Kursk Revisited

[Guest grunto]

Hi,

It appears that there may be new archival evidence which shows that there was a lot less german armor at kursk than had been previously thought, and that on the verge of limited success, hitler pulled the plug on the operation.

http://www.geocities.com/TimesSquare/Cave/1761/kursk.html

[Abbott]

A very interesting read. Thank you.

[Tanaka]

Thanks, nice reading.

hmmm... The guy was a 1st WW corporal...

[aka_Deadline]

Very Interesting Andy.

Thanks for the info.

Can't wait for CM 2 and to reproduce such

a Tank Battle.

Deadline

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"My honor is Life both grow as one, take honor

from me and my life is done."

[KLilly]

Thanks. Very interesting. I'd love to see more of this guy's research. It really is a good time now with the old Soviet records becoming available to do research in primary materials.

[Tiger]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

the disorganized SS divisions withdrew, leaving 400 destroyed tanks behind, including between 70 and 100 Tigers and many Panthers.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Utter nonsense. For the Germans, no more than 147 Tigers were commited to this battle. Only 6 Tigers were lost during the battle, another 13 during the Soviet counter-offensive. Grand total of 19 lost. As for the panthers, there were only 80 in the 48th Panzer Corps, 4th army. Most of these were write-offs due to mechanical problems, something which Guderian had warned Hitler about in May before the battle.

Nowhere is the Gross Deutschland division mentioned. It was part of the 48th Panzer Corps, One of the two German Panzer Corps in the 4th Army which spearheaded the southern pincer. "Gross Deustchland was a very strong division with a special organization. It mustered about 180 tanks, of which 80 were part of a "Panther Detatchment" commanded by Lieutenant Colonel von Lauchert.

...Forty-eighth Panzer Corps thus had some 60 assault guns, and more than 300 tanks...." (Panzer Battles, Maj Gen. F.W. von Mellenthin)

"The other Corps of the 4th army was the SS panzer corps consisting of the three panzer divisions Leibstandarte, Totenkopf, and Das Reich.

Apparently the author in this link is only including the SS Panzer Corps in his calculations, not the other Corps, the Forty-eighth Corps.

Note none of this includes the northern pincers' force of the 9th Army.

Also, regarding Kursk, Mellenthin writes:

"But Hitler kept postponing D day [for operation Zitadelle], partly in order to assemble stronger forces and partly because he had the gravest doubts about our prospects of success"

"At this conference on Citadel, hitler made the significant and perfectly accurate comment, that "it must not fail." On 10 May Guderian saw him again and begged him to give up the idea; Hitler replied, "You're quite right. Whenever I think of this attack my stomach turns over." Yet under the pressure of Keitel and Zeitzler he ultimately gave way and consented to an operation of grandiose proportions."

On calling off the offensive: "On 13 July, Field Marshals von Manstein and Kluge were summoned to East Prussia, and Hitler informed them that Citadel must be called off immediately as the Allies had landed in Sicily; troops must be transferred from the Eastern Front to deal with the invasion. Manstein had not commited all his forces and was in favor of continuing the offensive as a battle of attrition; by smashing up Russian armored reserves in the Kursk salient we might forestall major offensives in other sectors. This situation should have been foreseen before Citadel was launched; we were now in the position of a man who has seized a wolf by the ears and dare not let him go. However, hitler declared that the attack must stop forthwith."

Alot of the article is correct in the reduced numbers of tanks and tank losses, but quite incorrect on types of tanks and somewhat on the responsibility for the operation.

jmtcw,

john

[This message has been edited by Tiger (edited 09-27-2000).]

[Schrullenhaft]

Tiger - you missed the point of the article. The numbers you quote from the article are disputed by this author. He is just reiterating the "standard" story of Kursk before all the primary sources were declassified.

