ArmouredTopHat

The Russians are not really reforming though, they went back to basics and seem to be largely improvising at this point. They very much are 'doing it wrong' when they remain incapable of large scale assaults and instead seem set on smaller, managed and regular attacks that allow Ukraine to focus its UAS and limited firepower to best effect. I simply do not understand why they do this when broader attacks might open up more holes in the front and constrain Ukrainian abilities to focus reserves. I suspect its due to the declining quality and quantity of Russian reserves as well as the command and control issues as well as political will from behind that insists on these regular, wasteful attacks. 

We saw their lack of coordination right from the onset of the war, and I remain convinced the Russian army is simply incapable of large scale attacks that might actually bring about some more mobile warfare. This is a core failure of the Russian army and there is no signs of it being fixed alongside their other systemic issues that hamper their effectiveness so much. Its been literally years since we saw any Russian exploitation of a front, something Ukraine was able to achieve with the lightest of mechanised forces in Kharkiv. They were having these issues before FPVs became so prevalent on the front, so it cannot be down to the harsh operational environment entirely. 

I think its very fair for the west to announce that the Russians are doing it wrong, because they are still being limited in numerous respects quite needlessly. Rigid top down command structures, the lack of an empowered NCO system. These things are actively biting the Russians in the *** even before the increasingly polarisation of training and equipment, all of which is decayed by a truly appalling and intrinsic corruption issue. There are obvious limits to NATO criticisms, and I remain so very angry that the NATO response to Ukrainians getting caught in minefields was 'go around them'. NATO are not going to get everything right and they MUST take the lessons learned in this war to heart. This is where I agree very heavily with Battlefront and yourself on this issue. The evidence so far does point to NATO watching closely, time will tell if we see significant changes in consequence. 
 
Who exactly is doing this? China is the only potential that springs to mind and I am very suspicious about their stated capabilities when they feature some of the same issues the Russians do. Not to call them a paper tiger but as I stated before, they feel themselves that they are behind the curve and are still catching up to NATO, let alone trying to surpass them. 
10th Mountain division are a light infantry unit, not special forces. They are the ones dealing with the constant drone attacks. As the podcast states they are also the most experienced US unit when it comes to drone attacks and have learned valuable information in the process that is even now being actively disseminated through the rest of the Army. 
 
Russian military reform as we saw was literally their only option outside of doing nothing. They struggled enough with such a steady process and even then it did not work properly. There was no way in hell they could of even attempted anything more radical with the powers that be in the Russian state, let alone things like corruption getting in the way. Its simply not the kind of environment where you can flip a table and reset everything, not when some general does not get to steal funding for whatever project he was working on. 
 
Forgive me but this seems a little...arrogant? Assuming that your viewpoint is right and incontrovertible is exactly the kind of issue your claiming is prevalent in the military. Militaries need to be a little more pragmatic than that in my view. Is it not fair to point out that that what we consider the future for military organisation could very well change entirely, or shift back to something more familiar? This sort of stuff is hard to predict. I again need to make it clear, I agree with you on a lot here, I just think its a little silly to deride numerous countries entire military systems based on your sole opinion. You guys are not the only ones coming up with great ideas!

 

The Russians are not really reforming though, they went back to basics and seem to be largely improvising at this point. They very much are 'doing it wrong' when they remain incapable of large scale assaults and instead seem set on smaller, managed and regular attacks that allow Ukraine to focus its UAS and limited firepower to best effect. I simply do not understand why they do this when broader attacks might open up more holes in the front and constrain Ukrainian abilities to focus reserves. I suspect its due to the declining quality and quantity of Russian reserves as well as the command and control issues as well as political will from behind that insists on these regular, wasteful attacks. 

We saw their lack of coordination right from the onset of the war, and I remain convinced the Russian army is simply incapable of large scale attacks that might actually bring about some more mobile warfare. This is a core failure of the Russian army and there is no signs of it being fixed alongside their other systemic issues that hamper their effectiveness so much. Its been literally years since we saw any Russian exploitation of a front, something Ukraine was able to achieve with the lightest of mechanised forces in Kharkiv. They were having these issues before FPVs became so prevalent on the front, so it cannot be down to the harsh operational environment entirely. 

