How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Nope, no assumption   I was talking about relative improvements.  For example, there is no cure for Cancer but there's a range of treatments that can be applied to a specific situation with some hope of success.  Despite all this information being out there to utilize, Russia is still opting to go with blood letting and leaches.  My suggestion is that that if they went to the Internet they could dramatically improve their treatment options.

For sure that's a lot of it, but their capabilities are also a problem.  They are trying to fight a war that they don't really understand at the most basic level.  Worse (for them), they seem to think that when something fails it was because they didn't try hard enough, rather than assessing that they have to try something radically different.

For sure that's correct.  Which is why I don't knock them too hard for the first couple of days, maybe even week or two.  Their prewar assumptions were completely wrong, which led to the wrong strategy, which led to disaster.  But after this what did they do?  Start using their combined arms potential ("capability") to achieve better results?  Nope, they instead did this...

Yes, and this shows that Russia never had a combined arms capability, only the facade of one.  They don't even appear to know how one works.  This is the sort of thing that got the Cargo Cult analogy being brought into the discussion.  Russia does not have a combined arms capability to use in this war and, in fact, doesn't seem to understand how one works.  It has old, brute force application of firepower with only the most crude cartoonish concept of maneuver.

Put it this way.  Let's say the US military went into a country with a large scale Thunder Run that quickly showed was a very bad idea.  What would they do?  They would adapt to a more conservative, traditional combined arms fight.  Why? Because that capability is real and was just not being used.  Russia simply doesn't have it, despite outward appearances.

Again, they are showing that they don't have the capability to do more than brute force defense.  It is not necessarily ineffective (the Vietcong were very effective, though wasteful by Western standards), but it also doesn't show much signs of being particularly "modern".  Figure out where enemy is going to go, put down mines and trenches.  See enemy coming at you, blow it up.  Enemy too strong, die in place or retreat.  Where are the tactical counter attacks led by armor to regain key locations or to remove pressure from losing them?

Do the Russians "suck" at fighting and dishing out pain?  No.  Do they "suck" at fighting a modern combined arms war?  Absolutely they do.  Why?  Because they don't have a modern combined arms force to fight with, despite the appearance of having one.

The point I think you're missing is that the Russians pretended they had a modernized combined arms force, but everything on the battlefield shows that what they really have is still some sort of Cold War mashup with limited high tech capabilities.  Looks more like a 1945 army with a few drones sprinkled into the mix.  Hell, I think one could argue that the Russian ability to conduct maneuver warfare is worse than in even 1942 given the hardware they have (sorry, HAD) available to them at the start of this war.

Steve

The issue is time. Every time some minimally bright Russian capitan realizes that losing sucks and goes poking around for information this war gets harder. The Iranian drone thing is exhibit A. NATO needs to give the Ukrainians their entire shopping list, so that they can wrap this thing up before the Russians have to many bright ideas to make it expensive. Then hopefully the new arms race we are most certainly having will break the Russian government without a daily body count in the many hundreds.

Then we can switch to sending every missile the western world can make to Taiwan. Hopefully in time to keep that an arms race as opposed to a shooting war. Ain't life great?

Small postscript: China has taken notes on this whole Shahed 136 thing. Taiwan is going to need an engineered/integrated  solution at an an almost incomprehensible scale.

[Battlefront.com]

I just had a thought about the experts getting things wrong about Russia that I don't think has been said in quite this way.  I remember nibbling around the edges of it, but not quite what I'm about to say.

Let's think back to 1990 when the experts made predictions about what Iraq's military capabilities were leading up to the Desert Shield and Storm campaigns.  They said that Iraq's air defenses were amongst the best in the world and the size of its ground forces nearly unmatched.  Both disintegrated on contact with the Coalition forces.  I know for sure I mentioned Khafji as an example of how shocked everybody was when they found out the scale of the attack and how badly defeated it was.

