Spotting

[dieseltaylor]

NOW THIS IS HOW TO HIJACK A THREAD : )

Anyway it came about regarding spotting ability for a tank dead ahead at 800 feet FEET. Followed by various anecdotes. Fortunately JK has gathered together some respectable sources for us all to read.

And then we can start raiding our libraries for anecdotes that generally cut very little ice. I hope that people make the important distinction between static and moving targets as there are innumerable stories of static vehicles/men being unspotted.

Long Range Target Recognition and Identification of Camouflaged Armored Vehicles

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a077862.pdf

is a study prepared for the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Social and Behavioral Sciences by Human Resources Research Organization in 1979. It presents the results of literature research, scale model target identification tests and field tests on the effects of camouflage, background, target lighting and other issues as they relate to AFV detection and identification. Some insights follow.

"As Pabon1 reported, the Materiel Testing Directorate compared the performance of trained observers (ground and aerial) in detecting pattern painted versus camouflage-augmented M60Al tanks. The camouflage-augmentation techniques used were devices such as nets, brackets, and textured surfaces. Tanks were presented either stationary or in motion. The observers employed ground and aerial surveillance tactics and attempted to detect and identify the target within an array composed of tanks and distractors. The distractors were APCs and a prototype infantry fighting vehicle. The distractors were all pattern painted. The results were:

"Camouflage application degrades the detectability of the stationary tank for both ground and aerial observers.

" During the day the dust and noise signature cues created by moving tanks completely nullified the effect of camouflage.

During night observation trials both stationary and moving vehicles were approximately equally difficult to detect.

* The stationary pattern painted tank was identified more quickly than the stationary camouflage-augmented tank.

In target acquisition (after the tank had been initially detected) the camouflage application in general did not affect the observer's perormance. Acquisition times for both vehicles were not significantly different."

Now, here's what good camouflage (as opposed to pattern painting) on a static tank is worth in terms of both detection range and time to detect.

"In a well-designed field study, Barnes and Doss17 found that pattern painting alone was not sufficient. The researchers found that a camouflage-augmented tank (nets, disruptors, etc.) was more difficult to detect than a pattern painted tank. This report focused on aircrew target detection performance under two conditions:

__________________________________________________ ________________________

Footnotes for 2-9

"R. J. Pabon. Statistical Analysis Report of the M6OA1 Camouflage

Test, Technical Report 11-76, Directorate of Combat Operations Analysis, US Army Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, November 1976.

17.. A. Barnes and N. W. Doss. Human Engineering Laboratory

Camouflage Applications Test (HELCAT) Observer Performance, Technical Memorandum 32-76, US Army Human Engineering Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving

Ground, Maryland, November 1976.

__________________________________________________ __________________________

(1) detection while flying a nap-of-the-earth route reconnaissance, and (2) detection while searching from a pop-up position.

Under the route reconnaissance condition, the mean value of the normal straight-line target detection range was 236 meters against the camouflaged tank and 828 meters against the patterned tank. This difference was statistically significant. Mean detection time for the patterned tank was 42.40 seconds, while 75.00 seconds was required for the camouflaged tank. This difference was also significant. Under the pop-up condition the pilot/observer required 36.6 seconds to locate a patterned tank parked adjacent to a wooded area. Only 40% of the subjects detected the augmented tank and it took an average of 95 seconds to locate it."

Translating into CMx2ese, if you will, a helicopter flying at treetop height has to get 3.5 x closer to spot a camouflaged static tank (as opposed to a pattern painted one) and takes 2.5 CMx2 turns to do so. A pattern painted tank that's static not only is seen from much farther out but is detected in a bit over one turn (~40 seconds). The above study, though erroneously asserting the U.S. didn't camouflage paint its AFVs during WW II, nevertheless does explain why OD was an extremely sound overall paint scheme.

As noted above, though, movement, associated dust and noise are the great negators of detection minimization. Recall the "use low speed only" signs at Normandy. Noise doesn't carry anywhere nearly as far as seeing does, except at night. The Germans, when preparing for the Bulge attack, muffled the telltale track sounds by covering the roads near the front with straw. The comment of HSU winner Dmitry Loza, though, on T-34 track noise vs those of the M4A2 Sherman are instructive. He says theirs could be heard from a great distance.

http://english.iremember.ru/tankers/...triy-loza.html

Pg 1 of link

(Fair Use)

"The Sherman drove like a car on hard surfaces, and our T-34 made so much noise that only the devil knows how many kilometers away it could be heard."