[Tiger]

Yeah I see that now. The reduced numbers of tanks and types and losses are certainly more in line with what German "unofficial" (?)sources have always said they were. Von Mellenthin's book has been out since 1956 or so. I wonder why this and other sources were discounted in the first place (or was it) by historians in view of the higher numbers of tanks having been "unproven" by recently "declassified" reports. Did the old accepted data on the Kursk battle stem from complete belief in Russian reports/propaganda, which listed "hundreds of tiger tanks destroyed in the battle".

-john

[This message has been edited by Tiger (edited 09-27-2000).]

[Panzertruppen]

Bear in mind that the Soviets went to great lengths to foster the "legend of Kursk" having been a battle that saw hundreds of Tigers destroyed, etc. The Soviets had virtually every single possible advantage in this engagement - quantity, time, volume of firepower, and some of the most extensive defensive positions ever seen in the history of warfare.

The Soviet high command, although ultimately not defeated, was terrified to tell Stalin just how badly they had been handled by the Germans - particualrly von Manstein. They were probably quite right to have been so concerned. Judging by Stalin's past record he may well have executed several of them for "incompetance."

A new book is about to be released concerning Kursk and the legendary battle of Prokorovka. The book was researched by the Dupuy Institute and the maps are being done by noted cartogropher/wargame scenario designer Jay Karamales. Much of the information is very recently declassified material thay may well be more accurate than Colonel Glantz's previous books.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

A new book is about to be released concerning Kursk and the legendary battle of Prokorovka. The book was researched by the Dupuy Institute and the maps are being done by noted cartogropher/wargame scenario designer Jay Karamales. Much of the information is very recently declassified material thay may well be more accurate than Colonel Glantz's previous books.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That will be interesting, as Glantz & House used all declassed archival material available at the time, in their Kursk book, as did Dunn before that.

My question is how many books are ppl gonna write about Kursk, their are other operations & battles on the Eastren Front though smaller in scale that deserve some long overdue attention as well Ie, the Soviet offensive operations after Zitadelle, Ie, Belgorod - Kharkov, Smolensk, Donbas, Chernigov Poltava operations etc.

Every Westren author seems to go the Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, route while ignoring the smaller operations, but then again I guess Kursk is easier to research with the plethora of refrence material available.

I found it refreshing reading Glantz's Kharkov & Mars works, as well as Duffy's old RSOTR when it came out, hopefully we'll get more, soon an good look at the Korsun -Shevchenkovskii operation, is overdue IMHO as well especialy since the release of the formerly classified Soviet staff study on it, I'd also like to see a Dunn or Glantz & House work on the Berlin & Manchurian operations.

Regards, John Waters

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Notice: Spelling mistakes left in for people who need to correct others to make their life fulfilled.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 10-06-2000).]

[Grisha]

Yes, Glantz is quite detailed in his research, and is now considered one of the top western historians on the Soviets during WWII. I don't know where Panzertruppen got the idea that Stalin was upset with the results of the Kursk operation, since I've never read anything to that effect. In fact, Stalin was continually taking the advice of the STAVKA to not counterattack quite yet (Stalin didn't like being on the defensive), but in hindsight it was a good thing the Soviets held their reserves.

The most significant point to the battle of Kursk for me was that the Germans actually lost their first summer offensive. Equipped with the finest tanks in the world (unlike 1941), and spearheaded by an SS PanzerKorp, no less. And, still, the Germans lost.

I would have loved to have seen Manstein's face after he completed that post-Kursk operation that was to have ended any Soviet aspirations for an offensive that summer. From that point on, the panzers were reduced to the role of gap pluggers, though exceedingly good ones at that.

The Germans simply had no idea just how prepared the Soviets were for the summer of 1943, which says volumes about Soviet intelligence and deception.

[Thomas K]

Interesting article. But the Russkies still won the battle, the Germans were never again able to mount a significant attack on the Eastern Front. The Soviets continuously made better stategic decisions throughout the war. The Germans could always win tactically but made mistakes on the grand scale. i.e. The decision to turn south towards Kiev in '41. The decision to split the advance in '42, being sucked into Stalingrad and holding the flanks with weak allies. The decision to attack the dug in Russians at Kursk in '43. The misreading of Soviet intentions in '44 with the subsequent distruction of Army Group Center. Anyway the point being, Stalin listened to his Generals while Hitler did not listen to his and was terrible at stategic decisions.