The prewar assessment of Russia's capabilities was more similar than dissimilar to the Iraqi one.  There's some apparent commonality between the two:

• there was a focus on counting tanks, IFVs, troops, missile batteries, etc. without much regard to qualitative capabilities of each
• vast underestimation of the degree the soldiers manning these systems were proficient in their use
• it was presumed that recent battlefield experiences (Iran-Iraq War for Iraq, 2014/2015 Ukraine and Georgia for Russia) leads to reflection, rethinking, and adjustments even when things go well but especially when they don't.  This led experts to wildly overestimate how much recent battlefield experiences helped Iraq and Russia prepare for the next war
• underestimating the degree of stress the forces could take before reaching combat ineffectiveness
• under appreciation of how conscripted forces respond to experiencing their side's inherent deficiencies in combat
• next to no thought put into the impact of disrupted logistics on combat operations
• under appreciating the inherent communications deficiencies within the chains of command, in particular lateral ones
• under appreciating how easily command and control could be disrupted and how difficult it is to address afterwards
• very little understanding of how terrain impacted expectations.  In Iraq's case desert terrain offered maximum exposure to ISR and ranged weapons, in Russia's case the forests, water obstacles, and urban centers favored ambushes
• almost no thought, apparently, as to how well a smart and well resourced opponent could exploit all of the above weaknesses to gain asymmetrical advantages
• zero thought of how much Iraq and Russia would scale up their forces to have "mass" outweigh all of their disadvantages

No doubt there's more similarities, but I think these are sufficient to make my point that the failure of the experts in 1990 is eerily similar to their failure in 2022.  It boils down to not understanding what they really needed to be focused on and misapplying what they thought were lessons from past conflicts onto the forces being studied.

Steve

[Harmon Rabb]

1 hour ago, riptides said:

Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn

I personally know some Russians living in the West who are against Russian imperialism in Ukraine, but Aleksander is not really the best example given his views on Ukraine.

Quote

The United States is placing its occupation troops in one country after another. This is the de facto situation in Bosnia for 9 years, in Kosovo and Afghanistan for 5 years each, in Iraq for 3 years so far, but it will be a long time there. There is little difference between NATO’s actions and individual U.S. actions. Clearly seeing that today’s Russia poses no threat to them, NATO is methodically and persistently developing its military apparatus – to the east of Europe and into the continental reach of Russia from the south. There is open material and ideological support for “color” revolutions, and the paradoxical introduction of North Atlantic interests – in Central Asia. All this leaves no doubt that a complete encirclement of Russia is being prepared, and then the loss of its sovereignty. No, Russia’s accession to such a Euro-Atlantic alliance, which conducts propaganda and the violent introduction into various parts of the planet of the ideology and forms of current Western democracy – would lead not to expansion, but to the decline of Christian civilization.

What is happening in Ukraine, even from the falsely-constructed wording for the 1991 referendum (I have written and spoken about this before), is my constant bitterness and pain. The fanatical suppression and persecution of the Russian language (which in past polls was recognized as its primary language by more than 60% of the population of Ukraine) is simply an atrocious measure, and also directed against the cultural perspective of Ukraine itself. Huge expanses of land that never belonged to historical Ukraine, like Novorossia, Crimea, and the entire southeastern region, have been forcibly squeezed into the current Ukrainian state and its policy of greedy NATO membership. In Yeltsin’s entire tenure, not a single meeting with Ukrainian presidents was without capitulations and concessions on his part. The expulsion of the Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol (never ceded to the Ukrainian SSR even under Khrushchev) is a base and vicious desecration of the entire Russian history of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Under all these conditions, Russia dares not in any form indifferently betray the many millions of the Russian population in Ukraine, to deny our unity with them.

Here is the source for this quote. https://onepeterfive.com/solzhenitsyn-nato-ukraine-putin/

Edited October 24, 2022 by Harmon Rabb

[Zeleban]

1 hour ago, riptides said:

Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn

 

Solzhenitsyn is the head of what Russian political force? In the West, he is a significant figure, but in the understanding of the average Russian, he is just a pathetic traitor and a renegade who dared to criticize the Soviet regime.

[dan/california]

21 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I just had a thought about the experts getting things wrong about Russia that I don't think has been said in quite this way.  I remember nibbling around the edges of it, but not quite what I'm about to say.

Let's think back to 1990 when the experts made predictions about what Iraq's military capabilities were leading up to the Desert Shield and Storm campaigns.  They said that Iraq's air defenses were amongst the best in the world and the size of its ground forces nearly unmatched.  Both disintegrated on contact with the Coalition forces.  I know for sure I mentioned Khafji as an example of how shocked everybody was when they found out the scale of the attack and how badly defeated it was.

