How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

Good discussion started by ArmorTopHat.  I am heavily biased because tanks are god's chosen ones, obviously, but I still think TheCapt is right.  

This is great example of how to disagree and debate on a complex subject.  Well, done to both of you (and Steve also). 

[Battlefront.com]

I think this video was posted already, but I'm reposting it because the beginning and towards the end involve tanks

 

This was a platoon sized surprise assault on trenches in Kreminna are, probably a month or so ago.  Two tanks went ahead to pound the enemy, but although apparently unprepared and few in number (7 strong?) one tank got hit and burned up while the other one withdrew out of fear of being next.  It turns out they didn't offer much to this battle.

Towards the end the Azov guys heard some Russian radio chatter about sending in one of their tanks to counter attack.  The Ukrainian overall commander said not to worry because they control the skies and would spot it well ahead of time.  Whether they could attack it or not wasn't addressed.  As it was the Russians just dropped a bunch of artillery on the positions.

So, Ukraine lost a tank taking out a fairly insignificant trench held by a small number of light infantry which were only rooted out by other light infantry.  The Russians, had they chosen to counter attack, would have been spotted ahead of time (presumably, anyway) and could have been countered in some way.

This is yet another example of me wondering what the tanks accomplished and if something else could have done the same or better in their place.  If the tank was so great I wouldn't keep asking myself this question.

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

47 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think this video was posted already, but I'm reposting it because the beginning and towards the end involve tanks

 

This was a platoon sized surprise assault on trenches in Kreminna are, probably a month or so ago.  Two tanks went ahead to pound the enemy, but although apparently unprepared and few in number (7 strong?) one tank got hit and burned up while the other one withdrew out of fear of being next.  It turns out they didn't offer much to this battle.

Towards the end the Azov guys heard some Russian radio chatter about sending in one of their tanks to counter attack.  The Ukrainian overall commander said not to worry because they control the skies and would spot it well ahead of time.  Whether they could attack it or not wasn't addressed.  As it was the Russians just dropped a bunch of artillery on the positions.

So, Ukraine lost a tank taking out a fairly insignificant trench held by a small number of light infantry which were only rooted out by other light infantry.  The Russians, had they chosen to counter attack, would have been spotted ahead of time (presumably, anyway) and could have been countered in some way.

This is yet another example of me wondering what the tanks accomplished and if something else could have done the same or better in their place.  If the tank was so great I wouldn't keep asking myself this question.

Steve

Excellent video I must say.

Some of my own thoughts and responses.

Kreminna is probably close to some of of the roughest terrain for tank usage around, not to say they cant be used but yeah, very close quarters so this outcome is not exactly a surprise. To me even with the loss of a tank, they are still performing exactly what their intended role is: to spearhead a push and provide supporting fire to blast the infantry onto target. Outside of major mechanised movements this is the quintessential purpose of a tank in its form. Given the infantry make it into the Russian trenches and succeed in their assault, I view that as a success, especially as the crew of the tank reportedly survive.

If they did not have tanks at all in the assault its fair to argue that more men are liable to become casualties. As a rule of thumb, steel always saves on blood and sweat. You can even hear the Ukrainian soldiers seem pretty happy / confident that they have two tanks supporting them on this assault. Having that level of firepower for a small assault is pretty damn good to have and its clearly good for their morale!

The RU infantry in the meantime clearly have the opposite issue and are focussing their attentions on the tanks, which gives the  UA infantry the opportunity to act out their own mission. Is it not possible the defending Russian infantry might have been a bit more active and able if they were not suffering the significant emotional event of having tank fire directed at near point blank range at them?

The other big observation is, what would you use instead of the tank in this situation? Any other vehicle is going to be lighter and even more vulnerable to anti tank fire. To have nothing in support means your infantry are assaulting a trench position without any vehicular support. That is always an even bloodier outcome in most cases. To me, the issue here if there is one is that the poor bastards are having to use pretty old tanks. One wonders how much better the tanks would fare with thermals made in the last generation at least for instance. Not to mention that this seems more the perfect reason why something like a functioning APS system on a tank is so important. 

At the end of the day, the Ukrainians (and people in general for war really) are using what they have. 

Edited May 31 by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Again, it shouldn't be surprising that the countries that have deeply vested interests in MBTs aren't so quick to look for replacements.  Yet it is happening and this war is most definitely accelerating that interest.  Your MoD is certainly quite interested in UGVs.