I think its very fair for the west to announce that the Russians are doing it wrong, because they are still being limited in numerous respects quite needlessly. Rigid top down command structures, the lack of an empowered NCO system. These things are actively biting the Russians in the *** even before the increasingly polarisation of training and equipment, all of which is decayed by a truly appalling and intrinsic corruption issue. There are obvious limits to NATO criticisms, and I remain so very angry that the NATO response to Ukrainians getting caught in minefields was 'go around them'. NATO are not going to get everything right and they MUST take the lessons learned in this war to heart. This is where I agree very heavily with Battlefront and yourself on this issue. The evidence so far does point to NATO watching closely, time will tell if we see significant changes in consequence. 
 
Who exactly is doing this? China is the only potential that springs to mind and I am very suspicious about their stated capabilities when they feature some of the same issues the Russians do. Not to call them a paper tiger but as I stated before, they feel themselves that they are behind the curve and are still catching up to NATO, let alone trying to surpass them. 
10th Mountain division are a light infantry unit, not special forces. They are the ones dealing with the constant drone attacks. As the podcast states they are also the most experienced US unit when it comes to drone attacks and have learned valuable information in the process that is even now being actively disseminated through the rest of the Army. 
 
Russian military reform as we saw was literally their only option outside of doing nothing. They struggled enough with such a steady process and even then it did not work properly. There was no way in hell they could of even attempted anything more radical with the powers that be in the Russian state, let alone things like corruption getting in the way. Its simply not the kind of environment where you can flip a table and reset everything, not when some general does not get to steal funding for whatever project he was working on. 
 
Forgive me but this seems a little...arrogant? Assuming that your viewpoint is right and incontrovertible is exactly the kind of issue your claiming is prevalent in the military. Militaries need to be a little more pragmatic than that in my view. Is it not fair to point out that that what we consider the future for military organisation could very well change entirely, or shift back to something more familiar? This sort of stuff is hard to predict. I again need to make it clear, I agree with you on a lot here, I just think its a little silly to deride numerous countries entire military systems based on your sole opinion. You guys are not the only ones coming up with great ideas!

 

Hmmm really...
That's like me losing all my money at a casino and saying at least I won the napkin & free box of matches they gave me while pissing away all my life savings....
 

Yeah.
In hindsight, the End of History idea of forever peace after the Cold War ended was a combination of naive, stupid, corrupt and evil. Of course the Russia would eventually attack again. Of course other empires will rise and start attacking neighbors. Of course they did. They always do. Nothing lasts forever, there is always another war behind the corner.
Yet we did spend decades lying to ourselves and making ourselves vulnerable.
But this pales with how the West failed to defend itself against enemy information operations. Putin managed to cause untold suffering and destruction by orchestrating Brexit and Trump. But our own ideology of "marketplace of idea" and "censorship is bad" stops West from being capable of defending itself, and it will lead to our destruction. And there is no need for enemies of West to even do anything anymore, it will just snowball from here into fall od West by itself (see what US Supreme Court did in last few years).
The nuclear war would at least be quick.
...
As for the war being a stupid idea. If it's stupid and it works, it's not stupid. Russia got a lot of territory in exchange for few hundred thousand dead and little economic hiccup - and they will get to keep it forever. They got few million new people to enslave and exploit.
Yes, it's not as good as what they wanted, but still a win.

To make it clear, I do broadly agree with most of TheCapt's points, especially when it comes to complacency and procurement issues within western MICs and how drones / ISR with range emphasis are going to be a primary focus for future military planning. I guess we have a different in degree of action required I suppose. 

Really I just think he's being a little bit harsh on our forbearers who did not have the benefit of hindsight to immediately adopt things that seem so obvious to us now, or the fact that our governments are primarily a civilian entity and not military with very different priorities at times. There are complexities involved that explain why humans are not always going to instantly innovate even if its logical, and its not always a military bureaucracy getting in the way. This is why I prefer practical approaches. 

Its been an enjoyable debate for sure that's certainly made me think a lot on some things. 

To make it clear, I do broadly agree with most of TheCapt's points, especially when it comes to complacency and procurement issues within western MICs and how drones / ISR with range emphasis are going to be a primary focus for future military planning. I guess we have a different in degree of action required I suppose. 

Really I just think he's being a little bit harsh on our forbearers who did not have the benefit of hindsight to immediately adopt things that seem so obvious to us now, or the fact that our governments are primarily a civilian entity and not military with very different priorities at times. There are complexities involved that explain why humans are not always going to instantly innovate even if its logical, and its not always a military bureaucracy getting in the way. This is why I prefer practical approaches. 

Its been an enjoyable debate for sure that's certainly made me think a lot on some things. 

A drone based regiment is very much fascinating to see. 

A drone based regiment is very much fascinating to see. 

A drone based regiment is very much fascinating to see. 

