How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[hcrof]

3 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

Apart from the Anglo-Saxons did it stuff, he seems to be saying that the way to counteract confusion (envy) in the hearts and minds of those stuck in New Russia between the Berlin Wall 2 and Old Russia is to improve the quality of life of all Russians through neo-industrialization, but without actually mentioning quality of life or the Russian people.

And for a futurist he appears to like Soviet era 5-year plans.

He's right about needing to diversify Russia's economy though, so maybe they will spend 5 years making more guns and ammo.

It's almost as if, hypothetically, Russia were to improve the quality of life of their own people then they would do better in the ideological struggle against their western neighbours. And that destroying huge tracts of a country while trying to conquer it is not very effective in achieving this goal. 

Unfortunately for Russia they seem to have forgotten some key lessons of the cold war and it took their most clear-eyed futurists several years of bloody conflict to re-learn this complex concept. And the countries leadership is still a long way from figuring it out...

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, hcrof said:

Interesting perspective from a Russian that I think some people here might actually agree with!

 

I think it paints a pretty accurate picture of the most likely western strategy to be honest.  We are liking seeking a frozen conflict followed by full enfranchisement of Ukraine into the western world - exactly what we did with South Korea.  Russia will be boxed up and made to be China's problem.  Contain and compress into irrelevance, while showing off Ukrainian Brook Shields in blue jeans.

The danger of this theory is that at its core it reduces Russian options down to the nuclear ones.  The assumption being that Russia will never use them.  What is interesting is that as Russia runs out of conventional power options it will be pushed to decision point - accept the western "win" or cross the nuclear threshold.

The only possible exit/off ramp is a major shift in Western (and here, mainly US) policies based on internal political power shifts.  Or we fight to the end and deal with a full on Russian internal collapse.

Edited June 14 by The_Capt

[billbindc]

9 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I think it paints a pretty accurate picture of the most likely western strategy to be honest.  We are liking seeking a frozen conflict followed by full enfranchisement of Ukraine into the western world - exactly what we did with South Korea.  Russia will be boxed up and made to be China's problem.  Contain and compress into irrelevance, while showing off Ukrainian Brook Shields in blue jeans.

The danger of this theory is that at its core it reduces Russian options down to the nuclear ones.  The assumption being that Russia will never use them.  What is interesting is that as Russia runs out of conventional power options it will be pushed to decision point - accept the western "win" or cross the nuclear threshold.

The only possible exit/off ramp is a major shift in Western (and here, mainly US) policies based on internal political power shifts.  Or we fight to the end and deal with a full on Russian internal collapse.

I think it's worth considering this in terms of the Galeotti analysis I posted above. Putin's two modes are to either prevaricate or over react...with what I would argue is a very strong lean towards the former. How he reacted to the challenge Prigozhin presented illustrates the dynamic well. He literally disappeared for a while when it began and then negotiated a bad deal for himself which he revised later with the assassination of Prigozhin and Wagner's core leadership. Putin did not "go nuclear" in any way during the entire episode. No purges, no mass arrests, no lashing out. He did the bare minimum to protect himself without unleashing forces that might get out of control.

The war in Ukraine so far shows a similar mix of aggression and timidity. Yes Russia invaded and yes it is struggling mightily to win but it is quite difficult to find anything Russia has done outside the lines that goes beyond nuisance value. Dragging a Norwegian data line or paying some clown to toss a firebomb at some vans in Prague are not exactly attempts to dramatically broaden the strategic scale of this war despite the fact that Western aid has killed Russian troops in windrows and is very effectively destroying the Russian military.

And why not? Because the elites under Putin as a group simply must have stability to safeguard the control they exert over power and money in Russian society and his primary job is to ensure it. Dropping a nuke, in any context, destroys that compact and as we have seen Putin now certainly knows that large sections of the security state will remain on the sidelines if he is challenged on that basis.

