Penetration KT vs M-18 - some strange conclusions

[A Arabian]

Jeff, thats really good info. Thanks for providing it.

[This message has been edited by A Arabian (edited 12-17-2000).]

[Guest Big Time Software]

Rob,

I don't even know where to start with your post. You are basically claiming that CM is just a bunch of hooey and that there really isn't any strong attempt at actual simulation.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Although I believe CMBO to be the best example of the genre, I have once again been disappointed by the high claims of peerless realism. I was hoping for a game that would be more intrinsically driven by real world tactics than "random number generators".<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well... I'll overlook the outright uninformed insults and just tell you that CM is far from a "random number generator". If you took even a little time to read the discussions here, even in this thread, you would see how utterly wrong your statement is. You say you are fairly new, so I suggest reading up on things before making such groundless comments.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Even with the chaos of battle, I find the combat resolutions to be uneven and, at times, inexplicable.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

There are 150,000 posts here. People have questioned just about everything in CM, sometimes far more than just once. Vague and general statements like yours are really not very helpful or informative in the least. If you want to impress anybody here you need to be specific, consistant, scientifically sound, and back up your arguments with data and research.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I set up a battle containing the classic Axis quality vs. the Allied quantity scenario.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yet you set up a "classic gamey, utterly unrealistic, and never seen in the history of WWII battle lineup" scenario. And then you expect that this completely fictious engagement should somehow equate to battles fought by Sherman 75s and PzIVs? What an odd way to make an assessment of how realistic CM is.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> With all else being equal, i.e., unit location, terrain and distance, the performance advantage is still overwhelmingly in favor of the Allies.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But all things are hardly "equal". The US had more of the things that matter, right? And since you opted to give the US the best (and rarest) tanks, why should it be surprising that they came off the better? Stocking the scenario in their favor and then being surprised when they come off ahead is quite odd.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Even with a full klick separating the combatants, the computer will hit its target three to four times more often per unit than I can, regardless of my positioning.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Without having seen this example of yours, I can not comment on what happened. I can comment on the fact that CM's AI has absolutely no advantage vs. a human. I can also state that CM's ballistics and physics models are quite sound and scientifically laid out. They have withstood, quite well, off the cuff criticism as well as deeply informed discussion.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I can somewhat chalk this up to silouette factors, but I can tell you that if someone were shooting a cannon at me in the open, I would certainly be able to localize it after at least a couple of shots.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I suggest you do a Search of this BBS on "accuracy". There have been severaly very informed discussions about this subject.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The damage to my units is also unbalanced in comparison, especially considering the superior ballistics of the Axis' guns. Even with the gyrostabilizer on the Allied tanks, this is hard to explain.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Uhmm... you used the US tanks with the best guns and strongest armor ever fielded in the war by the US. However, only a few Pershings and only about 200 Jumbos ever saw combat. And yet you somehow think this is representative of WWII ETO combat in general? Sheesh... talk about a Red Herring. Comparing apples to organges is a horrible way to support whatever you are trying to argue for.

I am also puzzled why you posted what you did here in this thread. What you had to say is irrelevant to this discussion. Why not start a new topic to post your thoughts?

Steve

[Guest Big Time Software]

Jeff,

Thanks for all the figures. However, you haven't stated why you have posted all this stuff very clearly. I assume you are saying that CM's accuracy vs. a hull down vehicle isn't reduced enough? I'm interested to know exactly what it is you are thinking about here. Assuming is a bad thing

Steve

[Mr. Clark]

Hey!

I would have been more aggressive in my reply to Rob, but recently Madmatt yelled at me for letting a newbie have it!

I better see Madmatt appear and yell at Steve soon...

[Jeff Duquette]

Sorry for the long post.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Steve said:

I assume you are saying that CM's accuracy vs. a hull down vehicle isn't reduced enough? I'm interested to know exactly what it is you are thinking about here. Assuming is a bad thing.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I am not really throwing my hat in either way. I’m simply presenting some test results conducted by the British Army during the war. I’ve been playing wargames far to long to get particularly worked up about a little quirk here or there…even lack of smoke grenades (got another doctrine quote from the WWII Soviet Army on smoke grenades if you want it ). I simply adjust my game tactics to adapt to the games foibles.

