CMBB (or beyond) Artillery idea

[hellfish]

I am not a grog. I have really no idea how artillery forward observers worked in WWII. I have a lightbulb pop in the ole noggin' last night though. I think this is original (my first original idea in many, many days):

What if AFOs got to call for fire from more than one type of gun? If instead of having a 25lb FO, you've got one that you can use to call in 105mm, 155mm, 8in, etc.?

Instead of buying specific FOs, you buy a generic one (or two, or three), and during set up you purchase ammunition. Buy 100 105mm rounds, 20 155mm rounds, 200 81mm rounds and the FO (or FOs) then designate what you want to hit your target with.

The rounds are placed in a kind of "pool" that any FO can draw from, but each fire mission can only use one type of ammunition. However, two FOs can both use the same type of ammo at the same time, so you can have two 105mm bombardments at the same time from two different FOs, but you can't have one FO calling in 155 and 105mm at the same time.

I used to be in the Army, and though I wasn't a field artilleryman, I seem to recall that while our FOs were attached from an artillery battery, they could call on any other battery available as well. I was a grunt though, and too busy complaining about all the crap I had on my back to really pay attention.

Is this idea too unrealistic? Did FOs only call on their battery?

[Berlichtingen]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by fytinghellfish:

What if AFOs got to call for fire from more than one type of gun? If instead of having a 25lb FO, you've got one that you can use to call in 105mm, 155mm, 8in, etc.? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

FOs came from the batteries... so the FO can only call fire for his battery

[Slapdragon]

The only exception to this was the so called "US System" which placed artillery responsibility not on FOs (although batteries had FOs for larger shoots) but on platoon and company commanders. Read Gantner's "Roll me Over" where he had access at one point to a preplotted 8" battery, 105s, and mortars all by field radio to the main regimental artillery director.

The difficulty with the "US System" was, although it tried to offer the officer in the trench access to every gun in range, there just was not that much artillery available to assure that each platoon leader had several batteries of various sized cannon on call. The US certianly did artillery well, better than any other country in fact (mostly because they placed more people into Regimental and Divisional plotting and communications that other countries, paying for it by having less infantry out front) but in practice the game convention of a single FO for one sort of artillery is not too unrealtistic, and the communication chain advantages enjoyed by throwing people at the problem of com switching and plotting, plus the use of the preprogrammed tables started in 1943 and progressively improved during the war, is well simulated by giving US assets a little faster reaction time for calling arty than other nationalities.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

FOs came from the batteries... so the FO can only call fire for his battery<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

In the Commonwealth, this may have been correct for mortars, but the field artillery (25-pdrs and up) was on a fire control system allowing each FOO to call for each gun in range, if he felt the target required this. There were three levels of bundling:

MIKE - the Regiment (3 Batteries or 24 guns)

UNCLE - the division (3 Regiments)

VICTOR - all divisions in the Corps, plus attached AGRA guns.

All this could be delivered extremely fast. MIKE targets were nothing unusual, as I understand it. UNCLE and VICTOR required either a desperate situation or a very juicy target.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

In the Commonwealth, this may have been correct for mortars, but the field artillery (25-pdrs and up) was on a fire control system allowing each FOO to call for each gun in range, if he felt the target required this. There were three levels of bundling:

MIKE - the Regiment (3 Batteries or 24 guns)

UNCLE - the division (3 Regiments)

VICTOR - all divisions in the Corps, plus attached AGRA guns.

All this could be delivered extremely fast. MIKE targets were nothing unusual, as I understand it. UNCLE and VICTOR required either a desperate situation or a very juicy target.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This was called the "British System" and had advantages and disadvantages over the the "US system". But again, it was a rare FO who could call up a 5.5 inch from an ajoining regiment for a fight between a couple of companies of infantry.

[CMplayer]

The proper way to deal with this would be for the game to separate FOs from the batteries, and then make it a tweakable parameter in scenario design as to which FOs could access which batteries. This way, one could still set the game to play by the old system, or one could try out these various other configurations.

Basically, when you click on an FO or an arty enabled HQ, you would get up a window like in tacOps showing all available arty to that spotter at that time.

The current system is a design dead-end, IMO.