So while I would never entirely deny the possibility of Russia doing something idiotic, I think the invasion itself has used up Putin's allowance on that front unless and until dropping a nuke is seen as the only way in which the current internal order can be defended. That is only comprehensible in the case of a civil war...which goes a long way towards explaining American policy in this milieu.  

 

 

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, billbindc said:

I think it's worth considering this in terms of the Galeotti analysis I posted above. Putin's two modes are to either prevaricate or over react...with what I would argue is a very strong lean towards the former. How he reacted to the challenge Prigozhin presented illustrates the dynamic well. He literally disappeared for a while when it began and then negotiated a bad deal for himself which he revised later with the assassination of Prigozhin and Wagner's core leadership. Putin did not "go nuclear" in any way during the entire episode. No purges, no mass arrests, no lashing out. He did the bare minimum to protect himself without unleashing forces that might get out of control.

The war in Ukraine so far shows a similar mix of aggression and timidity. Yes Russia invaded and yes it is struggling mightily to win but it is quite difficult to find anything Russia has done outside the lines that goes beyond nuisance value. Dragging a Norwegian data line or paying some clown to toss a firebomb at some vans in Prague are not exactly attempts to dramatically broaden the strategic scale of this war despite the fact that Western aid has killed Russian troops in windrows and is very effectively destroying the Russian military.

And why not? Because the elites under Putin as a group simply must have stability to safeguard the control they exert over power and money in Russian society and his primary job is to ensure it. Dropping a nuke, in any context, destroys that compact and as we have seen Putin now certainly knows that large sections of the security state will remain on the sidelines if he is challenged on that basis.

So while I would never entirely deny the possibility of Russia doing something idiotic, I think the invasion itself has used up Putin's allowance on that front unless and until dropping a nuke is seen as the only way in which the current internal order can be defended. That is only comprehensible in the case of a civil war...which goes a long way towards explaining American policy in this milieu.  

 

 

My concern here is how much we can continue to pin Russian strategic trajectories upon Putin as this things continues to unfold.  The man is clearly a control freak autocrat but as things start to unravel some are going to realize that he is really a sad 70 year old man with dwindling prospects.  The "emperor is naked" moment is unpredictable and dangerous, particularly for a nuclear power.

I also do not think Putin would be dumb enough to try and flip the chess table over, but the guy behind him might be.  Further, as has been stressed by a few on this board, this war is existential for Putin's power structure.  It is irrational, but some of the gears in that structure may easily equate "internal stability" to the outcome of this war.

If it happens I suspect it will be incremental.  More likely use of chemical weapons, which is a line Russia has already hopped over in Syria.  Tac nukes would likely be reserved to try and head off a full RA collapse, using the "homeland defence" argument now that homeland has been redefined.  Again, one or two as a demonstration and signal on "Russian soil."  The aim would be to break western unity and try to break out of the box.

[billbindc]

2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

My concern here is how much we can continue to pin Russian strategic trajectories upon Putin as this things continues to unfold.  The man is clearly a control freak autocrat but as things start to unravel some are going to realize that he is really a sad 70 year old man with dwindling prospects.  The "emperor is naked" moment is unpredictable and dangerous, particularly for a nuclear power.

I also do not think Putin would be dumb enough to try and flip the chess table over, but the guy behind him might be.  Further, as has been stressed by a few on this board, this war is existential for Putin's power structure.  It is irrational, but some of the gears in that structure may easily equate "internal stability" to the outcome of this war.

If it happens I suspect it will be incremental.  More likely use of chemical weapons, which is a line Russia has already hopped over in Syria.  Tac nukes would likely be reserved to try and head off a full RA collapse, using the "homeland defence" argument now that homeland has been redefined.  Again, one or two as a demonstration and signal on "Russian soil."  The aim would be to break western unity and try to break out of the box.

