FancyCat

Sadly Drone vs Drone has equalized in Ukraine, Russians are at drone parity according to everything recent about it. This is where other systems come into play to give a opposing side more weight.
 

Sadly Drone vs Drone has equalized in Ukraine, Russians are at drone parity according to everything recent about it. This is where other systems come into play to give a opposing side more weight.
 

Sadly Drone vs Drone has equalized in Ukraine, Russians are at drone parity according to everything recent about it. This is where other systems come into play to give a opposing side more weight.
 

Some neat graphics in here: https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/

Some neat graphics in here: https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/

From february by Jack Watling at RUSI so I'm probably reposting old stuff, still good to review and compare to now, luckily it's good to see that the artillery ammunition situation is improving now in May.
https://time.com/6694885/ukraine-russia-ammunition/
 

From february by Jack Watling at RUSI so I'm probably reposting old stuff, still good to review and compare to now, luckily it's good to see that the artillery ammunition situation is improving now in May.
https://time.com/6694885/ukraine-russia-ammunition/
 

Efforts to find more air defense batteries for Ukraine continue, Ukraine has stated they need 7 more Patriot or similar systems, they currently have 3, Germany has pledged 1, and the U.S is working on sending another. Zelensky has pointed out to effectively defend Kharkiv, 2 Patriot systems are required.  
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-15/us-considers-sending-another-patriot-missile-battery-to-ukraine
 
 

tbh, HIMARS strikes on Belgorod could have done a lot....its time the restriction be lifted. Especially if the situation is as serious as indicated. 
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/14/ukraine-weapons-russia-00157970

Possible if russians run out of steam in the short term, my guess to that is they wont.
Whats flowing into the front right now wasn't stockpiled up, its the number of vehicles actively being restored and sent out in new units. What max help short term is the delivery of US shells, they are already having a visible effect in stopping assaults and covering tank columns quickly.
The earliest *possible* long-term depleation of soviet storages are estimated to mid 2025 to late 2025, after that its down to production numbers and the front would slowly freeze as replacements become scarce like they do for the ZSU.
This assumes china stays out of it and doesnt lend a hand to russia.
As for countering the current mess, the units are more exhausted than they were at the beginning of Avdiivka, there are however 3? Light Brigades in forming. I dont know at what stage they are or if they have already been commited.
There is also the plan to build 10 more brigades. Take note the commander of the ground forces states the issue is in heavy Equipment to outfit the units, not the manpower to fill them.
They will be used exclusively to Guard Kyiv though, as the fear is russia will launch another major offensive there.
About drones, Sternenko has a constant fundraiser, he started the 1 million drone Initiative: send.monobank.ua/jar/dzBdJ3737
His Telegram with proof of deliveries and several dozen daily result videos: t.me/ssternenko
 
 

tbh, HIMARS strikes on Belgorod could have done a lot....its time the restriction be lifted. Especially if the situation is as serious as indicated. 
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/14/ukraine-weapons-russia-00157970

tbh, HIMARS strikes on Belgorod could have done a lot....its time the restriction be lifted. Especially if the situation is as serious as indicated. 
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/14/ukraine-weapons-russia-00157970

tbh, HIMARS strikes on Belgorod could have done a lot....its time the restriction be lifted. Especially if the situation is as serious as indicated. 
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/14/ukraine-weapons-russia-00157970

Recall the headlines here: https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/ukraine-says-only-30-of-promised-eu-artillery-shells-received/
pledged artillery shells, only 30% of a million, the pledge was made in 02-2023, consider the Czech artillery hunt,  https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/inside-europes-drive-get-ammunition-ukraine-russia-advances-2024-03-06/ which is looking for shells beyond the EU, this initiative came on the heels of the EU arguing about purchasing ammo outside the EU
evidently, Ukraine does not get blank checks, with U.S leadership out of action, the EU didn't do anything beyond pledging money until 2024, and whatever it did, excluded looking for ammo from 3rd parties (why would they be having debates on it in the first place) until Ukraine looked ready to buckle. Sorta felt like the EU collectively forgot how to hunt for military equipment honestly. Now, the shells from the Czech initiative are inbound starting https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-czech-initiative-artillery-shells/32908749.html with 500k shells for about $3 billion? From this article, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/inside-europes-drive-get-ammunition-ukraine-russia-advances-2024-03-06/
and pricing for shells has increased on the global market, 
 

Consider the information shown in: https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-us-aid-going-ukraine
Now, someone correct me if I’m misreading or mistaken. 69 billion is a big number except, as far as I can tell, most of the money is directly earmarked for U.S manufacturers or NATO related to Ukraine. The only portion that Ukraine can use to purchase elsewhere is the FMF or foreign military financing, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040, and that says it’s around 6 billion. 6 billion for Ukraine to purchase ammo from 3rd parties. Most of the money is tied up in Western manufacturers and their production lines or from NATO country stockpiles or earmarked money for replacing said stockpiles.
no idea about the EU money except I certainly recall periods where Ukraine had to beg the EU to release portions of already pledged money to support the economy but again, uncertain the forms of funding.

