Commonwealth Tactics - Refugee post

[Guest Germanboy]

Right, coming back to the original question, maybe we can make this a decent discussion after all...

UK/Canadian operations, ETO history:

Victory in the West, 2 Vols, official history, check HMSO or your local library if in the UK.

The Canadian Army 1939-1945 Col. PC Stacey, Ottawa 1948

Smaller stuff:

Reynolds 'Steel Panthers', written from the German perspective, Normandy, Caen to Falaise.

A couple of divisional histories by Patrick Delaforce. I have read 'The Polar Bears' (49th Division) and 'The Fighting Wessex Wyverns' (43rd Division). They cover Normandy to 8/5/45. Well written, minor errors, lots of first person accounts. Delaforce was a troop leader in the 11th Armoured in Normandy.

Ken Tout 'A fine night for tanks: The road to Falaise' about operation 'Totalize'.

Autobiography:

Ken Tout 'Tank!' he was a gunner in the 2nd Northants Yeomanry during Totalize. Good read.

Forgotten the author '64 days of a Normandy summer'

There are a number of websites with very little info. One is the 'Scots at war' project. Have a look for that, forgotten the URL. On my next trip to London in two weeks I will stop by at the IWM to see if they have anything interesting.

In general, I have had a hard time dredging up UK stuff. There seems to be no equivalent to the Center for Military History or the Center for Army Lessons Learned in the US here. If there is, could someone please post a link.

Hope that helps. If anybody is aware of other material, please let me know.

Now can we restrain ourselves to mature discussion about the topic of sources for Commonwealth tactics here, please. I know I am not without fault, but it would be really nice if this thread worked out that way.

Cheers.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[Speedy]

If you are interested in finding web sites relating to the UK military try www.cyndislist.com/miluk.htm

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Speedy:

If you are interested in finding web sites relating to the UK military try www.cyndislist.com/miluk.htm <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks, that was what I was hoping for. It still does not seem that the UK possesses an equivalent to CMH or CALL on the web though. Shame.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[CEO]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Right, coming back to the original question, maybe we can make this a decent discussion after all...

UK/Canadian operations, ETO history:

Victory in the West, 2 Vols, official history, check HMSO or your local library if in the UK.

The Canadian Army 1939-1945 Col. PC Stacey, Ottawa 1948

Smaller stuff:

Reynolds 'Steel Panthers', written from the German perspective, Normandy, Caen to Falaise.

A couple of divisional histories by Patrick Delaforce. I have read 'The Polar Bears' (49th Division) and 'The Fighting Wessex Wyverns' (43rd Division). They cover Normandy to 8/5/45. Well written, minor errors, lots of first person accounts. Delaforce was a troop leader in the 11th Armoured in Normandy.

Ken Tout 'A fine night for tanks: The road to Falaise' about operation 'Totalize'.

Autobiography:

Ken Tout 'Tank!' he was a gunner in the 2nd Northants Yeomanry during Totalize. Good read.

Forgotten the author '64 days of a Normandy summer'

There are a number of websites with very little info. One is the 'Scots at war' project. Have a look for that, forgotten the URL. On my next trip to London in two weeks I will stop by at the IWM to see if they have anything interesting.

In general, I have had a hard time dredging up UK stuff. There seems to be no equivalent to the Center for Military History or the Center for Army Lessons Learned in the US here. If there is, could someone please post a link.

Hope that helps. If anybody is aware of other material, please let me know.

Now can we restrain ourselves to mature discussion about the topic of sources for Commonwealth tactics here, please. I know I am not without fault, but it would be really nice if this thread worked out that way.

Cheers.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks. At least some people try to help.

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No smilies were harmed in the making of this post.

[MikeO]

Those 'Victory in the West' volumes by L.F. Ellis are excellent, particularly vol 1 'The Battle of Normandy' with that small scale map of the 'Odon Battlefield' showing all the fields and hedgerows. Very much a dry 'official' history though IMHO.

For more in the way of eyewitness accounts of small unit actions, I still find 'Caen: Anvil of Victory' by A. McKee to be an old classic.

[Simon Fox]

By the time I got around to reading the parent thread it had degenerated into a conglomeration of the illinformed venturing their unwanted opinions which amounted to little more than a bunch of misconceptions. Thankfully we are starting afresh here. I should add that though Steve seems to think I am some sort of apologist for the British, I am an Aussie and would never shirk from declaring the existence of a "Pommie bastard" when I come across one

While I can cite a number of references, first person accounts abound and these are often the most useful. Unfortunately the web doesn't hold much promise for general texts but there are a number of personal accounts around.

