G.I. Joe

IMO if that happens, the only viable areas where RU could hope to still advance would be in the north, where they could support their forces from relative safety of their own territory, perhaps making a full on effort on Kharkhiv? The next escalation thershold to cross will then be for Ukrainians to start hitting targets inside Russia proper. 
Meanwhile, BSF is expecting ATACMS to appear unannounced and takes measures not to die suddenly:
 

In some sobering news, the OSCE has submitted a document detailing the results of investigations into war crimes, violations of international and humanitarian law from April 1 to June 25, tho events only uncovered within this period are also discussed from prior time. The war crimes are sanctioned, extensive.
https://www.osce.org/odihr/522616
Russia did not bother to assist the investigation nor communicate back to the OSCE regarding it.
For a much condensed summary, the U.S has one with helpful page references.
https://osce.usmission.gov/response-to-moscow-mechanism-report-on-ukraine/
Mark Hartling puts it quite well. May I add that for a UN Security Council permanent representative nation to so openly conduct war crimes and actions violating international law, and one that was looked upon as to counter balance Western domination on the world stage is a deeply disappointing and terrifying reality if you worried about western hypocrisy and counted on balance to maintain international humanitarian law.
There can be no peace without the withdrawal of Russia from all of Ukraine, and the restoration of its citizens back to their borders.
 

Just to add to this:
- Means greater chance of misdrops and error.  The Russian rely on a very simple “iron mountain” stockpiling system that is designed to overload sectors with ammo up front.  By pushing them back complicates things greatly with more routes and trucks to deal with.
- More exposure.  Based on the average range of extension looking like at least 100kms, that is an extra 1-2 hours on the road for resupply.  They will be open to arty, UAS and deep strike a LOT longer, particularly if they need more trucks to sustain.  And if you check Oryx, the Russian have taken a beating on logistics vehicles (1255 at last count, at least) [aside: at some point we should look at how much it is going to cost the Russian military to rebuild all this losses].
- Greater strain on Russian logistics in general.  Greater maintenance bills, more spare parts, and much more fuel costs.  This, plus data strain to keep this all organized, on an already crappy logistics capability is nothing but bad news.
- This will do nothing good for Russian morale on the ground.
So What?  Well first this looks like a pretty good indicator (if confirmed) the effect the HIMARs have been having.  Next the US should give the longer range precision ammo because a lot of those depots are on the beach and cannot pull back any further.  Then, the UA needs a cheaper deep strike capability to hit logistics vehicles along those roads.  Finally, this will limit the Russian offensive even more because they rely so heavily on massed fires.  Not only in ranges but duration.  We will likely see pulse offensives as opposed to continuous hard pressure.
If Russian logistics are blunted and fractured we may see the UA begin to shift operational targets and we may see Russian offensives become more narrow.

I also don't know how the Russians do it, but there are some general considerations.
If the last depot is further away from demand (the guns) then you need more trucks in total to keep up the same supply rate. Because those trucks might share the same roads, you may not have the capacity to keep up the supply rate to every gun (basically a bandwidth problem).
Those trucks might break down or be destroyed, creating even more congestions.
Then, due to the greater distance, you get lag: every request now needs more time than before. To compensate, you would need to stack more ammo at the gun itself. Which is problematic in two ways: you are more vulnerable to fire and if the ammo stacked at the gun is needed elsewhere you have to transport it again (buffer bloat).
So, if everything runs perfect and your roads have unlimited capacity and your trucks don't break down and nobody shoots at you - then it doesn't matter how close to the front your depot is.

 

Eagle/ Falcon/ Viper Alley - which one sounds best?

It's not that simple. Most of these SAMs are mobile, so the kill chain may not be short enough to allow them to consistently hit them. You might be able to get the more static S-300/S-400 systems, but they are much farther back than something like the Buk-M1/2/3 would be. These SAMs are also denying the airspace to Ukrainian drones, so it will be hard for them to use those to find them in the first place.
It is possible, yes, once the Russian artillery has been mitigated/neutralised, but Ukraine doesn't have nearly enough SAMs (especially medium/long range ones) to do that currently.