At the moment we have a bit of a standoff.  Tanks are not yet completely useless, but given their costs and expectations they aren't very useful.  UAVs, top attack weapons, and other things are showing that there's an end to the tank in sight.  UGVs may not be ready to replace them yet, but if I had $1b to invest in figuring out a solution I would be investing it into UGVs and not MBTs.  That's what a smart investor would do if said investor was a long term thinker.  Which, unfortunately, is the problem with our procurement system in the West.  Long term solutions are sold to buyers based on short term interests of the sellers.  The two aren't always incompatible concepts, but in this case I think they are.

This is sort of my point though. Plenty of countries have some degree of interest in a wide variety of drones and UGVs yet it is largely in supplemental roles rather than say replacing current vehicles / concepts in service. No one wants to take a potential risk on something that could very well end as a dead end or something that becomes ruinously expensive/ does not work as intended. (Not suggesting that is a likely outcome, but its something that clearly has to be potentially thought about and its something taxpayers are going to inquire about) 

A lot of countries already have pretty tight spending budgets which means they are less likely to want to splurge into what could be perceived as a risk. UK for instance is still very much struggling with halting the decline of its current armed forces due to constraining budgets. I am sure people are pushing for greater looks into the implications of increased drone warfare, heck I am certain that we will see a growing proliferation of drones on the squad level across NATO in the next few years.

Radical adjustments to established doctrine that see drones replacing vehicles though? That's going to take time, money, political will and some practise to actually get from an idea to reality. Assuming everything works as it should. Maybe data will eventually suggest some clear outcomes that countries will be interested in following, but right now the vibe I get is people / countries are watching intently and seeing what the outcome will be in Ukraine before even setting up anything experimental. 

Edited May 31 by ArmouredTopHat

[ArmouredTopHat]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Today I had a chance to listen to a couple of Perun vids while driving.  In the Kharkiv one he spent some time criticizing the restrictions and describing how they impacted the events that unfolded from the offensive.

It was truly infuriating to hear from frustrated Ukrainian artillery officers that the Russians were massing with near complacency across the border knowing that the systems with the range to hit them were not allowed to do so. All they could do was watch. A truly stupid restriction set by America that has cost Ukrainian lives for no good reason. Thankfully its been clarified at least. I imagine it wont be long until we see geolocated GMLRs rockets striking some juicy artillery targets inside Russia in due time. 

Edited May 31 by ArmouredTopHat

[Offshoot]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ooo baby, we got your unmanned on unmanned action right here folks. I think we might see more of this evolution in the next year.

 

[Battlefront.com]

44 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

This is sort of my point though. Plenty of countries have some degree of interest in a wide variety of drones and UGVs yet it is largely in supplemental roles rather than say replacing current vehicles / concepts in service. No one wants to take a potential risk on something that could very well end as a dead end or something that becomes ruinously expensive/ does not work as intended. (Not suggesting that is a likely outcome, but its something that clearly has to be potentially thought about and its something taxpayers are going to inquire about) 

A lot of countries already have pretty tight spending budgets which means they are less likely to want to splurge into what could be perceived as a risk. UK for instance is still very much struggling with halting the decline of its current armed forces due to constraining budgets. I am sure people are pushing for greater looks into the implications of increased drone warfare, heck I am certain that we will see a growing proliferation of drones on the squad level across NATO in the next few years.

Radical adjustments to established doctrine that see drones replacing vehicles though? That's going to take time, money, political will and some practise to actually get from an idea to reality. Assuming everything works as it should. Maybe data will eventually suggest some clear outcomes that countries will be interested in following, but right now the vibe I get is people / countries are watching intently and seeing what the outcome will be in Ukraine before even setting up anything experimental. 

Ah, but where there is the scent of opportunity comes those who are willing to be daring.  There are already a number of companies that are engaging in a "build it and they will come" mentality.  The early UGVs are, for the most part, being made by companies that at least started out independent of the big multinational defense firms. 

Milrem is an Estonian company that many, including me, view as pushing UGVs into reality.  They are not waiting around for the UK or the US to figure out what to do with these things, they are building them based on what they think they should be.  And customers are already buying them:

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/01/24/milrem-to-deliver-dozens-of-military-robots-to-uae-forces/

So here's the thing about limited budgets.  If someone offers you, a country with a modest budget, a tank(ish) capability for 1/10th the cost of buying even used tanks from one of the be producers... wouldn't you at least consider it?  Further, wouldn't it be nice to fully own what you buy and not be told what you can do with them by the producing nation?

This is what I said a few pages ago about it being too late.  The genie is out of the bottle.  Someone is going to make UGVs and then someone will make them more capable and someone after that will make them even better.  At some point one of the big defense contractors will get into the game in order to control it.  The first one in will have an advantage.  Since the goal of the big multinational defense companies is to make money, not tanks, they go where the money is. 