As a general observation it is important to note that the terrible losses of WW1 loomed large in British operational thinking and tactical doctrine. As a result there was an excessive emphasis on a combined arms doctrine which at times produced tactical rigidity. Though this does not necessarily impact upon the scale of CM. For all the criticisms of the massive tank losses in the battles around Caen one must remember that at the time the British would much rather lose tanks than men and in human terms the actual casualties were not that large in such battles.

First of all british infantry is equipped a little differently to the US and germans and definitely do not posses the infantry firpower of the latter or to a lesser extent the former. Arguably however the British were equipped with the best all-round squad light automatic weapon of the war. Now before the MG42 lovers go off half cocked I am talking about flexibility, employment in all tactical situations and all theatres. As the Germans didn't have to fight in any jungles the question doesn't really arise. I do not know how it is modelled in CM but I sincerely hope that British squads are able to more quickly employ their squad automatic weapon than the German equivalent and furthermore that they have more effective firepower on the move since IIRC the MG42 wasn't fired from the hip too often.

Though it is not modelled in CM anecdotally I would expect British troops to employ captured weapons more frequently and furthermore to more frequently vary from the official TOE in their weaponry. In defensive circumstances British troops frequently employed captured MG42s though they would not carry them around. Because of the relatively poor quality of the Sten (tendency to jam) wherever possible they were supplanted by the MP40, the Thompson and also the Beretta (which was much prized). Overall I think the British infantry employed SMGs more liberally than their TOE suggests.

The British MG (the Vickers) is relatively immobile compared to the HMG42 (don't go there) but being water cooled should be capable of a better sustained rate of fire. When mounted on a Bren carrier with the cooling running off the vehicles radiator it was good for suppression. The Brits also widely used the .30 cal. The 2" mortar is quite weak but should be ok for suppressing an MG position. The 3" and the 4.2" were good.

The British artillery is the preeminent arm with a high standard throughout the war only overshadowed slightly towards the end by the US. The 25pdr gun was very mobile and flexible and fired a pretty good round. It was considered by the Brits to be superior to the US 105mm in lethality, I'm not sure why, the arty gurus can answer that one.

Unfortunately bayonets for close combat aren't modelled since as we all know "Jerry doesn't like cold steel".

British AT guns are much better than their US counterparts and by Normandy all 6pdrs would commonly have the subcalibre rounds, also the 17pdr AT was common.

I'm not an armour guru but British armour includes lots of neat toys in addition to their versions of US vehicles. Also the british tanks were a lot more survivable (when knocked out) than the Sherman. Though their guns aren't so good (vis a vis the Germans, apart from the 17pdr) some Brit tanks have really good armour. The 6pdr with the subcalibre round is much better vs armour than the US 75mm which also armed British tanks. The Brits also used infantry support tanks with 95mm guns.

Basically with the British infantry you need to be a little more circumspect as to how you employ them than maybe US which had larger squads. As an example of how not to do it try the recent AAR, apologies to Bil 'the Somme' Hardenberger. A note of interest is that Fionn points out the poor HE capabilities of the Firefly...dead right. Only under extreme circumstances or long range was the Firefly to engage infantry. They were the British Tiger antidote, the HE ammo was stored down in the vacant co-drivers position and was quite hard to get too. They lurked to the rear of the troop and were only brought up to deal with German armour. In reality they would never be employed as Bil used his.

I'll hunt out some currently available references and post them when I can. Unfortunately a lot of mine are out of print.

[Pacestick]

Okay, jerry hates the thought of half a foot of bayonet slicing into his throat, no problem but who exactly likes "cold steel"?

Unfortunately bayonets for close combat aren't modelled since as we all know "Jerry doesn't like cold steel".

[Bastables]

Simon is referring to the doctrinal differences in infantry tactics between the Heer and the Imperial forces. The Germans based their infantry zug’s around the LMG as the killer of the zug. Commonwealth forces at that time and U.K. forces currently, see the individual soldier as the as the main arbitrator of infantry combat and the section is built around this belife. With the soldier as the focus of a section’s battle drills the marksmanship of riflemen and bayonet charge is seen as terribly sexy hence actual formal training in close quarter combat and the corresponding increase in willingness of British formations to charge in with bayonets fixed. From the Commonwealth perspective the Germans were generally unwilling to charge in instead preferring to use firepower to force the enemy out hence the idea that Jerry doesn’t like cold steel.

[This message has been edited by Bastables (edited 06-06-2000).]

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

As a general observation it is important to note that the terrible losses of WW1 loomed large in British operational thinking and tactical doctrine. As a result there was an excessive emphasis on a combined arms doctrine which at times produced tactical rigidity. Though this does not necessarily impact upon the scale of CM. For all the criticisms of the massive tank losses in the battles around Caen one must remember that at the time the British would much rather lose tanks than men and in human terms the actual casualties were not that large in such battles.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What an excellent post Simon. Funny that an Aussie and a German come riding to the defense of the English. Well okay, I still like to think I am defending the Highland Division, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the Tyne and Tees and the Canadians...