Most wargames have a certain amount of basic truth to them. If you try to employ historical tactics you will typically perform well in the wargame. I think ultimately CM does a good\very good job in rewarding players for employing REAL WORLD™ tactics. Reading some of the “this is unrealistic” posts on this board I sometimes wonder if I’m playing the same CM everyone else is playing.

Topic at Hand

Up till now we have seen a fair amount of game test results. I was curious how it compared with actual test data. A fair amount of player game testing seems to have been conducted at ranges of 500 meters or less. From the Operational Research data I posted earlier, there doesn’t seem to be any real advantage to hull down positions at short ranges. At least not from a simple “chance to hit” perspective.

On the other hand this data is representing idealized conditions that would only be found on a range. Systematic error is being addressed\isolated. Combat intangibles (i.e. human error) such as range estimation errors, or the ability to spot a full-view tank relative to spotting a hull down tank are not accounted for in the tables I posted.

Another unaccounted for factor would be coordination between TC and gunner in initial acquisition of a hull-down target relative to a full-view target (i.e. much tougher for a gunner to identify a small target from his periscope or gun sight than it is for him to spot a large target). Additional queues by the TC would likely be required to get the gunner on target. Increased time in initial target acquisition.

I like Treeburst155’s nickname as well as his write-ups on this thread. But I am wondering about the amount of additional time required by a gunner to re-acquire a target in between successive rounds. As the game is now a typical ROF for a medium tank in CM runs around 7 to 9 seconds per round. I guess on this point I would have to throw in with the assessment that once the target is acquired by the gunner, ROF is really going to be a function of the loaders ability to pull rounds from ready racks and feed them into the main gun. I can recall excited gunners yelling “on the way” before I – as a loader -- could flip the safety toggle off the gun. Dangerous in an M48A5 as the recoil of the 105mm takes the breach just about to the back end of the turret. If your caught between the two your FU$#ED. Anyway, 7 to 9 seconds seems like it ought to be sufficient time for a gunner to micro-adjust or do his “put burst on target” thingie for second or third or fourth rounds fired at the same target. So, as I don’t disagree with Treeburst155’s informed assessment, it seems like the typical ROF for tanks in CM is sufficiently protracted to account for gunner challenges associated with shooting at smaller targets (once the target has been aquired).

In closing, I hope the above has been successful in making my personal position on this topic even more vague.

[Guest Big Time Software]

Jeff:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In closing, I hope the above has been successful in making my personal position on this topic even more vague.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

He shoots, he scores!

OK, I think I understand your position (or lack of one) a little better.

Your figures, along with other factors (including common sense), backs up the notion that at close range (say... 500m or less) being hull down is not statistically beneficial from a to hit chance perspective. This was something that I attempted to show earlier back by increasing the range to 1000m.

Obviously, the above sill has nothing to do with the other benefits that come from being hull down. I illustrated these in previous posts, especially on Page 6 of this thread.

The thing that I found interesting is that the accuracy of a 1st shot hit falls of in a non-linear way. I suppose the main reason is that the size of the target at great ranges becomes increasingly subject to error (aiming and simply running against of the odds. In other words, even if the gunner makes a perfect call, the chances of a miss increase with distance far more than if the target were larger. Interesting.

I am not sure how CM models this. I think it is a linear reduction of the standard accuracy equation. Since the standard accuracy is not picture perfect (like test range data) a non-linear result is still evident. I'll point Charles to this thread and see if he has anything he would like to add.

Thanks,

Steve

[Guest Big Time Software]

Info back from Charles:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The accuracy vs. hull-down varies in a nonlinear fashion relative to range. CM uses the same calculations (based on a Gaussian

dispersion) that it uses for target size in the normal hull up. If a tank is hull down, it's "size" rating is reduced by a constant factor. But this does NOT lead to a linear reduction in *to-hit*.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What this means is there is a factor at work that means as a target gets smaller, the gunner has increasingly more difficultly hitting in addition to normal range accuracy factors vs. a larger vehicle. Therefore, hull down at longer ranges is far more effective than at closer ranges in terms of to hit chance in a non-linear fashion.

Thanks,

Steve

[MichaelU]

Oh man, I've been really busy this weekend but managed to run a few Stuart vs PzIV tests to check if the numbers still stacked up. But by the time I'd finished it was late at night/early in the morning and I collapsed into bed exhausted. Now I check Monday morning, not only has someone else done a PzIV vs Stuart test, but everyone seems to have come to happy agreement.