Yeah, it really depends on the echelon the dump supports - bde, div, corps, army. Below bde (bn or bty) the stocks 'should' all be on wheels.
The following pseudo-calcs are based on very not-Russian doctrine, and instruction to the level of "enough to know what the blanket-folders care about" rather than "enough to do the blanket-folder's job", so the principles should be about right, although the particular numbers will vary.
Generally, stocks are held in dumps based on days-of-supply (or some equivalent term) which is - as you can probably guess - the expected consumption per day in units of fire, rather than a specific number of rounds. For a ~150mm calibre gun (152, or 155) 1 unit would be 80-100 rounds^ at standard rates of fire. This is equivalent to the 'basic load' or 'first line' of 5.56mm that riflemen carry, or the standard loadout of a tank of IFV. You might double or triple it for high expected intensity, or halve it for quiet times, but 1 unit is as good a place as any to start. Then, 'all' you have to do is count up the number of guns in the echelon, multiply by the number of rounds in the basic load, and multiply all that by the number of days the dump is to support. For a bde you'd expect the dump to be able to support 2-3 days, a div 3-7 days, a corps something like a week to a fortnight, and an army ... well, whatever.
So, for a bde, you're looking at something like 18 guns x 90 rounds x 2 days = ~3200 rounds, or a bit over 400 pallets.
For a div, it'd be something like 4-10 times that amount, or 12,000 - 30,000rnds. (54 guns x 90 rounds x 5 days = ~24,000 rounds/3,000 pallets)
A corps would be about 4-10 times that (50,000-300,000rnds), although presumably split into multiple dispersed div- or bde-sized dumps.
If you then apply some level of safety thinking, and split the dump into multiple separated 'blobs' so you don't lose the whole lot to a single accident or enemy strike, well, a properly organised and run dump takes up a LOT of real estate. Each dump would expect to receive a flow of rounds arriving each day from the next higher dump, and in turn push rounds down to the next lower dump or have rounds pulled out out by the firing units. The dump therefore acts as a buffer so that local variations in the amount received or the amount consumed aren't felt by the firing units or their supported arms. If the amount received is less than the amount consumed ... the dump gets smaller. If the amount received exceeds the amount consumed then the dump swells. In either case the guns should experience no disruption in supply.
The pic below shows an 8-round pallet.
 
^ itself made up of a pre-determined mix of HE, illum, smoke, etc projectiles and a pre-determined mix of fuze types - PD, prox, time, etc

And, of course, that's only gun ammo. There's also mortar ammo, fighting vehicle ammo, small arms ammo, ATGMs and MANPADS, fuel, mines, engineering stores, personal consumables, medical supplies, bridging equipment, spare parts, batteries, ... the wonder is not that armies move so slowly, but that they move at all.

That's what I said: the new jobs won't be done by the same persons as the old jobs. Coal miners won't be making solar cells.
But automation makes stuff cheaper, and that creates demand. Bottom line is that you make more stuff, which need more people to make/transport/sell/service that stuff.
That is true with or without KI or automation. But that discussion would be really off-topic.
Now we come to something that is pertinent to this war. The current state of 'AI' has nothing to do with intelligence as we understand it. What AI is, is really, really good at pattern matching. And with 'really, really' I mean really magically good.
'Pattern matching' answers questions like 'is there a tank on this picture?'
I expect that a lot of more things to have video cameras, and those things will be comparatively small. The AI part will be able to identify well camouflaged units and be able to act accordingly (send information or actively fight). The time for analyzing the battlefield will be dramatically lower than anything before. I wouldn't be surprised if those systems already exist, and we just haven't seen them yet.
Should computers ever really be intelligent, it will either be Skynet or paradise. But that will be after we have working fusion.
About AI replacing programmers: here's a tweet that explains everything
 
If anything at all, this war has massively sped up the move away from fossil fuels. If that was Putins plan right from the start, he has succeeded. Like his plan to enlarge NATO.

