Book Recommendations on the history of mechanized infantry?

[Simcoe]

Not sure if this is the right forum to discuss but could anyone recommend books on the history of mechanized infantry? Anything from WW2 to the present would be great. My favorite part of Combat mission is the role of infantry in support of mechanized units and I'm always looking for more info on how these units were developed and the tactics they used.

[chuckdyke]

 

Here is the website with some useful books. Just by a quick search they came up with this one. No hassles. PDF Drive - Search and download PDF files for free.

[domfluff]

Yeah, this is something I'd really like to dig into myself. There have been some rather controversial takes recently in print, and I'd certainly like a clearer understanding of everything involved.

Broadly, I think the outline is pretty clear - you have some early examples in WW1, and some more focused experiences with Universal carriers, SPWs, tank riders and experiments with Kangaroos in WW2. Then the Soviets began mechanising everything with the early BTRs, and then changed the game significantly with the BMP - causing everyone else to catch up (with a possible exception made there for the Shutzenpanzer Lang HS.30). More recently, there's been a couple of trends - APC-like vehicles seem to have been gaining heavily firepower (blurring the line between them and IFVs), APCs have sometimes been getting heavier in general, and there's been a move to wheeled vehicles for increased operational mobility and flexibility (Stryker, Boxer, etc.).

Doctrinally through, there seems to have been significant debate on correct usage of infantry transport over the years, and that doesn't look like it's being resolved any time soon. How much you fight whilst mounted, when you dismount, and what the fundamental purpose of the vehicle is has been debated up and down the spectrum.

For instance:

My understanding of current Bradley practice is that the default would be that the infantry dismount at a significant distance from the target, and assault on foot as light infantry would (perhaps on a long move under cover, attacking the target from a flank). The Bradleys then provide organic long-range fire support, presumably in co-ordination with the formation mortars.

This is distinct from BMP practice, which is to keep the squad and BMP together as a single unit - and perhaps not to dismount at all, if they can help it. This clearly preserves tempo, but does increase the possibility of losing a transport with all hands.

German practice, as I understand it, was to use the Marder as a light tank in support of the armour - roaming *ahead* of the infantry, and using the infantry position as a line to fall back behind. (First time I read this was in "When the Squad Dismounts", a period article from Infantry magazine). I do have a copy of that floating around on the discord, but I don't have one to hand right now. Should be able to post it later though.

All three of those approaches seem like they can offer major advantages, so none of them seem stupid. They're all pretty distinct though.


Certainly the field manuals tend to talk about various options - dismounting before the objective, on the objective or past the objective - in the latter case, the attacking force would attack on and through, and then isolate and screen the objective, allowing the infantry to clear up. Some of the techniques discussed, especially the US Cold War stuff around the M113 formations seem... ambitious, looking at them with a CM lens. 

[chuckdyke]

51 minutes ago, domfluff said:

Some of the techniques discussed, especially the US Cold War stuff around the M113 formations seem... ambitious, looking at them with a CM lens. 

I understand what the grunt sees on the ground the VUDT sees it inside the IFV. With the fast firing mini cannon it is a different ball game. With a build in GPS and Robotics it can do anything at lightning speed. I can only guess the possibilities with modern computers.

 

[Probus]

Here are two recent German Army Pamphlet translations that I thought were very interesting:

German Army Regulation on the Medium Tank Company, May 1941, Translated by Bernhard Kast & Christoph Bergs.

 

The Assault Platoon of the Grenadier-Company, November 1944, Translated by Bernhard Kast & Christoph Bergs.

 

They also have YouTube Channels and are getting ready to release a new book on the Stuka dive bomber:

Stuka - The Doctrine of the German Dive-Bomber, Christoph Bergs & Bernhard Kast.

https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/stuka-the-doctrine-of-the-german-dive-bomber#/

 

[domfluff]

In terms of specifically Panzergrenadiers (which will be a small part of, but quite distinct from, the original question), there are some good videos that Military History Visualised has put out.

Two I've found useful for use with CM:
 

 

 

[chuckdyke]

Kesselslacht Cauldron Battle. On smaller scale works very good in combat mission. Surround the objective is the name of the game.

[chuckdyke]

All free downloads.

[Duckman]

3 hours ago, domfluff said:

Doctrinally through, there seems to have been significant debate on correct usage of infantry transport over the years, and that doesn't look like it's being resolved any time soon. How much you fight whilst mounted, when you dismount, and what the fundamental purpose of the vehicle is has been debated up and down the spectrum. [...]

