ArmouredTopHat

While a Sherman was not as over-engineered as a lot of German models, it was anything but just metal to metal, certainly not to the degree of a T-34 was in 1942. There was plenty of novel features in the tank that were advanced for the time, such as the electronics, radio equipment and the gyro stabilisation system (even if it was rarely used) 

The key difference was that American production was truly insane, taking the principles of automotive industry and applying them at scale instead of the artisan approach of the Germans. This mass production was of quality as well (look at the welding points of your typical Sherman vs a T-34 and you can see what I mean) The Americans were able to literally have their cake and eat it really. 

The point I am trying to make is that you can manufacture complex machines at a decent cost provided you scale appropriately. F-35 for instance is a great example of this. Bradley might be more complex than a Sherman, but at the same time our capacity to build complex machines has only increased. Our factories are more productive when pushed to the max ect. The difference is of course that NATO is not on a wartime footing, hence the 'lazy' production of current inventories. Small orders of vehicles ensures that the cost of these platforms are going to be expensive, as that cost per unit reflects the setting up of a production line and its investment more than simply paying for the vehicle itself. Its probably an attitude we need to change to ensure security in our time. We need to be thinking thousands of a certain platform to equip NATO forces really. 

You need to compare relative complexity, not absolute. In today's terms, a Sherman is mostly welded metal. Back then, it was (nearly) the best they could do.
However, we can compare prices. A Sherman cost about $60k in '45 a piece. That is roughly $1m in today's money.
A Bradley sets you back about $3m. So same ballpark range. The factor 3 may very well be the difference between a mass product and a small batch.
Don't forget, we are all sitting on the shoulders of giants. Try to think about the amount of technology necessary to read these very words that have appeared on your screen. This is mind-boggling and yet, literally in everybody's hands.
A Bradley is more complex than a Sherman, but the effort to make one (in its time) is roughly the same. All the improvements in productivity make this possible.
 

If (!) someone ordered 100k Bradleys then the capacity of the supply chain would become larger, too. Don't assume production to be static.
Depending on how fast you want those Bradleys, you may or may not make a dent in the global supply chain. I admit that sometimes stuff becomes rare that nobody thought of (masks...). But then my half priced 100k Bradleys order just amounts to about $150B, so I guess the purchasing department can move one thing or the other.
 
You look at it from a sales view, and I did from the production view. I never said that anyone would really want to buy 100k Bradleys.
That is your original quote:
You said that Bradleys have a low rate of production because they are complex & expensive, and making more of them does not change this equation significantly.
I disagree because if that what you said would be true, then mass production would be pointless. Prices per piece come down the more you produce. That is a very basic law of economics and is also true for military vehicles.
This is not about selling or demand - just the production.

And with that I shall fade back once more. 
 

Just a bit of explanation: this is not caused by a sudden lack of will to support Ukraine. This is mostly about an inner-political impasse between factions in the government. It will be fixed one way or the other with the next vote in '25.
It is very likely, that the next government will be the same or even be more pro-Ukrainian than this one. If that means more money, I don't know.

Pretty much my exact take on it.

That and Europe really needs to work on getting a better defence economy set up that is not so limited and subject to intercountry diversity of vehicles. Seems I am not the only one saying this at least...
 
 

I'm not arguing about the rest of your post, but this is wrong. Bradleys and every other current military vehicle are so expensive because they are literally manufactured - 'manu' meaning 'by hand'. It is an artisanal product and priced accordingly.
If you placed an order for 100,000 Bradleys you sure get them for half price, likely less. With such an order, it is economically to set up a properly automated production line. The fixed costs will vanish in the numbers and you only pay variable costs.
I'll take your argument about the Sherman tank: it was cheap, there were many, it was easily serviceable, and it was good enough. It was designed and built by car companies.
The German tanks were expensive, few, difficult to service and very good tanks. They were designed by engineering bureaus.
The Americans had mass production in mind, the Germans perfection.
Ferraris sold 13,663 vehicles in 2023. There are 6724 Bradleys in total, produced over 15(!) years. That's a comparison between a niche car manufacturer and a common military vehicle (yeah, poor comparison, but I think you get my point).

Its a big chonky vehicle for one, with top of the line equipment, though I suspect what is most expensive is that modularity component so inherent to its design. I am pretty sceptical about such designs in the first place. You can achieve a modularity of spare parts across a family of vehicles for a much cheaper cost. Being able to plug in various different mission capsules is actually relatively limited in overall practical function on the field. At least its not having procurement woes unlike Ajax...
 
I think if you asked a Ukrainian if they would prefer a Bradley or an M113, you would get a pretty comprehensive answer. Just because an M113 is a great and cheap APC does not make it a great substitute for an IFV. Use of them in direct combat is the same as using an MTLB to assault a position, its using a less effective tool due to lack of anything better. Its far from an ideal solution. Certainly dont need to go the Mark Sparks route with the fascination on the M113, its pretty much a mobile box with a 50 on top and should be treated as such. 
 
