ArmouredTopHat

https://abcnews.go.com/International/france-train-lines-hit-arson-attacks-hours-2024/story?id=112296820
In case anyone missed news- coordinated arsonist attacks on French railways took place today in several places at once. Fresh news is that incendiary devices were found.
At first glance ekoterrorist could be blamed, but their modus operandi is very different, they have no interest in targeting public transport and there aren't that many of them. Last Generation weirdos in turn usually take their responsibility and do it openly. Islamists on their part prefer direct slaugther, not disruption.
Now let us cautiously point toward possible suspect...perhaps a country that: publically lamented they cannot take part in olympics and openly promised "dire consequences" for organizer (topic was in a time very present in state TV with a lot of "Umph, omph!" revenge taunting), that have interest in "punishing" French military support and is already proved to be behind various arsonists attacks in EU countries?

Ukriane will get the first 1.5 billion of interest / investment return from the frozen Russian assets. 
It took some legislative effort to make this legally robust. A good line to cross.
 
 

Experience has shown that a weapons system capable of physically damaging or destroying a drone is the cornerstone of effective counter-drone defense. Anything else is more or less nuisance for current drones. It's good to temporarily disrupt the drone mission, but that's about it.
So, unless lasers prove their worth (size, bulk, reliability, speed of engagement, affordability requirements) gun based CUAS will be one of the major trends (drone interceptors is other).      
 
For battlefield thermals, noise detection being passive will be primary methods with radars and emission detection supporting them (right now emission is primary and thermals supporting). 
Do not expect to spot all drones. Skilled pilot can exploit terrain, vegetation, and buildings to escape detection. But this would limit his fields of observation. On the other hand, drones are not very pricey. So, if the enemy wants to view something for a short amount of time, it will be difficult to deny it to him.
 
The gun based systems with range 1.5/2 km are not that good against recon drones that make backbone of battlefield surveillance. Generally they are ok at dealing with drones that entered our territory (you can ambush drones). But they will struggle against drones that fly over enemy territory (these are the drones that are responsible for prevalent idea of all seeing eyes)
It is claimed that smaller common recon drones can spot human at 2 km . And bigger, more advanced (but still not that expencive) drone can spot human at 5 km. Obviously they can spot vehicle at greater range. You need specialized bigger caliber guns that will be useless against smaller more agile FPVs.
Still current consensus is that you need Interceptor drones for that job. But personally I would add LMM or APKWS missiles (RU Nats do not have them).  
 
It would work right now. It will work against poor or low-skilled opponents (the majority of Western conflicts are against them).

However, principle of concentration of infantry/AFVs is no longer effective against peers or even low-skilled opponents who know what to do. My own opinion is that concentration of infantry/AFV is no longer feasible, and we need to move away from it (not from DF, as Capt insists).
 
They will dramatically decrease losses from drones. Right now like 90% of RU infantry losses and significant part of vehicle losses are due to Bomber drones. Bomber drones are easy meat from gun based CUAS systems. AFAIR RU are discussing putting HMG with thermals on every infantry vehicle or at least to have 1 per platoon. 
 
AT Mines are critical. They mitigate biggest advantage of AFVs - speed (infantry is already slow). Regarding Kharkiv is just BS excuse. In reality you cannot put proper mine fields in Grey zone (which is around 5 km from the enemy position). So, no proper minefields are possible till Volchansk (which is 5 km from the border). No surprise local units were denied mines. Now focus is on quantity of mines. But there are obvious problems with mines. Big one is that it is not easy to put mines in Grey zone without getting unwanted arty or FPV guest. New kind of self-deployed mine is needed. Probably just cheap simple low UGV with Directional mine on top. You bring few of them with you, start it inside of your defensive position. It drives outside and wait autonomously for unlucky bastard. Enemy find sneaky way in? Reactivate it, move to new location and enjoy the show. Possibilities are endless - enemy broke the perimeter of the base? Drive out of guard post few of the bad boys with Claymore on top to isolate penetration. Then move them forward once their base section is clear.  However, UKR drone pilots do play a lot with dropping single mines in un-expected locations. You can use dumb mines and drone does not need to be electronically advanced (to bypass personal jammers). But putting any serious quantities of mines is time consuming. And pilot time is expensive.  