The prewar assessment of Russia's capabilities was more similar than dissimilar to the Iraqi one.  There's some apparent commonality between the two:

• there was a focus on counting tanks, IFVs, troops, missile batteries, etc. without much regard to qualitative capabilities of each
• vast underestimation of the degree the soldiers manning these systems were proficient in their use
• it was presumed that recent battlefield experiences (Iran-Iraq War for Iraq, 2014/2015 Ukraine and Georgia for Russia) leads to reflection, rethinking, and adjustments even when things go well but especially when they don't.  This led experts to wildly overestimate how much recent battlefield experiences helped Iraq and Russia prepare for the next war
• underestimating the degree of stress the forces could take before reaching combat ineffectiveness
• under appreciation of how conscripted forces respond to experiencing their side's inherent deficiencies in combat
• next to no thought put into the impact of disrupted logistics on combat operations
• under appreciating the inherent communications deficiencies within the chains of command, in particular lateral ones
• under appreciating how easily command and control could be disrupted and how difficult it is to address afterwards
• very little understanding of how terrain impacted expectations.  In Iraq's case desert terrain offered maximum exposure to ISR and ranged weapons, in Russia's case the forests, water obstacles, and urban centers favored ambushes
• almost no thought, apparently, as to how well a smart and well resourced opponent could exploit all of the above weaknesses to gain asymmetrical advantages
• zero thought of how much Iraq and Russia would scale up their forces to have "mass" outweigh all of their disadvantages

No doubt there's more similarities, but I think these are sufficient to make my point that the failure of the experts in 1990 is eerily similar to their failure in 2022.  It boils down to not understanding what they really needed to be focused on and misapplying what they thought were lessons from past conflicts onto the forces being studied.

Steve

For thirty years we have been told that, of course the Iraqis are awful, but the Russians would be much better. There is remarkably little evidence that this is true.

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, riptides said:

Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn

Wrong example, unfortunatelly. Solzhenitsyn in last 10-20 years of his life was Russian ethnonationalist (of "humanistic" type- unique Rusisan phenomenon, difficult to comprehend for most Westerners who assume intellectual and "freedom fighter" equals liberal/left minded) that for example claimed Ukraine and Belarus will become "colonized" by Poland if they will not be protected by Russia. While he was not a villain, many of his claims were not that dissimilar from Dugin's.

And of course he was not political leader. Note also he had personal contacts with Putin.

Edited October 24, 2022 by Beleg85

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Correct.  Same from my US perspective.  However, Kraze is not entirely wrong.  This has been the experience of the Baltics more than anybody else.  It's taken 20+ years and the literal dying off the old Soviet types for progress to be made.  The experience of large numbers of Russians in Berlin demonstrating in favor of the war when it started and the "Australian Cossacks" video we just saw prove that.  Then there's more isolated incidents such as expat Russians attacking Ukrainian refugees to throw into the mix.

So, the only question is what percentage remains tied to traditional thinking, what percentage switched totally to Western, and how much is somewhere between?  I have no clue, but honestly... it does seem the traditional mindset is not a small minority.

Steve

It's the Bomber Damage Analysis fallacy. Yes...we hear about and see the obnoxious Russian emigres behaving badly. We don't hear about the many, many others who are real refuges from Putinist repression and/or bitter enemies of it. In my anecdotal experience, they far outnumber the loons. Kraze can indulge himself in this bigotry if he wants to. I will not. 

[Billy Ringo]

Maybe it's just me, but I cut Kraze some slack.  Because if my country was being raped, devastated, killed, kidnapped, tortured, etc. I'd probably be little biased and bigoted also.   But very thankfully I haven't had to experience any of that during my lifetime.  Walking in someone else's shoes and all that...

[RandomCommenter]

Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn

I like his books. I read Gulag Archipelago and Cancer Ward. And clearly he is at some level a good human being with empathy.

 

BUT. And it is a big but. Even he is infected with the Russian imperialism virus.