[JonS]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

This was called the "British System" and had advantages and disadvantages over the the "US system". But again, it was a rare FO who could call up a 5.5 inch from an ajoining regiment for a fight between a couple of companies of infantry.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually Slap, any Commonwealth FO had the authority to order any gun within range.

As I understand it US FOs (and infantry commanders) could only request artillery support. The difference between ordering and requesting is subtle but important.

After their misadventures in the Western Desert (see the thread about the 25pdr being [mis]used as an AT platform and in "Jock Columns"), the Royal Artillery worked very hard to successfully develop systems to give junior FOs the ability to swiftly call down massive bombardments

Your point about there being only so many barrels and so much ammo is correct, but peripheral in terms of CM the game. IMHO.

Jon

[Andreas]

Jon has it right. Trust me, err, him. The only time the control over the guns was taken away from the FOO was when the proverbial had really hit the fan, and there were too many conflicting demands on them. Blackburn mentions one instance when that occurred in Normandy IIRC, and the commander of his Field Regiment was 'firing the guns'.

I think the big difference to the US was that not every hill-billy with a radio could call in the rounds, but that the FOOs were trained well, so they were expected to know when to call for a VICTOR target and when to use a troop. The FOOs were professionals at their job. Unlike the infamous example in Company Commander where the grunt requests 'big ones' or something, and gets 155mm much too close for comfort. Oops.

[JonS]

to reinforce what Andreas has just said, its worth considering where FOs come from.

In the Commonwealth FOs are Captains or higher, with long experience and thorough training. FOing is something to aspire to, after 'doing your time' at the gun position.

AFAIK, in the US nearly the reverse is true. FOs are junior Lts, and FOing is their first role in a battery. After spending time at the pointy end, they graduate to positions in the rear.

For some interesting insights, take a look at "Allies and Mates"*. It is the story of a US FO attached to the ANZAC field force in Vietnam. When he first arrived all the Kiwi and Aussie FOs assumed he must have been something special with long experience to have been assigned to a foreign unit. He kept it quiet that this was in fact his very first posting.

Regards

Jon

* Its been a while, so I don't recall the exact title nor the author. I'll try and verify it when I can.

** Found it. Here's the Amazon page, and the B&N page.

*** BTW, as the basis of an idea, I quite like Hellfishs' proposal. Potentially, his suggestion could be varied to reflect different nationalities doctines. Though, how that would fit with BTSs' "one size fits all" apoproach to national traits is open to question.

**** I just noticed that I refer to 'junior' FOs two posts up, and in this one state they were all senior officers. This isn't a contradiction. A senior officer may still be referred to as 'junior' if all his colleagues are more senior.

[ 10-15-2001: Message edited by: JonS ]

[ 10-15-2001: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Affentitten]

I'd like to get into this in more detail, but the book I need to confirm some of the points aint here at work with me.

But basically, the Commonwealth artillery command system was a highly elaborate one, with all levels from troop, through battery to regimental and beyond tied in together by land lines and radio. FOO's could order fire from their batteries, with orders for heavier or more concentrated bombardments being passed up to brigade, divisional and corps level, and control being passed quickly to the man at the sharp end if the situation warranted it. I guess that discretion and responsibility in only calling for what was needed was the key to this system.

Each battalion had an attached RA FOO, as somebody has mentioned, always a captain. Sometimes a Lieutenant would be detached from a gun troop to act as FOO for a company or smaller unit.

Sometimes communication problems meant FOOs didn't get what they bargained for. In the defence of the Arnhem perimter, a Lieutenant Barron of the 1st Airlanding Light regt RA was sent forward and called upon for a "stonk" on a tree line about 200 yards from positions of the Border Regiment. However, Barron's wireless, to be used to contact his troop, refused to work, so he had no choice but to use the Borderer's battalion net and hope the orders got through to the batteries of 75mm pack howitzers back at Oosterbeck.

He relayed the orders and nothing happened for several long minutes. The Borderer's company commander began to get very irritated indeed, as he was expecting an attack from that tree line in compnay strength.