It wasn't merely the lack of rubber treads over their steel tracks, but also the way we held ours together. The Russians used simple steel pins inserted from the back and a flange which, as the track rotated, pushed them back into place. I read this years ago but recently saw it for myself on a WW II production T-34/85 undergoing restoration. Here's how we did our Sherman tracks. It wasn't merely the rubber track pads but the whole technical approach.

http://www.shermantracks.com/history.html

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Speaking of acoustic detection, during operational testing in Europe, the XM-1, with its low whining turbine engine was effectively a terrifying stealth tank. Rather than announcing its presence with a thunderous multi-fuel diesel, the soft whine (high frequencies don't carry far) of the turbine was all but inaudible, allowing the XM-1s time and again to surprise the "enemy." So pronounced was this effect, in conjunction with better accuracy firing on the move than tanks had previously had while static, that the Army developed a fundamentally new approach to warfare.

I've been around and in a running M48A5 and near (20 feet) both a running Bradley and an Abrams. Both the M48A5 and the Bradley are thunderous, smoke spewing monsters, whereas the Abrams is practically inaudible and doesn't smoke like an old steam locomotive.

My brother, who was an Armored Cav Scout on Bradleys in Germany in the late 80s told of how envious he and his men were of the Bundeswehr Luchs, essentially a rework of the German 234 series 8-wheel armored cars. It was low, quiet, not so heavily armed one might be inclined to fight it like a tank and had the same dual driver configuration of its WW II ancestor. By contrast, the Bradley CFV more nearly resembles a house on tracks and puts out so much smoke you might think it was laying it!

Apropos of visual detection issues (AKA Spotting for us), here is a doctoral dissertation on how human observers really handle the issue of target detection when looking for human targets.

I've only skimmed it, but I can already tell it's going to blow some minds here. Among other things, it shows it takes very little to distract an observer (bullets flying, explosions, people screaming, not just a few extraneous scene elements reported in the dissertation) and that target fixation (long my bane in wargaming and, as Steve will aver, at times in my posts) in a scene can cause the observer to entirely NOT SEE several other threats!

http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholar...ngkunz_PhD.pdf

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA (Naval Post Graduate School)

DISSERTATION

MODELING HUMAN VISUAL PERCEPTION FOR TARGET DETECTION IN MILITARY SIMULATIONS

Patrick Jungkung June 2009

Here is part of the abstract of a 1959 study

ENGINEERING RESEARCH INSTITUTE

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

ANN ARBOR

Final Report

THE EFFECTS OF CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL VARIABLES UPON TARGET DETECTABILITY

H;. Richard Blackwell

Vision Research Laboratories

ERI Project 2455

BUREAU OF SHIPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CONTRACT NO. Nobs-72038

WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 1958

http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstr...txt?sequence=4

"These studies were intended to evaluate the significance of certain

differences which obviously exist between the conditions under which

visual detection is studied in the laboratory, and the conditions existing in military visibility problems. The effect of these differences

is in each case expressed in terms of the contrast factor, that is the

factor by which target contrast must be multiplied in order to compensate

for the presence of the difference.

It was found that when a target appears without previous warning, a contrast factor of 1.40 is required to compensate for the resulting

loss in visibility. Absence of warning that a target is to appear, and

absence of prior information concerning the target's size and duration of

appearance require a contrast factor of 1.49. The absence of knowledge

concerning the precise location to be occupied by the target requires a

contrast factor of at least 1.31 even though the observers know precisely

when to expect the target."

These are but a few studies (and if I could do a DTIC search, I could find hundreds) which illustrate the nontrivial and complex nature of Spotting under real world conditions. To my knowledge, nobody's run these tests in a realistic or near realistic setting. Obviously, this would further degrade performance.

Regards,

John Kettler

__________________

Invitational Tourney, ROW I, Section Two, ROW II, Tourney II, Section Four, ROW IV, Group 2, Section 1, ROW V, AAR Judge

[dieseltaylor]

Vanir Ausf B

Senior Member

Join Date: Mar 2001

Location: In the middle of a desert in SW Wyoming, USA.