 

He disliked actual life in America and bought into the idea of Russia as a "great power" with a "sphere of influence"

 

 

[Zeleban]

 

The Russian command has finally centralized the process of command and control of its troops in the northern part of the Luhansk region of Ukraine - the West grouping of troops has been created, which included mainly units and subunits of the Western Military District

[Zeleban]

While there is no Grigb on the forum. I will try to translate Mashovets' posts. I can't guarantee an excellent result, as my English leaves much to be desired, and there are a lot of special military terms in his posts

[NamEndedAllen]

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Now if you want to talk cargo cult militaries…and that one cost us a lot more than the investments in the UA.

The cargo cult-ish manifestation if at all in this instance, is related more to the US *policy making*. Recalling examples of nation- & modern military-building in past colonized (or otherwise occupied countries), or fighting wars in other less developed countries, policy makers imitated the approaches that from their far removed perches and vastly different culture…seemed to have worked. The Administrations and sometimes the military believed that if they did these actions, these behaviors, something good would be forthcoming. But those other examples were in vastly different cultures, geography, and histories. Perhaps those were not all that successful in themselves in any long term sense. And of course, it didn’t work.

But honestly, I think we’ve stretched the idea of cargo cult analogies beyond the breaking point. The straight forward descriptions of what actually has happened - as @The_Capt just laid out here, are sufficient. We are in danger of making a Procrustean Bed. Next we’ll start saying our political parties are cargo cults. Oh, wait…

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

The cargo cult-ish manifestation if at all in this instance, is related more to the US *policy making*. Recalling examples of nation- & modern military-building in past colonized (or otherwise occupied countries), or fighting wars in other less developed countries, policy makers imitated the approaches that from their far removed perches and vastly different culture…seemed to have worked. The Administrations and sometimes the military believed that if they did these actions, these behaviors, something good would be forthcoming. But those other examples were in vastly different cultures, geography, and histories. Perhaps those were not all that successful in themselves in any long term sense. And of course, it didn’t work.

But honestly, I think we’ve stretched the idea of cargo cult analogies beyond the breaking point. The straight forward descriptions of what actually has happened - as @The_Capt just laid out here, are sufficient. We are in danger of making a Procrustean Bed. Next we’ll start saying our political parties are cargo cults. Oh, wait…

Fifteen or twenty one year plans, instead of one ten year plan didn't exactly help...

[NamEndedAllen]

8 hours ago, poesel said:

Do say, how many countries are participating in that 'world series' of yours?

 

One may only hope that realization may dawn on the veiled minds of those unbelievers, just as the glory and truth of real football may in time be recognized rather than the imposter behavior of banging basketballs around with one’s head and calling it “football”.

[NamEndedAllen]

7 hours ago, panzermartin said:

Last night I dreamt that Putin was assassinated and in the next hour nuclear bombs started to fall all over Europe and I could see the distant flashes in a stormy beach and we were rushing for cover in buildings. And while dreaming, I thought I wanted to post on this forum that someone who argued that we have not that much to fear because of bad russian maintenance of WMD, was deadly wrong. 

I need to stop reading this forum everyday and stop drinking beers late at night

Good thing dreams are the brain washing itself of unnecessary crap from previous days (however entertaining) , and not predictive of the future!

[Beleg85]

I simply love Belligcat and online investigate journalists, it's normal world's response to Russian pranksters...this time Grozev and Higgins tracked names of operators of Russian missiles killing civilians:

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2022/10/24/the-remote-control-killers-behind-russias-cruise-missile-strikes-on-ukraine/

Look at those folks, they look sympathetic, so unlike average Russian soldiers.

[dan/california]

 

Just now, Beleg85 said:

I simply love Belligcat and online investigate journalists, it's normal world's response to Russian pranksters...this time Grozev and Higgins tracked names of operators of Russian missiles killing civilians:

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2022/10/24/the-remote-control-killers-behind-russias-cruise-missile-strikes-on-ukraine/

Look at those folks, they look sympathetic, so unlike average Russian soldiers.

I don't know whether to advocate for their immediate demise, or be concerned that they might be replaced with more competent people.