One thing that struck me reading first-person accounts of UK infantry officers in the ETO is how often they used the words 'set-piece attack'. This usually meant a combined arms, two sub-units frontage attack (e.g. two companies of a BN or two BNs of a Brigade) following a barrage (often involving the MG Batallion), with the men then walking behind a rolling barrage involving lots of smoke.

Also, both the 43rd and the 49th Infantry Divisions seem to have had so-called battle schools during 1942-4, in which all officers and sometimes NCOs, IIRC, were drilled in doctrine.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[Aacooper]

The British lack of armor-infantry cooperation hurt them throughout desert and Normandy battles, but by the battle for the Rhine, they had made improvements. From the start of Operation Veritable on February 8th, infantry rode in Kangaroos and Buffalos (i.e. APC's) and Crocodile Churchills stayed close by to chew up the German defences. I wasn't sure how they made the tactical transition until I read about Operation Totalize (in Normandy). General Simonds apparently decided to start the attack at dark, and used 76 converted Priests as APC's (aka Kangaroos). However, the English hesitancy in the attack continued up through Operation Varsity (in Germany) where the Rhine was successfully crossed, but Horrocks' 30 Corps was bogged down for three days by a single fallschirmjer (sp?) battalion.

[guachi]

Re: firing the MG42 on the move.

I've seen pictures and explanations of how the MG42 was fired on the move. From a standing/hunched position the gunner would use the shoulders of an ammo carrier as a bipod. They could move forward at up to a slow jog if necessary and stop to quickly bring fire on to the enemy.

I can't imagine that it would be very pleasant to be the human bipod, though.

Jason

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Betas available to everyone are just publicity stunts anyways. -FK

[Holman]

Here's a Commonwealth tactics question:

I've heard that the small tracked troop carriers (I don't know the official name, but I've seen them referred to as Bren Carriers when they mounted a Bren) were relatively common in CW infantry organizations. Is this so? If true, how were they employed? Would they actually accompany the infantry in an advance on enemy positions, or did they (like halftracks, say) usually hang back?

Any information on these carriers is welcome.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Martyr:

Here's a Commonwealth tactics question:

I've heard that the small tracked troop carriers (I don't know the official name, but I've seen them referred to as Bren Carriers when they mounted a Bren) were relatively common in CW infantry organizations. Is this so? If true, how were they employed? Would they actually accompany the infantry in an advance on enemy positions, or did they (like halftracks, say) usually hang back?

Any information on these carriers is welcome.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think they were just called 'carriers' when not mounting a Bren, Vickers or flamethrower (called WASP and in CM). When equipped with guns they were sometimes used for fire support, sort of fast HMG teams. Apart from that they were used as supply vehicles, couriers, to carry heavy weapons, tow AT guns, so mostly in rear-area work. I believe they were quite vulnerable, open-topped with no heavy armour, so in a front-line employment they would have been wasted. I don't know whether the WASP had better armour.

That is all just off the top of my head, and I am sure someone here knows a lot more about these.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[Marty]

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Simon Fox said:

...First of all british infantry is equipped a little differently to the US and germans and definitely do not posses the infantry firpower of the latter or to a lesser extent the former....

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Simon's post, overall is excellent, and great info that I am really glad to see. I do however differ a little bit with what he says in the above statement - I think the firepower levels are reversed.

The German squad was based around the LMG, in this case the MG42, and the remaining squad members were utilized so as to bring its firepower to bear.

In the American squad, the LMG, in this case the BAR, was seen more as a support weapon while the firepower leverage was seen to be in the use of the semi-auto M1 rifle.

Most references I have seen indicate a German squad organized as 10 men:

- Feldwebel (Sergeant) armed with SMG (MP38)

- Kapral (Corporal) armed with SMG or K98 rifle

- Gunner for MG42

- Ammo Bearer for MG42 (with K98 rifle)

- 6 privates armed with K98 rifle

The info on the American squad shows 12 men:

- Sergeant armed with SMG (Thompson/Grease Gun) or M1 Rifle

- Corporal with M1 Rifle

- Gunner with BAR

- Ammo Bearer for Bar with M1 Rifle

- 8 privates with M1 Rifles

The German firepower would have been lethal close up because of the SMG's and anywhere in the cone of the LMG.

The American firepower was broader based and overall more effective from long range across a frontal area.

Several articles and documentaries have mentioned that german soldiers, both rifle-armed and MG42 gunners were often "impressed" with the amount of firepower that Americans squads could bring to bear from many directions.