Certainly the field manuals tend to talk about various options - dismounting before the objective, on the objective or past the objective - in the latter case, the attacking force would attack on and through, and then isolate and screen the objective, allowing the infantry to clear up. Some of the techniques discussed, especially the US Cold War stuff around the M113 formations seem... ambitious, looking at them with a CM lens. 

There certainly was a doctrinal difference, with the West Germans and Soviets going for vehicles the infantry could (at least theoretically) fight from while the US chose the battlefield taxi route with the M113. The BMP seems to have largely failed in the fighting role in the Arab-Israeli Wars while the M113 ironically turned into a fighting vehicle with the ACAV variant in Vietnam. However the very different circumstances prevent a direct comparison.

As for various tactical options, that would also depend on the terrain. In open terrain tanks will lead, when assaulting a built up area the infantry will dismount and lead, etc. 

[Simcoe]

5 hours ago, domfluff said:

Yeah, this is something I'd really like to dig into myself. There have been some rather controversial takes recently in print, and I'd certainly like a clearer understanding of everything involved.

Broadly, I think the outline is pretty clear - you have some early examples in WW1, and some more focused experiences with Universal carriers, SPWs, tank riders and experiments with Kangaroos in WW2. Then the Soviets began mechanising everything with the early BTRs, and then changed the game significantly with the BMP - causing everyone else to catch up (with a possible exception made there for the Shutzenpanzer Lang HS.30). More recently, there's been a couple of trends - APC-like vehicles seem to have been gaining heavily firepower (blurring the line between them and IFVs), APCs have sometimes been getting heavier in general, and there's been a move to wheeled vehicles for increased operational mobility and flexibility (Stryker, Boxer, etc.).

Doctrinally through, there seems to have been significant debate on correct usage of infantry transport over the years, and that doesn't look like it's being resolved any time soon. How much you fight whilst mounted, when you dismount, and what the fundamental purpose of the vehicle is has been debated up and down the spectrum.

For instance:

My understanding of current Bradley practice is that the default would be that the infantry dismount at a significant distance from the target, and assault on foot as light infantry would (perhaps on a long move under cover, attacking the target from a flank). The Bradleys then provide organic long-range fire support, presumably in co-ordination with the formation mortars.

This is distinct from BMP practice, which is to keep the squad and BMP together as a single unit - and perhaps not to dismount at all, if they can help it. This clearly preserves tempo, but does increase the possibility of losing a transport with all hands.

German practice, as I understand it, was to use the Marder as a light tank in support of the armour - roaming *ahead* of the infantry, and using the infantry position as a line to fall back behind. (First time I read this was in "When the Squad Dismounts", a period article from Infantry magazine). I do have a copy of that floating around on the discord, but I don't have one to hand right now. Should be able to post it later though.

All three of those approaches seem like they can offer major advantages, so none of them seem stupid. They're all pretty distinct though.


Certainly the field manuals tend to talk about various options - dismounting before the objective, on the objective or past the objective - in the latter case, the attacking force would attack on and through, and then isolate and screen the objective, allowing the infantry to clear up. Some of the techniques discussed, especially the US Cold War stuff around the M113 formations seem... ambitious, looking at them with a CM lens. 

Thank you. That was an interesting read. I keep reading about how the BMP was a failure but never much elaboration. I'd love to find a good book on the Yom Kippur war and the lessons learned from it. That subject seems to be fraught with propaganda on both sides though.

[domfluff]

I think "the BMP was a failure" is a tricky sentence to claim, since it's never been used in the context for which it was intended (i.e., rolling into West Germany with the Soviet Army).

Iraqi BMPs were hugely outclassed by Desert Storm, certainly, and they were (among many other things) the wrong tool and doctrine to fight in Afghanistan with. 1973 I'm less clear on, but clearly is not the Soviet army, and by most accounts none of the operators were employing it as per Soviet doctrine, which makes it a hard thing to judge.

In a CM context, the BMP-1 and BMP-2 are pretty laughable in CMSF. The BMP-3 is scary in CMBS, but outclassed by the Bradley. In Cold War, however, the BMP-1 and BMP-1P are terrifying vehicles, which make an awful lot more sense. That would be even more true the further back you go, especially since it was introduced in the sixties.

[Simcoe]

I started reading Panzergrenadier from Osprey publishing and I highly recommend it so far. Lots of great pictures too. Just wish the Osprey books were cheaper and longer. Their US armored infantry vs Panzergrenadier is another great book but very short.