[Zeleban]

 

The Russian command has finally centralized the process of command and control of its troops in the northern part of the Lugansk region of Ukraine - a grouping of troops "West" has been created, which included mainly units and subunits of the Western Military District, reinforced by a number of units from the troops of the Central Military District (PPU is located in the north - the eastern outskirts of the village of Pokrovskoe, Lugansk region). In particular, it included forces and means:

- 1st Guards TA

- 20th CAA

- 2nd CAA (3 BTGr from the 15th, 21st and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade)

- 41st CAA (1 BTgr from the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade)

- 11th AK.

In general, this is up to about 10-11 BTGr or units equal in number to them (although not all of them are still staffed with personnel and weapons and military equipment to full-time standards). Of these, at least 4-5 are in the reserve of the first and second stages. Therefore, the "gaps" in this operational direction of the front, the Russian command is actively closing with formations of the BARS type, "personnel" units of the 1st and 2nd AK and their so-called "mobilization reserve", as well as various kinds of "assault units of the Wagner PMC" (this is about another, up to 6 "battalions" - most of them are exclusively "rifle", without heavy weapons and military equipment).

 

The main task of this grouping is to hold the northern part of the Lugansk region of Ukraine and prevent the Ukrainian Defense Forces from reaching the state border of Ukraine in the Kharkiv and Lugansk regions in the Peski-Novokievka section. The day before yesterday, yesterday and today, active hostilities resumed in the Svatovsky direction.

Thus, the enemy with a motorized rifle company of the 423rd "Yampolsky" infantry regiment of the 4th TD of the 1st Guards TA, with the support of 4 tanks and fire from two artillery batteries, tried to attack the forward positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the direction of Novoselovskoye - Berestovo. However, during the 40-minute battle, he suffered losses and retreated to his starting lines in the Novoselovskoye area... Subsequently, units of the 4th TD of the enemy were forced to go on the defensive in the area of the villages of Krokhmalnoe and Novoselovskoye ...

In the area with Nevsky the enemy continued to hold forward positions with the forces of a motorized rifle unit with armored vehicles, although it was obvious that there was a very real possibility that this enemy unit would fall directly into encircling ...

During the last 2 days, this enemy unit suffered significant losses due to the fire impact of the forward units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, ultimately, this morning was forced to leave their positions in the village and near it ...

 

Southwest of Svatovo (near the village of Kovalevka), the enemy is intensively preparing for defensive operations. To this end, the enemy command deploys a battalion defense area in this direction. It will probably be occupied by units of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 2nd Guards. CAA (up to 1.5 BTG), at least during the past 2 nights, the enemy has been actively moving the forces and means of this brigade to this area.

In addition, the enemy command to the left flank of this defense area also transferred a reinforced motorized rifle company (up to 22 armored vehicles and more than 100 fighters) from the area with. Miluvatka. This morning its deployment was recorded southeast of Kovalevka.

It is obvious that the command of the enemy troops will soon try to counterattack with these forces and means the forward positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the area of the village. Karmazanovka, which are confidently advancing towards Svatovo... After all, in this direction, the advanced units of the Ukrainian army have quite good chances not only to cut the R-66 road in the Svatovo-Chervonopopovka section, but also to block Svatovo from the south in general...

[Zeleban]

During the last 2 days, the enemy also led the "consolidated" BTG of the 15th and 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 2nd Guards. CAA unsuccessful defensive battles on the eastern outskirts of c. Makeevka (Lugansk region). Let's just say that he failed to hold his positions, "hooking" on the eastern outskirts of the village ... In two scattered groups, he was forced to retreat to the village. Kovalevka and towards Novonikolskaya - Milovatka.

After the forward units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine advanced towards Svatovo in the Stelmahovka area, the enemy was forced to leave the area of the village of Myasozharovka, two significantly "shabby" motorized rifle companies (probably from the 15th or 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade) withdrew to the area south of Kolomiychikha.

Let's summarize (a few general remarks regarding the current and further development of the situation in the Svatov direction)...

1. It is obvious that the main goal of all these counterattacks northwest of Svatovo, mainly on both sides of the R-07 road (Kupyansk - Svatovo), as well as tough "oncoming" battles southwest of Svatovo, is the desire of the enemy command to keep the city of Svatovo. And it is no less obvious that he, to put it mildly, "doesn't work." The advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are confidently advancing from two sides into the city and have actually reached its near approaches.