Is the war in Ukraine basically a climate change war?
In case you're now rolling your eyes and letting out a groan because you are fed up with hearing about climate change, I get it. But I think there's actually an argument to be made here:
1: Russia's economy is massively built upon revenue from oil and gas.
2: Fossil fuels are now rapidly being phased out due to climate policies. Electric vehicles are booming in many countries and the demand for oil is therefore set to decrease.
3: The world's population is still growing, and it's becoming harder to produce food due to more chaotic weather patterns. So while demand is increasing, supply is set to fall. This will make food production a more important resource in the future.
4: Ukraine is a huge food producer.
Therefore, if we look at it from a purely cynical perspective, and if we assume Putin cares about Russia's future greatness, I think it makes rational sense to try to seize Ukraine.
I'm not saying climate change is the only reason for the war, but I think it might be one of the most important ones.
 

https://xkcd.com/386/

Exactly, A2A is the key, CAS a cherry on top. Crossing the line of contact to RU might not be worth it. For sure should be verboten for any volunteer pilots…
Whatever is chosen, they need the new aircraft fast:
 

E-2D  If we are really after giving UA an edge in A2A. I really wonder what will come of that, can still be vaporvawe/ psychological warfare. But if not - if RU hates GMLRS, I wonder how they’ll like 2000lbs GBUs…

https://xkcd.com/386/

No worries, I figured we might have been at slightly cross purposes on that point.
Regarding the on topic part:
Since the F-15EX is just entering production, I would guess it is not the version in question. However, the existing F-15E might be a possibility, and it would offer far better range and a heavier weapons load compared to the F-16, as well as a two-person crew (see also the tweet @FancyCat linked). Against the Su-27 and Su-35 it does make sense to have a heavyweight fighter and the Strike Eagle's air to ground capabilities make it a solid candidate as an Su-24 replacement for Ukraine while also potentially replacing the Su-27 with the same platform. Since Ukraine currently operates four tactical fast jets (Su-24, Su-25, Su-27 and MiG-29), a high/low mix of F-15Es and either F-16s or F-18s would still be simpler than the existing mix.
Alternately, the F-15C could be more readily available and possibly easier to train pilots on quickly as a pure air superiority fighter to counter Russian air activity.

That's always part of it.  The other part, at least for me, is the strategic element of the Russo-Ukrainian war, as it touches on the economic element that underpins all extended wars.
https://mises.org/library/economics-war
"If a tailor and baker go to war with each other, it is significant that the baker can wait longer for a new suit than the tailor can go without bread. "
I say Ukraine, backed by the West, is the baker.

https://xkcd.com/386/

https://xkcd.com/386/

Possibly a matter of not enough units with the right training and gear yet... But also possible that they may be waiting for certain systems, or enough of them, to arrive (and I think Huba just posted a strong candidate for what "certain systems" might be, especially if the process is already ongoing). Alternately, they may be waiting for the full impact of the HIMARS strikes on Russian ammo depots to be felt.

Big big news: US law (and $100M budget) to train UA pilots on F-16s and F-15 passed the first level of legislatory process. As I understand, it has to be approved by Senate and POTUS now. I'm not that familiar with the way it works in US, but given previous cases, their support for that is probably a sure thing? 
What remains to be seen is if that would start from the scratch, or if the process is already well ongoing. I'm sure some loophole to make it legal is easily found, especially with help of allies who operate F-16s ?
https://www.airforcemag.com/as-ukrainian-pilot-training-passes-house-ndaa-legislators-work-to-overcome-roadblocks/