A lot of aid is payment for stuff not set to arrive for years. I've long been suspicious of the U.S over inflating the value of some of these aid packages, and certainly as shown via the artillery shell debate, 3rd party countries production was being taken by Russia, while the EU debated on purchasing them. If we view the EU debate and U.S debate as representing Western collective awareness of Ukraine's needs, let's be honest, it's not great. Why couldn't Ukraine order the shells and pay the supplier itself in the case of the EU or U.S? Makes sense to conclude this aid is largely not being sent in the form of cash with Ukraine able to do as it pleases.

A lot of aid is payment for stuff not set to arrive for years. I've long been suspicious of the U.S over inflating the value of some of these aid packages, and certainly as shown via the artillery shell debate, 3rd party countries production was being taken by Russia, while the EU debated on purchasing them. If we view the EU debate and U.S debate as representing Western collective awareness of Ukraine's needs, let's be honest, it's not great. Why couldn't Ukraine order the shells and pay the supplier itself in the case of the EU or U.S? Makes sense to conclude this aid is largely not being sent in the form of cash with Ukraine able to do as it pleases.

How much I wished I was losing the bubble, for in that case Russia would be nearer to defeat than Ukraine, sadly 15 days away from your response noting that Russian collapse is possible and must be managed as a possibility, we have Ukraine essentially admitting its reserves are deployed and hard pressed with possible Russian offensives on new axes a definite possibility. 
whatever the mind games that may be ongoing, in no way does the increasing chance of victory make dents in the potential of Russian collapse, therefore the concerns about Russian collapse, on the heels of Russia continuing to signal intent for a long war are misplaced. Macron had been signaling deescalation way past other Western leaders past the early part of the invasion intent on providing deescalation and prevent Russian fears of collapse/defeat, his switch from simple support of Ukraine to potential escalation of French troops in Odesa harkens to with passage of time, the potential of Ukrainian collapse. 
You mentioned that it’s not necessarily total defeat in the event of Ukrainian collapse, a “Plan A” you mentioned envisioned a new Cold War, I think Putin would be aware of this and understanding the risk of long cold wars and the risk for Russia, I wager that the idea of initiating hybrid war with the West, dividing NATO and seizing whatever he can, understanding that his invasion of Ukraine and subsequent decision to not back out once the initial invasion failed locked him into a Cold War with the West is very much a possibility, one that drives partially the attitudes of the Baltic governments and Macron’s rhetoric. Meaning that if the goal of the West is managing to prevent nuclear war or preventing the destruction of NATO, then allowing Ukraine to fall and NATO to potentially be faced with the threat of actually activating the alliance to wage war with a Russian invasion is completely not furthering that goal. I.e the increasing rhetoric towards making Ukraine the final stop is a mirror of Russian rhetoric that drove the Russian collapse concerns partially in the first place, only its NATO beginning their ramp up. 

And we are back to why it is not "ok" for fighting aged males to be hanging out in other countries while Russia mauls their home nation.  Regardless, we will have to see how this develops.  What is odd is not only how the Kharkiv thing has gone off, but why there?  A major urban center is not a place to try for a break out,  There is a lot of open country side on this extremely long frontage, so why move there.  Obvious answer is to freak out the Ukrainians and force them to push resources to respond.  Straight up war-by-terror, threaten large civilian populations, get a reaction that forces resource reallocation.
So my next thought is "to what end?"  If the RA can actually pull the UA back enough they might get an operational collapse they can exploit.  But what does that look like?  The RA has not demonstrated any acumen on operational level manoeuvre since Feb '22, and "acumen" is a gross overcompliment based on how that went.  Since then they have collapsed, harassed, denied, and made minor tactical gains.  So we really do not know if they can really exploit what they are doing here.
But let's not drink the copium too deeply. This is strategic/operational shaping by the RA. The fact that they still have the initiative and are able to do this is not good news.  Now shaping is not an immediate sign of success - ask Lee at Gettysburg - but it definitely demonstrates that the Russians are still in this thing.  The UA needs to remobilize and quickly.  They have ISR but it appears to be watching the RA walk forward.  They need capability at this point to counter.
No matter how one spins it, this proxy war just took a weird turn.  So here I agree with FancyCat - West needs to stop playing grab @ss and get back into this game or things could get very bad, very quickly.