One other factor also comes into it, which was commented on by one German rifleman who carried a K98. He said that in their training they were taught to carefully pick a target and make each round count, as they had a bolt-action rifle. The Americans, on the other hand, just threw lots of ammo quickly in a general direction for a suppressive effect.

[Formerly Babra]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Martyr:

Any information on these carriers is welcome.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Just to flesh it out a bit, they are called Universal Carriers (various marks).

There was a carrier platoon organic to the HQ of every rifle battalion at least. I don't have my sources handy, so I don't know if any were attached at company level.

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When I die I want to go peacefully, like my grandfather, in his sleep -- not screaming, like the passengers in his car

[Major Tom]

I had this wackassed big post to go here, but, I accidentaly hit the Esc button, and lost it all. Damn.

The Commonwealth forces have a LOT of interesting stuff.

The Cromwell is like a Sherman, but, with a LOW profile (can hide better). I can't see any difference in armour or speed, and they both have the same gun (Don't know if any 6 Pounder Cromwells served in Normandy?)

Churchill is a VERY tough tank. It is a GREAT Infantry support vehicle. Use it to kill enemy infantry, not enemy tanks. It's heavy armour can probably shrug off Schreck and Faust attacks much better than Shermans or Cromwells.

Universal Carrier. Armed with a Bren or Vickers Machine Gun these things are mobile pilboxes. Use these things as small arms cover fire for advancing infantry or defensive fire. They can move fast and set up faster than regular HMG and MMG, plus, their low siloette can keep them out of enemy sight.

The regular Commonwealth Squads aren't as powerful as the Specialized German squads, nor do they contain the numbers of the American Squads. They are a 'happy' medium. Equipped with a good LMG and Rifle, they surpass at medium range supression fire. Their SMG, well, sucks. A good way in advancing with British Infantry is to divide the squad, have the LMG Team provide cover fire, and have the SMG team advance. A platoon of this can supress an enemy platoon with LMG fire and advance and kill close range with SMG and rifle fire. Also, the Vickers HMG was VERY good, was used until the 1970s! Use this with the Bren Teams to supress the enemy, so, their close range firepower cannot be put to bare on your Infantry Teams.

Here are some general tactics:

1. ATTACKERS should always have a diversionary attack. Have a plan, and stick to it. Even if you encounter a weak spot with your diversionary assault it is best not to change your plan totally, as, it will cause too many delays.

2. ATTACKERS should advance along trails and through forests hidden from enemy observation. Move along the dead ground offered by hills. Patrol along the planned route with the camera view on ground level, and observe to see if your troops can be spotted along the route.

3. ATTACKERS should divide their force to have the majority of infantry (60%) in the main attack and the minority form diversions. Divide your diversionary squads into teams, it will appear from a long distance that there is a company advancing instead of 1.5 Platoons. Before you engage the enemy combine all of your teams back into full squads. Have these troops accompanies by HMGs and Mortors. Engage the enemy with these troops and keep up the appearance that this is the main attack (so they deploy all their reserves).

4. ATTACKERS should deploy the majority of tanks with their diversionary attack. This will further the appearance that this is the main assault. Engage the enemy with these vehicles as medium support weapons. Remember, tanks can move accross the map quickly, so, when your main attack begins you can move the surviving vehicles to support it.

5. DEFENDERS and ATTACKERS should ALWAYS have a mobile reserve. Save your weak skinned vehicles along with at least a platoon of Infantry in a rear protected area. Behind a hill, or forest will offer the best protection. Keep it near the centre of the map so it can easily be sent toward the most important area (to support a breakthrough or to counter attack). ONLY deploy this force when you REALLY need it.

6. DEFENDERS shoud NEVER weaken another area of defence in order to boost another. Keep troops together and don't send them piecemiel to be chewwed up in an already lost cause. If the other position falls, withdraw your troops further to the rear to avoid getting flanked.

7. DEFENDERS should defend only individual bastions, not a line. Lines can be easily broken, while, groups, or hedgehogs cannot. The best/minimun formation should consist of an entire Platoon of infantry, along with a HMG/MMG, a zook/schreck/PIAT with mortor support. Never get any smaller than this, as it can be too easily defeated. Also, for defensive positions and ambushes always have a balanced force of Infantry, HMG, and Zooks.

8. USE vehicles and troops for what they best do. SMG Squads make great assault troops, while HMG Squads make great covering groups, use them as such. Tanks with good HE capability should be used primarily for infantry support. You don't want to waste a Firefly on Infantry, better save it for any possible Tigers or Panthers along the road!

9. NEVER rely on a special weapon to win the war. Even King Tigers get knocked out. Have adequate support for even your 'invincible' vehicles, as well as a backup plan in case your top troops/tanks die.