[tss]

Thomas K wrote:

The Germans could always win tactically but made mistakes on the grand scale.

There were plenty of cases where Soviets won also tactically. I'd say that they were better than Germans in two enviroments: forest and city.

Forests were difficult for Germans because they depended too heavily on roads. Even their horse-drawn wagons were too heavy to be truly useful offroads and without cartloads of ammo their MGs got useless pretty quick, and their infantry tactics were centered on MG support. The Germans simply couldn't mount sizable offensives without roads.

Soviets could do it. In April 1942 they caused a serious trouble at Kiestinki when they attacked with three regiments from three different directions, through forest. One of their prongs was aimed against German positions there. The Germans initially estimated that a 80 men patrol had managed to sneak through their lines. By that time there were already two batallions... (In the end the reserves of Finnish 6th division managed to throw back the offensive after heavy fights that lasted for a month).

- Tommi

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Grisha:

I don't know where Panzertruppen got the idea that Stalin was upset with the results of the Kursk operation, since I've never read anything to that effect. In fact, Stalin was continually taking the advice of the STAVKA to not counterattack quite yet (Stalin didn't like being on the defensive), but in hindsight it was a good thing the Soviets held their reserves.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Same here, as I have read the communications between Stalin & the commanders, an interesting conversation between Stalin & Vautin took place on July 6th when Vautin requested reinforcements, due to pressure from AGS, despite AGS progress Stalin was not worried about AGS as evident in the conversation transcript *"exhaust the enemy at prepared positions and prevent his penetration until our active operations begin on the Westren, Briansk, and other Fronts". Then he released the 2nd Tank Corpse (168 tanks & SPs), 10th Tank Corps (185 tanks & SPs) as well as ordering Konev (Steppe Front) to forward deploy Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army to the Staryi Oskel. & I'd add that their was very little that escaped Stalin's attentention as witholding imformation from him would have consequences.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

The most significant point to the battle of Kursk for me was that the Germans actually lost their first summer offensive. Equipped with the finest tanks in the world (unlike 1941), and spearheaded by an SS PanzerKorp, no less. And, still, the Germans lost.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed, & launched a counter offensive & a continous set of offenseves, as well that ended with much regained territory. The article IMHO missed several facts that Soviet Reserves were available even if II SS Pz.Korps won a tactical victory at Prokhorovka, it was going no where as the II SS Pz.Korps was being steadily worn down by attrition & the flow of Soviet reinforcements, as well as new obstacles emplaced by Soviet eng's etc.

Soviet formations were being reinforced faster then they could be destroyed. The Soviets had also gained air superiority, as well, due mostly to Luftwaffe fuel priorities & due to shortages.

The Soviets were already showing sighns of launching an massive counteroffensive offensive, into areas which German units had been stripped of armored reserves for Zitadelle, and exerting strong pressure on Hausers flank. Ie, Totenkopf was stuck defending the Korps flank since Kempfs forces were bogged down still at their 5 July jump off point, utill late on 6 July, and then their advance was sparodic at best,leaving open flanks utill a hookup.

The Question then remains what was to be the II SS Pz. Korps, objectives ? the goals set for them were untainable by 9 July. Even after Prochorvka had been fought the Soviets had moved up more Armored reserves, into the II SS. Pz. Korps path which remained undetected. Hausers 200 tanks meant very liltle in the larger operational scheme , Prochorvka was but 1 battle in 1 huge failed operation.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

The Germans simply had no idea just how prepared the Soviets were for the summer of 1943, which says volumes about Soviet intelligence and deception.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed.

*See: See: Glantz David M, House Jonathan: "The Battle of Kursk" p.114

Regards, John Waters

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Notice: Spelling mistakes left in for people who need to correct others to make their life fulfilled.

[Kingfish]

Here's one I found a while back. Check out the "day to day" section.

http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/avenue/vy75/kursk.htm

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Charlie don't surf!