It's a legitimate concern but we have to look at what happened when a table flipper did show up. Prigozhin started out trying to defend a losing hand to Shoigu but the *cause* he took up was a hard war, no holds barred approach to Ukraine and to mobilizing the Russian state. And it was popular with the people! What happened? Once it looked like he might actually succeed, the passive support he received evaporated pretty quickly and his silent partners were quite happy to bank their winnings (in terms of greater current freedom of action and positioning for a post Putin state) and let him hang. 

So while we don't know what we are going to get next we do know that the structure of the Russian state as currently constituted is conservatively oriented towards avoiding the kind of cataclysmic change that could threaten the health and wealth of the top rungs. And let's be honest, the Russian people en masse have almost zero power. Until that structure changes...and it would likeliest take an actual regime collapse to accomplish it...I'm going to sleep pretty well at night. 

[cesmonkey]

 

[cesmonkey]

Quote

Two years ago, I outlined eight lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine. And though I warned that it was too early to be confident about any predictions, they have held up reasonably well.

 

[The_Capt]

54 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Until that structure changes...and it would likeliest take an actual regime collapse to accomplish it...I'm going to sleep pretty well at night. 

Your faith in people not being stupid is comforting. However, that same clowns juggling hand grenades blindfolded show thought this entire war was somehow a good idea. To my mind Priggy’s Wild Ride as he fumbled towards ecstasy is a prime example of just how freak show this entire thing can get.

Regardless, we are definitely still in the military solutions space for awhile longer.

[billbindc]

9 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Your faith in people not being stupid is comforting. However, that same clowns juggling hand grenades blindfolded show thought this entire war was somehow a good idea. To my mind Priggy’s Wild Ride as he fumbled towards ecstasy is a prime example of just how freak show this entire thing can get.

Regardless, we are definitely still in the military solutions space for awhile longer.

I would point out that Prigozhin proved the weakness of Putin but the strength of the systema and nobody is going to be in the position Putin was in early 2022 for a very long time. Yes everything is contingent and bad bounces happen but in general countries remain within the ruts of the road their wheels already know. Russia was a weak, declining power with a rapacious elite most interested in self aggrandizement before this war began and it's more likely to revert to that norm than anything else. Call me an optimist.

[The_Capt]

52 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

 

Not bad, really.  Some of these would not be my picks, others are “duh”/low hanging fruit.  His first lesson and tanks is self-contradictory.  In this war we are watching old and new weapons try and figure it all out.  If I could pick a quick 8:

1.  Know the war you are in. The West continued failure to really frame this war has led to confusion on the stakes and desired outcomes.

2.  Technology is a symptom of change.  Learning is deterministic.  The side that is able to learn faster in a war of technological disruption has advantage.

3.  Narratives matter.  The authors point on “winning story” really resonates.

4.  Macro and micro lenses.  So much of this war started with Macro lenses being applied.  Now with social media we are galvanized on micro-lenses, often 50 sec vignettes. The balance of perspective is more important now than ever.

5.  Mass, friction and defence/denial have all shifted - direction TBD.  They have done so on the backs of precision and processing.

6.  Open source is both better and worse than filtered mainstream reporting.  We have seen the first real open source information war.  The data collected in this war is exponentially larger and closer to real-time than any in human history.

7.  Hard power is back with a vengeance. The political theories of the post-Cold War centring on soft power and human security have proven inadequate for this war, and likely the next one.  We need to rethink discourse between nations as the dream of collective pressures and “friend-shoring” are nowhere near enough.

8.  All war remains a violent negotiation of irreconcilable certainties that suffers time poorly.  This war, like most, was “come as you are”.  The West needs to learn that “come as you were” is a very poor fit and we need to rethink what the western way of warfare is and build that machine.  Instead we have a mad scramble of a dog’s breakfast of capability being thrown at Ukraine.  NATO standards are a joke. Capacity and industry need a major realignment as the dirt wars of the last 30 years are likely over.

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

My concern here is how much we can continue to pin Russian strategic trajectories upon Putin as this things continues to unfold.  The man is clearly a control freak autocrat but as things start to unravel some are going to realize that he is really a sad 70 year old man with dwindling prospects.  The "emperor is naked" moment is unpredictable and dangerous, particularly for a nuclear power.