Posts: 3,963

Quote:

Some forty German tanks were now clearly visible, and they were indeed busily engaged in destroying these guns. There would be nothing to stop them driving down to Tobruk harbour, only 3 miles away. We swung right into battle line.

I handed Milligan his cigarette, and told him to start shooting. There was no need for me to indicate the target to him. ‘Loaded,’ yelled Adams, and away went another solid shot, tearing at the thick enemy armour. The fumes of burning cordite made us cough, and our eyes water, and soon the turret was so thick with smoke that I could only just make out the figure of Adams as he loaded shell after shell into the breach. We were firing faster than ever before, and so were my other four cruiser tanks.

It must have been a minute before the Germans spotted us, and by then their tanks had received many hits from our shells.

-- Leakey’s Luck: A Tank Commander with Nine Lives, by Michael Carver

Leakey's Luck - Carver's book is very good. However in this instance the enemy tanks were already engaged in battling guns so are arguably distracted from another threat.

[John Kettler]

dieseltaylor,

Thanks for doing this! I bet 76mm's CMAK Guide would have some good combat spotting stuff, too. To resume...

No distance given, but on page 91, a jeep, with its tire being changed, isn't seen by a German tank which had rumbled right by it (was Spotted) one street over, U-turned and came straight back down the street on which the jeep was, going right past it. It was raining hard, and the jeep and occupants, though in plain sight were never Spotted by the tank!

Patton's Forward Observers, by Rieth (looks like a must own)

http://books.google.com/books?id=XsrpOiF4jtwC&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=famous+forward+observers&source=bl&ots=iCs6d2deIo&sig=3K6jqnsUCZGZ7aZwXv70roswNDs&hl=en&sa=X&ei=YTWzUbb2E8iwqQGq3IC4AQ&ved=0CFUQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=famous%20forward%20observers&f=false

Page 95 talks about such scales of artillery fires (ours defensive, theirs offensive) neither the sound reporting positions nor the flash observers could make sense of the data. Additionally, it specifically talks about harmful effect on people's mood. Later, it talks about how a 15 minute U.S. pause allowed the situation to be resolved long enough to target the German batteries, since the noise was roughly halved.

This corresponds precisely to the simplified model I described in the GAJ AAR thread. Finding a target and identifying fundamentally constitute a signal processing task. The desired target is the signal, and it must somehow be extracted from everything masking it (weather, dust, explosions, camouflage, tired, frightened observers, technical limits, sleep deprivation, incoming fire, hunger, even screaming officers both in person and over the nets).

In this case, there most definitely was command impact, for the artillery location apparatus was paralyzed, then overloaded further by various commanders raising Cain over the terrible German bombardment. And this was back at XX Corps, not on the front lines where our in-game forces live.

Returning to the individual AFV level, I have gone through the Crew Drill manuals for both the 105mm Sherman (straight tank version not yet found) and the M5A1 Stuart for any information on who's supposed to spot what and in which sector. No joy. Barring any breakthrough for U.S. AFVs, we have my first find, the FM covering the M-10, T70 (soon to be M18) and some other goodies. The spotting part begins on page 34, paragraph 27 and continues from there. Summarizing, when the M10's in road march or moving tactically, EVERYONE is watching somewhere, providing all round visual surveillance. Only when the M10 Spots a target does the crew go to action stations (Buttoned Up), drastically reducing Spotting capability.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/PDFs/FM18-15.PDF

Nor did the halftrack FM help with the problem at hand, but it did yield a considerable shock, principally that EVERY Armored Infantry rifle squad, mortar squad and LMG squad has a bazooka team, that there is a drill for firing the bazooka FROM the HT, and that fighting from the HT is part of the core training for Armored Infantry!

Moving on, the FM for towed TDs is full of relevant material, starting on page 32 (Positions) and going from there. This is the how-to of 3-inch ATG siting and camouflage, with clear instructions on how to avoid or postpone being spotted. The line drawings are useful, but sadly, the photos are effectively useless. Even so, this will provide quite an education on the subject.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/PDFs/FM18-21.PDF

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Here's another great source of U.S. WW II manuals.

http://www.easy39th.com/manuals.php

FM 17-30 Tank Platoon (1944) covers the nitty gritty of minimizing detection, reducing exposure at all times, not making an attractive target and what to use, against whom and when. Lots of good line drawings!