Then there are the problems that Western volunteer based militaries are experiencing... recruiting difficulties.  Think of the 10s of thousands of soldiers the US could free up from direct and indirect duties that are related to keeping tanks on the battlefield.  Only a fraction of them would be needed for an equivalent UGV fleet.

This is inevitable.  The only question is what the timeline.  I think it's quite short.  5-10 years for it to be proven enough to start to become a big thing.  Transition will be much slower, but with the Abrams fleet aging we could be surprised how quickly things change.  Look at the Stryker program for an example.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

20 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

 

When we've talked about drones fighting drones, I think we should have done a better job of describing which drones are being targeted and by what.  Using fast moving FPVs with light shrapnel type explosives against slow flying ISR type drones?  Yeah, that should work just fine provided you can figure out where the ISR drones are.  All the FPV needs to do is get reasonably close and detonate.  ISR drones are not robust enough to survive too much damage.

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ah, but where there is the scent of opportunity comes those who are willing to be daring.  There are already a number of companies that are engaging in a "build it and they will come" mentality.  The early UGVs are, for the most part, being made by companies that at least started out independent of the big multinational defense firms. 

Milrem is an Estonian company that many, including me, view as pushing UGVs into reality.  They are not waiting around for the UK or the US to figure out what to do with these things, they are building them based on what they think they should be.  And customers are already buying them:

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/01/24/milrem-to-deliver-dozens-of-military-robots-to-uae-forces/

So here's the thing about limited budgets.  If someone offers you, a country with a modest budget, a tank(ish) capability for 1/10th the cost of buying even used tanks from one of the be producers... wouldn't you at least consider it?  Further, wouldn't it be nice to fully own what you buy and not be told what you can do with them by the producing nation?

This is what I said a few pages ago about it being too late.  The genie is out of the bottle.  Someone is going to make UGVs and then someone will make them more capable and someone after that will make them even better.  At some point one of the big defense contractors will get into the game in order to control it.  The first one in will have an advantage.  Since the goal of the big multinational defense companies is to make money, not tanks, they go where the money is. 

Then there are the problems that Western volunteer based militaries are experiencing... recruiting difficulties.  Think of the 10s of thousands of soldiers the US could free up from direct and indirect duties that are related to keeping tanks on the battlefield.  Only a fraction of them would be needed for an equivalent UGV fleet.

This is inevitable.  The only question is what the timeline.  I think it's quite short.  5-10 years for it to be proven enough to start to become a big thing.  Transition will be much slower, but with the Abrams fleet aging we could be surprised how quickly things change.  Look at the Stryker program for an example.

Steve

I mean, I suspect once someone has a tried and tested platform in widespread service we will see the proverbial dam burst. I still think it will be a lengthy transition process however, both to build the doctrine around their usage and to iron out the kinks as they arise. 

To me the two primary issues with UGVs on the top of my head are how will EWAR / jamming effect their performance (We know that air based drone suffer significantly from this and UGVs will be somewhat more expensive platforms) and how to best ensure that the weapons they carry as well as the platform themselves are reliable enough that things like misfires / jams or other malfunctions impede the platforms too much since you dont have the luxury of a human in / on the vehicle to fix the problem straight away. (Though infantry could do it themselves I suppose, albeit at risk)

What I personally think is that once UGVs are started to be seriously trialled in exercise and training we will see some momentum and presumably eventual mixing into the TOE of a unit makeup. I recall Chieftain conceding the notion that a tank could very well become a command asset for a platoon of UGVs in the same way a battalion commander leads his tanks in person. I certainly see potential applications for mixing UGVs into units instead of outright replacing existing vehicles for the moment. It would make their maintenance easier for instance, rather than giving them directly to infantry who would at the very least require retraining for maintenance.

Ultimately if a country manages to pull it off and it all works, we can expect everyone to quickly follow suit. Just a big if with plenty of variables to consider. 

Edited May 31 by ArmouredTopHat

[Battlefront.com]

37 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I mean, I suspect once someone has a tried and tested platform in widespread service we will see the proverbial dam burst. I still think it will be a lengthy transition process however, both to build the doctrine around their usage and to iron out the kinks as they arise.

Countries with big militaries are already trying to figure this out.  Trust me, I might not know much, but I do know some stuff

I think doctrinally the concepts are pretty simple and straight forward, though not completely analogous to current systems.  I have many thoughts on this and now is not the time or the place to share them.