I also do not think Putin would be dumb enough to try and flip the chess table over, but the guy behind him might be.  Further, as has been stressed by a few on this board, this war is existential for Putin's power structure.  It is irrational, but some of the gears in that structure may easily equate "internal stability" to the outcome of this war.

If it happens I suspect it will be incremental.  More likely use of chemical weapons, which is a line Russia has already hopped over in Syria.  Tac nukes would likely be reserved to try and head off a full RA collapse, using the "homeland defence" argument now that homeland has been redefined.  Again, one or two as a demonstration and signal on "Russian soil."  The aim would be to break western unity and try to break out of the box.

 

25 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Your faith in people not being stupid is comforting. However, that same clowns juggling hand grenades blindfolded show thought this entire war was somehow a good idea. To my mind Priggy’s Wild Ride as he fumbled towards ecstasy is a prime example of just how freak show this entire thing can get.

Regardless, we are definitely still in the military solutions space for awhile longer.

 

8 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I would point out that Prigozhin proved the weakness of Putin but the strength of the systema and nobody is going to be in the position Putin was in early 2022 for a very long time. Yes everything is contingent and bad bounces happen but in general countries remain within the ruts of the road their wheels already know. Russia was a weak, declining power with a rapacious elite most interested in self aggrandizement before this war began and it's more likely to revert to that norm than anything else. Call me an optimist.

Let me try to clarify a few things. Billindc's argument is that Russia is so deep in the hole, and restrained by he contradictions of its own excuse for a system, that the "West" can push for a near maximalist victory at acceptable risk.

The_Capt's theory is that the risk of trying win this thing in a way that humiliates, and might destabilize, the Russian regime are to high. We need to take our chips off the table and try to land this thing where the front lines are at more or less. Let Russia fail slowly without the risk of an ongoing hot war. 

Now let me ask a third question, what is the outcome of this war that most encourages China not to wreck the world economy,and a great deal else, by trying to grab Taiwan? Because that, along with avoiding a nuclear exchange, is the real goal here. A major part of The Capt's argument is that the exact settlement in Ukraine is less important than we would like to think, short of the complete collapse of Kyiv. I would argue that what IS important is an outcome that that maximizes the deterrence of Xi from doing something as remotely as stupid as Putin's little plan for a short victorious war. Does the way Ukraine ends really move the needle on that one way or the other?.

[billbindc]

1 minute ago, dan/california said:

 

 

Let me try to clarify a few things. Billindc's argument is that Russia is so deep in the hole, and restrained by he contradictions of its own excuse for a system, that the "West" can push for a near maximalist victory at acceptable risk.

The_Capt's theory is that the risk of trying win this thing in a way that humiliates, and might destabilize, the Russian regime are to high. We need to take our chips off the table and try to land this thing where the front lines are at more or less. Let Russia fail slowly without the risk of an ongoing hot war. 

Now let me ask a third question, what is the outcome of this war that most encourages China not to wreck the world economy,and a great deal else, by trying to grab Taiwan? Because that, along with avoiding a nuclear exchange, is the real goal here. A major part of The Capt's argument is that the exact settlement in Ukraine is less important than we would like to think, short of the complete collapse of Kyiv. I would argue that what IS important is an outcome that that maximizes the deterrence of Xi from doing something as remotely as stupid as Putin's little plan for a short victorious war. Does the way Ukraine ends really move the needle on that one way or the other?.

My argument is definitively *not* that we can push for maximalist victory. My argument is simply that Putin sits atop the system but he is not the system personified. Ergo, if we behave in a sober manner, chances are more likely that the internal incentives control for behavior. 

What discourages China is the degree of will/power/military force the US is willing to commit to vis a vis Russia and what that suggests about a response to a seizure of Taiwan (which is far less likely than a blockade). 