[Panzertruppen]

Below I have posted some comments that Jay Karamales made about the famous battle at Prokorovka. As I said, Jay is part of the team working with the Dupuy Institute on the new Kursk material. I invited Jay to paticipate in a discussion of Prokorovka at the Blitzkrieg Wargame Club some time ago. Jay accepted and there were some really excellent posts from him and others. I thought I had them saved on disk, so I'll post them if I can find them. (In the post below Jay refers several times to scenario design work that he did for Talonsoft.)

"This is supposed to be one of the biggest tank battles in history. The Germans had 400 to 600 tanks at the battle. Where are they all?"

At this stage of the battle the II SS-Panzer Korps had 319 tanks, assault guns, and SP panzerjägers (Marders) available to them. According to the strength returns filed by the II SS-Panzer Korps at 1800 on the 11th, the three SS divisions had the following tanks "ready for action" (from north to south):

SS-Totenkopf:

54 x Pz III

24 x Pz IV

6 x Pz VI (Tiger I)

20 x StuG III

7 x Marder II/III

TOTAL: 111

LSSAH:

2 x Pz I (that's right, Pz I)

4 x Pz II

20 x Pz III

31 x Pz IV

3 x Pz VI (Tiger I)

20 x StuG III

20 x Marder II/III

TOTAL: 100

SS-Das Reich:

43 x Pz III

18 x Pz IV

27 x StuG III

12 x Marder II/III

8 x captured T-34

TOTAL: 108

Das Reich has no panzers in the scenario because they were all actually off the south edge of the game map that day. (They also suffered only two tanks lost all day). That means the Germans really only had 211 tanks present on the board.

There was a whopping total of nine Tiger I's (PzKpfw VIE) involved in this battle. Sorry to disappoint you Tiger fans, but that's the way it was. Likewise you will see no Mk V Panthers. That's because all the Panthers that were in this area (25 of them on this day) were in the 39th Pz Regt, which was attached to the Großdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division further to the west (off the left edge of the map).

Against this force the Russians threw some 842 tanks, predominantly T-34s and T-70s but with a few Mk IV Churchills, SU-122s, and SU-76s. These were broken out as follows:

2nd Tank Corps: 59

2nd Guards Tank Corps: 140

5th Guards Tank Army (18th Tank Corps, 29th Tank Corps, and 5th Mech Corps): 643.

Not all of these, particularly those of the 5th Mech Corps, come into play in this scenario given the time and space constraints; but there are enough that the German player should certainly have his hands full.

The final tank loss figures for 12 July were 313 for the Soviets and about 49 for the Germans. Seem more one sided than you have always been led to believe? Yeah, that's what I thought too. But that's what happened. In fact, if you read the German after-action reports, it took them a couple of days before they even realized that they'd been in a major tank battle. To them, Prokhorovka was one more day of sharp fighting that followed over a week's worth of similar days.

"So how did the story of the gigantic tank clash at Prokhorovka get started?"

By Russian generals who were terrified of telling Stalin how roughly they'd been handled. To save their own hides they inflated German strengths and losses. By the time Stalin died in 1953 and the truth could be told, the story was too entrenched and too many decorations had been handed out. Plus, it makes a better story to say that there were hundreds of burning tanks on each side. This problem of playing down Red losses and inflating German losses is common to all Soviet sources.

"But if the battle was such a lopsided German victory, why didn't they push on to Kursk, or at least to Oboyan?"

Because by this time the German attack had run out of steam anyway. The Germans had been having, and continued to have, logistical problems that hampered the advance. There are a number of field reports from the panzer unit commanders stating that their tanks were advancing with less than ten, and sometimes less than five, rounds of ammunition in their turrets. The Germans never did establish air superiority over the battlefield, and Il-10 attacks on their supply lines and combat units hampered them as well. Much more importantly, the German advance slowed because of continued intense Soviet resistance, of which Prokhorovka was just one (albeit rather exceptional) example. Actually, in the face of the heavy resistance directly in front of Prokhorovka, SS-Totenkopf (aided somewhat by LSSAH) continued its push on the 13th to try to get around the Soviet flank. This is probably when it suffered the majority of its tank losses for the 12th and 13th.