I argue with you, Capt, not because we have different doctrinal views (we are not), but because some of your conclusions sometimes are too extreme and not supported by real world experience.
Here is reality check - Mashovet about Avdiivka pocket collapse
So, your conclusion that company-level (and above) maneuvering is no longer possible without the enemy noticing is not supported by evidence. RU was effective in denying operational level UKR ISR by confusing it. Despite the detection of movement, the UKR ISR was entirely confused about what was going on and missed it. 
There are no magical all seeing eyes. There are devices that can be fooled and brains that can be confused. You confuse operational brains and fool tactical devices. This is current reality. 

It is good that the Russians remain incapable of properly sealing pockets and inflicting far more severe damage to units. 

A little macabre but I suppose it gives good preparation for both parties. 

I have no words.

ISR should cut both ways though. A breakout should be quite easily discovered.
It might also be that with NVGs being relatively rare and force densities relatively low it becomes relatively easy to escape during nighttime.

If fighter pilots are not even getting water, god knows what the men in the trenches are getting.

It amazes me how dysfunctional the Russian military is sometimes. 

It is good that the Russians remain incapable of properly sealing pockets and inflicting far more severe damage to units. 

It is good that the Russians remain incapable of properly sealing pockets and inflicting far more severe damage to units. 

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/swarm-wars-pentagon-holds-toughest-drone-defense-demo-to-date/

Man I would love to get the juicy details on this one, numerous systems being tested and while the details are sparse, apparently good results were obtained compared to previous showings. Key point is layered defence featuring soft and hard kill being more effective. The key word used was a maturing state of affairs for counter UAS.

I once again iterate the potential for counter UAS systems that might be being underestimated here in its ability. Very interesting that they specifically tested for drone swarms. 

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/swarm-wars-pentagon-holds-toughest-drone-defense-demo-to-date/

Man I would love to get the juicy details on this one, numerous systems being tested and while the details are sparse, apparently good results were obtained compared to previous showings. Key point is layered defence featuring soft and hard kill being more effective. The key word used was a maturing state of affairs for counter UAS.

I once again iterate the potential for counter UAS systems that might be being underestimated here in its ability. Very interesting that they specifically tested for drone swarms. 

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/swarm-wars-pentagon-holds-toughest-drone-defense-demo-to-date/

Man I would love to get the juicy details on this one, numerous systems being tested and while the details are sparse, apparently good results were obtained compared to previous showings. Key point is layered defence featuring soft and hard kill being more effective. The key word used was a maturing state of affairs for counter UAS.

I once again iterate the potential for counter UAS systems that might be being underestimated here in its ability. Very interesting that they specifically tested for drone swarms. 

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/swarm-wars-pentagon-holds-toughest-drone-defense-demo-to-date/

Man I would love to get the juicy details on this one, numerous systems being tested and while the details are sparse, apparently good results were obtained compared to previous showings. Key point is layered defence featuring soft and hard kill being more effective. The key word used was a maturing state of affairs for counter UAS.

I once again iterate the potential for counter UAS systems that might be being underestimated here in its ability. Very interesting that they specifically tested for drone swarms. 

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/swarm-wars-pentagon-holds-toughest-drone-defense-demo-to-date/

Man I would love to get the juicy details on this one, numerous systems being tested and while the details are sparse, apparently good results were obtained compared to previous showings. Key point is layered defence featuring soft and hard kill being more effective. The key word used was a maturing state of affairs for counter UAS.

I once again iterate the potential for counter UAS systems that might be being underestimated here in its ability. Very interesting that they specifically tested for drone swarms. 

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/swarm-wars-pentagon-holds-toughest-drone-defense-demo-to-date/

Man I would love to get the juicy details on this one, numerous systems being tested and while the details are sparse, apparently good results were obtained compared to previous showings. Key point is layered defence featuring soft and hard kill being more effective. The key word used was a maturing state of affairs for counter UAS.

I once again iterate the potential for counter UAS systems that might be being underestimated here in its ability. Very interesting that they specifically tested for drone swarms. 

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/swarm-wars-pentagon-holds-toughest-drone-defense-demo-to-date/

Man I would love to get the juicy details on this one, numerous systems being tested and while the details are sparse, apparently good results were obtained compared to previous showings. Key point is layered defence featuring soft and hard kill being more effective. The key word used was a maturing state of affairs for counter UAS.