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, billbindc said:

My argument is definitively *not* that we can push for maximalist victory. My argument is simply that Putin sits atop the system but he is not the system personified. Ergo, if we behave in a sober manner, chances are more likely that the internal incentives control for behavior.

I think billbindc has outlined how Russia works pretty well.  If one looks at Russian history going back a few hundred years, there's been more consistency than inconsistency throughout.  Ruling elites have always dominated Russian society to a degree that has no Western equivalent for the last 100+ years (at least).  The details might have changed in terms of how the power is maintained and divided up, but it has consistently been clan based.  Putin might be powerful, but he is not all powerful.

It is entirely possible for Putin (or any Russian leader) to upset enough of the elites to have them reconsider their support for him.  The Priggy Parade to Moscow was an indication that their support for Putin is less than solid, but also not yet ready to move against him.  That message being that they are not actively seeking to replace him.  Yet.  However, they are also not actively going to intervene to save him.  The fact that Putin didn't have large chunks of the elites slaughtered for support or complacency tells us that he lacks the power to do so.

As I've maintained for the last 2.5 years... the risk of things getting worse with Russia come with a large scale internal conflict.  I do not think the West should be actively pursuing a strategy that actively pushes Russia into a civil war.  Unfortunately, I think it's inevitable at some point so it would be smart to start planning for it.

Steve

[Maciej Zwolinski]

6 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Now let me ask a third question, what is the outcome of this war that most encourages China not to wreck the world economy,and a great deal else, by trying to grab Taiwan? Because that, along with avoiding a nuclear exchange, is the real goal here.

I think the most discouraging scenario for China is the one where: 1) NATO has awaken to the existence of conventional military threat and is restoring the capacity for conventional military production and force replacement; 2)NATO is not tied up with the need to continue providing significant military aid to the Ukraine; 3) Russia's military force is spent and incapable of opening a second front in Europe on China's behalf.

Condition 1) can be satisfied now regardless of what happens next on the Ukrainian front. US and Europe has received enough of a wake up call to start rearming ourselves. It is after 1936 and budget forecasts no longer assume no significant conflict in Europe in the next 20 years. It is dependent only on the political will and quality of leadership of NATO countries.

Condition 2) and 3) are to an extent internally inconsistent.  2) would be best served by a clean UKR win ASAP, Ukraine being able to switch to rebuilding its forces and most importantly, rebuilding or otherwise acquiring the means of war production without being dependent on the NATO allies on the day-to-day basis. On the other hand, the longer the war takes, the more depleted the Russians are. I think that the sweet spot is the moment, when Russia's post-Soviet stocks are no longer able to give it the quantitative advantage and/or the means of force replacement without resorting to new production. Once Russians have to sustain the war effort from new production, their quantitative advantage becomes limited to meat assaults and their magic is gone.

Taking the above into consideration, I think the most discouraging outcome to the Chinese is a clear-cut Ukrainian victory with Russians having to withdraw to pre-2022 border, sometime in 2026 after the post-Soviet stocks of tanks, IFVs, guns and gun barrels become depleted sometime in 2025.

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

7.  Hard power is back with a vengeance. The political theories of the post-Cold War centring on soft power and human security have proven inadequate for this war, and likely the next one.  We need to rethink discourse between nations as the dream of collective pressures and “friend-shoring” are nowhere near enough.

This is THE lesson, the last argument of Kings is still a thing. We need to act like we understand that not rhetorically acknowledge it.  Acting like it means massive investments in the defense industrial base among other things, and return to making well chosen risky bets on future technology. Not everything is going to work, but getting caught out in the areas where the new stuff DOES work is going to be very painful.

Let me add one more lesson that encompasses essentially everything that has happened after 1991. The superpower that is having to do its own fighting is losing. Even regional superpowers that have to do their own fighting are losing. Russia immolating itself in Ukraine is just one of many examples. Indeed one of the more likely outcomes of Ukraine is that Russia becomes a Chinese proxy. 