http://www.easy39th.com/files/FM_17-30_Tank_Platoon_1944.pdf

FM 5-20 Camouflage-Basic Principles (1944) lays out how the enemy finds us and how we defeat such efforts. This is an extensive tutorial, with the parts of direct relevance here starting on Page 9, The Problem of Concealment

http://www.easy39th.com/files/FM_5-20_Camouflage,_Basic_Principles_1944.pdf

FM 17-12 Tank Gunnery (1944) is a treadhead grog fest, right down to the gun reticles, gyrostabilizer use and when to use canister. The single most useful insight from it, though, is that standard U.S. practice was for only the TC to be up in combat, buttoning when necessary. A stack of drawings confirms what the text clearly states. Thus, the rest of the sighting comes from limited FOV (field of view periscopes) and gunsights. Naturally, this is a considerable spotting constraint. Also, I've had the opportunity to be inside a 76mm Sherman, and I can say that the cupola, compared to the German drum type or the Panther variety and similar, is a joke. It's so low and the glass so obliquely angled that the effective FOV from each cupola port is very small, not to mention severely limited in look down angle because it's practically flush with the turret roof.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/PDFs/FM17-12.PDF

Battle of Ben Het, RSVN, 3 March 1969, night battle (illumination by moon unknown) Despite acoustic detection (no localization) and extensive surveillance with a night vision scope (image intensifier) and the M48A3 mounted active IR searchlights, NVA armor got to within 800 meters of a commanding U.S. hilltop position. It took a mine detonation and subsequent AFV fire to reveal the enemy armor's true location.

http://www.rjsmith.com/ben-het.html

(Fair Use)

"At 2100 hours that evening, the camp's central hill began receiving recoilless rifle fire from two locations. Between 2130 and 2200 the entire camp came under increasingly heavy mortar and artillery fire The tankers again began to hear the sounds of engines coupled this time with the distinctive rumbling of tracked vehicles. The men were again unsuccessfully scanning the area with both night vision scope and infrared searchlights when an enemy vehicle was suddenly illuminated as it detonated some personnel mines located approximately 800 meters from the perimeter. These caused some portion the vehicle to catch fire. In the light of this fire, three tanks and an open, tracked cargo/personel carrier were observed. Immediately, the platoon crews began taking the enemy vehicles under fire with HEAT and high explosive ammunition. And they began firing final protective fires with other organic weapons. Other tank company people immediately went into action assisting the camp's indigeneous forces in manning mortar and recoilless rifle pits or in transporting ammunition and treating wounded defenders."

(Fair Use)

At Lang Vei, RSVN, 6 February 1968, an NVA tank and infantry attack wasn't SPOTTED until (wait for it) a trip flare went off when the first tank hit the barbed wire protecting the Green Beret protected CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defense Group) camp! The NVA PT-76s had crept up a narrow trail from about a klick away to make the attack.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/7-ff/Ch6.htm

"As a precaution, Willoughby radioed an alert to the Khe Sanh Marine Base, a few kilometers away to the northeast. Whatever the enemy planned, he expected that the big guns at Khe Sanh would make it costly.

Just after midnight, shrouded by the blackness, five Soviet built PT76 medium tanks crept steadily north up a narrow trail from the shell-scarred village of Lang Troai, less than a kilometer south of Willoughby's camp. Behind them, wearing green uniforms and steel helmets, their weapons at the ready, two platoons of heavily

110

armed North Vietnamese infantrymen followed in the dust and exhaust raised by the tanks.

As the first two tanks, their commanders perched in the cupolas, reached the barbed-wire barrier that outlined the camp, a trip flare ignited, bathing the green metal tanks and dust-covered soldiers in an eerie flickering light. For a second both the camp's defenders and the enemy force were transfixed, staring at each other, then both sides began firing furiously."

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

FM 23-10, Chapter 4, Field Techniques. Note that movement is the PRIMARY daylight detection means. Why? The human eye is attracted to movement! FM is for snipers--who aren't constrained by being in a cramped, noisy metal box, most likely looking at the world through narrow FOV optics.

"4-1. TARGET INDICATORS

To become proficient in camouflage, the sniper team must first understand target indicators. Target indicators are anything a soldier does or fails to do that could result in detection. A sniper team must know and understand target indication not only to move undetected, but also to detect enemy movement. Target indicators are sound, movement, improper camouflage, disturbance of wildlife, and odors.

a. Sound.