A drone based regiment is very much fascinating to see. 

To make it clear, I do broadly agree with most of TheCapt's points, especially when it comes to complacency and procurement issues within western MICs and how drones / ISR with range emphasis are going to be a primary focus for future military planning. I guess we have a different in degree of action required I suppose. 

Really I just think he's being a little bit harsh on our forbearers who did not have the benefit of hindsight to immediately adopt things that seem so obvious to us now, or the fact that our governments are primarily a civilian entity and not military with very different priorities at times. There are complexities involved that explain why humans are not always going to instantly innovate even if its logical, and its not always a military bureaucracy getting in the way. This is why I prefer practical approaches. 

Its been an enjoyable debate for sure that's certainly made me think a lot on some things. 

In terms of FPV/loiter munitions, I would entirely agree. Switchblade seems grossly expensive for far less capability than a cheap FPV. 

Has there been any interest for mass produced FPV units anywhere in the West?

I also view the Gulf war as a clear case of Western doctrine working vs a country that at least tried to work with soviet doctrine, not to mention the intricacies of western approaches like a strong NCO system and Mission command tactical approaches that give NATO armies such flexibility and 'soft power' in the field. These I feel remain especially relevant if not more so in conflict given the fast acting status of warfare, and we see that as Ukraine steadily tries to shift from its soviet doctrine to one more western aligned with regards to such concepts. I view top down military systems increasingly obsolete for this very reason.

Certainly we hear a lot how the younger Ukrainian leaders frequently clash with the older figures who are more soviet approach focussed. The Soviet system is simply too rigid for even this relatively static warfare due to command decisions requiring speedy responses. We saw this quickly with how sluggish the Russian ability to direct artillery or airstrikes onto valuable targets, something that's taken them literal years to fix and even then its still only caught a handful of valuable Ukrainian assets. The fact it two two years for Russia to actually visually destroy a single HIMARs system for instance spoke a lot about the inflexibility of such doctrine and how damaging it was in the field. 

Yeah, the comment was tongue in cheek. I come to praise the TopHat, for avoidance of doubt.
And I think he's on to something re 1991. Air power dominated and overmatched or not, Desert Storm was the 'prime time' test of AirLand Battle, which while designed for Fulda Gap, took very useful note of the learnings from the Arab-Israeli wars (and to a limited extent the Iran-Iraq war) and refined it for years in the NTC.
This was indeed something new for the Big Green Machine, not just Alamein with smart bombs.

Stick to your (obsolete and doomed, DOOMED!!!! do you hear me?) guns, @ArmouredTopHat. 
Our Capt's bark is worse than his bite, and we all learn a lot from the ongoing discussion. Cheers!

I take issue with this a little, numerous countries invested and experimented with carriers, including the premier naval powers of the world at the time which all had proponents of carrier warfare. It was not a uniform opposition else said ships would have never seen service, yet they did pretty quickly. Navies could easily see the value of carriers as scouts at the very least, and in the space of literally a couple of decades they rose to prominence in the strike capability. In an era of ships taking years to build I think that's pretty damn fast adjustment of thinking. The only 'opposition' to carriers that I really see is simply the fact that people were not entirely sure how to use them to full potential and that if they would replace battleships or compliment them. The doctrine was new and required development. Cunningham for example was quite the 'old fashioned' type of admiral famous for using battleships near point blank against the Italians in the Med yet he saw Carriers as a very valuable asset, even in the confined waters of of his command. 

I feel like were using the power of hindsight a little too much here. Its easy to reflect on the past and see that Battleships were clearly becoming obsolete, its much less clear for the people at the time. Aircraft were still a very 'fresh' invention even in the 20s, the pace of technological development was truly shocking. I think we can forgive people for at least being cautious. Did opposition / battleship adherents exist contrary to the growing evidence of carrier power? Absolutely. But it was far from uniform, not when the main blue water fleets all introduced carriers within the same space of time. (USA, UK, Japan) In fact navies were quite used to pretty radical changes and innovations in that time period, considering the blisteringly fast speed of battleship development for instance. Doctrinal changes are usually always slower than technological, if only because humans usually need some time to figure out the shiny new thing and how to use it to full potential. Just look at the wacky tank / mobile warfare concepts and theories in the 20s and 30s that came up before mechanised warfare settled into place. 