Eventually the radio crackled back "Shot, scale 1 with the heavies." Barron realised, with mixed emotions, that his orders had been relayed back to the 5.5 inchers of the Wessex division. They were firing a full battery program onto his target without any ranging shots. Barron knew that they were firing at extreme range, and that the spread of shot would probably engulf them all. He pulled down the cranky major behind a wall just as the rounds arrived.....all on target.

Seeing the woods completely disappearing in an inferno of explosions, the Borderer's commander became quite lively. "Well done Gunner! More of that! Not bad those little guns of yours!"

A patrol after dark found at least a platoon's worth of dead Germans in the woods and piles of abondones and damaged equipment.

[Simon Fox]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

The only exception to this was the so called "US System" which placed artillery responsibility not on FOs (although batteries had FOs for larger shoots) but on platoon and company commanders. Read Gantner's "Roll me Over" where he had access at one point to a preplotted 8" battery, 105s, and mortars all by field radio to the main regimental artillery director.

The difficulty with the "US System" was, although it tried to offer the officer in the trench access to every gun in range, there just was not that much artillery available to assure that each platoon leader had several batteries of various sized cannon on call. The US certianly did artillery well, better than any other country in fact (mostly because they placed more people into Regimental and Divisional plotting and communications that other countries, paying for it by having less infantry out front) but in practice the game convention of a single FO for one sort of artillery is not too unrealtistic, and the communication chain advantages enjoyed by throwing people at the problem of com switching and plotting, plus the use of the preprogrammed tables started in 1943 and progressively improved during the war, is well simulated by giving US assets a little faster reaction time for calling arty than other nationalities.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I would like you to justify your contention that the "US system" was "better than any other country". I have seen you make it before and I would like to know why for example you consider it better than the British system.

[JonS]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

I would like you to justify your contention that the "US system" was "better than any other country"...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Don't hold your breath. I'm waiting for an acknowledgement (at least) of something I sent him a week and a half ago.

[argie]

As every time this discussion flourishes, I will point the participants to : http://members.tripod.com/~nigelef/

Must be noticed that also was customary that the COs from Batteries and even Regiments in CW armies were doing FOO activities, or liason with other units... Guess who get the fires first

I forgot!

Seems like in CMBO the FOs are simulating the batteries AND the FOs. Is an elegant abstraction to do both and with any RL Arty system.

And before the flames started, I want the 25lbers firing faster and the M16s too!!!

And also at least some of the heavy Armored Cars the British had

[ 10-16-2001: Message edited by: argie ]

[Simon Fox]

My impression is that by 1944 the most common Commonwealth fire mission by far would be a Mike target (ie 24guns). This is supported by data presented by Blackburn in which for one period of about 2 weeks in August 1944 (my recall may be a little imprecise on the dates there) they fired only Mike targets or above, as well as by the contents of his narrative for his entire period in action.

I recall Blackburn mentioning a typical Mike target time from call as 90secs? Maybe Andreas can confirm that?

The great strength of the Commonwealth artillery system was the attachment system whereby regiments were attached to brigades, batteries to battalions etc. The result was that the most senior artillery officers were up with the infantry, either in their brigade and Bn HQ or as FOOs with the forward companies. It would be a grave mistake however if this was seen as restricting access to the guns. If anything it enhanced flexibility. Having every man and his dog able to call in arty isn't necessarily a good thing. This business of uberamerican artillery is given widespread credence but I have yet to see any realistic assessment or analysis from someone who actually understands how the different armies systems really worked rather than just being an expert in one.

Berli,

As pointed out by Andreas you are incorrect in your statment regarding FOOs and batteries, at least for commonwealth arty.

[JonS]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

Berli,

As pointed out by Andreas you are incorrect in your statment regarding FOOs and batteries, at least for commonwealth arty.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But I think he might be close for the method the Germans used.

[JonS]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

The great strength of the Commonwealth artillery system was the attachment system whereby regiments were attached to brigades, batteries to battalions etc. The result was that the most senior artillery officers were up with the infantry, either in their brigade and Bn HQ or as FOOs with the forward companies. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Something Simon doesn't mention is that these semi-permanent attachments also encouraged close working relationships between inf and arty pers who were used to working with each other.