37 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

To me the two primary issues with UGVs on the top of my head are how will EWAR / jamming effect their performance (We know that air based drone suffer significantly from this and UGVs will be somewhat more expensive platforms) and how to best ensure that the weapons they carry as well as the platform themselves are reliable enough that things like misfires / jams or other malfunctions impede the platforms too much since you dont have the luxury of a human in / on the vehicle to fix the problem straight away. (Though infantry could do it themselves I suppose, albeit at risk)

We have had this discussion regarding UAVs many times already.  A combination of autonomous and Human guidance is just as applicable to ground based UGV vehicles as it is aerial.  There are also possibilities for anti-jamming that aren't as practical, if at all, for UAVs due to power, weight, shape, etc.  For example, more powerful transmitter/receivers, redundant systems, "smart" transmitters, etc.

UGVs can also be fitted with physical tethers which can be used at distances practical for tactical combat scenarios.  Again, something you just can not do with a UAV.

37 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

What I personally think is that once UGVs are started to be seriously trialled in exercise and training we will see some momentum and presumably eventual mixing into the TOE of a unit makeup. I recall Chieftain conceding the notion that a tank could very well become a command asset for a platoon of UGVs in the same way a brigade commander leads his tanks in person. I certainly see potential applications for mixing UGVs into units instead of outright replacing existing vehicles for the moment. It would make their maintenance easier for instance, rather than giving them directly to infantry who would at the very least require retraining for maintenance.

I think this is what the tank will transition into as UGVs take over.  If for no other reason than to leverage sunk costs. At least for the countries that have invested so much in their tank fleets.  Other nations? 

Some smaller nations, such as Denmark and the Baltic states, never went with tanks because they are too expensive and their militaries too small.  We saw some of the mid sized militaries get rid of their tanks, such as Canada, The Netherlands, and Belgium.  The Netherlands and Canada regretted doing so, but that's because they made the right decision (get rid of tanks) for the wrong reasons (pure cost savings) and without an adequate strategy to replace them.'

The point here is we have evidence that smaller and mid sized militaries are potential customers for UGVs precisely because tanks are so flipp'n expensive.  The nations that are integrated into NATO who experiment with these are going to be watched carefully by other members.

37 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Ultimately if a country manages to pull it off and it all works, we can expect everyone to quickly follow suit. Just a big if with plenty of variables to consider. 

We are already seeing Ukraine trialing UGVs.  The ones that laid mines along a road they knew Russians used was really eye opening.  Laying strings of mines in fields is also already a thing.  Most recently we saw one with a MMG mounted on it at the frontline (I think).

For sure these are still early days even for Ukraine, but they ARE using them NOW.  That's only about 2 years tops from nothing to operational.  Which means probably 18 months of serious active work.

I'll say it again and again and again.  The future is here to see right in front of us.  All one has to do is choose to see it.  And if one choose not to see it, guess what?  It's going to happen anyway.  Proof?

Milrem just announced, not 6 days ago, that it is opening up a new factory that can produce 500 THeMIS UGVs a year:

https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/estonian-company-milrem-robotics-opens-new-facilities-to-meet-ground-drone-international-demand

Even if you think a UGV might be 1/10th as effective as a tank, this one factory can produce enough to outfit a country like Norway or The Netherlands with what it needs in one year.  One factory.  One year.

Steve

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385?i=1000657357549

Jack Watling, and some special ops people on drones in Ukraine, and after Ukraine. 

[hcrof]

On UGVs I do actually agree with ArmouredTopHat that we are a while off before they become really useful. Driving a vehicle across bad terrain is hard and it will be a long time before that is automated. If you choose to drive it manually you are very vulnerable to terrain interference and EW, and even if it all goes well it is still harder to control since you dont have the same feedback as when you are in the vehicle. 

In my opinion the shooting part of a ugv can be semi or fully automated in the very near future, but the driving around part is a very hard problem to crack. I have been thinking about including a single driver/operator in my tankette idea for that reason, but I'm honestly not sure about whether having a single person in a fighting vehicle woks from a psychological point on view! Maybe if the tankettes could always see each other it would work.

[cesmonkey]

 

[cesmonkey]

From today's ISW update on the Czech initiative to acquire artillery shells for Ukraine:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024

Quote

Western countries continue efforts to increase artillery production and procurement for Ukraine. The Financial Times (FT) reported on May 30 that the Czech-led initiative to purchase artillery ammunition for Ukraine is struggling to compete with Russia to purchase ammunition from non-NATO countries.[17] Czech Governmental Envoy for Ukraine's Reconstruction Tomas Kopecny stated that some unspecified countries are supplying ammunition to both Russia and Western procurement efforts for Ukraine.[18] Kopecny suggested that Russia can make cash pre-payments to ammunition suppliers faster than the West and that this could allow Russia to purchase millions of rounds from the same suppliers. The owner and chairperson of Czech domestic arms producer Czechoslovak Group (CSG), Michal Strnad, stated that about half of the components CSG acquired from countries in Africa and Asia for the Czech-led initiative required more work before CSG could send it to Ukraine and that some of the shells had missing components.[19] Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala stated on May 28 that the first "tens of thousands" of 155mm artillery ammunition sourced through the Czech-led initiative will arrive in Ukraine within "days."[20]

