15% shooters?

[Dmeek]

The recent post regarding SPR used the statistic that claimed only 15% of American infantrymen fired their guns in anger. Does anyone have any specifics on how this number was reached? Personally, I find the idea that any unit directly engaged with an enemy would have only 1 in 7 soldiers return fire dubious. I am no expert, but in terms of CM that would mean only about 2 men per squad would shoot, and you would be lucky to have one machine gun open up per company. I also find it had to believe that infantry divisions that were involved in fighting hard enough to receive well over 200% casualties over the campaign would have 85% of their soldiers just sit there and wait to get shot.

It just doesn’t add up. I know statistics can be as confusing as enlightening and I believe this statistic falls into the confusing category. If anyone can tell me where to find more information to prove or disprove this theory please let me know. Thanks. If this has already been discussed, I apologize. I didn't even know how to begin to search for it.

[This message has been edited by Dmeek (edited 04-15-2000).]

[Kevin Peltz]

Possibly the 15% figure is a reference to the number of logistics and support personnel involved ("REMF's"), vs the number of troops in the line. I read somewhere that it took something like 14 rear echelon troops to support 1 fighting soldier in the ETO, and even more in the Pacific theatre.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Kevin Peltz:

Possibly the 15% figure is a reference to the number of logistics and support personnel involved ("REMF's"), vs the number of troops in the line. I read somewhere that it took something like 14 rear echelon troops to support 1 fighting soldier in the ETO, and even more in the Pacific theatre.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

IIRC, this assumption is wrong, and the 15% actually relates only to the front-line troops involved. Methinks it was based on some OR done immediately after the war, interviews with soldiers etc.pp.

Again, IIRC, Michael Doubler in 'Closing with the enemy' disputes the number as far too low, but admits that there were problems in getting soldiers to shoot. This seemed to relate to their training. If they were trained to be marksmen, they would not shoot unless they were sure to have a target. What would have been needed was suppression fire however, and apparently that was not drilled into the soldiers. Doubler quotes Patton somewhere, who was also concerned that his soldiers did not shoot enough. Something like 'The unit that shoots controls the battlefield' or such. I haven't got the book to hand at the moment, it is raining (surprise) and I can't be bothered to go to the library to verify, so this is based on memory.

So in closing, while 15% seems to be too low, there was a problem with GIs being unwilling to shoot, probably relating to their training. Taking these figures and the reasoning, in general green units should shoot less, while veterans should shoot more.

Doubler, Michael D. - Closing with the enemy : how GIs fought the war in Europe, 1944-1945. - Lawrence, Kan. : University Press of Kansas, 1994. - (Modern war studies). - 0700606750

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Andreas

[sage]

I *believe* that that number was reached by S L A Marshall, (historian of the army, right?) based on interviews conducted in 1944 and 1945. I believe it is a flawed figure based on poor evidence.

Sage

[Guest Ol' Blood & Guts]

Well here's an intersting thought. Now think about it...

Take SPR for example, how many of those soldiers storming the beach actually fired a shot? Barring getting killed themselves, of course?

I mean it seems while the "15%" of men that are firing, the rest of the men are advancing under cover fire or just running for their lives!

So take it in CM terms, so you have a squad of 8-12 men. Just how many of those men are actually going to be in firing positions? The others are probably ducking or jockeying for position themselves. Especially when trying to fire out of "windows" in CM's buildings.

The only way a full squad can be in position to fire is if they are already set up in a defensive position like the boys in SPR were in at the last town battle. That's kinda hard to do when you're attacking.

I don't know, I may be totally off the mark here concerning this 15% figure, but it's still a interesting point.

[Black Sabot]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Dmeek:

The recent post regarding SPR used the statistic that claimed only 15% of American infantrymen fired their guns in anger.

[This message has been edited by Dmeek (edited 04-15-2000).]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The other 85% fired their guns in complete fright

[Juice]

Sage is right on both counts. Page 54 of S.L.A. Marshall's book Men Against Fire reads in part, "Later when the companies were interviewed at a full assembly and the men spoke as witnesses in the presence of the commander and their junior leaders, we found that on average not more than 15 percent of the men had actually fired at the enemy positions or personnel with rifles, carbines, grenades, bazookas, BARs, or machine guns during the course of the entire engagement. Even allowing for the dead and wounded, and assuming that in their numbers there would be the same proportion of active firers as among the living, the figure did not rise above 20 to 25 percent of the total for any action. The best showing that could be made by the most spirited and aggressive companies was that one man in four had made at least some use of his fire power." Had the book handy so I thought I'd toss that out.