Much as we see today, we are seeing some major innovations but we cannot guess the full consequences of how they are going to pan out. Its evident that tanks and perhaps even mechanised warfare are going to change in some key ways, but its far less easy to determine how exactly things are going to look like or what that will ultimately result in terms of a force structure. For all we know the technology pendulum might swing hard in the other direction and suddenly drones have it rough on the battlefield for whatever reason. We are very early into this radical shift of military operation, if it is indeed coming. 

It makes sense to me that modern militaries are investing into both drone solutions and experimentation while also looking to upgrade / replace / develop new vehicles and platforms better able to survive a drone heavy environment. Its an understandable level of covering your bets so to speak. I simply caution that we might be arm chairing a little too much here and might be deriding procurement industries a little too hard. Most countries are -very- interested in drones and their growing prominence in warfare. They are also interested in making sure their vehicles can operate in said environment as clearly all militaries still want a mechanised force of some sort. Until doctrine adjusts or there is sufficient momentum to change technology wise (Which is an if) we are unlikely to see countries going 'all in' on major changes until they know for certain that they do in fact offer wholescale improvements. 

My question you Capt would be this, I agree on a variety of points you made back in one of your posts about what the future priorities might be and the emphasis on ranged firepower and ISR, but how would this look like in a typical military unit. Has anyone actually developed a tactical unit in line with your ideas? I am genuinely curious. What would a brigade look like in terms of composition? I personally feel like were going to see more gradual changes, new generations of vehicles, proliferation of drones on the platoon / squad level and gradual integration of UGV to current units for instance. Do you envision something more radical in terms of changes?

I would argue we have more evidence of it working than it not working.

 
 
You say this as if its not being applied to everyone else. We are actively seeing just how badly the Russian approach to things has gone in Ukraine. This is the same approach China has in a lot of respects. If the west way of thinking has been challenged by this war, then does not that apply to everyone else in an even more severe fashion?
 
The nature of warfare in the last 100 years had changed so rapidly that I think its a little unfair to have an expectation for human beings to be able to not just keep up but outright predict future changes perfectly and ahead of time in an era of rapid technological progression. I dont disagree that we need to be better, but we should also have realistic expectations here. We as a species are kind of infamous for being capable of blistering change but also conservative sluggishness and we should bear that mind mind for any planning of this nature. I would argue that simply keeping ahead of the curve compared to others is 'good enough' and a far more realistic outcome to expect. I do agree that timing could be better though, but is that just a feature of our species that we need to factor in?

My example was simply a case where a nation that really did have better things to spend on after the scars of WW1 still innovated in a measure that had not been done before, despite not being at war. (more referring to the spending budget pre 1934 here)

I again feel this is a little unfair to say, even with todays breakneck pace of technological development Militaries can and are innovating on a near daily basis. Plenty of notes have already been made with Ukraine (Which is a literal live conflict) and even prior there was a lot of consideration to the systems now so heavily used now:

https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-magazine/edm22singleweb.pdf

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/innovation-military

Could innovation be improved upon? Sure, certainly when it comes to procurement contracts. Claiming Western institutions as monolithic entities with little capacity to change is a little silly though. There is a reason why they are at the head of the curve in pretty much all respects of warfare. We are already seeing active consideration from the Ukraine war with regards to future procurement, this is only going to get stronger in the next few years.
 
An interesting example that is quite antithesis to your argument. The UK literally fully motorised its army in the 30s despite its lengthy cavalry heritage and in an environment of a tight budget and no conflict pressure. Cavalry units were entirely converted as well, going from horses to either motorised units or armoured cars. They recognised after the first world war that steel over flesh was the way to go and managed to significantly change the makeup of the armed forces despite some truly horrendous budget constraints. This was achieved in just over a decade following some experimental mechanised force usage in the 20s. In short, just one example of a military being quite capable of innovation that was later perfected by the Americans. I figured the experimental exercises most militaries do should be a good example of that in todays environment. 

The above is the introduction to an article about the British armies adoption of machine guns before WW1. It highlights many of the same issues we are discussing about drones now. It isn't just an issue of money (although money was certainly an issue), but organization, doctrine, reliability, and so on. Thus the British Army started WW1 with two machine guns per battalion. They eventually figure out that not quite enough. But there was a whole lot of dying before the adapting got under way. The Russians seem to demonstrate daily in Ukraine that dying is necessary but not sufficient.
.The trick is make as many correct predictions as possible, and thus do as little dying as possible while the adapting is underway. I would argue that the U.S. Navy carrier force in WW2 was a success in this regard. Despite a continued belief the battleship, and battleship tactics, the USN had done enough with carriers that it didn't have to start the campaign in the Pacific by retaking Hawaii. Indeed it Won at Midway with ships built before the outbreak of the war. The the goal should be to get closer to the USN in 1941, than to the British Army in 1914.
 