Part of this is on Ukraine in failing to mobilize, part of this is definitely on the West for failing to supply Ukraine, for wasting months and lives to engage in useless partisanship and concerns about paying non-Western countries for shells. No wonder France and the Baltics are rumbling about increasing escalation with deploying western forces to Ukraine, the idea of Russia collapsing as a result of this war is as far fetched as ever and increasingly the scenario of Ukrainian collapse and further territorial loss increases and rest assure, that image is a Western loss, no ifs or buts, if the West cannot pursue at least a stalemate (and why would Putin agree? He’s advancing) how horrid it would look globally and with regard to the Pacific in particular. 

From a Ukrainian Telegram, quoting mostly from a NYT article:
“I’ve used everything we have. Unfortunately, we don’t have anyone else in the reserves” - Budanov in an interview by the New York Times
“The situation is on the edge,” Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, said in a video call from a bunker in Kharkiv. “Every hour this situation moves toward critical.”
His bleak assessment echoed those of other Ukrainian officers in recent days, that the country’s military prospects were dimming. In addition to being outnumbered, the Ukrainians face critical shortages of weapons, especially artillery ammunition, and $60.8 billion worth of arms from the United States — approved three weeks ago after months of congressional gridlock — has barely begun to arrive.
Like most Ukrainian officials and military experts, General Budanov said he believes the Russian attacks in the northeast are intended to stretch Ukraine’s already thin reserves of soldiers and divert them from fighting elsewhere.
That is exactly what is happening now, he acknowledged. He said the Ukrainian army was trying to redirect troops from other front line areas to shore up its defenses in the northeast, but that it had been difficult to find the personnel.
“All of our forces are either here or in Chasiv Yar,” he said, referring to a Ukrainian stronghold about 120 miles farther south that Russian troops have assaulted in recent weeks. “I’ve used everything we have. Unfortunately, we don’t have anyone else in the reserves.”
General Budanov assessed that Ukrainian forces would be able to shore up their lines and stabilize the front within the next few days. But he expects Russia to launch a new attack further north of Kharkiv, in the Sumy region.
Full article here (without Paywall)
- Note: After this article was published, Budanov has stated that the expected russian attack in Sumy has not taken place as the enemy had originally planned, due to "problems" that they have experienced in Kharkiv.
You would think that admitting you have no more reserves left is something you don’t want to announce to the world, but I suppose they reckon Russia more or less knows anyways.
That aside, it’s not looking great. By all accounts it seems that Ukraine has committed most or all of its reserve troops, while Russia can still throw quite a bit more into the fight.
We talk in this thread about war exhaustion,  and unless something dramatically changes it‘s looking increasingly likely that Ukraine and not Russia will run up short first. For all of Russia‘s internal problems, it seems their government‘s crude but persistent ruthlessness is working. They may lose scores of tanks each week and their men may die like dogs, but they keep finding more.
In Ukraine there is lacking a similar kind of ruthlessness. Zaluzhny said last year he needed 500k men, by the looks of things on the frontline right now he was probably right. But it seems like the Ukrainian government and military leadership are either unwilling to accept the realities on the ground, or aren’t prepared to do something that could potentially push the country’s internal situation to potentially unstable levels.
Is there a solution to all this? Honestly it’s hard to say. The Ukrainians I know seem to be mistrustful of their government and pessimistic of the overall situation. And unless they get a lot more men, or the tactical situation swings greatly in their favour, then I’m not sure if they can ever stop the Russians from steadily munching away at their territory so long as the fighting continues.
Regardless of the outcome, it’s times like these where I’m sure every NATO country is breathing a sigh of relief to have the collective support of many other powerful countries at their back to deal with the Russian menace. Because if the war in Ukraine is proving anything, it’s that there may be not a single European country that can indefinitely hold back the Russian tide with its own reserves of manpower.
But I maintain that if every NATO country got involved in a conflict with Russia, offensive or defensive, that the latter would be wrecked as devastatingly as they deserve…

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/why-ukraine-should-keep-striking-russian-oil-refineries
article on the strikes to Russian refineries, i would pull paragraphs out but frankly, the entire article is essential,  basically lays out why these attacks are having a big effect on Russia but not to the global economy.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/why-ukraine-should-keep-striking-russian-oil-refineries
article on the strikes to Russian refineries, i would pull paragraphs out but frankly, the entire article is essential,  basically lays out why these attacks are having a big effect on Russia but not to the global economy.

I tried my best to find the source, couldn't find it so.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/why-ukraine-should-keep-striking-russian-oil-refineries
article on the strikes to Russian refineries, i would pull paragraphs out but frankly, the entire article is essential,  basically lays out why these attacks are having a big effect on Russia but not to the global economy.