10. NEVER advance along a road (especially one surrounded by trees) with vehicles. You can get nailed pretty easy, and, roads are the most predictable routes (Therefore most heavily defended!). If you must, advance with troops ahead of and along the flanks of the vehicles. HOwever, doing this will lower the chances of survival of your troops (as the tanks will be too far back to offer adequate support). Your best bet of advance is through fields. Even though it seems like a wrong move, this is the best way to move while minimizing casualties. Have infantry walking ALONG WITH the tanks. This will have any threat against the Infantry being taken out by the tanks, and the Infantry keeping Schrecks/Zooks a safe distance from the tanks.

11. USE artillery and smoke CAREFULLY. Never use it on an enemy that is a distance from your line of defence, it will only cause them a slight nusance. If you can predict where/when the enemy will be when he encounters your line of defence set down a barage. Artillery will supress the enemy troops and allow your troops to inflict more casualties as well as have less of their own. Smoke is a good for both the attack and defence. Use it to cover artillery or to stop flanking fire on advancign troops. Creating corridors of smoke will allow you to cover your flanks but still have the capacity to blast the target your infantry is going for with tank support. Never cover the area you are planing to advance to in smoke. Defensive smoke fire can be used to stop tanks from killing your poor infantry or to cover a withdrawl.

12. RETREATS should be planned carefully. THere are NEVER any invulnerable positions, eventually the attacker will find a way, or blast a way through almost any defence. Keep routes of reatreat open (valleys/forests) that aren't seen by your enemy. If these aren't availible, lay down a smoke screen between your enemy and the planned path. Retreat your slow moving troops (Mortors, HMG's, etc.) before your infantry. Ineed, they don't offer much in close range fighting either. If you have a platoon of infantry to retreat, the best bet for survival is to detatch a squad divided into 2 teams to cover the rest of the troops. If there is enough time, withdraw these troops as well. Hopefully your support weapons will be set up intime to help the Infantry survive their retreat. If you have waited too long to retreat, the best bet is to keep where you are. Troops in motion make great targets. You can only hope in taking out a few of the enemy before you yourself are wiped out.

13. DEFENDERS should keep all of their weaponry hidden from long range fire. Attackers 'usually' carry more long range firepower than defenders. Best to use your firepower close where numerical superiority means less (you can get local superiority this way). Set up a series of ambushes hidden by hills or forests. Make sure you can get the most guns pointed at your enemy with the fewest of his pointed at you. Flanking fire can be devestating.

14. Specialized vehicles, like the StuG, should not be used like tanks. Use them to support tanks/infantry, through long range fire (makes up for their lack of traversing speed), or, close range ambush where you have the benefit of suprise. Don't be afraid to withdraw, you can always retake VP!

15. NEVER attack a tank with infantry without AT support (ie Panzerfausts/Rifle Grenades). You loose too many troops in a close assault for just one tank (possibly!). If your enemy is smart, they will not have a lone tank, or one without infantry support.

16. KEEP your tanks away from houses, forests, or hedgerows that you don't control. Keep them in the rear, or far enough away that zooks cannot effectively kill them. Keep your infantry inbetween tanks and suspicious places such as these.

18. BUILDINGS should be taken only by sheer firepower. Blast them down with direct fire from tanks. If you have to assault them, first you must isolate the building/town and attack it from multiple directions. THis way the defender cannot have their troops in the rear of buildings to catch your guys walking in with their pants down. ALWAYS knock down the 2 story buildings. Doing this can remove your enemies bonus of high fround detecting your advancing formations, plus, they are difficult to take! But, don't destroy EVERY building, you must have something left to defend once you have taken it! Keep tanks well outside of towns, unless you are using them to defend a town (in this case have infantry covering all cases of advance so your enemy can't sneak up a zook to knock your tank out!)

19. DEFENDING towns should not just be a matter of occupying buildings. If you are defending (ie. your troops dig foxholes) your best bet of setup is to divide your squads into teams, and position ALL troops (including HQ's, HMGs, mortors, etc...) within OUTSIDE positions of defence (ie. forests, hedgerows, etc... Keep these as secondary lines of defence, or, keep them occupied to avoid flanking or rear attacks into the town. Recombine your teams back into squads and then move back into the buildings. These foxholes can then be used later on for reinforcements or rear positions.

[von Lucke]

Bravo, Major Tom! That is certainly the most comprehensive (yet, to the point) post I've seen here in some time.