 

[JonS]

[editor’s note: I drafted this about 12 hours ago but because reasons I couldn’t post it till now. The conversation has moved on a bit in the meantime – apologies for being a bit tardy]

***

Some time ago in this thread I asked ‘what is tank?’ and it’s not so surprising that almost 2 years later we’re still circling that tree. Traditionally, tanks are considered to embody three qualities: mobility, protection, and firepower, with trade-offs between the three depending on what your doctrine thinks is more important (Israel, for example, prioritises protection at the expense of mobility), but still having elements of all three – if you just have mobility and firepower then what you’re driving is a technical, not a tank. Or perhaps a drone. If you have protection and firepower but no mobility; you’re in a bunker, not tank. If you have protection and mobility but no firepower; that’s a truck, not a tank.

The tank will be dead when that troika is no longer relevant on the battlefield. The last couple of pages have seen some weird intellectual gymnastics, such as: “tank dead because tank only has mobility, protection, and firepower – all else is drone!” to which; um, yes? And “tank dead because tank only do infantry support! Tank only SPG now!” as if infantry support were not the very thing tanks were created to provide. Tanks entered the battlefield to assist the break-in and breakthrough. The breakout was the domain of the cavalry. The horsed cavalry. Since then tanks have proven useful in other roles, and endured on the battlefield because that troika remains valid.

In the intervening century there have been any number of times when tanks have immolated themselves on whatever the anti-tank defence du jour was; August 1918 at Amiens, May 1940 just down the road at Arras, June to December 1941 in Cyrenaica, May to October 1942 in North Africa, July 1943 in Russia, July 1944 in Normandy, March 1945 in Hungary, June 1954 in Vietnam, October 1973 in the Sinai … and those are just off the top. I am certainly forgetting many many other examples. And yet, and yet, despite all those salutary and sanguinary examples the troika remained relevant.

Armour was useful in Falklands and Vietnam. Granted there wasn’t a lot of armour in the Falklands, but the ground commanders – on both sides – appreciated the ones they had and would certainly have liked more. That they didn’t was mostly a function of logistics (and employability in that particular landscape), rather than utility. Similarly, in Vietnam the Australians, at least, found their Centurions (and their Gavins if you care to include APCs in the generic ‘amour’ bucket) so useful that the RAAC was finally able to shake off their reputation as being Koalas. Armour wasn’t decisive in either conflict, but that’s a different question.

Usefulness aside, noting that tanks aren’t supreme – or decisive - in all contexts is a startling insight into the obvious. For example it is true, as I fully and happily acknowledge, that tanks were not decisive and indeed had practically no impact at all on the Sikkim conflict in 1967, or on the Sumdorong Chu standoff in 1987. By the same token, aircraft carriers were of exactly zero use during the Chaco War in the mid-1930’s or the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1969, yet surprisingly that didn’t spell the demise of carriers.

Iraq 1991 was a gross mismatch of technology, which led to some extraordinarily photogenic technology-porn moments, which were subsequently used to prove everything from the supremacy of airpower, the accuracy of Patriot (whoops, lol), the relevance of the A-10 (lol), the dominance of tanks, or the superiority of the “Western Way of War.” But those all come back to technological supremacy – lose tech supremacy and the rest doesn’t matter; at tech parity you’re going to be stuck in an attritional grind, while at tech-deficit you get a turn at being the whipping boy. Tech parity is what happened in Normandy 1944, and it’s what happened in Iran-Iraq in the 1980s, and tech parity led to operational deadlock. And this dynamic is what we are seeing repeated again in Ukraine.

ISR has become more pervasive and persistent, which definitely makes life harder, but once again we’ve been here before. The whole point of aerial combat in WWI was to retain or deny aerial recce ability, and it led directly to the formation of national airforces. In 1944 a few stupid little toy planes that could barely fly bought activity along whole sections of the fronts in Normandy and Italy to a halt because those toys could see everything and were directly linked to overwhelming fires systems. And yet, the German army was able to adapt and overcome … for a while, at least defensively. They weren’t able to go on an general offensive despite having loads of shiny tanks, but that had more to do with loss of any ability to operate in the aerial domain, and more generally the yawning chasm of overall materiel inferiority, than it was to do with the Austers and the Cubs.

Neither side in Ukraine is at the point of having either air supremacy, or absurd materiel overmatch, or a significant technological advantage and so parity has led to a broad stalemate.