Edited June 14 by dan/california

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-putin-remains-uninterested-meaningful-negotiations-ukraine

Western media continues to report that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine, although Kremlin rhetoric and Russian military actions illustrate that Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and any settlement that would prevent him from pursuing the destruction of an independent Ukrainian state.

Russia is currently preparing for the possibility of a conventional war with NATO, and the Kremlin will likely view anything short of Ukrainian capitulation as an existential threat to Russia's ability to fight such a war.

 

ISW is coming down rather hard on the side of there being no choice but beating the Russians more or less completely.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

 

ISW is coming down rather hard on the side of there being no choice but beating the Russians more or less completely.

Yup, and they've been very consistent about this since the very earliest days when Putin first suggested there could be a ceasefire.  The folks over at ISW are not fools.

Steve

[cesmonkey]

 

[dan/california]

https://www.threads.net/@antifaoperative/post/C8NUbqRv6He?deeplink_ig_tifu=1&tifu_login=True&xmt=AQGzR0QG2agm2-4duThXs_Dq-As6SIAUtomkLKFvDIObbSY

 

[ASL Veteran]

Quote

One of the fascinating parts of this war is that combatants on both sides frequently video the same incident. Because people are chasing social media clout, neither side cares about making themselves look bad. In this video, a vehicle jam-packed with Russian troops is attacked by a Ukrainian FPV drone. The Russian POV is captured via something like a GoPro. The lack of situation awareness is astounding. The video shows they have a man in the vehicle with a shotgun. That could have saved them a lot of grief if someone had been pulling security.

 

[ASL Veteran]

 

 

[The_Capt]

9 hours ago, dan/california said:

 

 

Let me try to clarify a few things. Billindc's argument is that Russia is so deep in the hole, and restrained by he contradictions of its own excuse for a system, that the "West" can push for a near maximalist victory at acceptable risk.

The_Capt's theory is that the risk of trying win this thing in a way that humiliates, and might destabilize, the Russian regime are to high. We need to take our chips off the table and try to land this thing where the front lines are at more or less. Let Russia fail slowly without the risk of an ongoing hot war. 

Now let me ask a third question, what is the outcome of this war that most encourages China not to wreck the world economy,and a great deal else, by trying to grab Taiwan? Because that, along with avoiding a nuclear exchange, is the real goal here. A major part of The Capt's argument is that the exact settlement in Ukraine is less important than we would like to think, short of the complete collapse of Kyiv. I would argue that what IS important is an outcome that that maximizes the deterrence of Xi from doing something as remotely as stupid as Putin's little plan for a short victorious war. Does the way Ukraine ends really move the needle on that one way or the other?.

Holy crap…someone has definitely been taking notes.  You bullies in the back take note and do not beat dan up after school.

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, dan/california said:

 

ISW is coming down rather hard on the side of there being no choice but beating the Russians more or less completely.

It is not a question of “complete/not complete” - there is no theoretically consistent complete victory here as it would mean unconditional surrender and likely occupation of Russia while the international community rebuilt a functioning democratic state…in Russia.  So every victory is less than complete.  We can achieve major victory here but the question there is speed. My sense is that a slow stranglehold, containment and marginalization will yield internal change within Russia that has a chance of not coming completely undone. My evidence is the fall of the Soviet Union, not perfect but there is that.  

Other than that we have 1917 which we do not want but can see the conditions for it right in front of us - rigid autocracy largely held up by elites, masses held together by fear and lies, and a grinding war.  Not a perfect fit but we are closer to 1917 than 1991.  So based on historical precedent, slow and steady might give the best shot of eventually getting Ukraine back to where it was and Russia in a position to do internal change that we can work with, without blowing the f#ck up.

If ISW is saying “hey it is 1917 but screw it,” then I disagree with ISW.  18% of Ukraine in 2025 is not worth a nuclear power tearing itself apart uncontrollably. People can doubt this or “poo-poo” the risk but it is simply a reality we have to live with. Further, I know the grown ups are in this headspace or we would have seen NATO airstrikes two years ago (again history is on my side - see Saddam H).