In Sgt Steiners thread about the effectiveness of late war German infantry Jary is quoted as saying ...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>...To knock them out we required HE, fired directly by supporting armour or, indirectly by Dennis Clarke or Bramley Hancock, our beloved F00s...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I.e. He knew the two FOs who regularly worked with the battalion (of which 18 platoon was part) by name and held them in very high regard.

Regards

JonS

[ 10-16-2001: Message edited by: JonS because it drives The Anglophile wild, and he's posting to this thread so will probably see it, tee hee ]

[ 10-16-2001: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JonS:

But I think he might be close for the method the Germans used.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think so too. My grandfather told me that for counterbattery they usually had one battery of 105 attached, and he seemed to mean the same one. It was all land-lines where he was, and a fairly static frontline though.

[Scott B]

I'm a former US Army artillery officer, and what's being discussed is near and dear to my heart. I'm somewhat familiar with the US Army's system for the employment of field artillery during the time period represented in CMBO, but my knowledge of British Army practices during the same period is relatively more shaky.

That said, it's apparent from the outset that both the British and American systems reflect the two most important aspects of an effective system for the employment of indirect fires, and the fact that they do it in somewhat different manners should be considered less important than the fact that they both more or less "got it right."

Artillery has a dual nature - you want it available to as many front line troops as possible, yet it is most effective when applied against a target en masse. The generally accepted solution to this problem was a decentralized observer system with what was basically a centralized, parallel artillery chain of command. This was the case in both the British (and I assume the other Commonwealth armies as well) and the American armies.

Contrast this with the German and Soviet systems. The German system was, as best I can tell, completely decentralized. It was basically exactly as is shown in Combat Mission-- the observer calls back to his battery and the rounds come. With the exception of pre-planned deliberate attacks, the fires lacked mass, but were responsive to the needs of the observer.

In a total black-and-white contrast to the Germans, the Soviets exercised near-absolute centralization of their indirect fire resources, generally sacrificing responsiveness in order to guarantee that those rounds (and there'd be a lot of them) would go where the commander wanted them. This meant an operational level ability to exert massive amounts of firepower, but it basically left line units to fend for themselves with whatever organic assets they had available.

Clearly, the fact that the United States' and British Armies could exercise tactical level control over large amounts of artillery means that they were doing something more effectively than the Germans and Soviets were. In fact, one of the important things to remember about Western Allied artillery is that they were not opposed by an effective fire support system, and as such had somewhat exaagerated effectiveness, as the counterbattery and enemy air threats were low. Therefore, you're looking at excellent conditions for employment of very effective fire support systems.

As for a comparison of US and British systems - I'd need to know more about the British. Here are my questions:

1. To what extent did the British employ aerial observers organic to their field artillery? (This is one often-mentioned area that granted impressive advantages in US target acquisition.)

2. What level of training did an observer require? Did the British observer do the calculations for the firing battery, or did they have any sort of Fire Direction Center to "do all the math?"

3. What's the difference between "ordering" and "requesting" a fire mission? (And I mean, really, not just semantics.)

Some areas that I can already see that could be issues in comparing the US and British systems are:

1. Organic systems in the Division. A US Division had 48 howitzers, and a British Division had 72. More is better, although one for one I'd personally take the 105mm over the 25-pounder (shell weight is probably a more important concern than rate of fire - after the first salvo lands your target is going to be seeking cover with haste). Organic systems are important, because your guys are more used to working with them than those Corps arty types that showed up a week ago.

2. Fire Direction - the principle advantage of a Fire Direction Center system is that the tricky parts of fire calculations are done back in a tent someplace, and not up at the front where someone's shooting at you. By creating a simplified Call For Fire procedure, you can effectively teach anyone with a radio to call for fire. That kind of observation coverage is effectively absolute when radios become sufficiently widespread.

3. Staffing - communications and survey are critically important for effective artillery support. I do know that one of the strengths of US artillery was that it was well staffed, as previously mentioned by Slapdragon.

Some other misconceptions - that US junior lieutenant "FO" (actually a FSO - Fire Support Officer) is a Vietnam War and later thing, part of the FIST system, and it works quite well when you understand the other working parts of the system. It's not in the correct context. In that same system, a battalion fire support officer is generally a senior captain.