Most noticeable during hours of darkness.

Caused by movement, equipment rattling, or talking.

Small noises may be dismissed as natural, but talking will not.

b. Movement.

Most noticeable during hours of daylight.

The human eye is attracted to movement.

Quick or jerky movement will be detected faster than slow movement.

c. Improper camouflage.

Shine.

Outline.

Contrast with the background.

"

Attempt to slip into Houffalize, Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge after a dismounted HQ (recon troop) runs smack into a German OP (range 15-20 feet)! Time is ~0630, January 15, 1945. Someone with the right bent could figure out the lighting conditions then. No snow, fog or rain reported.

http://11tharmoreddivision.com/history/Link-up_History.html

(Fair Use)

"CONTACT

Up until the moment that the lead armored car fell into a tank trap, I had firmly believed that the task force could sneak into Houffalize undetected. But a few minutes after passing a water mill, the first armored car of Ellenson's platoon dropped through the light coat of snow into a hastily dug, but well concealed, trap in the middle of the road. We were within two hundred yards of our target--within sight of Houffalize, but blocked by one of our own vehicles.

Inasmuch as the assigned mission was to get to Houffalize and contact elements of the 2nd Armored Division to close the now famous Ardennes Bulge, we had to go ahead in spite of the armored car. To make a personal reconnaissance of the approaches to the town and to be able to report that the task force had reached its destination, I took Lieutenant Ellenson and walked ahead two hundred yards to the city limits sign. We walked around this sign a couple of times and congratulated each other upon the fact that we had finally reached Houffalize.

As we started back toward the column Lieutenant Ellenson suddenly said to me, "Say, Major, there's someone up there on the hill to the left. It looks like an OP to me."

I could see where he was pointing and there did appear to be a man, of two men, in a foxhole. Lieutenant Ellenson shouted several times in an effort to attract the man's attention, but got no reply.

"Lets go up there," Ellenson said. "It's probably a 2nd Armored patrol."

Without thinking, I said "Okay," and we started up the hill. Ellenson hollered to his car commander, Sergeant Till, that we were going up the hill and would be right back.

We climbed up about fifty yards until we were within fifteen of twenty feet of the outpost. Our high hopes were dashed to the ground as the man in the foxhole stood up, trained a machine gun on us, and shouted something in German. Both of us stopped dead in our tracks and reflected for a fraction of a second as to what we should do. Ellenson's only weapon was his flashlight and mine was my pistol, snug in its holster. Before we could think very much, the German again said something that sounded much like hands up.

Lieutenant Ellenson threw his flashlight down and put his hands up saying as he did so, "I guess we are caught, Major."

I hesitated for a second, just long enough to shout to Sergeant Till, "This is a German up here--fire at him."

Fortunately, the alert sergeant heard me. He fired the antiaircraft machine gun in the direction of the German. This fire diverted his attention long enough for Ellenson to slide down the hill and for me to jump behind a nearby log. Why the German did not fire at us, I shall never know. Instead, when fired on, he jumped out of his foxhole and ran back into town. Ellenson and I hastily returned to the column.

The firing by Sergeant Till seemed to awaken what troops were then in Houffalize because immediately small-arms, antitank, and mortar fire began to fall all around us. I directed that the armored car in the rear be abandoned temporarily and that all other vehicles seek protection behind the mill--the town dominated the field east of the mill, which the column had started across."

(Fair Use)

[John Kettler]

I apparently forgot to list the Crew Drill for Halftrack, FM 71-71

http://www.easy39th.com/files/FM_17-71_Crew_Drill_for_Half-track_Vehicles_1943.pdf

and Sniper Training Techniques, FM 23-10 (1994)

http://library.enlisted.info/field-manuals/series-2/FM23_10/CH4.PDF

Where is everyone? I thought we had a great thread developing?

Regards,

John Kettler

[Baneman]

...

Where is everyone? I thought we had a great thread developing?

...

Reading, but unable to participate much since much that could be said would also cite events from Bil & GAJ's AAR which would violate operational security.

Besides, most of my opinions of in-game spotting devolve to

- Tank Spotting of infantry seems too good.

- Infantry Spotting of tanks/AFV's seems too poor.

- most other spotting algorithms seem ok.