2. Also, no less obvious is the fact that the command of the enemy troops, to put it mildly, rather strangely distributed their forces and means for conducting defense, both in the Svatovo region and in the Kremennaya region ... Yes, I mean exactly between the so-called "northern" and "southern" parts of their "West" grouping. It is clear that the "northern" (Svatovo) part is noticeably inferior "in volume" to its colleagues from the "southern" (Kremennaya - Rubizhnoye). It follows from this that it is much more important for the command of the enemy troops to keep the Kremennaya area than Svatovo ...

3. At first glance, this may look somewhat strange, but in my opinion, in this case, the Russian command made a completely correct and logical decision ... Why?

 

The answer is in my morning messages. In short, it is obvious that the breakthrough of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through Kremennaya and Rubizhnoye north of Severodonetsk (essentially bypassing it from the north) towards Novoaydar or Starobelsk (with subsequent access to the GKU, for example, in the Gorodishche area) is much more threatening than protracted defensive battles in the area Svatovo, or even Belokurakino or Novopskov ... Which, by and large, do not pose a significant threat to the Russian troops, or difficulties in terms of some kind of bypass maneuvers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, or hypothetical "breakthroughs" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the rear of the Zapad grouping ...In this case, the Russians can conduct stubborn, deterrent defensive battles in this part of the Lugansk region (Svatovo - Starobelsk), thus exhausting the advancing Ukrainian troops, and at the same time gradually withdraw as if on their own territory (while maintaining a very real threat to the Armed Forces of Ukraine of going on the counteroffensive on a broad front), and to the south, gradually building up their forces along the Kremennaya - Novoaidar - Alekseevka - Gorodishche line ...

4. Therefore, proceeding precisely from these considerations, I believe that the fate of the northern part of the Lugansk region will be decided not in Svatovo, but in Kremennaya and Rubizhne, which the enemy will strive to keep under any circumstances.

Moreover, the fate of Lisichansk and Severodonetsk will largely depend on who and how will control the area of Kreminnaya and Rubizhnoye, as well as the "triangle" Shipilovka - Privolye - Novodruzhesk and the LNPZ area.

[Tenses]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I just had a thought about the experts getting things wrong about Russia that I don't think has been said in quite this way.  I remember nibbling around the edges of it, but not quite what I'm about to say.

Let's think back to 1990 when the experts made predictions about what Iraq's military capabilities were leading up to the Desert Shield and Storm campaigns.  They said that Iraq's air defenses were amongst the best in the world and the size of its ground forces nearly unmatched.  Both disintegrated on contact with the Coalition forces.  I know for sure I mentioned Khafji as an example of how shocked everybody was when they found out the scale of the attack and how badly defeated it was.

The prewar assessment of Russia's capabilities was more similar than dissimilar to the Iraqi one.  There's some apparent commonality between the two:

• there was a focus on counting tanks, IFVs, troops, missile batteries, etc. without much regard to qualitative capabilities of each
• vast underestimation of the degree the soldiers manning these systems were proficient in their use
• it was presumed that recent battlefield experiences (Iran-Iraq War for Iraq, 2014/2015 Ukraine and Georgia for Russia) leads to reflection, rethinking, and adjustments even when things go well but especially when they don't.  This led experts to wildly overestimate how much recent battlefield experiences helped Iraq and Russia prepare for the next war
• underestimating the degree of stress the forces could take before reaching combat ineffectiveness
• under appreciation of how conscripted forces respond to experiencing their side's inherent deficiencies in combat
• next to no thought put into the impact of disrupted logistics on combat operations
• under appreciating the inherent communications deficiencies within the chains of command, in particular lateral ones
• under appreciating how easily command and control could be disrupted and how difficult it is to address afterwards
• very little understanding of how terrain impacted expectations.  In Iraq's case desert terrain offered maximum exposure to ISR and ranged weapons, in Russia's case the forests, water obstacles, and urban centers favored ambushes
• almost no thought, apparently, as to how well a smart and well resourced opponent could exploit all of the above weaknesses to gain asymmetrical advantages
• zero thought of how much Iraq and Russia would scale up their forces to have "mass" outweigh all of their disadvantages

No doubt there's more similarities, but I think these are sufficient to make my point that the failure of the experts in 1990 is eerily similar to their failure in 2022.  It boils down to not understanding what they really needed to be focused on and misapplying what they thought were lessons from past conflicts onto the forces being studied.