The vehicles are more expensive issue is probably down to more restricted production runs more than anything, that and potentially some design problems. Its not a defence of it by any means. Already outlined we really do need to have  a hard rethink on numbers and inter NATO country cooperation on vehicle procurement. Imagine how many more vehicles NATO could operate if we all used the same basic chassis for APCs and IFVs. Being able to take a vehicle made in the UK and go into a repair shop in Estonia to get spares seems such a no brainer to me. 
 
Its always a fair point to question roles, but I would point out that the Ukrainians seem to love good western IFVs due to their firepower as well as the ability to move people around. An IFV does not need to have everything put on it. (I can certain grant you some parties are guilty of wanting their vehicle to do everything) Certainly the western stuff is almost universally praised as being far better than the Soviet era kit than what the UA was using prior, so were doing something right at least.

I am just cautious about the 'going back to basics' argument because it rings a little too uncomfortably close to the reformer nuttery from the USA, where people like Sprey were saying that F-15 would of been better without Radar, or the whole incident of James Burton lying his *** off about the Bradley. (Who's book that despite being heavily debunked subsequently became a movie no less that continued to peddle his...less than honest account of Bradley development)

I mean, protecting the lives of your soldiers does in fact matter more than monetary value of a lost vehicle. Even if you factor cold hard logic, losing machines is always preferable to losing people. Especially if you are in a situation like Ukraine where you need to maximise conservation of your forces. Of course you can take the soviet principle and lose both and be even worse off...

Sure, a vehicle is expensive, so is is the whole pipeline of recruiting, training and deploying people. Losing said people hurts a lot more than just in immediate military value as well. That's one less person contributing to a country in various ways. Manpower is really priceless and its pretty evident that protection is perhaps more important than ever. 

Its why things like all those MaxPros were so important. They might not be able to offer the same level of usefulness in an assault as a Tank or BMP, but they -will- help soldiers survive a lot more than a civilian truck or MTLB (I think this conflict has more than anything solidified that soviet design ethos is an absolute dead end with regards to vehicles) Of course, giving Ukraine more actual tanks and IFVs also helps as well. Why Biden doesn't just dump another 300-400 Bradleys into Ukraine's lap I do not know, plenty he can do before the election which remains such a dangerous uncertainty. 

Given vehicles in the format we understand them are unlikely to go too much anywhere at least for a decade or two, we can expect to see a lot more dynamic all round protection to at least ward off some level of FPV strikes, given it looks like the Bradley has proven quite resistant to multiple strikes. Then again, there is a clip of a M1 somewhere eating 11 of the things in a row before finally succumbing. Long term is probably going to be a case of friendly drone swarms protecting your valuable assets, whatever those might look like in 30-40 years. 

Its honestly nuts if this sort of loss level is anything consistent on a wider scale. 

Well those look very safe

The problem is you circle back to the entire reason IFVs were developed in the first place, IE what delivers you firepower in the event the squad runs into something nasty, or just needs a bit more ompf in the first place when delivering troops or performing its own combat missions. 

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1e3wslc/gopro_attached_to_a_ukrainian_m2_bradley_as_it/
There is clearly still a use for having something with the firepower capability, certainly the Ukrainians seem to think so. (I recall them pointing out they like the Stryker too, but consider it far more poorly armed in comparison) Seen enough Bradley footage of them tearing BTRs and infantry to pieces to know they are extremely useful on the battlefield. 

I entirely agree though that NATO needs more common vehicles. Think F-35 but for a family of ground vehicles that everyone can produce at scale. I really do think we can no longer rely on everyone having their specific niche vehicle, it simply does not translate to any scale production at all. The problem is convincing various defence companies to adopt a universal platform has been tricky in the past. Perhaps the reality of the situation might jog something down the line in Europe, especially with a potential US withdrawal of interest in the area. 

Its honestly nuts if this sort of loss level is anything consistent on a wider scale. 

Well those look very safe

I am arguing the status quo by saying vehicles need to change and that drone based interceptors are likely going to be the major aspect of defending against drone munitions going forward? Sure. Okay. Pointing out that tanks have a role, or that perhaps such extreme changes might not be so predictable due to potential counters is not my saying everything is fine carry on. Please understand that just once, I have tried to make it clear several times. Stop acting like I am some deep rooted conservative who thinks that drones are a temporary fad. 
 
Then you need to either stop debating with me or figure out how not to so frustrated from a differing opinion, because being so rudely treated is not why I am here. If I want to argue with people I will go on twitter and fight the genuinely brainless. Just because I have a different opinion that is still broadly supportive of the idea that war is and will change should not be getting you and others so wound up. I came here to debate with reasonable people, not be told to shut up and that my argument actually sucks. Its not a good way to change peoples minds. I dont pretend to be some sage who predicts everything, but neither do I expect to be treated as if I am incapable of thinking properly. 
 