Tanks … and armour generally … and land vehicles even more generally … are taking a lot of hits in Ukraine, in part because they are facing a weapon system that has some novel characteristics. But then, so is infantry. And artillery. And navy. And air force.

But I don’t believe we will give up on infantry.

I don’t believe we will give up on ships, or airpower, or artillery.

And I don’t believe we will give up on armour or tanks, at least not while the troika remains relevant.

All of those systems will change over time though. Of course they will. They have to, to survive! But that’s normal – force densities, for example, have plummeted since the days of Waterloo, going from being measured by the number of men per metre then to the number of metres per man now, in response to increased range and lethality of weapons, as well as the ability to perform distributed and dispersed command, plus having highly trained and professional standing armies.^ Aircraft too have evolved over the last hundred years, finding new roles while at the same time inventing new ways to accomplish old roles. And so have tanks.

Will there be a next generation of tanks? I think yes. Will the next generation of tanks be broadly similar to the current generation in terms of the balance of the troika between mobility, protection, and firepower? Again, I think yes. Broadly.

What about the generation after that? I think there will be one, not least because yes; militaries are conservative beasts. They are conservative beasts because they're paid to be. Betting the farm on an unproven nascent technology is probably not a great idea, especially when 'the farm' happens to be liberty and independence for the nation and all its citizens.^^ Bet wrong and you get to say hello to Johnny Foreigner as your new head of state. See, for example, France 1940-1944 after they went all-in on shiny new high-tech heavy fixed fortifications, which no one else was doing.

But I also think that gen+2 tanks will be about as different to current tanks as the Centurion was to the Mark I “Male.”^^^ Still a tank that combines firepower, protection and mobility in a single package, but differently.

 

Wars tend to do that to equipment.

 

***

^ as an aside, to my eye modern professional standing armies seem almost akin to the ~16^th Century mercenary armies in Italy in terms of their separation from the societies they nominally serve

^^ Yes; Unproven. The information we are getting from Ukraine is partial, highly biased, and selective. That is not a good foundation to make fundamental or existential decisions on.

^^^ fun fact: the British sent a Centurion south to participate in the Falklands War.

Edited May 31 by JonS

[JonS]

13 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Not the stupid pinecone thing,

I keep forgetting you're a n00b here, and probably aren't au fait with some of the jargon.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

I keep forgetting you're a n00b here, and probably aren't au fait with some of the jargon.

How dare you!  Check your inception date…junior.

[Yet]

14 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think we are sticking a toe over a red line in a gradual escalation.  Before we get to ho hum, we are talking about US weapons and targeting support, killing Russians…in Russia. In 2024. Wrapped your heads around that one and let it sink in.  Imagine for just a second if the roles were reversed…we would be looking at WW3.

soooo. Nato invades Belarus 'cuz we like potatoes', and Putin allows Belarus 2 years later  that Belarus army may use Russian weapons to attack assembling army Nato army  in Bialtstok (PL) ready to invade Belarus.

=WW3? 

Edited May 31 by Yet

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, JonS said:

The tank will be dead when that troika is no longer relevant on the battlefield. The last couple of pages have seen some weird intellectual gymnastics, such as: “tank dead because tank only has mobility, protection, and firepower – all else is drone!” to which; um, yes? And “tank dead because tank only do infantry support! Tank only SPG now!” as if infantry support were not the very thing tanks were created to provide. Tanks entered the battlefield to assist the break-in and breakthrough. The breakout was the domain of the cavalry. The horsed cavalry. Since then tanks have proven useful in other roles, and endured on the battlefield because that troika remains valid.

Really weird font btw…painful to the eyes, in the same way that your clinging onto tanks argument is on the mind. We have heard this one before - tank is not dead because we still need a tank, tank is not dead because it was dead before, tank is not dead because nothing can replace tank - followed by a lot of historical (and hysterical) gymnastics of your own.  An old man clinging to his AOL account because it still works, while his dial up modem squeals in the distance.

The sacred trifecta of mobility, survivability and firepower upon which you have based your entire argument is not only self-serving (I need a rock because only a rock like qualities can be delivered by said rock), they completely miss the point.  A tank is a single platform within a capability - mechanized land forces - a capability that delivers effects: manoeuvre and fires.  Effects project consequences upon an opponent that upon accumulation can push us towards decisions.  Decisions in sequence (we call it campaigning) can create outcomes.  At a strategic level, those outcomes create or destroy options.  The Game of Strategic Options charts the course of a war - a violent collision of irreconcilable human certainty.  Finally, options are nothing more than the bricks upon which the Political story unfolds - that narrative is how we survive as a species.