Steve

Just before the invasion I expected Ukraine to give Russians hell. But I expected it in the form of fierce and heroic defense against superior enemy and later extremely deadly partisan war. Especially the latter seemed like an absolute argument to prevent Russia from eventually attacking Ukraine, with forces that were clearly way too small for the country of this size.

But there is one thing that was a total shock for me and in fact is for this day. I can't understand how useless is russian air force in this conflict, when you take the overall forces and AA assets into account. Apart from obvious things like bad training of mechanized forces, terrible logisticks and lack of manpower, this is the major factor in that we see, what we thought would be impossible 8 months after Putler made his first step to end himself and his country.

[Zeleban]

Here is a description of a curious episode under Piski. Thanks to the night counterattack, the Ukrainian unit managed to stop the offensive of the DPR troops. This is about equipping night vision devices.

Over the past few days, in the Donetsk direction, the enemy was using the forces of a strike tactical group consisting of a company of a separate assault battalion "Somalia", 2 reinforced platoons of a separate reconnaissance battalion "Sparta", as well as BTGr of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 1st Army Corps (company) tried to advance from the Donetsk airport towards the settlements of Vodiane and Opitne ... having the immediate goal - to take full control of the road between the village. Opitne and DAP ... and in the future - to take with. Vodiane and s.Opitne.

Through a series of attacks from the area with. Spartak, positions north of the DAP and the northern outskirts of the village of Pisky, starting from the evening of October 18, the enemy sought to oust the advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the indicated lines.

During these attacks, the "Somali" unit was able to advance up to half the road from the village Pisky on Vodyanoye (before the fork in the road to Opytnoe and actually to Vodiane) and was forced to stop due to the fire influence of the advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the village Vodyane.

In turn, operating in the center of the combat order of the tactical group, "Sparta" did not reach the road, stopped to the south and was forced to provide assistance to units of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade, which, after moving into the forest plantation north of the DAP road - the village of Opitne, suddenly came under a night counterattack advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the side of the village. Opitne...

As a result of these actions, as of the evening of October 21, 2022, the enemy could not, with the exception of his left flank, approach and gain a foothold at the line along the road DAP-Opіtne village ... along its northern edge, not to mention the capture settlements of Opіtne and Vodyane...

Moreover, units of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 1st Army Corps were even forced to retreat south of the road, as a result of a counterattack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Even the maneuver of the "Sparta" units from the center to the right flank of the tactical group could not improve the situation in the sector of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade...

 

Only due to the introduction of assault bn "Storm" and separate special forces battalion "Pyatnashka" units into battle did the enemy manage to stabilize the situation in this zone of action, near the village Spartak.

[Zeleban]

4 minutes ago, Tenses said:

Just before the invasion I expected Ukraine to give Russians hell. But I expected it in the form of fierce and heroic defense against superior enemy and later extremely deadly partisan war. Especially the latter seemed like an absolute argument to prevent Russia from eventually attacking Ukraine, with forces that were clearly way too small for the country of this size.

But there is one thing that was a total shock for me and in fact is for this day. I can't understand how useless is russian air force in this conflict, when you take the overall forces and AA assets into account. Apart from obvious things like bad training of mechanized forces, terrible logisticks and lack of manpower, this is the major factor in that we see, what we thought would be impossible 8 months after Putler made his first step to end himself and his country.

The use of aviation requires much more competence than the use of tanks or artillery.

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

The use of aviation requires much more competence than the use of tanks or artillery.

And that competence is EXPENSIVE to develop. That money was needed for the yacht program...

[dan/california]

Russian's under enough pressure in Kherson to commit their rotary wing assets to places they shouldn't go. A month of this and they won't have any K-52s to lose. 

[Haiduk]

15 hours ago, dan/california said:

Two requests to anyone who might have this at their fingertips. 

1) The L/DPR order of battle on 2/24 and where those units went initially

2) The article on L/DPR forces training the Russian regular army in how to do drone adjusted artillery fire with quadcopters.