One final note to anyone interested in the "real" battle of Kursk: Christopher A. Lawrence of the Dupuy Institute is hard at work on a book about Kursk, including special attention to Prokhorovka. This will be the first work, in any language, that will have as its basis the official records and strength returns from both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. It will be published in 2000 by Westview Press (a division of Harper Collins). I will be providing the maps.

—Jay Karamales

Chief Cartographer, Olórin Press

3 March 1999

[This message has been edited by Panzertruppen (edited 10-06-2000).]

[This message has been edited by Panzertruppen (edited 10-06-2000).]

[Grisha]

panzertruppen,

I concur with just about all Jay states. It's probably true that Prokhorovka was made into a propaganda victory - German armor losses were not anywhere near Soviet losses. But I very much doubt that any Soviet generals were unduly afraid of reporting the loss figures to Stalin, and the primary reason is because they held the field. Against the Germans during a summer offensive. Can you imagine just how big that was? It was world shattering news in 1943. However, Prokhorovka was the place where the Germans finally ran out of steam in the south axis of Citadel, maybe not the epic battle popular history has drummed it up to be, but it was the pivot point. More of a 'groan' than a 'whack!'

[Tekman]

Panzertoopen is right that the Germans had no I dea of how big a tank battle they were in . Russian propaganda has created false impressions of this battle that are clearly evident in these posts the Germans had to cease operation due to a lack of fuel which ment that tanks could no longer support infantry. Most losses incured on the Germans were on the retreat by russian air power not by armour in the battle.

[PzKpfw 1]

I concur but I'm going to add again that their seems to be some confusion with the II SS Pz.Korps, sucess even if they had a tactical victory at Prokorvka, the SS Pz Korps objectives were untainable as of the 9th, had the II SS pressed on to the station or farther what diference would it have made to Zitadelle?. Lets look at the state of the German offensives progress a bit, & we can break Zitadelle into 4 battle phases:

1). in the South, 9th Army pushes into the 2nd defensive belt and is stopped cold by the 2nd Tank Army with no reserves sent from STAVKA.

2). In the West the 48th Pz.Korps pushes South towards Oboyan, and is stopped cold in its tracks, by 1st Tank Army, again alone with no reserves sent from STAVKA.

3).The most successful penetration is by AGS, & Hauser's SS. Korps who drives as far as Prokorovka.

4). Kempf's failed attempts to get his push started on a broad front, that finaly makes some headway only after 3rd Pz.Korps turns north away from its original objective of Korotscha.

As we see their virtualy is no German progress anywhere but in Manstiens AOO, any continued push by Hauser was questionable do to the events above, and the overall situation.

To many ppl have translated the SS Korps tank losses to imply that that Hauser's Korps could somehow have pressed on and achieved a victory on their own. or their halt was due only to logistical problems.

While others claim that Hitlers loss of will, overode Manstiens pleas for a continuation of AGS advance, and had Manstien been allowed to continue the German would have reached their goals.

This again is poppycock Manstien assumed that his forces had destroyed everything in their path & that Soviet operational reserves were exhausted, as seen in the latest material released, this was a very wrong assumption considering the Soviet forces awaiting any further push by Hausers Korps, Manstien also believed had he been given the 23rd Pz. Div & 5th SS that the offensive could be continued succesfuly, again questionable due to the Soviet build up, that remained undetected by the Germans.

The most logical move would have been to push on as far as possible then dig in to establish a continoius front, but that was out because of the German failures across the front, meant AGS had no suport, the next likely scenerio had AGS continued its drive was the encirclement & possible elimination of the Korps, ppl need to realise just how huge the Soviet reserve buildup was against the AGS penetration, and this was without effecting their counter offensive plans at all, as well as recognising the dwindling German capabilities to continue an offensive effort due to losses & prior commitment of reserves.