I take issue with this a little, numerous countries invested and experimented with carriers, including the premier naval powers of the world at the time which all had proponents of carrier warfare. It was not a uniform opposition else said ships would have never seen service, yet they did pretty quickly. Navies could easily see the value of carriers as scouts at the very least, and in the space of literally a couple of decades they rose to prominence in the strike capability. In an era of ships taking years to build I think that's pretty damn fast adjustment of thinking. The only 'opposition' to carriers that I really see is simply the fact that people were not entirely sure how to use them to full potential and that if they would replace battleships or compliment them. The doctrine was new and required development. Cunningham for example was quite the 'old fashioned' type of admiral famous for using battleships near point blank against the Italians in the Med yet he saw Carriers as a very valuable asset, even in the confined waters of of his command. 

I feel like were using the power of hindsight a little too much here. Its easy to reflect on the past and see that Battleships were clearly becoming obsolete, its much less clear for the people at the time. Aircraft were still a very 'fresh' invention even in the 20s, the pace of technological development was truly shocking. I think we can forgive people for at least being cautious. Did opposition / battleship adherents exist contrary to the growing evidence of carrier power? Absolutely. But it was far from uniform, not when the main blue water fleets all introduced carriers within the same space of time. (USA, UK, Japan) In fact navies were quite used to pretty radical changes and innovations in that time period, considering the blisteringly fast speed of battleship development for instance. Doctrinal changes are usually always slower than technological, if only because humans usually need some time to figure out the shiny new thing and how to use it to full potential. Just look at the wacky tank / mobile warfare concepts and theories in the 20s and 30s that came up before mechanised warfare settled into place. 

Much as we see today, we are seeing some major innovations but we cannot guess the full consequences of how they are going to pan out. Its evident that tanks and perhaps even mechanised warfare are going to change in some key ways, but its far less easy to determine how exactly things are going to look like or what that will ultimately result in terms of a force structure. For all we know the technology pendulum might swing hard in the other direction and suddenly drones have it rough on the battlefield for whatever reason. We are very early into this radical shift of military operation, if it is indeed coming. 

It makes sense to me that modern militaries are investing into both drone solutions and experimentation while also looking to upgrade / replace / develop new vehicles and platforms better able to survive a drone heavy environment. Its an understandable level of covering your bets so to speak. I simply caution that we might be arm chairing a little too much here and might be deriding procurement industries a little too hard. Most countries are -very- interested in drones and their growing prominence in warfare. They are also interested in making sure their vehicles can operate in said environment as clearly all militaries still want a mechanised force of some sort. Until doctrine adjusts or there is sufficient momentum to change technology wise (Which is an if) we are unlikely to see countries going 'all in' on major changes until they know for certain that they do in fact offer wholescale improvements. 

My question you Capt would be this, I agree on a variety of points you made back in one of your posts about what the future priorities might be and the emphasis on ranged firepower and ISR, but how would this look like in a typical military unit. Has anyone actually developed a tactical unit in line with your ideas? I am genuinely curious. What would a brigade look like in terms of composition? I personally feel like were going to see more gradual changes, new generations of vehicles, proliferation of drones on the platoon / squad level and gradual integration of UGV to current units for instance. Do you envision something more radical in terms of changes?

I take issue with this a little, numerous countries invested and experimented with carriers, including the premier naval powers of the world at the time which all had proponents of carrier warfare. It was not a uniform opposition else said ships would have never seen service, yet they did pretty quickly. Navies could easily see the value of carriers as scouts at the very least, and in the space of literally a couple of decades they rose to prominence in the strike capability. In an era of ships taking years to build I think that's pretty damn fast adjustment of thinking. The only 'opposition' to carriers that I really see is simply the fact that people were not entirely sure how to use them to full potential and that if they would replace battleships or compliment them. The doctrine was new and required development. Cunningham for example was quite the 'old fashioned' type of admiral famous for using battleships near point blank against the Italians in the Med yet he saw Carriers as a very valuable asset, even in the confined waters of of his command. 