The recent developments with Iranian drones have made the earlier stuff about the L/DPR impossible to google my way back too easily.

Many thanks in advance if someone had the sense to save either one.

1st Army Corps (DPR):

Corps HQ (Donetsk - all names of settlements given according to new decommunized names)

Separate units, directly subordinated to HQ:

- separate control and HQ security battalion "Pautina" (Donetsk)

- separate commandant regiment (Donetsk)

- 2nd tank battalion "Dizel" (Donetsk)

- separate naval infantry recon battalion "Sparta" (Donetsk)

- separate motor-rifle assault battalion "Somali" (Donetsk)

- 1st Spetsnaz battalion "Khan" (Donetsk)

- 3rd Spetsnaz battalion (Donetsk)

- separate engineer-sapper company (Donetsk)

- separate SAM battalion (Donetsk)

- separate EW company (Donetsk)

- separate UAV company (Donetsk)

- repair battlion "Kongo" (Donetsk)

- logistical&supply batalion (Donetsk) 

 

Combat core:

- artillery brigade "Kalmius" (new name Tactical Group "Kolchuga" almost doesn't use)

- 1st MRB "Slavianskaya" (Kal'mius'ke)

- 3rd MRB "Berkut" (Horlivka)

- 5th MRB "Oplot" (Dokuchayevsk, Donetsk)

- 100th MRB, so-called "Republican Guard" (Donetsk)

- so-called "International brigade "Pyatnashka" (attached to 100th MBR, really about 1,5 battalions, represented mostly Abkhazian and Osetians volunteers)

- 9th naval infantry regiment (Novoazovsk) 

- 11th motor-rifle regiment "Vostok" (Donetsk)

 

Territorioal defense battalions:

- 1st TDB (Makiivka, Horlivka)

- 2nd TDB "Shakhtiorskaya diviziya" (eng. "Coalminer division") (Donetsk, attached to 11th motor-rifle regiment)

- 3rd TDB (military builders) (Horlivka, attached to 100th MRB) 

- 4th TDB (Donetsk, attached to 100th MRB)

- 5th TDB 

- 6th TDB

 

Internal Troops:

- brigade "Vostok" (Donetsk), not to be confused with 11th MRR "Vostok"

- 1st operative purpose battalion "Patriot" (Donetsk)

- 41st operative regiment

- 52nd operative regment

- 1st Spetsnaz company

- 3rd cossack company (Khartsyzs'k)

- 4th company "Rubezh" (Zugres)

 

State Security Service:

- security regiment  - battalions "Patriot", "Legion", "Vityaz' " (Donetsk)

Emergency Service

- battlion "Legion" (despite they nominaly are emergency service, in real they have a weapon)

 

2nd ARMY CORPS (LPR)

Corps HQ (Luhansk)

Separate units, directly subordinated to HQ:

- separate control and HQ security battalion (Luhansk)

- separate commandant regiment (Luhansk)

- 4nd tank battalion nemed after st.prince Aleksandr Nevskiy (former name "Avgust") (Luhansk)

- separate recon battalion (Luhansk)

- separate motor-rifle women battalion "Rus' " (Sorokyne) 

- spetsnaz battalion (Luhansk)

- separate engineer-sapper company (Luhansk)

- separate SAM battalion (Donetsk)

- separate EW company (Luhansk)

- separate UAV company (Luhansk)

- repair battlion (Luhansk)

- logistical&supply batalion (Luhansk) 

 

Combat core:

- 10th special purpose brigade (artillery brigade)

- 2nd MRB (Luhansk)

- 4th MRB "Zarya" (Khrustal'nyi)

- 7th MRB (Brianka)

- 6th cossack MRR (Kadiivka)

 

Territorial defense battalions:

- 11th TDB "Ataman" (Stanytsia Luhanska district)

- 12th TDB "Rim" (Dovzhans'k)

- 13th TDB "Kul'kin" (Roven'ky)

- 14th TDB "Prizrak" (Holubivka, Donetskyi)

- 15th TDB "SSSR" (Brianka)

- 16th TDB "Leshiy" (Antratsyt)

- 17th TDB "Bolshoy" (Slavianoserbsk district)

- 18th TDB "Pokhodnyi" (Khrustal'nyi)