German troops are just as responsible for spreading the propaganda one only has to read a few statements by SS troops concerning it & see they almost mirrior Soviet troop statements about the carnage & huge tank battle, ramming tanks etc, as well as the fact it has been portayed as one huge tank battle by everyone till basicly Dunn's Kursk as it was not a 'huge tank battle' it was 3 seprate battles, fought over a large area.

Regards, John Waters

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Notice: Spelling mistakes left in for people who need to correct others to make their life fulfilled.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 10-07-2000).]

[Hussar]

Hi Guys

I have been following this thread with interest, but it seems to have dried up so...

I would be hesitant about a lot of the "new" revisionist stuff coming out now. The German OOB at Kursk, and elsewhere, has been known for years and several good books have been written about this battle, particularly in the "high interest" period of the '70s.

Manstein in particular was heavily discredited in the 1950's, so much so that the first edition of his book was heavily altered by the time the second edition came out to cover some of his lies. The first edition is now a collectors item as a result. Whilst it is true that the Soviet records have opened up widely in the last few years, they have added little to what was known about Kursk, particularly from the German side.

[Grisha]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Hussar:

Hi Guys

I have been following this thread with interest, but it seems to have dried up so...

I would be hesitant about a lot of the "new" revisionist stuff coming out now. The German OOB at Kursk, and elsewhere, has been known for years and several good books have been written about this battle, particularly in the "high interest" period of the '70s.

Manstein in particular was heavily discredited in the 1950's, so much so that the first edition of his book was heavily altered by the time the second edition came out to cover some of his lies. The first edition is now a collectors item as a result. Whilst it is true that the Soviet records have opened up widely in the last few years, they have added little to what was known about Kursk, particularly from the German side.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sorry to resurrect an old thread, but, Hussar, I think you miss the point of the 'revisionist' thing. Your post appears to me to imply that it is German material alone that should decide the truth of Kursk. Granted, past Soviet published works inflated German armor losses, but the German army was more than just Panthers and Tigers, much more. And while German heavy tank losses were quite small the same cannot be said of their medium tanks, their infantry, and their support vehicles. Without these assets German heavy tanks could not hope to hold any ground past dusk. The Soviets would have eliminated them in the night.

And, just how many Soviet troops were still out there? You see, this is where your train of thought collides smartly with 'revisionist' history, because the Germans never knew just how many Soviets were actually in reserve during the Prokhorovka action, or for the entire Zitadelle operation, for that matter. And we now know just how many there were due to the opening of Soviet archives. In fact, there were enough that after the carnage of Zitadelle, then Manstein's post-Kursk operation, the Soviets launched a major counteroffensive in the very same area a mere two weeks later! With that amount of reserves in the Kursk area, the Soviets could have lost Prokhorovka, and still the SS PanzerKorps would have run dry before too long. The Soviet archives prove that such was the thoroughness of STAVKA contingency planning that had the Germans won at Prokhorovka, the outcome of Zitadelle would have been no different than it was. And not only that, it also provides convincing evidence that even if the Germans had commenced Zitadelle in late May, or in June, their chances of success would have been no better than they were in July.

This is the key to 'revisionist' history wrt the Great Patriotic War. It fills out the other half of the picture, allowing us all to see just who and what the Germans were up against. The Germans had many tactical victories, but these victories spelled doom for them operationally, because the Germans could not recoup the losses they did incur, and in many instances either did not anticipate, or would not consider the consequences of such losses. In contrast, Soviet archives show that the Soviets were very aware of possible losses, and made extensive plans for worst case scenarios in order to ensure success of their operations. These plans were not only logistical in nature, but encompassed massive deception operations, and in depth intelligence on all levels. What the archives show is that while the Soviets would never be the equals of the Germans in tactical genius, they did do everything in their power that would give them an edge, and they literally left no stones unturned.

When one reads the memoirs of the German generals like Guderian, Mellenthin, and Manstein, then reads the new works coming out from the Soviet archives, one comes away thinking that on many levels, the Germans never really knew who hit them.

[This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 11-03-2000).]