[Duckman]

16 hours ago, domfluff said:

I think "the BMP was a failure" is a tricky sentence to claim, since it's never been used in the context for which it was intended (i.e., rolling into West Germany with the Soviet Army).

Iraqi BMPs were hugely outclassed by Desert Storm, certainly, and they were (among many other things) the wrong tool and doctrine to fight in Afghanistan with. 1973 I'm less clear on, but clearly is not the Soviet army, and by most accounts none of the operators were employing it as per Soviet doctrine, which makes it a hard thing to judge.

At least the Syrians seems to have pretty much followed texbook Soviet tactics in 1973, which was also the combat debut of the BMP. It ended badly but as always sources are frustratingly limited when it comes to the Arab side.

Howewer there does seem to be a consensus that fighting from inside the vechicle wasn't much use since it was too cramped and the gun and armour were too weak, with the last two complaints perhaps suggesting unsuitable tactics (Soviet, Syrian, or both). Average engagement distances on the Golan may have been longer than what was expected ion Europe but I haven't seen any data.

[domfluff]

6 minutes ago, Duckman said:

At least the Syrians seems to have pretty much followed texbook Soviet tactics in 1973, which was also the combat debut of the BMP. It ended badly but as always sources are frustratingly limited when it comes to the Arab side.

Howewer there does seem to be a consensus that fighting from inside the vechicle wasn't much use since it was too cramped and the gun and armour were too weak, with the last two complaints perhaps suggesting unsuitable tactics (Soviet, Syrian, or both). Average engagement distances on the Golan may have been longer than what was expected ion Europe but I haven't seen any data.

I'm not sure that first point is clear at all - indeed, there have been several books written about it, and ultimately their failings. My general understanding was that Soviet Advisors were rarely of the military sort. It does seem to be that for the run up to the 1973, the Soviet Union was more closely involved with Syrian policy than it was before or afterwards, but I don't know how much that carried across into operational and tactical planning. You may well be correct, but I don't think it's clear.

As to the utility of the BMP in general, I'm going to put this in terms of experience with CMCW here, since that's at least grounded in something testable, even if his does not necessarily align exactly with reality.

The 73mm HEAT round can frontally penetrate any and all NATO armour of the period - Leopard 1, M60 and even Chieftain. The ATGM clearly can do even better at range. AT-3s have all of the obvious problems of that manual system, but the later AT-5s do not, and represent a very scary proposition.

Fighting from within the vehicle is often stated as being an NBC concern, and I imagine that's true, but CMCW shows that there is utility to remaining mounted far beyond that. In the context of CMCW, the US artillery call-in times are incredibly fast, and dismounting takes precious time. The Soviets on a tactical level have to keep moving, and and dismounting for combat is going to result in being hit with artillery within 2-5 minutes. This doesn't mean that firing ports are a good idea, but it does mean you should probably be dismounting later with your BMP infantry, if you dismount them at all. Never dismounting is a viable and defensible option with them.

The problems? The BMP is blind and cramped, it only has a one man turret, the 73mm is a good AT option, but it's rate of fire is too low to suppress infantry effectively (the 73mm gun was originally supposed to be an AGL, but they needed an AT option to cover the AT-3's minimum range). It's a troop carrier, so it's inherently vulnerable and it's expected to fight, so it's going to be exposed. Some of those are issues with every IFV (and indeed the entire IFV concept), and some of those are unique to the BMP-1.

The end result though is that you have a vehicle which packs a tremendous amount of firepower in a small space, and is a threat to everything on the CMCW battlefield. As a design it's a compromise, as all IFVs are, but I definitely do not think that in the context of CMCW that it can be dismissed.

[Simcoe]

7 hours ago, domfluff said:

I'm not sure that first point is clear at all - indeed, there have been several books written about it, and ultimately their failings. My general understanding was that Soviet Advisors were rarely of the military sort. It does seem to be that for the run up to the 1973, the Soviet Union was more closely involved with Syrian policy than it was before or afterwards, but I don't know how much that carried across into operational and tactical planning. You may well be correct, but I don't think it's clear.

As to the utility of the BMP in general, I'm going to put this in terms of experience with CMCW here, since that's at least grounded in something testable, even if his does not necessarily align exactly with reality.