[Simon Fox]

Some useful recent texts on this subject:

Arnhem Martin Middlebrook 1995

A fine night for Tanks Ken Tout 1999

Also 3 other books by Tout: Tanks!, To hell with Tanks!, Tanks, Advance! from Normandy to the Netherlands

Monty's Marauders Patrick Delaforce 1998 (bit of a naff title but good)

18 Platoon Sydney Jary

Thank God and the Infantry John Lincoln 1999

A view from the turret Bill Close

Now to respond to a few points:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The British lack of armor-infantry cooperation hurt them throughout desert and Normandy battles,<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>aacooper

This is not strictly correct though it would be certainly accurate for many of the desert battles. Unfortunately it is one promulgated by widely read books like Max Hastings Overlord which is somewhat unbalanced on this issue and which totally fails to consider exactly what the British doctrine and training were at the time. Following from my previous post it is without doubt that by 1944, and well before, British training and doctrine overemphasised cooperation between arms with the specific objective in mind of sparing the infantry the appalling casualties of WW1 and as a result of the German success in 1940. To view British failings in Normandy as being in part a result of poor armour-infantry cooperation is simplistic since it totally ignores the nature of the terrain which was absolutely unsuitable for armour. In fact I would suggest that it was the combination of rigid adherence to armour-infantry dogma and inflexibility of thought engendered by overtraining and inexperience which meant that British infantry formations took some time to break free of their over-reliance upon armoured support (or expectation of it at least).

As for Marty's points regarding the relative firepower of US and German squads I beleive there has been plenty of discussion on this subject on previous threads. I think it is pertinent to note that in this context that the firepower of the German squad was best employed on the defensive, residing as it did primarily in the MG42 (ignoring later squad OOBs), which was after all the principle posture of the Germans at this time.

[Simon Fox]

In one of his posts Andreas mentions the "Battle Schools". These were the principle training schools of the British army at the time and they perpetuated a fairly formulaic approach to tactics. Often they were staffed by officers with little practical experience themselves. There is some merit to the idea that training for so long with a rigid set of standard tactical solutions British infantry formations became locked into a way of thinking which took some time to break out of when they eventually encountered battle and of course with considerable cost.

I have quoted some pertinent points from Jary's book below:

"I now have little doubt that, for the first two months in Normandy, we lacked two things: comprehensive and imaginative training and personal experience of battle. We were also seriously handicapped by our casual attitude. Too many junior officers did not think for themselves and persistently relied on the narrow teaching of the Battle Schools, whose dogma had assumed the proportion of holy writ......"

"Mesmerised by the performance of the German panzer divisions in their blitzkrieg campaign in France in 1940, co-operation between arms became the gospel. Infantry had to fit into the big picture, rarely operating without artillery and armoured support. The most successful actions by 18 Platoon were fought without the support of either. We had learned in a hard school how to skirmish, infiltrate and edge our way forward. The left or right flanking platoon attack, so beloved of the Battle School staff, would rarely succeed in the Normandy bocage. I remember with horror being locked into the timetables of meticulously planned large battles. These invariably left the junior infantry commander with no scope for exploitation. If you found a gap in the enemy defences, adherence to the artillery program, which rarely could be altered, effectively stopped any personal initiative. To me, the preparation for these battles assumed the demented proportion of a Kafka-like nightmare ballet, in which the anonymous 'they' ordained that 'we' must perform a choreographed ritual danse macabre. I felt trapped and helpless. No solo parts were written into the score, nor was there scope for small groups of performers in this mammoth ballet of machines. Undoubtedly, far shadows from the Somme clouded my emotions, but instinct told me that this kind of show would be unlikely to succeed. The irony was that this support was planned and given to the infantry with the best of intentions. The Somme had also cast its shadows on our artillery and armoured commanders. Both genuinely believed that in their hands they had the panacea which would protect us, the infantry, from the terrible slaughter of 1916. Instead they put us in a straightjacket.

Some battalion and brigade commanders had, with the most humane intentions, been seduced by this doctrine. Their soldiers expected and relied upon artillery and armoured support and this tended to rob them of the self-reliance essential to well trained infantry. As a twenty year old subaltern, I felt strongly about over-reliance on other arms. Now in my sixties, I do not under-estimate the influence that the Somme had on the British military psyche. Far too much time had been spent fitting the infantry and armoured junior leaders into the "big picture" and too little had been spent training them and stimulating their imagination, initiative and individual resourcefulness to probe, draw conclusions, infiltrate and exploit weaknesses in the enemy's dispositions. Providing the junior leader survived and adopted a professional attitude to the business in hand, time corrected the disadvantage of inexperience. However, the damnably casual attitude we British, including many regular soldiers, brought to most of our enterprises was unforgivable. I was too young at the time to appreciate this factor thoroughly and, without doubt, I was imbued with it myself. Three weeks commanding 18 Platoon eradicated this attitude for ever."