What's really interesting was that the original test was not run to check the effect of hull down, but just to check the new tungsten abilities in the patch. I was a bit surprised by the results I got though, but now am satisfied that BTS has got it right (how could I have doubted?).

Thanks BTS and everyone else for the replies.

[Jeff Duquette]

Mike:

I would still be curious as to how any test results for ranges between say 700 to 1000 meters turned out.

Thanks

[M Hofbauer]

Steve quoted Charles:If a tank is hull down, it's "size" rating is reduced by a constant factor.

Does that mean that CM's hull down does not account for how much a tank is hull down, rather that hull down is a fixed I/O value?

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"Im off to NZ police collage" (GAZ_NZ)

[Jarmo]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by M Hofbauer:

Does that mean that CM's hull down does not account for how much a tank is hull down, rather that hull down is a fixed I/O value?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yep, that's the way it is.

But what I'd still like to know is, if the "constant" is same

for all tanks. Does a small turreted tank benefit more?

[aka_tom_w]

As I understand it, hull odwn is either ON or OFF 1 or 0 no grey shades in between no fancy percentages.

I suspect that the lower hull is not available to shoot at because if a tank is hull down because it NEVER gets hit in the lower hull, when in the hull down position.

So some of the Upper Hull is available to take a hit and the turret is obviously available to take a hit.

I'm GUESSING here, but its seems to me when a tank is deemed to be in a Hull down Position by the game engine, it is about 50% less visible and about 50% percent harder to hit with range as a variable to make that number not really a constant. (I think, mostly guess work here)

One thing is for sure, Hull down is either ON or OFF like being pregnant, either you are or you are not, a hull down Tank either IS Hull down (about 50%) hidden below grade, or it is NOT Hull down, 100% fully exposed.

Again I'm guessing on the 50% below, grade not exposed part, but it is something like that.

-tom w

[This message has been edited by aka_tom_w (edited 12-18-2000).]

[M Hofbauer]

Great. And here I was thinking that CM calculates true LOS/LOF.

It's like someone telling me there is no Santa.

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"Im off to NZ police collage" (GAZ_NZ)

[Jeff Duquette]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It's like someone telling me there is no Santa.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Considerably less disappointing than a game designer saying his intent is to recreate little green army men duke’in it out in a sand-box.

[Guest Big Time Software]

Jeff wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Considerably less disappointing than a game designer saying his intent is to recreate little green army men duke’in it out in a sand-box. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hehe... with lighter fluid to simulate napalm of course

M. Hoffbauer wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Great. And here I was thinking that CM calculates true LOS/LOF.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

One of the limitations of today's CPUs This has all been covered before, but the short of it is that LOS calculations right now are the single biggest CPU hog in Combat Mission. And trust me... the code is as good as it gets. LOS (or any exact line between two variable points checking for intersects) is just one of those things that is horrible no matter how you program it. It can be worse though

If we simulated every mm of every object in the game, CM would be unplayable. The exponential increase in CPU requirements would crush any CPU out there. Probably with only a few vehicles driving around. Because of this reality, we must abstract LOS/LOF to some degree. No way around it.

So right now, when connecting two points together a vehicle is either hull down or it isn't. It is either behind a building or it isn't. It is either all on a Road or it isn't. There is no inbetween for any of these things.

When we rewrite the Combat Mission engine (sometime after CM2) there will be some room for improvement here. Not mm for mm, but probably enough to have partial degrees of hull down/cover (maybe 3-4 different possibilities instead of the current 2). But until then, it is the way it is because it has to be.

Jarmo wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>But what I'd still like to know is, if the "constant" is same for all tanks. Does a small turreted tank benefit more?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, it is a constant % for all vehicles, regardless. The abstract is not as great as it might first appear. Since the % reduction is based on the silhouette, that means a smaller vehicle will have a proportionally smaller exposure. Also, the proportion differences between turret/hull are not all that great between various models. Generally the bigger the turret, the bigger the hull, which means a bigger silhouette.

When we rewrite the CM engine we will have the CPU power necessary to simulate vehicle part sizes exactly. I can tell you for sure that it will happen.