A major victory is possible that would see Ukraine restored, reconstructed and in NATO…and a path to renormalization with Russia. Yep, I said it. You want to frame this war and Russia in terms of the bigger game?  Pull them westward and take all that oil and gas away from China. Now the Russia we renormalize with cannot be Putin’s Russia. It must be a stable democracy (within reason), a functional member of the international community, pay reparations for this war, prosecute war criminals and generally fix itself.  That, is one tall order, but we are on the topic of real victory here.  I do not think we will get this in my lifetime, so we may have to live with a weak and tethered Russia instead.

If you want to talk strategic, look at after this war.  If Ukraine is back to 100% territory and in NATO, it is still not a “complete win”.  In fact the state and facing of Russia is a far bigger issue in the larger game than Ukraine.  And we haven’t even talked about the wall of climate impacts coming our way in about 20 years.

Edited June 15 by The_Capt

[dan/california]

27 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

It is not a question of “complete/not complete” - there is no theoretically consistent complete victory here as it would mean unconditional surrender and likely occupation of Russia while the international community rebuilt a functioning democratic state…in Russia.  So every victory is less than complete.  We can achieve major victory here but the question there is speed. My sense is that a slow stranglehold, containment and marginalization will yield internal change within Russia that has a chance of not coming completely undone. My evidence is the fall of the Soviet Union, not perfect but there is that.  

Other than that we have 1917 which we do not want but can see the conditions for it right in front of us - rigid autocracy largely held up by elites, masses held together by fear and lies, and a grinding war.  Not a perfect fit but we are closer to 1917 than 1991.  So based on historical precedent, slow and steady might give the best shot of eventually getting Ukraine back to where it was and Russia in a position to do internal change that we can work with, without blowing the f#ck up.

If ISW is saying “hey it is 1917 but screw it,” then I disagree with ISW.  18% of Ukraine in 2025 is not worth a nuclear power tearing itself apart uncontrollably. People can doubt this or “poo-poo” the risk but it is simply a reality we have to live with. Further, I know the grown ups are in this headspace or we would have seen NATO airstrikes two years ago (again history is on my side - see Saddam H).

A major victory is possible that would see Ukraine restored, reconstructed and in NATO…and a path to renormalization with Russia. Yep, I said it. You want to frame this war and Russia in terms of the bigger game?  Pull them westward and take all that oil and gas away from China. Now the Russia we renormalize with cannot be Putin’s Russia. It must be a stable democracy (within reason), a functional member of the international community, pay reparations for this war, prosecute war criminals and generally fix itself.  That, is one tall order, but we are on the topic of real victory here.  I do not think we will get this in my lifetime, so we may have to live with a weak and tethered Russia instead.

If you want to talk strategic, look at after this war.  If Ukraine is back to 100% territory and in NATO, it is still not a “complete win”.  In fact the state and facing of Russia is a far bigger issue in the larger game than Ukraine.  And we haven’t even talked about the wall of climate impacts coming our way in about 20 years.

If we are talking our preferred historical analogies, 1905 was lovely year. Russia was militarily defeated almost utterly in an unnecessary  war of choice, and then rocked but not tipped over by civil unrest. If it hadn't been for WW1 they might have managed some semblance of gradual reform, as opposed to an epic implosion. I grant the eye of that needle gets ever smaller, and the consequences of missing it higher, with every passing day.

If i can be forgiven for throwing out an extra idea, am I the only one that thinks modern communications might be making autocracies both stronger and more brittle? It massively increases the regimes ability to repress all dissent everywhere, right up until the whole country blows up at once?

[dan/california]

https://www.threads.net/@24hoursukrainenew/post/C8NbTQugf-w

A BMP going boom. It is an interesting, and funny, bit of data in the ongoing debate about whether it is more dangerous to ride in a BMP, or on one.

Edited June 15 by dan/california