So now back to your little tankie thingy - an iron box on treads with a long nose.  It is not a sacred horse that decides anything. No need to try and find the one or two times it showed up in the Falklands (really?) to justify its existence.  It is one tool within a massive tool box, within a game, within a long story.  So what?  Well as soon as something can deliver the same effects at a tank for less effort, evolution says that primates programmed for less effort are going to shift onto whatever that thing is - don’t argue with me, argue with a few million years of evolution.  So the effects we are looking for are supported by a system (remember the tank is but one component) that can deliver fires power and manoeuvre.  The consequences of those effects are shock, dislocation, disruption, favourable attrition/erosion and positioning reactions/advantage - these are the whole show (in a single domain mind you, doctrine says there are at least 4 others).

So in reality warfare could give two sweet fleshy figs about your trifecta - that was something zipperheads made up in the mess.  Warfare only cares about the consequences leading to decisions.  Now a few posts back you demonstrate quite pointedly the proof in the pudding that an emergent system of land warfare is delivering effects/consequences as well as the old system…under a specific set of conditions. 

Right now this weird C4ISR, unmanned, PGM and infantry in old basements system - along with things that really will endure such as dumb old mines and dumb old artillery - are able to deliver defensive consequences after four months of intense testing.  They did so without any real support from armor (as lack of everything was noted) and even did so as dumb old artillery went dry.  In reality they did a successful defence/denial without much of the old conventional land force capability at all.  Like most major inventions, necessity calved the little fella.

So this is not about “hey look tanks are getting killed again.”  Nor clinging to one’s fuzzy Leo teddy.  It is about a new land force capability system being tested in real time…and delivering…to a point.  I am less interested in the death of a giant hot steel box and more in whatever this weird Frankenstein’s monster that showed up and broke land warfare - hell it may have broken naval and air warfare too.

So while you are arguing about one screw driver…a shiny wondrous screw driver with so many good memories; I am looking a bunch of nano bots that just showed up and built us a f#cking table.  What baffles me is why a bunch of old men are holding up the screw driver and going “ya but!”  But it shouldn’t because as we have seen the history of war is full of such enlightened moments.

Edited May 31 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

3 minutes ago, Yet said:

soooo. Nato invades Belarus 'cuz we like potatoes', and Putin allows Belarus 2 years later  that Belarus army may use Russian weapons to attack assembling army Nato army  in Bialtstok (PL) ready to invade Belarus.

=WW3? 

So Belarus means as much to NATO as Ukraine does to Russia this scenario? Uh, yes. Russians lobbing missiles into Poland could very well trigger WW3 but even then your weird take is off.

This would be Russia lobbing missiles into Washington state because we invaded Belarus

=WW3, ya think?

[hcrof]

I was posting earlier about how I am skeptical about the utility of small UGVs and this video really makes my point:

 

The problem is not that Russian engineering sucks (well maybe a little bit), they are simply too small. Yes they might be able to hit maybe 30km/h on a road, but as soon as they hit rough terrain they move at a geriatric pace and get stuck on a knee-high fold of ground (and this is the promotional video they released to the internet).

If a UGV gets stuck, they don't have any way of extracting themselves. Because of this their off-road capability needs to be top notch so they can handle being driven badly over a crappy video link without bogging down.

Edited May 31 by hcrof

[Yet]

39 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So Belarus means as much to NATO as Ukraine does to Russia this scenario? Uh, yes. Russians lobbing missiles into Poland could very well trigger WW3 but even then your weird take is off.

This would be Russia lobbing missiles into Washington state because we invaded Belarus

=WW3, ya think?

ehhh... no? 

Russia (in the reversed scenario USA/NATO) isnt lobbing anything.

Belarus (Ukrain) is lobbing Russian (NATO) missiles just over the border in Bialystok (Belgorod) to prevent the opening of a new piece of the front near Grodno (Kharkiv) in a 2-year ongoing war. 

... am i reversing something wrong? 

 

(and yes I picked Belarus, as a perfect example for the turnaround wasn't there. Ukr could be used but it would be clouding as people would start screaming 'uninmaginable!).

Edited May 31 by Yet

[ArmouredTopHat]

5 hours ago, hcrof said:

On UGVs I do actually agree with ArmouredTopHat that we are a while off before they become really useful. Driving a vehicle across bad terrain is hard and it will be a long time before that is automated. If you choose to drive it manually you are very vulnerable to terrain interference and EW, and even if it all goes well it is still harder to control since you dont have the same feedback as when you are in the vehicle. 

In my opinion the shooting part of a ugv can be semi or fully automated in the very near future, but the driving around part is a very hard problem to crack. I have been thinking about including a single driver/operator in my tankette idea for that reason, but I'm honestly not sure about whether having a single person in a fighting vehicle woks from a psychological point on view! Maybe if the tankettes could always see each other it would work.