[Aacooper]

Simon -- you are correct that Hastings in "Overlord" is hard on the English about their cooperation. He says:

"A reasonable level of understanding between infantry and tank commanders on the battlefield was often absent."

also

"The infantry and armoured brigade commanders of one elite British armoured division were scarcely on speaking terms with each other in Normandy"

Also, when you read "Steel Inferno" and dig through its dense stories of the various operations, Reynolds expresses his opinion:

"Outdated military philosophies and old-fashioned discipline born and bred on the parade ground, had been shown to be badly wanting"

In several operations Reynolds refers to the lack of cooperation, like during the confusion of the beginning of EPSOM, where the tanks halted and the infantry plodded on without them, and an attack in the middle of GOODWOOD where Canadian infantry took up the attack with tanks held in the rear in a counter-attacking role.

I think regardless of the English training at the time, their execution led in several cases to a lack of cooperation between tanks and infantry. Inflexible artillery fire plans also hurt, as the advance German outposts were smashed, but the more dangerous mobile forces operated more freely.

Perhaps the English training led to the more coordinated tactics shown in the Reichswald, but through Normandy the English could not operationalize that doctrine.

[This message has been edited by Aacooper (edited 06-11-2000).]

[Formerly Babra]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The Black Day, Der Schwarze Tag, visited on the German Army on 8 August 1918 by the Canadian and Australian Corps was not repeated in the half-forgotten summer of 1944. In the final analysis Operation "Totalize" was a failure. Despite overwhelming air and artillery superiority, five divisions and two armoured brigades totalling upwards of 600 tanks could not handle two depleted German divisions, mustering no more than 60 panzers and tank destroyers. Contrary to popular belief, the bulk of roughly 80 88mm antitank guns, mostly belonging to the three Luftwaffe FlaK regiments, were deployed south of Potigny; only the divisional batteries were forward. It was thus mainly the 12th SS Division's resourceful handling of Tigers and Panthers that stemmed the Canadian attack. Yet, while these eastern front leviathans were more than a match for Shermans and Churchills, the Germans had nothing to compare with the Typhoon or "Jabo" as their troops fearfully labeled it. Then, too, the 17 Pounder in its Firefly, SP, and towed configurations possessed an ample margin of power over the Tiger as demonstrated in 1943.

To Simonds, the problem was not weapons or machines, but rather lack of proper handling of resources within armoured divisions. Troops also displayed a tendency, traceable back to training in Britain, to stick to roads and thereby inevitably encounter the antitank guns sited to cover them. Simonds had also expressly urged his armoured commanders not to wait for infantry divisions to take out final objectives or "get involved in probing...before they called down fire...or fighter-bombers." If he had given them narrow frontages, he had also allotted each division an AGRA of five medium regiments specifically to assist them in getting on quickly. Kitching's reaction, however, was to attack with two brigades up, instead of in depth as per Simonds's operational policy, leaving them pretty much to their own devices. Booth, in turn, delegated tactical responsibility down to battle groups with the result that artillery was never effectively brought to bear against pockets of resistance like that initially, and critically, encountered at Gaumesnil.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

From "Failure in High Command" by Lt. Col. John A. English, ISBN 0-919614-60-4

[Simon Fox]

Aacooper:

I would agree with your final points regarding the inflexibility of British doctrine. My main concern was with your use of the word "lack" in your earlier post which implied an absence of such cooperation. I am sure there are plenty of occasions when the coordination of infantry and armour were poor. But I think Hastings overemphasises the significance of this in the context of the Normandy battle. Unfortunately like many popular histories Hastings' book (and to a lesser extent Reynolds') has a tendency to take particular instances and broadly brush entire organisations with the conclusions without particular reference to supporting evidence for that extension. Quite what the personal antipathy between two brigadiers in a particular division has to do with overall British practice I do not know. Just an another example of Hastings' shoring up his basic premise of hidebound Brits versus stupendously professional Germans, both of which are equally incorrect characterisations. I am sure that there were plenty of occasions when cooperation was good. The basic point is that Normandy is very poor country for maintaining close coordination between armour and infantry even for experienced units which most British formations were not. German counterattacks in this terrain fared no better than their opponents.

Babra,

The point of your quote seems to be largely an operational one I would be interested in knowing your view of it's relevance.

On the subject of British weaponry and CM, the British equivalent of the bazooka and schrek, the PIAT, operated on an entirely different principle being spring operated. Although the warhead was considerably less effective than the zook or schrek the absence of a backblast made it excellent for firing from concealment and harder to spot. Though IIRC the range was also less.

[Spook]

Simon:

This topic is getting a bit deeper, and I appreciate the recent comments of you and others to delve into the British experience in Normandy.

(Forewarned, I am a Yank, but I will add that my first planned CM "operation" would be with a Commonwealth infantry unit.)

What I now have to offer from Doubler's "Closing With The Enemy" will in one way read as an antithesis to your comments in some ways, and a supporting thesis in others.