I think I will just agree to disagree here. This is a wildly speculative scenario in the first place and its literally pointless to argue it when we can just make up any potential solution. I could point out how you rarely see infantry in and around armoured vics (Unless they are riding on them) or are caught dismounting in Ukraine, so the assumption that a PD system would be ineffective just because of friendly fire risk seems unlikely, at least to me. 

Because as I keep saying, complicating a kill chain as much as possible is so much better than relying on one means of interception, especially when dealing with such a potentially versatile threat. PD that can serve as an RWS in most situations but is optimised for drone munition intercept as a last resort without compromising on the vehicle role seems sensible here and very much worth the money. If it reduces vehicle losses by a certain metric then its absolutely worth it, because no matter what we say about the tank, vehicles in general are not going to disappear overnight. 
 
Could you be so kind as to specify what fully autonomous lethal system you are talking about here, the only thing I can think of is the AI on some FPV drones that allow a terminal approach which is not exactly a standardised thing yet, nor is it fully autonomous. the only thing I could find was potentially Turkish Kargu-2 being used in 2020 in fully autonomous mode. (Not in Ukraine)
 
I have literally given you numerous articles to potential ideas and solutions, so to say there is 'nothing' on hand is just a bald faced lie. The same swarm drone company making offensive drones has literally been tasked to make counter drones as well. 

I'm not sure why the link is not working https://battle-updates.com/small-calibre-solutions-for-c-uas-systems-by-julian-nettlefold/ But this covers the wide range of different RWS systems that are actively signing contracts to do with Ukraine and are all meant for counter UAS. So please stop telling me there is no other solution or that point defence / gun counter UAS stuff is fantasy when that is literally a lie.
 
Just as there are significant problems with actually designing practical fully autonomous systems. Could you actually provide a source that shows how close these swarm drones are to practical deployment? Because a lot of what I read seems a little whishy washy on the subject. Have they been featured in any major NATO exercise?
 
Concluding confidently that there is ' no counter' two years into a war that is probably going to last a fair bit longer seems foolishly premature, especially when there are active potential counters in the works. Gun based and otherwise. The only legitimate conclusion is that CURRENT systems are clearly not going to cut it against drone munitions at scale and there needs to be evolution to counter systems....which is exactly what is happening. Its pure arrogance and conjecture to declare something is a dead end before widespread practical solutions are not even being used at scale yet. 

Acting as Both eyes and hands, I assume. The capability is inherent. 
Also, I'm very unconvinced that DF is going away in favour of missiles any time soon. Both will exist, albeit swapping primacy 
I suspect only a real peer war will force a Bradley Replacement that's a true reimagining of the IFV. I wonder what Ukraine would build, right now? They can access the entire EU MIB. Why not put out fast track RFP for an entirely new approach that fundamentally incorporates drones? 
There's proven platforms that could form the base. Something new that responds directly to the changed nature and tracks forward to further changes could actually be be that forbidden word: game-changer... 
 

The problem is you circle back to the entire reason IFVs were developed in the first place, IE what delivers you firepower in the event the squad runs into something nasty, or just needs a bit more ompf in the first place when delivering troops or performing its own combat missions. 

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1e3wslc/gopro_attached_to_a_ukrainian_m2_bradley_as_it/
There is clearly still a use for having something with the firepower capability, certainly the Ukrainians seem to think so. (I recall them pointing out they like the Stryker too, but consider it far more poorly armed in comparison) Seen enough Bradley footage of them tearing BTRs and infantry to pieces to know they are extremely useful on the battlefield. 

I entirely agree though that NATO needs more common vehicles. Think F-35 but for a family of ground vehicles that everyone can produce at scale. I really do think we can no longer rely on everyone having their specific niche vehicle, it simply does not translate to any scale production at all. The problem is convincing various defence companies to adopt a universal platform has been tricky in the past. Perhaps the reality of the situation might jog something down the line in Europe, especially with a potential US withdrawal of interest in the area. 

I mean, protecting the lives of your soldiers does in fact matter more than monetary value of a lost vehicle. Even if you factor cold hard logic, losing machines is always preferable to losing people. Especially if you are in a situation like Ukraine where you need to maximise conservation of your forces. Of course you can take the soviet principle and lose both and be even worse off...

Sure, a vehicle is expensive, so is is the whole pipeline of recruiting, training and deploying people. Losing said people hurts a lot more than just in immediate military value as well. That's one less person contributing to a country in various ways. Manpower is really priceless and its pretty evident that protection is perhaps more important than ever. 