The 73mm HEAT round can frontally penetrate any and all NATO armour of the period - Leopard 1, M60 and even Chieftain. The ATGM clearly can do even better at range. AT-3s have all of the obvious problems of that manual system, but the later AT-5s do not, and represent a very scary proposition.

Fighting from within the vehicle is often stated as being an NBC concern, and I imagine that's true, but CMCW shows that there is utility to remaining mounted far beyond that. In the context of CMCW, the US artillery call-in times are incredibly fast, and dismounting takes precious time. The Soviets on a tactical level have to keep moving, and and dismounting for combat is going to result in being hit with artillery within 2-5 minutes. This doesn't mean that firing ports are a good idea, but it does mean you should probably be dismounting later with your BMP infantry, if you dismount them at all. Never dismounting is a viable and defensible option with them.

The problems? The BMP is blind and cramped, it only has a one man turret, the 73mm is a good AT option, but it's rate of fire is too low to suppress infantry effectively (the 73mm gun was originally supposed to be an AGL, but they needed an AT option to cover the AT-3's minimum range). It's a troop carrier, so it's inherently vulnerable and it's expected to fight, so it's going to be exposed. Some of those are issues with every IFV (and indeed the entire IFV concept), and some of those are unique to the BMP-1.

The end result though is that you have a vehicle which packs a tremendous amount of firepower in a small space, and is a threat to everything on the CMCW battlefield. As a design it's a compromise, as all IFVs are, but I definitely do not think that in the context of CMCW that it can be dismissed.

I remember reading a quote from a Syrian saying "we got a Mercedes when we probably needed a Ford" in regards to the BMP. I don't think we could ever expect the Syrians to implement Soviet tactics even if they had been trained. 

I think propaganda from the Nazis and later the US makes us underestimate the skill the Soviets would have had on a Cold War battlefield. A well trained crew/dismounts in a BMP with proper artillery support would have been terrifying.

[Thewood1]

As mentioned Osprey has a few books.  I own these.  They are short but fairly detailed to their subject and give a good history of the combat application and development of mechanized/armored infantry tactics:

https://ospreypublishing.com/world-war-ii-german-motorized-infantry-panzergrenadiers

https://ospreypublishing.com/vietnam-infantry-tactics

https://ospreypublishing.com/world-war-ii-us-armored-infantry-tactics

https://ospreypublishing.com/world-war-ii-combat-reconnaissance-tactics-pb

There are also books on specific battles and APC/IFV units that shed some light on more modern developments.

[Simcoe]

2 hours ago, Thewood1 said:

As mentioned Osprey has a few books.  I own these.  They are short but fairly detailed to their subject and give a good history of the combat application and development of mechanized/armored infantry tactics:

https://ospreypublishing.com/world-war-ii-german-motorized-infantry-panzergrenadiers

https://ospreypublishing.com/vietnam-infantry-tactics

https://ospreypublishing.com/world-war-ii-us-armored-infantry-tactics

https://ospreypublishing.com/world-war-ii-combat-reconnaissance-tactics-pb

There are also books on specific battles and APC/IFV units that shed some light on more modern developments.

Thank you. Reading through Panzergrenadiers from Osprey. I wish it went a bit more into tactics rather than the different models of SPW but I'm enjoying it so far.

[Probus]

How has the BMP faired in Ukraine and Syria more recently (last 5 years or so)?

Fighting them in CMCW seems to me to be unmounted until you see the spotting rounds then jump in and scoot. But I know precious little about Soviet doctrine.

I know the later BMPs are some kinda scary if you don't have much that can kill them. Good thing that's not a problem with the way the US platoon is outfitted. The US platoon is pretty deadly capable with or without it's Bradley.

Edited January 26, 2022 by Probus

[domfluff]

16 hours ago, Probus said:

How has the BMP faired in Ukraine and Syria more recently (last 5 years or so)?

Fighting them in CMCW seems to me to be unmounted until you see the spotting rounds then jump in and scoot. But I know precious little about Soviet doctrine.

I know the later BMPs are some kinda scary if you don't have much that can kill them. Good thing that's not a problem with the way the US platoon is outfitted. The US platoon is pretty deadly capable with or without it's Bradley.

1) One trend in the "lessons learned" from Ukraine has been a push towards heavier vehicles in general, and heavier carriers in specifics. That may well just be a tactical concern though, since a war in the Donbas doesn't require vast operational movement. The BMP by this point (especially the BMP-1 and BMP-2) are very old vehicles, and were not designed for anything like this generation of weapons. The BMP of any model is a glass cannon -  extremely high amounts of firepower, with limited protection (although there's been some change on that).