I feel like were using the power of hindsight a little too much here. Its easy to reflect on the past and see that Battleships were clearly becoming obsolete, its much less clear for the people at the time. Aircraft were still a very 'fresh' invention even in the 20s, the pace of technological development was truly shocking. I think we can forgive people for at least being cautious. Did opposition / battleship adherents exist contrary to the growing evidence of carrier power? Absolutely. But it was far from uniform, not when the main blue water fleets all introduced carriers within the same space of time. (USA, UK, Japan) In fact navies were quite used to pretty radical changes and innovations in that time period, considering the blisteringly fast speed of battleship development for instance. Doctrinal changes are usually always slower than technological, if only because humans usually need some time to figure out the shiny new thing and how to use it to full potential. Just look at the wacky tank / mobile warfare concepts and theories in the 20s and 30s that came up before mechanised warfare settled into place. 

Much as we see today, we are seeing some major innovations but we cannot guess the full consequences of how they are going to pan out. Its evident that tanks and perhaps even mechanised warfare are going to change in some key ways, but its far less easy to determine how exactly things are going to look like or what that will ultimately result in terms of a force structure. For all we know the technology pendulum might swing hard in the other direction and suddenly drones have it rough on the battlefield for whatever reason. We are very early into this radical shift of military operation, if it is indeed coming. 

It makes sense to me that modern militaries are investing into both drone solutions and experimentation while also looking to upgrade / replace / develop new vehicles and platforms better able to survive a drone heavy environment. Its an understandable level of covering your bets so to speak. I simply caution that we might be arm chairing a little too much here and might be deriding procurement industries a little too hard. Most countries are -very- interested in drones and their growing prominence in warfare. They are also interested in making sure their vehicles can operate in said environment as clearly all militaries still want a mechanised force of some sort. Until doctrine adjusts or there is sufficient momentum to change technology wise (Which is an if) we are unlikely to see countries going 'all in' on major changes until they know for certain that they do in fact offer wholescale improvements. 

My question you Capt would be this, I agree on a variety of points you made back in one of your posts about what the future priorities might be and the emphasis on ranged firepower and ISR, but how would this look like in a typical military unit. Has anyone actually developed a tactical unit in line with your ideas? I am genuinely curious. What would a brigade look like in terms of composition? I personally feel like were going to see more gradual changes, new generations of vehicles, proliferation of drones on the platoon / squad level and gradual integration of UGV to current units for instance. Do you envision something more radical in terms of changes?

Apologies - this got long as I mused over your analogy. The shorter point is that it's not the machines, it's the theory of battle that the machines fit into. Whoever can shake loose of *that* fastest wins.
The transition from battleships to carriers is definitely a "slowly, then all at once" phenomenon, with inflection points at Taranto, the sinking of the Repulse, the creation of the Kido Butai, Coral Sea, and finally the creation and devastating use of TF38/58. Respectively, you've got proof that carrier borne aviation can sink capital ships at port, that (land based) aviation can sink capital ships at sea, that carrier based aviation can act as the primary power projection asset in a fleet, that naval battles need not involve ships firing at one another, and that carrier aviation can suppress and assault islands (which was previously deeply contrary to doctrine; the theory was that you can't sink islands). All of those seemed risky before they seemed inevitable.
I think the relevant think to think about is how each nation's *theory of battle* changed in the inter- and early war period. The Germans, British, French, and Italians did not have a coherent theory of naval battle, except that the Germans thought that commerce raiding was the way to go, either with submarines or with battleships. They envisioned their ships emerging from the fog or night, wailing on a convoy, and slipping away again. And that sort of worked for a while until the sheer productive power of the allies made it futile.
The Americans and Japanese, ironically, had the same picture of naval battle before Pearl Harbor: both battle lines would meet somewhere in the Phillipine Sea and slug it out in one decisive battle. Carriers would scout, and smaller ships and aviation would nibble around the edges until the battle lines could engage.
What made Pearl Harbor so shocking was that it was totally contrary to Japanese naval doctrine. And, weirdly, they never repeated its success, because they were *still committed to the pre-war vision of naval combat as two battle lines mauling each other*. Even in 1945! Both the Phillipine Sea and Leyte were totally misguided attempts to deliver a decisive battle.
The United States, on the other hand, quickly gave up on the idea of decisive battle and adopted something much more like corrosive warfare. Relatively few Japanese capital ships were sunk in things that an observer from 1915 would recognize as a "battle". It was submarines and airstrikes mercilessly attriting the Japanese fleet.
What does a land "battle" look like now that it's so distributed? I don't know. But it doesn't look like a heavy mechanized breach exploited by mechanized infantry supported by close air support. Whoever figures out a new theory of battle first is going to be in really good shape.
edit: To your point about old ideas dying hard, Halsely was still lured by decisive battle long after Spruance appears to have switched to a new paradigm, despite Spruance being a black shoe admiral.