Its why things like all those MaxPros were so important. They might not be able to offer the same level of usefulness in an assault as a Tank or BMP, but they -will- help soldiers survive a lot more than a civilian truck or MTLB (I think this conflict has more than anything solidified that soviet design ethos is an absolute dead end with regards to vehicles) Of course, giving Ukraine more actual tanks and IFVs also helps as well. Why Biden doesn't just dump another 300-400 Bradleys into Ukraine's lap I do not know, plenty he can do before the election which remains such a dangerous uncertainty. 

Given vehicles in the format we understand them are unlikely to go too much anywhere at least for a decade or two, we can expect to see a lot more dynamic all round protection to at least ward off some level of FPV strikes, given it looks like the Bradley has proven quite resistant to multiple strikes. Then again, there is a clip of a M1 somewhere eating 11 of the things in a row before finally succumbing. Long term is probably going to be a case of friendly drone swarms protecting your valuable assets, whatever those might look like in 30-40 years. 

Another small, encouraging sign that they're having problems recruiting.
 

The irony of Russia complaining about dam destruction is truly something. 

Leaving aside the question of the conditions for the applicability of one or another method, let us note that none of them provides for a long walk at full height ("sticking") in front of an enemy trench, and even going in a crowd. 19/
The translation is a little unclear here. Markin laments that no Field Manual (RU or NATO) stipulates that the attack group should stick around at the front of the trench as an unorganized blob. Aside from psychological (fear) and organizational issues (delays), there are practical reasons to do so.
The majority of firefights end when one side decides they've had enough or runs out of ammunition. So, it is possible to outlast the enemy just by sticking around. Second, getting into the trench is dangerous. Your situation awareness suffers and usually trench is already pre-registered. Finally, advancing forward beyond the trench is dangerous as well; rear areas outside of the trenches are mined deliberately to keep assault force inside the pre-registered trench.
As you can see, sticking around is not as bad as you may think (Markin fails to realize it). 
[Skipping not very useful part] 
If trenches are not almost completely covered from above (and there are simply not enough materials, as well as time and effort resources to do so), those in such a trench will be knocked out rather quickly. 44/
It is quite problematic to return to the practice of canopies over trenches, which was practised in the First World War, precisely because of the lack of resources in the broad sense of the word for their construction. 45/
In addition, it was noted as early as the early 20th century that canopies interfered with the use of trenches as a starting point for attacks, limiting their usefulness. Canopies were subsequently abandoned. 46/
Interesting problem. A trench that is only partially covered with overhead cover is not protected from drops. Drone will just drop the gift where the cover ends, blasting soldiers with shrapnel from the side. You can cover the whole trench, but your situation awareness will be poor, and it is impractical to send so much material to the front lines. Also, following artillery fire, debris from the cover tends to clog the trench.
In the main document, he suggests doing what UKR do. You dig up a small branch as an individual firing post. Then, cover the small branch and a portion of the main trench that intersects with it. Even if a drone drops anything into the main trench, the soldier inside the branch is behind the corner and will be unaffected. 
[Skipping not very useful part] 
3) The next important factor is the effectiveness of preparatory artillery fire through fire correction by UAVs, the ability for real-time correction of small arms, grenade launchers and small-calibre mortars at individual defensive positions (firing cells/embrasures) using… 61/
…UAVs, which multiplies the probability of knocking out the most significant firepower of the defenders, as well as the use of UAV ammunition drop systems in preparation for and support of an attack. 62/
As a result of the impact of these factors, the defenders, who are initially few in number due to the thinness of the formations inherent in the current conflict, are knocked out a significant number of soldiers and firepower for a given defensive position. 65/
and few next quotes
I will paraphrase these statements based on the main document description. 
Infantry in forward positions will most likely be significantly reduced owing to dispersion and attrition. Anything (including crew-served weapons) and anybody outside of the shelters will most likely be destroyed/killed by drone-adjusted artillery/drone drops/FPVs by the preparatory fires. As a result, the defender will most likely have to defend the position with substantially fewer soldiers than he would normally expect (literally 3-4 soldiers for a platoon sized strongpoint). In this situation, the majority of standard techniques, such oblique fire or throwing grenades in a volley, won't be effective. Now I'll compile some Markin's recommendations from the article/tweets (I adjusted it for better readability) 
 

Its really interesting to hear that Bradleys have a reputation for surviving things like FPVs and visually have typically little improvised protection applied to them when the M1 crews have had the need to plaster a lot of improvised protection on the sides and top with a few noteworthy complaints about its top or side turret weaknesses against loitering munitions. 

Shows you how design can very much influence survivability despite the heavier vehicle being on paper more protected.

That's probably a translation of кум, word meaning "mate" in vernacular (as in "a mate of Syrski") (historically meaning a friend close enough to be a godfather to one's child) in Ukrainian and several other slavic languages. Not the other thing.

We are really getting into Mad Max territory now, seems to be some sort of troop carrying section built onto a T-54 turret.