I don't know that either the US or British systems were noticeably superior to the other. From 1944-1945 neither were effectively challenged by the Luftwaffe or German Artillery, and the extremely compressed nature of the front in Northwest Europe certainly compounded their effectiveness. I'm not certain a convincing argument can be made for one over the other, as the effects at the point of the spear were basically the same.

Scott B.

(Edited for spelling/grammar.)

[ 10-16-2001: Message edited by: Scott B ]

[Brian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

I would like you to justify your contention that the "US system" was "better than any other country". I have seen you make it before and I would like to know why for example you consider it better than the British system.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I too would like to see Slappy justify that comment. One could almost believe he was putting forward a *GASP* "nationalist agenda" or even proclaiming an "uberAmerican" position.

Of course that can't be right. Afterall, he has proclaimed he has a "superior intellect" and is above "all that" sort of thing.

I suspect you'll find he's scurrying for his books, Simon. It will be interested how he goes up against Bidwell... :eek:

[argie]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B:

A lot

Scott B.

(Edited for spelling/grammar.)

[ 10-16-2001: Message edited by: Scott B ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I suggest yo to go to the link I posted above. Is a very comprehensive essay on British Arty in WWII, including such things as training, FDCs and FOOS, and SOPs and procedures.

[Juardis]

Well, if we're talking about CMBB, then contrasting US System vs. Commonwealth System is irrelevant isn't it? Unless the soviets used one or the other that is. But...since we seem to be talking about the US System, what I'd like to see is a command for ToT (Time on Target) wherein ALL rounds of ALL calibers land at the SAME time. This was common practice by the US and I'd like to see it. However, if it wasn't common practice for the Soviets, then it's another great idea (IMHO ) for the engine rewrite and not necessarily for CMBB.

[Andreas]

Scott, excellent post by you. Really very helpful to someone with as little understanding of these matters as I do possess. I have inserted some comments below. They are mostly based on George Blackburn's 'The guns of war'. Blackburn was the longest-serving FOO in NWE in the Canadian Army. It is well worth reading. I have been looking for a book called 'Mike target', but it seems to be out of print (or I imagine it, not sure which is worse...)

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B:

Clearly, the fact that the United States' and British Armies could exercise tactical level control over large amounts of artillery means that they were doing something more effectively than the Germans and Soviets were. In fact, one of the important things to remember about Western Allied artillery is that they were not opposed by an effective fire support system, and as such had somewhat exaagerated effectiveness, as the counterbattery and enemy air threats were low. Therefore, you're looking at excellent conditions for employment of very effective fire support systems.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed - that certainly was a major point. Also the previous one about German/Red Army practice. The German system for CBF was well developed, but depended somewhat on static frontlines I believe. My grandfather did that job outside Leningrad. They even had observation balloons earlier in the war

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B:

As for a comparison of US and British systems - I'd need to know more about the British. Here are my questions:

1. To what extent did the British employ aerial observers organic to their field artillery? (This is one often-mentioned area that granted impressive advantages in US target acquisition.)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Commonwealth used aerial observers in Austers quite extensively, AFAIK.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B:

2. What level of training did an observer require? Did the British observer do the calculations for the firing battery, or did they have any sort of Fire Direction Center to "do all the math?"<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Okay, I have just checked with Blackburn. Seems to me there were three types of targets:

1. SOS - the guns would be aiming at this spot if they were not firing elsewhere. This would cover the most likely advance of the enemy. Response including flight time for one example in Normandy < 1min. Fire rate and time of shot predetermined

2. DF - defensive fire. Could only be ordered by a Brigadier (CRA) or up, for security reasons. Math would have been done beforehand, target was numbered. FDC in the gun position would just shout the number to the gun commander, fire starts at pre-determined intensity and time of shot.

3. Map reference targets (observed or unobserved 'firing from the map') - FOO calls target grid reference, number of rounds, and orders fire. FDC does the math. FOO calls adjustments as necessary. Time in one example for a troop shoot is under 'one minute or thereabouts'.