Steve

[A Arabian]

I have a hypothesis (and BTS may refute me) that the original plan was to have a much more comprehensive LOS checking algorithm - this based primarily on the FAQ which is on the CM links page. Its dated something like march of '99 - its worth seeing if only for the historical value of the graphcis. But there are a couple of spots where it states that it calculates true LOS. My guess is that in the alpha version it was coded to do a lot more, and then they realized it was taking two days to crunch the movie.

Course, it also says in there that dead vehicles block LOS and LOF...

FYI, BTS, but the FAQ could do well to be updated. Theres a lot of questions that keep arising here that could be maybe put in an updated FAQ. But the graphics should stay - if only to show the timeline of development of the game. I remember seeing those ages ago though and thinknig they were awesome - if for no other reason than the fact that it suggested that this game wouldn't just be vaporware....

How far you have come....

[ModernTimes]

Getting back to the topic...

Let's put away probability for a minute and consider logic. Let's assume that both enemy and allied tanks facing each other are identified, assume any distance, penetration and armor thickness and also assume that the angles of penetration are not a factor due to a tank being in a hull-down position.

A tank gunner firing on a tank which is not hull down has the option of firing at the turret or the hull. If the opposing tank is hull-down, the choice is only the turret.

If he knew that firing at the hull was not advantageous, he would ALWAYS (unless, possibly, a conscript with no training) fire at the turret. Thus, the kill probability upon both H/D and not H/D may - at best - be equal, but there cannot be an advantage in avoiding a hull-down position. Gunners would simply fire at the turret if there was a disadvantage in firing at any other part of the tank.

(Others may say that hull-down should be better protected - and I agree - but my point is that a hull-down tank should never be at a disadvantage under the assumptions made above.)

I am not sure whether or not this is a REAL problem as I have not seen the "Studies" and experiments, but if it is and relief of said problem is not a burden to the fine designers of CM, it would be nice to see a correction.

Please respond if you have a question or a comment to my tedious post. Thanks.

[Jarmo]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by ModernTimes:

If he knew that firing at the hull was not advantageous, he would ALWAYS (unless, possibly, a conscript with no training) fire at the turret.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yeah, if he knew.

But isn't it a bit much to assume that most gunners know what parts of which tank their

gun can penetrate.

For example the King tiger, the Porche turreted one used here as a sample. There were

only about 50 made, I wouldn't expect any allied tanker to tell it apart from the "common"

King tiger.

Actually it's even a bit much for the crews to know when the have no hope and need to

back away.

[Guest Rex_Bellator]

ModernTimes - I remember seeing an earlier post by ex-tanker Treeburst on this thread, where he advised from experience that he and others were always trained to shoot at the centre of mass of the target.

This pretty much tallies with the way the game works, and we have seen that from various posts that in real life as well as CM, forcing people to shoot at your turret while Hull Down doesn't always pay. Hope this helps.

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[This message has been edited by Rex_Bellator (edited 12-19-2000).]

[Guest rune]

Rex is correct. All the documentation and veterans stories I have said they aimed at center mass of what they could see. if the sight was off a little, they would still be able to hit the target. While aimed shots occasionally happened, it was not the norm.

Rune

[ModernTimes]

Excellent replies and I can see both of your points; however, and it seems to me, either tank doctrine of the time had it wrong (i.e. fire at the center mass of the tank to improve probability of a hit) or CM does not model the benefits of a hull down position correctly.

That is to say, IF there was a greater chance of knocking a tank out by taking AIMED shots at the turret, Army INTEL would have passed that along to the tankers and, if there were once previous advantages to not being H/D, those advantages would disappear under a new doctrine of fire. (e.g. Gunners would take aimed shoots at the turrets of enemy tanks out in the open and not the center of mass.) One major incentive for so optimizing a tank's effectiveness is the live's of the crew.

I think that it is highly likely that tankers, whose very survival depended on how well they knew the enemy, would be very familiar with the opposition's tanks (unless "first time" scenarios like "Elsdorf") and what was NEC. to knock them out.

[Jeff Heidman]

It seems rather unlikely to me that Army tank doctrine would be something like this:

Aiming standards for the M4A3 (76mm armed) Sherman:

If you are firing at a Tiger, King Tiger, PzIV, Pz(38)t, or Marder II then aim at the center of the turret, unless you are over 1159m and less than 1765m.