In the chapter "Fighting the Bocage", Doubler's focus on US troops in Normandy starts with noting the comparable tactical problem----the minimal, or nonexistent coordination of US armor with infantry when starting into the bocage. The central failing to this, however, was not simply due to the bocage terrain. Rather, it traced back to the fact that most tank units nominally assigned to US infantry divisions never had the chance to train, pre-invasion, with any infantry unit it was intended to support. Add the fact right after the invasion that several integral tank battalions were reassigned or cross-attached after landing, then many of the tankers just didn't know who they were supposed to coordinate with. The infantry, in turn, had to figure out ways on how to communicate with tanks that did happen to be on the field.

So these comments both support and challenge your points on the "fixation" that tank-infantry combined arms was a cure-all. You are right to note that just throwing tanks into the vicinity of supporting infantry wasn't going to solve the problem. But once they learned to work with each other, that story changed, especially in Normandy for the US forces. Eventually, some US units just behind the front lines started practicing to develop tank-infantry communication, by use of hand signals, smoke grenades, and especially rear-deck mounted radios.

And what of the bocage? Well, even a method was developed to deal with this terrain that allowed the tanks to stay up, with the help of attached engineers. To assault a bocage field, a tank would get up to the "jump-off" hedgerow and put suppresive fire onto the opposite bocage field corners where the Germans preferred to hide their MG's. (A 60mm mortar was sometimes attached too for helping with the suppresion.) Then the attached infantry would jump off from the base hedgerow to close with the suppressed Germans. While this happened, the tank would back off from the hedgerow, the engineers would lay charges to blow a gap into the hedge, and the tank could then cross into the field to keep up with the assaulting infantry. (Or the new front-welded "cutter" devices might have sufficed instead.) The process then repeated itself.

The hard-luck US 29th Division was among the first to apply this method in mid-July. By July 16th, the tank-infantry-engineer assault method had caused a significant breakthrough at regiment-level frontage, such as to set the stage for St. Lo's fall on July 18th.

So ultimately, the bocage was not proof against combined arms. Rather, it was the need to develop the combined arms down to a small-unit level to respond to the constraining nature of this terrain.

It was the same on coordination with the artillery too. If the attackers had to time themselves to pre-arranged barrages alone, that reduced flexibility to changing events or sudden "crisis situations." But if the artillery could also shift its mission to provide "on-call" fire, that would change matters too.

So the combined-arms "doctrine" wasn't inherently flawed. Rather, it was the pre-invasion small-unit integrated training that was lacking to implement the desired effect. The US Army experience in Normandy showed both an advantage and disadvantage to its "problem-solving", however. The advantage was that lower-level commanders were given the discretion to innovate and adapt to changing situations. The disadvantage was that this low-level problem-solving, instead of being developed also at higher levels, often meant that each major US Army unit had to learn its own lessons rather than having the corrective training passed to them from above.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

The disadvantage was that this low-level problem-solving, instead of being developed also at higher levels, often meant that each major US Army unit had to learn its own lessons rather than having the corrective training passed to them from above.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I believe, from reading critical accounts of the fighting in Korea and Vietnam, that this also affected the ability of the army to absorb the lessons learned. Apparently a lot of the hard-learned lessons of WW2 had been forgotten only a few years later. Or putting it into the terms of the latest management fad, they lacked in knowledge management.

------------------

Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[Spook]

It has to be added, Germanboy, that the lessons of one war don't necessarily transfer well into another war, even if they are learned and applied from the preceding war. Not everything learned in WW2 was going to work in Vietnam.

This is going to be a bit touchy for me to use as reference, but a good recent example is the Kosovo bombing campaign. The premise when starting into the bombing was that bombing precision had advanced to such a degree that high-altitude bombing was deemed as feasible for a normal mission type. The Gulf War experience of '91 was used to buttress this view. While the Kosovo campaign achieved its political end, more recent post-war bombing assessments have really pared down the earlier claims to the amount of destroyed Serbian equipment. For one example, what was earlier claimed to be 130+ Serbian tanks destroyed may instead be about 14-20.

Now getting back to WW2, there is one other lesson to combined arms that wasn't easily learned by either the US or the UK. While the US, per examples in the earlier post, had demonstrated the ability to develop combined arms at the smaller unit levels, it was a bit more difficult for either the US or the UK to form combined-arms "battlegroups" (kampfgruppen?) at brigade-level or higher as effectively as the Germans were able to. The closest attempt at this was the "combat command" organization within the US armored divisons, but even this didn't work as well as desired.

From the 1980's onward, however, the concept of battlegroup training has improved in the US Army, as evidenced by special training areas for mid-level organizations like the National Training Center at Ft Irwin, CA.