We also know from practical experience that putting a driver outside of his traditional spot in a vehicle (MBT-70s turret driver springs to mind) results in a very disorientated user. While technology is substantially better now, one wonders just how ideal a control system would be with something remote controlled that is heavier and tracked. There is something to be said for a driver being able to 'feel' his vehicle when traversing terrain that a remote operator would be deprived of that might result in said UGV getting itself stuck more easily.  

You can of course make a greater effort to 'simulate' the driving for your operator, but then you have to ask yourself where said driver is on the battlefield and do you have the space / ability to move or house them. If they are in a trench close by, you cant expect to fit in a more comprehensive system. If they are further back then you run into issues of signal / interference. There is also the question of crew delegation. How best do we actually operate the UGV. Do we have it worked by one soldier? Or do you adopt similar crew layouts to current vehicles?

These are the sorts of things that I think need to be experimented with before we see decisive shift overs to UGVs in general. I suspect we would need to see a vehicle similar in weight and terrain crossing ability to a Scimitar for it to be practical, which then raises the question of protection. 

*Edit*

Incidentally, the Russian Uran-9, which is in effect a heavy UGV equipped with auto cannon and ATGMs supposedly was tested in Syria and found to be disappointing. Now this could be an issue of design (It certainly reeks of the Russian 'Wunderwaffe' equipment like Su-57 and T-14 that likely wont see much if any practical use) But at the same time it does indicate that there are plenty of kinks that need to be worked out. The fact it has not appeared at all in Ukraine is....interesting. 

Edited May 31 by ArmouredTopHat

[The_Capt]

9 minutes ago, hcrof said:

I was posting earlier about how I am skeptical about the utility of small UGVs and this video really makes my point:

 

The problem is not that Russian engineering sucks (well maybe a little bit), they are simply too small. Yes they might be able to hit maybe 30km/h on a road, but as soon as they hit rough terrain they move at a geriatric pace and get stuck on a knee-high fold of ground (and this is the promotional video they released to the internet).

If a UGV gets stuck, they don't have any way of extracting themselves. Because of this their off-road capability needs to be top notch so they can handle being driven badly over a crappy video link without bogging down.

So UGV are definitely behind their air counter parts, but things are moving faster than I think we appreciate:

The Chinese in particular have invested a lot of money on UGVs.  Like UAS they will likely need human pairing and start in narrower force employment but they are coming…and fast.  To my mind the UGV that scares me is basically a cheap smart mine.  We know mines still work, but mines with legs that can even just move a few hundred meters make them a complete nightmare.  Our entire breaching doctrine is built on mines being static. Even mobility of a few meters can break that.

If I was put in charge of this, I would develop a simple chassis that could be strapped onto existing dumb mines.  A chassis that gave levels of mobility and networked communication between the mins and a controller.  I don’t need them to walk to Moscow, I need them to walk a few dozen feet.  So when a very expensive breach goes off, I can reseed while the breach is happening - right behind the breaching vehicles.  This alone would break things because minefields essentially become autonomous and unbreachable. Safe lanes become impossible.  And one could produce and mount these systems on hundreds of thousands of existing mines.

And this is not even fancy like EFP or off route systems.  Let alone mounting a Javelin on a system, or pairing an FPV with a ground system (GFPV?). So while the challenges are different, in reality the bar is lower, not higher for UGVs.  They do not have the same load capacity restrictions.  They do not have the same 3D problems (ie have to fly).  But like FPVs we only need HE in the right place and time, and that they can do.

I do not know if UGV will happen at scale in this war.  My sense is, no.  But in a decade?  All bets are off.

[The_Capt]

5 minutes ago, Yet said:

ehhh... no? 

Russia (in the reversed scenario USA/NATO) isnt lobbing anything.

Belarus (Ukrain) is lobbing Russian (NATO) missiles just over the border in Bialystok (Belgorod) to prevent the opening of a new piece of the front near Grodno (Kharkiv) in a 2-year ongoing war. 

... am i reversing something wrong? 

 

(and yes I picked Belarus, as a perfect example for the turnaround wasn't there. Ukr could be used but it would be clouding as people would start screaming 'uninmaginable!).

Ok, fine.  This would be Belarusians lobbing Russian missiles, using Russian C4ISR, into Washington state…much better.  The very big point that you are missing is that Russian homeland = US soil in this equation.  Not some ally.

You are purposefully underestimating the risk here for political ends.  We are talking about active targeting in Russia with increasing US/NATO direct participation.  Play internet games all day long, and please keep shaming the West - we love that, but this is an escalation and has real risks associated with the decision.  This is also why the US has signalled very loudly that this will be tightly controlled on their end.