II.Fallschirmjager Ersatz und Ausbildings (E.u.A.) Regiment Hermann Göring

[Broadsword56]

Does anyone know anything about the II.Fallschirmjager Ersatz und Ausbildings (E.u.A.) Regiment Hermann Göring, who were part of the Eindhoven Regional Command when Market-Garden started on 17 Sept. 1944?

From poking around online, I gather that this was a training and replacement unit that happened to be garrisoned here -- the main HG Division was at the Eastern Front.

They'd be Luftwaffe troops and have the FJ structure (as well as the FJ uniforms I suppose). Does anyone know anything about their degree of readiness and morale and leadership, etc., at that time? Anything unusual abotu their TO&E or equipment?

[Ithikial_AU]

Grain of salt required...

If they are the ones I'm thinking of, part of the regiment were holding Joe's Bridge on Sept 10 in the ad-hoc defense of the Belgian-Dutch border prior to Market Garden. Many surrendered without a fight after being taken by surprise, though I think others of regiment did put up a bit of struggle in nearby areas.

[Broadsword56]

Thanks, but the troops I'm referring to were farther north, defending near Son bridge.

[mjkerner]

I have Frank Kurowski's book on the HG Fallschirmjaeger-Panzer Div. The E. und A. Regiment was spread around southern Holland, mostly in bits and pieces. It had 3 battalions, an NCO training company, possibly a pioneer battalion (the Regimental Commander lost his notes in Russia and couldn't recall the exact makeup), plus admin units. The II battalion was shot up badly in and around Son. The NCO Training Company helped hold the Nijmegen bridge and, along with an SS company, occupied the Citadel until overwhelmed.

[poesel]

Does anyone know anything about the II.Fallschirmjager Ersatz und Ausbildings (E.u.A.) Regiment Hermann Göring,

...

From poking around online, I gather that this was a training and replacement unit that happened to be garrisoned here

...

'Ersatz' = replacement

'Ausbildung' = training

So what you found online might be true!

Sorry, can't help you more.

[Broadsword56]

One reason I ask is because one might assume "Training and Replacement" means a low-quality unit of recruits. But my operational boardgame has these two companies of II.E.u.A Rgt HG rated very high in troop quality (as high as the 101st Airborne).

I think it might be because ersatz battalions usually contained a cadre of the very best and most experienced/motivated veterans from the parent division. Maybe these men got this nice Holland assignment in a "quiet area" as a reward for good performance, and because they were deemed too valuable to be wasted as cannon fodder on the Ostfront. Just speculation on my part.

[ASL Veteran]

One reason I ask is because one might assume "Training and Replacement" means a low-quality unit of recruits. But my operational boardgame has these two companies of II.E.u.A Rgt HG rated very high in troop quality (as high as the 101st Airborne).

I think it might be because ersatz battalions usually contained a cadre of the very best and most experienced/motivated veterans from the parent division. Maybe these men got this nice Holland assignment in a "quiet area" as a reward for good performance, and because they were deemed too valuable to be wasted as cannon fodder on the Ostfront. Just speculation on my part.

Holland was the normal rest / recovery area for the Hermann Goring Division since its formation. Battalions would be regularly rotated in and out of Holland to refit before returning to Italy. As an aside, I sincerely doubt that rating those troops equivalent to US airborne troops in Sept 1944 is anywhere close to a reflection of reality.

[GJR144]

One reason I ask is because one might assume "Training and Replacement" means a low-quality unit of recruits. But my operational boardgame has these two companies of II.E.u.A Rgt HG rated very high in troop quality (as high as the 101st Airborne).

The Wehrmacht replacement doctrine was completely different from the western Armies.

Contrary to the Communist and Capitalist egalitarian view, that 1+1 people was 2 people, the Wehrmacht respected that 1+1 people being MORE than 2 people. Therefore units that trained together were not torn apart. If possible units even were formed around a common regional heritage.

[Battlefront.com]

From what I recall the FJ replacement units in Holland were poor quality. One of them even broke in panic.

As for the replacement systems, GJR144 is correct that the systems varied greatly. But to say one was inherently superior to the other does not show an appreciation of the pros and cons of each. The US Army conducted a very detailed study of this after WW2 using German veterans. Extremely boring to pretty much anybody, including most wargamers, but I liked it a lot

It's been a long time since I've studied this in detail, but as I remember it the three basic systems were:

1. Rotate in/out entire sub units, such as Squads, Platoons, Companies, Battalions, etc.

2. Rotate in/out individual soldiers

3. Do not rotate anybody. Unit continues until it can no longer function and is used as replacements for a newly forming unit (possibly with the same designation)

The Germans and Commonwealth used the first method, Americans the second type, and the Soviets the third (for 1st half of the war, then IIRC they switched to the American system).

The primary pro to the first type is that units in the field tended to have higher unit cohesion (bonding) than the second type. The downside is that it required more effort to keep units in the line when they faced slow rates of attrition. Reason being a unit wasn't rotated out until it got below a certain level and that meant until they did replacements weren't forthcoming. Also, if Unit A suffered huge losses, and Unit B did not, the spare personnel in Unit B sat idle while Unit A struggled to recover.

The second type had the advantage of being able to keep units at the front with (theoretical) full strength regardless of casualty levels. That's because the units themselves didn't withdraw, but instead had replacements brought in when needed. The con was the replacements had to integrate into the unit and that meant unit cohesion problems.

The third type had the advantage of simplicity of the replacement system. As casualties mounted the formation was consolidated until it reached a certain point deemed ineffective. At that point the unit was withdrawn and rebuilt (either as the existing unit or a different one). It had the con of ever decreasing fighting power and confusion between "paper strength" and actual.

Note that NONE of the nations in WW2 followed these systems exclusively. The Americans, for example, switched to a more German like system late in 1944. Individuals were still trained in the US without regard to a specific unit, but once they got into Europe they were assigned to specific divisions and trained together before acting as replacements. The Germans, on the other hand, often found themselves doing the Soviet system of wearing a unit out and then withdrawing it for rebuilding because it couldn't produce individual replacements fast enough and also had a shortage of reserve units. It also had to start combining sub units from multiple formations because it simply couldn't bring in replacements fast enough. And as the war went on the traditional geographical regimental pool system broke down and started to look more like the American system. Similar for British too. The Soviets found that their prewar system sucked and started to feed replacements in as individuals to keep frontline units functional.

A fascinating subject for those few who are fascinated by it

Steve

[ASL Veteran]

The Wehrmacht replacement doctrine was completely different from the western Armies.

Contrary to the Communist and Capitalist egalitarian view, that 1+1 people was 2 people, the Wehrmacht respected that 1+1 people being MORE than 2 people. Therefore units that trained together were not torn apart. If possible units even were formed around a common regional heritage.

Except that by 1944 the training period was much shorter than it was in 1939 and the regional restrictions were almost obliterated in addition to the fact that there were wholesale interservice personnel transfers and recruits were coming in at very young ages (which matters from a physical standpoint because a boy just doesn't have a man's strength and endurance). There was also a severe shortage of trained and experienced NCOs and officers by 1944. Some training units got lucky and had well trained and experienced NCOs and officers, but many units got their NCOs from the supply and administrative areas or had soldiers who were promoted too quickly beyond their actual capabilities. If you were talking about 1939 then you would have a valid point.