BTW, every expert I've heard make reference to the 15 percent figure has questioned Marshall's methodology.

Back to lurking now.

-- Juice (Lurker since February, pre-ordered since March.)

[Darryl]

Don't know if I'd be so quick to dimiss

General Marshall's research. The information

he gathered over the years was hardly flattering in many cases to the training methods used by the U.S. Army, yet they

thought enough of it to make him a General.

Even if one cares to nitpick the actual

percentages, the fact remains that large numbers of troops failed to use their weapons in combat. This revelation was needed to cause the army to change it's training doctrine. Though as General Marshall found, even in the Korean conflict

many men were just not firing their weapons.

As he noted, it's very difficult to overcome

the inertia that siezes most men in combat.

I believe that is the crux of the problem.

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Darryl

[Teutonic]

Ok, so far the books I have read have a common theme when it comes to US infantry. When the GI's encountered the enemy a lot of times the first thing was to call in artillery or air. Also I think that the way that the germans attacked by selecting a narrow area to attack could also be part of the reason so few seemed to have fired.

Don't know if that made any sense but it is my $.02 worth.

Teutonic

[argie]

The General Depuy argues in the same terms about the lack of firepower in GIs. Not only because training, but poor leadership also. The germans NCOs was shouting to their men all the time, making things happens. Instead, the USA soldier was left alone with his panic

The germans was trained in suppressive fires also. Train that the GIs lacks.

But in the german side most of the time the only effective fire was conducted by the MGs, which makes a 15% figure also.

Sorry by the bad english.

Ariel

[DrAlimantado]

J. Bourke has a lengthy and complicated discussion about these numbers in 'An Intimate History of Killing: Face-To-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare' (Granta Books,London, 1999). If you have any spare chash, try to get the book .... it is very interesting even though if it has its flaws. But it is a good attempt to try to understand the individual psychological mechanism that enable and sustain and war.

[Echo]

They fired enough shots to win the war.

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As I walk through the Valley of Death, I will fear no one, for I am the meanest mother*#*#** in the valley. (George S. Patton)

[Renaud]

Not sure if this applies to WWII engagements the size of CM, but i've heard that at the operational level fuel usage and ammo usage are inversely related with more fuel being used in offensive operations and more ammo being used in defensive operations.

The 15% figure seems reasonable given that many infantry will be suppressed by HMG/MMG crew fire, cannon fire and artillery fire during an intense engagement. This seems to be modelled in CM. Also consider that when an infantry regiment deploys for action, only 1 or 2 battallions will be up front, out of each battallion only 1 or 2 companies will be up front and out of each company only a few platoons will be up front depending on whether the operation is an attack or defense. So even though the entire manpower of the 'regiment' might be listed as 'in action' only a fraction come into contact with the enemy and had the opportunity to fire personal weapons.

From what I can tell, WWII small unit actions succeeded or not for reasons other than how many grunts fired their rifles. Support fire saturating the objective, attacking where the enemy isn't, tactical surprise and manuever would rank higher in importance for me as a commander than making sure every soldat fired his bolt action rifle. I'd place more importance on finding concealed routes of advance for the assault infantry so I could infiltrate them into the objective area without firing a shot.

In defensive situations where a regimental line is penetrated there are going to be a lot of men fleeing, throwing down weapons, surrendering and generally not fighting. (ex: bulge) This would certainly help explain a low %%-fired figure for squad personal weapons.

Another interesting tidbit (from Bruce Catton I believe) is from examination of the US civil war battlefield at Antietam Creek. It was found that sometimes 4 out of 5 rifles discarded on the battlefield by soldiers of green Union regiments had never been fired. Some had been loaded up to 5 times but never discharged. Some regiments simply freaked and didn't fire hardly at all. I imagine the same could happen in WWII.

Ren

[This message has been edited by Renaud (edited 04-16-2000).]

[Guest Ol' Blood & Guts]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Renaud:

Another interesting tidbit (from Bruce Catton I believe) is from examination of the US civil war battlefield at Antietam Creek. It was found that sometimes 4 out of 5 rifles discarded on the battlefield by soldiers of green Union regiments had never been fired. Some had been loaded up to 5 times but never discharged. Some regiments simply freaked and didn't fire hardly at all. I imagine the same could happen in WWII.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This was mentioned in the film "Gettysburg" during the Battle of Little Round Top sequence. The old guy mentioned that to make sure the guys discharged their weapons, "some guys just keep loading their weapons and end up with 4 or 5 rounds crammed up in the barrel."