2) In CMCW (or the Cold War), this sentence is pretty much backwards. To take a CM-specific example, an adjusted 155mm DPICM cluster mission can be on target in as little as two minutes. Dismounting is slow, and slow is the one thing the Soviets can never afford to be - for a number of reasons they are forced into the proactive role in a tactical sense.

Doctrinally, the BMPs were supposed to fight mounted wherever possible. When not possible (which means sufficient unsuppressed AT assets or complex terrain, although what "sufficient" means is an interesting question here), the intention would be to dismount as close as possible to the target - typically within 300m. If you're facing heavy enough AT assets, then dismount range would be at 1000m, but that's going to make the attack very unlikely to succeed. Aside from terrain and AT, the main other reasons to dismount are situational awareness and the extra firepower.

It's a good mental exercise to try to plan your offensive assuming that you're never going to dismount, and work out what you'd have to do to ensure that this is successful. Then you have the option of dismounting if that makes something easier.


3) All BMPs have most of their armour to their heavily sloped front. They're designed to be pointing at the enemy. The BMP-3M in particular has quite significant frontal armour, which makes it hard for a Bradley to penetrate it with the 25mm autocannon. There's been a move towards larger calibres across NATO for this reason, and more vehicles are getting 40mm cannon because of it. Clearly the TOW will still wreck them.

In CMBS, the BMP-3M (ERA) can resist 25mm fire at a reasonable range pretty well. It's not great, but there's a good chance of surviving and sending a lethal attack in return. Clearly the Javelin is an overmatch to most things on CM battlefields, and the BMP won't change that, but that would be true in "Blue v Blue" scenario as well, so I don't really think the ability of a US rifle squad to deal with BMPs is indicative of the BMP's design necessarily.

Edited January 27, 2022 by domfluff

[Dan Dare]

On 1/24/2022 at 10:41 AM, chuckdyke said:

 

Here is the website with some useful books. Just by a quick search they came up with this one. No hassles. PDF Drive - Search and download PDF files for free.

fm 17-42-Armored Infantry Battalion (ww2)

[domfluff]

Still not exactly what you want, but an interesting article discussing the logic and organisation of various modern IFV and APC solutions with their dismounts, as well as where those came from.

http://www.regimentalrogue.com/blog/caj_vol13.3_06_e.pdf

[Simcoe]

6 hours ago, domfluff said:

Still not exactly what you want, but an interesting article discussing the logic and organisation of various modern IFV and APC solutions with their dismounts, as well as where those came from.

http://www.regimentalrogue.com/blog/caj_vol13.3_06_e.pdf

Looks interesting. I'll check it out.

[Aragorn2002]

On 1/24/2022 at 1:18 PM, Probus said:

On 1/24/2022 at 1:18 PM, Probus said:

Here are two recent German Army Pamphlet translations that I thought were very interesting:

German Army Regulation on the Medium Tank Company, May 1941, Translated by Bernhard Kast & Christoph Bergs.

 

The Assault Platoon of the Grenadier-Company, November 1944, Translated by Bernhard Kast & Christoph Bergs.

 

They also have YouTube Channels and are getting ready to release a new book on the Stuka dive bomber:

Stuka - The Doctrine of the German Dive-Bomber, Christoph Bergs & Bernhard Kast.

https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/stuka-the-doctrine-of-the-german-dive-bomber#/

 

 

Very interesting, Probus. Any idea where the book on the assault platoon can be ordered or dl-ed?

[Probus]

Just now, Aragorn2002 said:

Very interesting, Probus. Any idea where the book on the assault platoon can be ordered or dl-ed?

I ordered the tank book from Lulu.  They have the MP44 book also:

https://www.lulu.com/en/us/shop/christoph-bergs-and-bernhard-kast/the-assault-platoon-of-the-grenadier-company-1944-softcover/paperback/product-qqv5nr.html?page=1&pageSize=4

[Aragorn2002]

10 hours ago, Probus said:

I ordered the tank book from Lulu.  They have the MP44 book also:

https://www.lulu.com/en/us/shop/christoph-bergs-and-bernhard-kast/the-assault-platoon-of-the-grenadier-company-1944-softcover/paperback/product-qqv5nr.html?page=1&pageSize=4

Thank you, Probus. I've ordered the MP44 book. Hefty price, but a must have for me.