>7th Flieger: An ad hoc Sturmgruppe of Battallion strength. Not a

>Sturmbattaillon.

>

>Hermann Goering: Again, an extra-organisational force (the

>Sturmkompanie) was created on the divisional CO's authority. This was

>possible due to the patronage of the division. Any sturmgruppe formed

>at this time and later expanded was NOT doctrinal but merely a result

>of the CO's seizing any advantage possible for his troops. He should

>be warmly congratulated for his action of course but it wasn't in

>keeping with Heer doctrine, it was simply possible due to the

>patronage of the division. It holds a position analogous to the Tiger

>Kompanies in certain SS divisions which I don't need to tell you are

>extra-doctrinal and also a result of patronage.

>

>Stalingrad: Not Sturmkompanien. Sturmgruppe of kompanie strength.

>They were an extempore conglomeration of survivors from the detritus

>of other units.

>

>78th, Again, a name. It doesn't really speak the doctrinal nature of

>Armee Sturmbattaillon units IMO.

>

>Sturmbrigades: *Chuckle* Yeah well a fancy name makes up for the

>woeful training etc . Gotta love the "If it has a fancy name it

>will fight well" view they had going don't you? Again, Sturmbrigades

>have little to no bearing on these discussion ( good encyclopaedic

>knowledge of all things "sturm" in the Heer and Schutzenstaffel

>though but we both know some of these have little to no applicability

> . )

>

>

> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> In sum, I do not think the presence of the "7th Army

>Sturmbattalion", which is certainly accurate, means that every German

>army had a permanent sturmbattalion, that such units existed at no

>other levels as permanent units or temporary ones, or that the line

>between such sturmbattalions when they were present and other

>sturmkompanies, was so clear. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

>

>1. Definitely the presence of a 7th Armee Sturmbattaillon doesn't

>prove their presence elsewhere. Readings of OOBs and doctrine prove

>this .

>

>2. I never said sturmGRUPPE didn't exist at other levels as permanent

>or temporary units. The thread started off asking about

>"Sturmbattaillonen" and that word, to a German officer of the time

>has ONLY one meaning. I interpreted it with that in mind.

>

>3. The line between sturmbattaillonen under the command of division x

>and a sturmgruppe of battalion strength formed from spare men in

>division x would be pretty thin in functional terms. The easiest way

>to describe it is to say that a sturmgruppe would have, over the

>course of the war, fewer LMGs and SMGs and fewer men per tactical

>maneuvre unit than a doctrinally organised sturmbattaillon.

>Sturmbattaillon also, generally, had much more experienced soldiers

>than ad hoc sturmgruppe although this, obviously, applied less on low-

>priority fronts and fronts starved of combat-savvy reinforcements.

>

>

>

>Anyways, there is a LOT of potential for confusion between

>sturmbattaillonen and sturmgruppe of Bn strength but that is why

>military academies all over the world teach precision in term

>definitions and precision of usage. To a German officer of the time a

>Sturmbattaillon meant one thing and one thing only. A sturmgruppe

>could mean pretty much anything.

>

>Hope that helps a bit.

[JasonC]

Useful, at least for stating the claim.

"Readings of OOBs and doctrine prove this"

That is just it. I'd like to see the OOBs and/or a document about the doctrine, not an assertion of their existence. I told Terence I meant the "willing to be corrected" remark, precisely because this seems to me quite possible. But saying it is actually is saying, or hearsay. What is wanted is more like, here are the lists of Armee level troops for these five armies and the locations of the units or what-not, and each one has exactly 1 S.A. Plus a doctrinal brief, would be great.

Incidentally, the quality of men point and number of LMGs and SMGs, doesn't strike me as sound. Of course ad hoc assault units picked men out of larger units precisely to get better than average men, and to collect needed weapons. If you take some of the longest-service sergeants, half the corporals, and men with iron crosses, out of a battalion, you will not get an average quality unit but an improved one. If you let them select their weapons and draw them from the units they are leaving, you will not be short of MGs and SMGs - the units they were combed out of will be, temporarily, but that is all.

If doctrinal sturmbattalions were being formed - which is likely with the claim, certainly - then I'll bet they arose out of the ad hoc process and not the other way around. Meaning, the front commanders may have been so regularly forming comb-outs, that it was institutionalized, to avoid depleting the rest of the units or being caught without, etc. I'd guess that change would have been made in 1943 if that were the way it happened. (Why? Two big Russian offensives met, meaning repeat lessons on the need to have counterattack-ready reserves).

So, I find the claim interesting and plausible, but not proven until I see the evidence from OOBs or doctrinal documents.