[Guest R Cunningham]

I thought they found one musket at Gettysburg that had been loaded 7 times.

In any case I accept the figures from SLA Marshall as fairly accurate. This is the first time I'd seen the number shown to be as low as 15%. Normally I see 25% used. The primary occupation of a soldier is staying alive. I talked about this with my grandfather who was with Charlie Company 338th RCT (85th ID) in Italy. He said in any squad there might be 3 or 4 guys who were "worth a damn" and the rest were just there. With 12 guys in a squad 3 or 4 comes out 25 to 33%. Not exactly scientific but my grandfather's observations always cemented Marshall's numbers for me.

The 25% is supposed to represent "natural fighters" the guys who will actively particiapte in a firefight as opposed to just hunkering down behind a tree or hiding in their holes. These guys fight regardless of the weapon they are assigned. IIRC the soldiers who had automatic weapons were more inclined to participate because they had confidence in the effectiveness of their weapon while the guy with the bolt action rifle is having doubts about his ability to affect the outcome of the battle by exposing himself to fire one shot.

I think there was a similar study done in Vietnam that reported the percentage of fighters to be up around 80% and IIRC this was attributed to the M16's full auto capability. The image of a GI holding his weapon up from behind cover and going through a magazine comes to mind. The full auto capability encouraged the soldiers to participate and used up a lot of ammo. So much that we know have only 3-round burst on the M16A2.

[Guest Seimerst]

While SLA Marshall has his critics from the operational analysis community, many others feel he is not far off. He used his same "combat interviews" in Korea and Vietnam where his goal was to talk to troops as soon as he could while they were able to tell him what it was like before the mind began to make the real memory better. Watch some old film footage about fire fights in Vietnam and his figures seem close. I remember the old adage we 2LT were told at Infantry Officer Basic about staying alive. "When you get to your platoon, find out who your psychopath is-- give him the M-60 machine gun and have everyone else hump ammo and spare barrels for him. And then handcuff him to you." One reason the Special Forces A-teams were so successful in defending their camps was that everyone fired-- read the citiation of Roger Donlon's Medal of Honor.

[Simon Fox]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>When the GI's encountered the enemy a lot of times the first thing was to call in artillery or air<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This opinion crops up so many times that I am sure there is an element of truth in it but I feel it is grossly overexaggerated. Sure, towards the end of the war this became standard practice for many US units when confronted with opposition in Germany. I would suggest that it may have been more prevalent in less experienced units. Even so they did have the firepower so why not use it, the main problem occurs when it becomes a reliance upon it which is danegrous as it isn't always going to work.

Funnily enough I always contrast this European theatre opinion of the US army with how they were viewed by the Aussies in the Pacific. They felt the were too gung-ho and aggressive - "always charging in and getting themselves into situations they couldn't get out of".

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"Heaven sent and hell bent

Over the mountain tops we go

Just like all the other GI Joes

EE-AY-EE-AY adios!"

[KiloIndiaAlpha]

15% is probably about right. The average GI was a pretty poor soldier. USMC a bit better but neither of them first-rate Soldiers.

[DrD]

I have heard this before and find it very interesting. I also heard that the original study concluded that German units must have had similarly low numbers of troops firing their weapons as an American Platoon and a German Platoon did not have grossly disparate volumes of firing after taking into account the differences in weapons. I have heard it said that one of the big reasons for this statistic was assumed to be a lack of will in soldiers to actually kill someone and as a result of this study the US Army began emphasizing the "killer instinct" in training. From what I've seen in movies and heard from friends in the army there's alot of "kill, kill, rip his guts out, etc." in training now.

[Bigggie]

The number 15% might be a little low, but not by much. I remember reading in a book that quoted an Army study (of troops in Vietnam)that estimated between a 20% - 30% firing rate. I am looking for the book so I can cite it on the board. I'll post it when I find it.

[Speedy]

I am reading 'The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby' at the moment. I am only halfway through yet at the moment it seems to uphold the 15% figure for the British Army to. Rifleman Bowlby has been in several engagements so far and has still to fire his weapon .

So far the smartest person in the platoon is Coke. He continually deserts and has now been sent of for courtmartial. His philosophy is that 2 years in prison will keep him alive while the rest of the blokes in the platoon will probably get killed in battle.