I once again iterate the potential for counter UAS systems that might be being underestimated here in its ability. Very interesting that they specifically tested for drone swarms. 

The drama never ends it seems

Is it based on some relevant sources?
The RU Nats who did it form one of the RU units with the most powerful anti-drone capabilities. They are like RU counterpart of Birds of Magyar. And you casually declare that UKR ISR failure just happened by accident exactly when they were there.
Do not support that view.
There was ISR blind spot that allowed RU to concentrate enough troops to swamp the area quickly instead of slowly grinding their way forward. It was so quick that UKR lost access to AKHZ plant (entrance to underground facilities was near the penetration and it was quickly captured). Avdiivka defense was hinged on AKHZ plant. Once it was lost there was no reason to defend Avdiivka and it was abandoned.  
 
Final assault on Avdiivka was performed by 114 Brigade, so the assault echelon was around company-battalion size or couple of hundred men. They walked several kilometers without tactical drones, ground sensors, operational systems (unmanned and manned) and strategic (space based)…along with OSINT and SIGINT, ELINT and a few “INTs” we are still finding names for seeing them.
enough said.
Imagine that all of the offensive forces (that still in the rear) are spread in separate platoon and company columns throughout a substantial area. They all move at their own speed on various local routes. So, while they all move in the same overall direction, movement at individual periods appears to be random since local roads have different directions.
You with your shiny tools might detect increased traffic but that is all you see. No specific direction. No specific groups of vehicles. Nothing that clearly demonstrates the movement's goal.
At a certain point in time, these columns are ordered to concentrate at a specified location and launch an attack. You will see that. But the sighting needs to be analyzed and reported, decision needs to be made and information must be passed to field commander. So, by the time you call field commander with the news that RU are launching their attack he will reply back  that he is fully aware becasue there is RU tank is on top of his dugout.
AFAIK, this method was used for initial surprise attack on Avdiivka (along with utilizing bad weather).
 
Can your toy look inside underground dugout and detect how many men are there? 
 
We saw “quick breaching” that resulted in quick decisive collapse of the pocket. It was private initiative of the RU Nats volunteers unit that got tired of following official orders. And breakthrough and breakout did not happen exactly becasue it was private initiative of a single unit not supported by overal RU command.  
 
That crowd is mistaken. I am not part of that crowd. I've been reading for a years RU complains about Ukrainian drones.
Simple truths I got from reading UKR and RU sources.
Drones are here to stay Drones fundamentally change the way we fight Classical mechanized warfare through concentration and mass of armor is obsolete

The VKS is / was nowhere near the third best air force in the world. Many NATO countries have more capable individual airforces on their own its safe to say at this point, let alone the grouping of NATO in total. The VKS never had the training / pilots / practical expertise to be anything like what we see from more comprehensive airforces and that was demonstrated since 2022. It was truly a night and day difference in performance compared to something like Desert storm. 

The Russians have been struggling to defend themselves properly from a handful of ATACMS strikes and some HARMS missiles fired in their most ineffective setting fired from some Mig 29s. One can imagine the damage a dedicated SEAD campaign would do to their defences over time. Factor in 5th gens that can readily target their best AD systems without fear of effective reply and you can imagine why the Russians are so petrified of NATO airpower. Their AD is still potent of course, especially to 4th gens but NATO air is just in another league at this point.

Half the reason this war is relatively static is the lack of decisive air power. Its easily one of the top failings of the Russians in that regard. 

Tankers in the past have usually been pretty vocal when their perceived survivability was a problem, even when it was not backed up by statistics. (Allied tanks in Normandy for instance)

If UA tankers were constantly venting about how they couldn't do anything due to drones (their operations are constrained but clearly not denied) then I would give you more credit. The greatest acknowledge is that they are heavily aware of the threat and take the appropriate precautions. Mobility helps them out a lot in that respect. As long as the tanks have a safe haven to reach by the end of the day (as indicated by the above sources) they seem to be reasonably survivable. 

Turns out if you dont suicide your vehicles in penny packet attacks you dont suffer god horrible attrition or something.

We can circle about this all day, we clearly have a difference of opinion on the subject.

Captures my thoughts on the Boxer modularity pretty much exactly. Really not a fan of that sort of modularity.