Blackburns regiment 4th Field CRA had a training standard whereby the guns could move from travelling in convoy to putting a spotting round out in the time of 3-5 minutes, including laying the guns etc. 3 mins in normal terrain.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B:

3. What's the difference between "ordering" and "requesting" a fire mission? (And I mean, really, not just semantics.)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don't know what the difference is (apart from semantics) since I don't know the US system. In the Commonwealth (shouldn't that be Dominion anyway?), an FOO requested a target and it got fired, unless someone higher up thought the guns might be more gainfully employed otherwise. I think it was a matter of institutional trust - if the FOO required something, the FDC would know that he needed it. If Joe Bloggs the 90-day wonder with the radio requests the same thing, there maybe some lingering doubts... Just guessing.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B:

1. Organic systems in the Division. A US Division had 48 howitzers, and a British Division had 72. More is better, although one for one I'd personally take the 105mm over the 25-pounder (shell weight is probably a more important concern than rate of fire - after the first salvo lands your target is going to be seeking cover with haste). Organic systems are important, because your guys are more used to working with them than those Corps arty types that showed up a week ago.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The AGRAs (Army Group Royal Artillery) with the medium and heavy/super-heavy regiments were pretty permanent attachments on Corps level and would have been known, although of course not as familiar.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B:

2. Fire Direction - the principle advantage of a Fire Direction Center system is that the tricky parts of fire calculations are done back in a tent someplace, and not up at the front where someone's shooting at you. By creating a simplified Call For Fire procedure, you can effectively teach anyone with a radio to call for fire. That kind of observation coverage is effectively absolute when radios become sufficiently widespread<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>.

The most dangerous thing in the world is a Lieutenant with a map... You still need to be able to read your map correctly.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Scott B:

3. Staffing - communications and survey are critically important for effective artillery support. I do know that one of the strengths of US artillery was that it was well staffed, as previously mentioned by Slapdragon.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think there were more men in the RA (including LAA and AT Regiments) than there were in the infantry. Simon said the level was at 18% compared to 16%.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JonS:

[ 10-16-2001: Message edited by: JonS because it drives The Anglophile wild, and he's posting to this thread so will probably see it, tee hee ]

[ 10-16-2001: Message edited by: JonS ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Anglophile just notes that you are incapable of getting it right the first time

I have also seen references to FOOs like that one in a book called 'Tug of war - the Canadian battle that opened Antwerp' which I received yesterday, together with a copy of Stacey's 'History of the Canadian Army 1939-1945' signed by Stacey to Bob Moncel, OC 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade. No, I am not sad

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JonS:

Don't hold your breath. I'm waiting for an acknowledgement (at least) of something I sent him a week and a half ago.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

JonS, I did not recieve any e-mail from you, please post it here (if it is important enough that you really would like an answer) and I would be happy to respond, but it is silly to post a comment like this when you have not even e-mailed me anything.

Now, Simon and Brian are just trying to get the flames burning here and short circuit any intellectual discussion, but for Berl and Andreas and other who do want a to discuss this, here is the reason why the US system worked better.

People.

The US system devoted nearly twice the number of people to communications than the commonwealth system, one of the reasons why the US had a larger tail than other countries (the other was supply). This allowed relatively junior members of their force structure to call in artillery. In the CW system, no FO meant no arty generally (I know of exceptions though), while each platoon leader in the US system could call down a barrage with excellent accuracy, kind of useful when the battery FO is 5 km away and has never even seen or heard of your platoon.

It was not a disadvantage to have junior officers control artillery assets, but an advantage -- assuming you had the communications infrastucture and training to back that up.

In practical terms, since the above is not simulated in CM, the US and its oversized communication network made artillery direction and redirection faster.

Note that I can make this arguments without using insults Brian, perhaps you can attempt the same in your reply. And JonS, I really do want to hear what you have to say, just post it here and I will be happy to respond, I really did not get any e-mails from you.

[Slapdragon]

PS -- sorry for taking so long to answer the baits (in all fairness, Simon's was not a flame bait though) but I was on the road all weekend in training. JonS, it may be that your account has been used or is used for spam, or is close to an account used for spam, which is why you cannot send me an e-mail. All three of my primary e-mail addresses have some pretty hefty spam blockers in place, which cut apart free e-mail services and sometimes accounts with common names or numbers in them. Again, just post your question here and I will be happy to answer it.