[John Kettler]

Baneman,

I thought the direction we were going was to present historical examples of Spotting issues and the factors affecting Spotting. that's why I've spent so much time rooting around in FMs and trying to find some useful actual WW II accounts. I thought the Houffalize account was very much on point.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Sublime]

Couple of quick thoughts John - I didnt check the link but the jeep and tank anecdote from Pattons FOs - is it possible the German crew was nearby, in bivouac? A building, foxhole or whatever? Maybe asleep?

Also the Vietnam attack where armor got to within 800 yards - I wonder how much noise a PT 76 which is light, makes compared to 'real' armor? PT 76s are amphibious apcs, and Im sure this in large part helped them get close without a noise signature. The NLF/NVA were geniuses at stealth and camoflauge. Dien Bien Phu and their forward slope artillery deployment is a great example, as is the success of the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Not an opinion one way or another the spotting issue, just two thoughts as I scanned your posts.

[John Kettler]

Sublime,

Regarding the jeep and the tank, I don't follow at all. The account says the FO types were fixing a jeep with a flat tire, saw a German tank go by, in the rain, on a road paralleling theirs in the town. The tank then apparently made a right at the next intersection, followed by another, such that it was now headed straight toward the guys by the jeep. It was raining hard, and the doubtless battened down Panzer didn't see them, which is how they lived to tell the tale. As I recall, the tactical situation then was fluid.

The PT-76 is a light tank (76mm gun, P = amphibious), not an APC. The APC, also amphibious, is the BTR-50, which employs the same chassis. If the engines haven't been upgraded, here are what the BTR-50K (K means has roof) and the PT-76 sound like. Not quiet!

Here's a great vid on the PT-76 and, towards the end, the BTR-50. Wish I spoke Russian!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTZsqzZuL-c

Finally, here's a vanilla PT-76, as opposed to a Ukrainian rework in the first vid.

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

dieseltaylor,

In an effort to keep Spotting related goodies all in one thread, I've chosen to copy over the link to the AFV-G2 which directly shows the analysis the Germans did of the first real production model of the T-34/76.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/105589859/1971-AFV-G2-Volume-3-No-4

Regards,

John Kettler

[Freyberg]

I've been reading it. Thanks It's an excellent thread

[John Kettler]

Freyberg,

Glad you're enjoying it! I think the issues raised are well worth thinking about.

Regards,

John Kettler

[c3k]

Anecdote: Two days ago I was driving in rural America with my 16 yr. old son. Cattle spread amongst low rolling grasslands with light woods. There was one steer (? forgive my imprecise terminology: if it's not on my grill, I don't know much about it ) standing off to the side of a tree. Odd, because it was HOT out, and there was plenty of shade at the base of the tree. It caught my eye as I closed on it from a mile or so.

As we came abeam it, about 50-100 yards to the side of the road, only then did I realize that the "shadow" at the base of the tree was a friggin' herd of about 40 head, just lying there.

My son was equally taken in by the "illusion". (This is where grogs can talk about the physio/psycho aspects of vision and how the brain processes imagery. The startle reflext is a great place to start.)

So, about a minute of observation, tall grass, but we started above them, and 40 cattle were "invisible" until we came abeam them.

Focus, attention, oddness, lighting, all played a role.

There are LOTS of ways to trick the brain's idea of what it sees. Magicians rely on it.

Ken

[sfhand]

if it is a steer you know more about it than you're letting on... (um... if WHAT is not on your grill???)

[Sublime]

Fair nuff. As I said, I hadnt gone and read the links, just had read your thread.

APC or no (if you consider a BMP an APC, and I'd say it has very similar capabilities to a PT76 really..) a PT 76 is a pretty light vehicle compared to heavy armor. The NLF/NVA again were famous for smuggling in weapons and other stuff through amazing means - e.g. the entire mountain under a US base hollowed out. I also have heard anecdotal stories (from people who had been there) that the NVA was smuggling in disassembled tanks (probably PT76s) and assembling them again in the South after their journey. Mind you I doubt they were completely broken down, or don't even know how true this is. But it is food for thought.

[Freyberg]

That article on T34s was interesting. Tanks ought to be very vulnerable to infantry close assault.

[Offshoot]

So, about a minute of observation, tall grass, but we started above them, and 40 cattle were "invisible" until we came abeam them.

But did you unbutton and pull out your bino's?