If you are firing at any other tank at a range between 0 and 567m, aim center mass, unless the target is obscured, in which case aim at the left center of the third road wheel.

If firing at a Panther in the rain, aim at the turret if the shot angle is greater than 25 degrees, otherwise aim enter mass, but only if the range is less than 1200m with tungsten, or 800m with standard APCBC.

Of course, when firing at a Panther (or a JagdPanther, but not a JagdTiger) when the target is on an uphill slope facing towards your right-front or left front, common sense dictates aiming at the left-center of the turret mantlet, or the center mass of the hull if using HVAP. If not using HVAP, please refer to Appendix C: Why Aren't You Using Your HVAP?

For instructions on aiming standards for the M4A3E8 (76mm), see addendum 14.5a: Now I Have More Armor, What Should I Do With It?

My guess is that the gunner were ordered and trained to aim for center mass all the time. Just like us riflemen are ordered to aim for center mass.

Jeff Heidman

[Guest rune]

Jeff is correct. They were told to fire center mass. In his book "Death Traps", Mister Cooper explains the training a lot of tank crews got, it went somethig like this:

Infantry unit arrives in Europe. grabs XX amount of men, and make them tankers. training consisted of between 4 hours and 8 hours of training. This included everything on the tank. Now, how much information are you going to give a crew like this? They were told to fire center mass. Yes, veteran crews that survived long enough would aim at a specific, IF they could. this was more a function of on the job training then the Army teaching them.

Excellent book by the way. He really lays into the commanders who ordered stupidity like this. Not to mention the Sherman tank when the Pershing could have been pushed forward. He was a maintence officer for a tank division.

Rune

[aka_tom_w]

I found these reviews of the Book "Death Traps"

Its looks like one I want in my library for SURE!

This is what others say in their reviews:

A valuable memoir from a veteran., December 18, 1998 Reviewer: Jonathan Beard jbeard@panix.com (see more about me) from New York City

Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II is an unusual addition to the growing pile of memoirs being published as WW II veterans age and then die. It is not written by a soldier who was in the thick of combat and has brave tales to tell, nor is it the story of someone in command, explaining and justifying his decisions. Instead, Cooper was a junior officer in charge of vehicle maintenance for the 3rd Armored Division as it fought its way from Normandy to Central Germany. He was always right behind the front lines, but seldom in combat, though frequently exposed to sniper and artillery fire. The main revelation of Death Traps is obvious from its title: the famous M4 Sherman tank which was the mainstay of American armor during the war was completely inadequate when facing German tanks. American commanders, especially Gen. Patton, chose to continue producing the Sherman even when they knew it could not face German tanks and antitank guns, and American tank crews paid a heavy price for this mistake. Cooper has done his homework. Unlike many war memoirs, he has spent time reading the general histories in recent years, and gets the background information right when he discusses the pursuit across France, the invasion of Germany, and the Battle of the Bulge. But the most important thing here is the details: how the Sherman worked, how maintenance was carried out under harsh conditions, and, especially, what happened when a high-velocity 75 mm or 88 mm shell hit an M4.

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22 of 23 people found the following review helpful:

Maintenance view of a WWII Armored Division in Europe, December 31, 1998

Reviewer: Tommytank1@aol.com from Midland City, Alabama

Hundreds of books have been written about armored warfare in World War II, usually from the viewpoint of a combat commander."Death Traps" is a first hand account of the often overlooked area of maintenance support. Belton Cooper was a army Ordnance officer with the 3rd Armored Division. He gives a different perspective of the day to day life of supporting a combat command of the 3rd ADduring WWII. He served as a laision officer with the duties of evaulating knocked out military vehicles, primarily M4 Sherman Tanks. Hisjob was to determine if these tanks could be salvaged,rebuilt and be reissued to tank crews. It is already well known that America's main battle tank was far inferior to German Armor, but Cooper explains how the M4 met its fate through numerous encounters with German Panthers and Tigers. This required Tank Commanders to rethink Armored Warfare and to come up with ways to defeat the enemy. He explains in detail the numerous obstacles that had to be overcome from the Normandy landings all the way to the surrender of Germany. You will read of the development of the famous Cullen Hedgerow device that helped break the stalmate in the hedgerow country of Normandy. Also the first trials of the M26 Pershing Tank which was so badly needed by our troops to counter heavy German Armor but was refused by General George S. Patton. Pattons view was that we needed fast tanks to go to the enemys rear to disrupt supply and command elements, did not warrant tanks like the Pershing. Coopers evaluation of the Pershing shows that if we had this tank in great numbers the war in Europe could have been over much sooner and with less loss of life. Also there is the rare story of the use of the M26A1E2(aka M26E4) Super Pershing and its encounter with a Panther. This is a great book. As a Veteran Tank Commander I highly recommend this book be read by all Armor Officers and Tank Commanders. You will awe at the stories of horror when you have to clean out a destroyed tank and try to match up the body parts. You will laugh at the comical incidents soldiers often find themselves in. A great deal of thanks is due to Cooper for contributing this work. It is a much needed addition to the library's of our nation's history. The new millineum is upon us. We must encourage our veterans to write about their experience's before they are lost to time. Cooper has done this and we thank him.

Tom Holt Veteran, The Big Red One

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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

The "Good War" wasn't. (Apologies to Mr. Studs Terkel...), October 24, 2000

Reviewer: Robert J Murphy (see more about me) from Seattle, WA USA Belton Y. Cooper was an ordnance officer with the 3d Armored Division in W.W. II, where his unit's central task lay in the the immediate, post-battle recovery of those knocked-out M4 Sherman's which could be repaired in the field, and the marking for the salvage teams of those 'brewed-up' M4s -- tanker speak for catastrophic battle damage resulting in fire -- which could not. Thus, Cooper bore witness to the terrible consequences of the Sherman's late-war obsolescence when faced against the Wermacht's vastly superior tanks, and the resulting tragic and disgraceful cost in American lives. ('Disgraceful', for the proposition of fielding the superbly designed M26 Pershing in large numbers well before Operation Overlord (D-Day) was foolishly rejected on the basis of the recommendations of no less an Allied general than George Patton, in late '43/early '44.)

Every bit as powerful as E.B. Sledge's memoir of his experience as a Marine in the Pacific War, ("With the Old Breed"), what lend's Cooper's book such a visceral power is his most unself-conscious and rigorous honesty in recounting his war. Like Sledge, he is obviously a very perceptive and humane individual, who trusts that each anecdote which he has judged to be most illustrative of the urgency and horror of the events which surrounded him in '44-'45, will strike home to the reader with a poignancy borne of his refusal to indulge in any of the petty embellishments which ultimately weaken the impact of the memoirs of lesser writers. Brutal honesty in a literal sense...

--This text refers to the Paperback edition.

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7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

Rebuilding shot up Sherman tanks, July 14, 2000

Reviewer: Robert Weymouth (see more about me) from Memphis, TN USA

Mr. Cooper was an ordinance officer with the 3rd Armored Division and his job was to reclaim shattered US tanks and return them to ordinance depot or other repair facilities and bring them back to action. If anyone knows the shortcomings of the Sherman tank it would be this man. His story is one of attrition, superior German tanks and SP guns being overwhelmed by the ability of American units to be resupplied with restored or new tanks. One interesting sidelight, Mr. Cooper is highly critical of Gen. George S. Patton's recommendation to build masses of Shermans rather than M-26 Pershings. The Pershing had much better protection, immensely better firepower and could have stood up to Panther and Tiger tanks much more successfuly than the Sherman. Patton thought the Sherman was more mobile but on muddy ground, the Pershing had more track width and was the quicker of the two. This is one of the best books on armored warfare and the war in the West in 1944 ever written. I highly recommend it.

[This message has been edited by aka_tom_w (edited 12-19-2000).]

[M Hofbauer]

MT, you need to get a grasp on reality. Back then the poor souls which had to man those tanks on both sides didn't enjoy that 20/20 hindsight we armchair warriors and wannabe-grogs of today have.

Even the much-lauded and very good HBoGMF of the US Army even in it's 1945 post-war edition still contains a number of flaws, and it wasn't something that was circulated in the trenches.

IOW, a regular US Tanker would not have exact armor thickness charts for every other german cat and odd welded-together modvehicle around.

Jeff H,

ROTFLMAO...!

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"Im off to NZ police collage" (GAZ_NZ)