"Washington and its NATO partners more and more often resort in international relations to the policy of blackmail and crude pressure. They try to impudently force their will on other countries and nations. Imperialist bigwigs put forward adventurist doctrines of either a "limited" nuclear war or a war with the use of only conventional, non-nuclear weapons."
Great Putin quote, right? Actually...that's from Yuri Andropov in the early 1980's.
It's tempting to look at Russian history in long form or at the numbers but that often leads to pretty tendentious ideas about "national character' (don't get me started on the supposed Chinese penchant for long term planning). I would argue it's better to look at the formative experiences of the current political elite in Russia. For the most part they were part of the nomenklatura and security services at a time of rapidly declining Russian power and were led by profoundly paranoid people like Andropov. This was intertwined with an approach to the economic underpinnings of national power that vies with the Khmer Rouge and China's Great Leap Forward for hapless ineptitude. *That* is the school they learned statecraft in. If you want to find 'reasons' you need look no further than the fact that Putin and his clique simply didn't see any other options...going as far back as the early 2000's when a pivot to modernity and out of the paranoid security state model would have been a fairly obvious transition.

Seriously, this is a dog's breakfast for China. NATO is entirely united. Taiwan has come to realize that invasion is far more than theoretical and a successful defense is quite possible. The entire US military establishment is reorienting to peer on peer warfare at a far faster pace than the Pentagon could have dreamed of (they got an extra $58 billion for projects they didn't ask for in the current budget). China's Asian opponents are solidifying into a quasi-Nato-ish alliance and any possibility of Russia forcefully distracting the US from Taiwan's defense has evaporated. 
And all of this has happened 4-5 years before China might have been capable of pulling it off in an unchanged environment. Now...not so much: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-state-dept-approves-potential-sale-air-defense-support-taiwan-pentagon-2022-04-05/

Biden should make it vert clear, albeit quietly, that every "unexplained accidents" in the Western energy sector will be met with truly massive increases in aid to Ukraine. A brigade worth of Bradleys and Abrams level massive. Or a couple of squadrons of F-16s with top grade AAMs and guided bombs.

The interesting thing about Russia in the war is the ideological vacuum.  There are not great ideas here.  They definitely have nationalism and a weak tea “I will protect you from NATO” but lacks the power that communism or monarchy had back in 1917 by a wide margin.  Putin has worked hard for over 20 years to build a personal cult but he in nowhere near the level of the Kim King’s of NK.  Nor does Putin have a religion to hold everything together because it is the “will of God” such as they have in theocracies such as Iran.  Nor does Russia have democracy or an idea of liberal freedom.
So what ideology does Russia have beyond paranoia and a general zeitgeist of revelling in misery?  Maybe that will be enough but I think it is weak glue in the absence of an existential crisis.  Putin has, and will continue to make the argument that this is an existential crisis but it is a weak argument.  As the social lattice in Russia comes under increasing stress I have to wonder how long the social contract will hold.  Russians have proven they can take a lot, under the right circumstances; however, without a crystalline idea to hold them together outside the bonds of their intimate communities and micro-social spaces, I think they are in fact more vulnerable than many think.

You guys remember that quote from the UA solider in the field early on in this thing?  "I can't believe how f#cking stupid they are?"
I keep coming back to this at a strategic level.  I have gone on at length that the Western Strategic Centre of Gravity (CoG) is unity and resolve, if that falters this could all end badly.  So, Russia being a sophisticated nation and a master of the art of strategic narrative would try and take the high road with respect to ROEs in this war. To demonstrate that they will play by the rules even if the Nazi-whatever-the-hell-Putin-was-going-on-abouts are the true villains.  This play could plant a small seed of doubt that if nurtured could erode the Allied CoG - "look this is an Eastern European border skrimish" etc
Or....
Toss missiles around like a drunken frat boy demonstrating that he can both hurl empty beer bottles and throw up on himself simultaneously.  Now maybe Russia is full-on "no body likes me, everybody hates me, so I am gonna eat worms...and commit egregious war crimes anyway."  But all of this is actually reinforcing their opponents strategic center of gravity...it is shoring up the resolve of the West.  A dead soldier is supposed to happen, a dead little girl with blue running shoes is not.  Russia's inability to "get with the program" is frankly baffling.  
Collateral damage happens, it is the tragic truth of warfare since the beginning; however, nations are judged on how hard they work to avoid it.  And as far as I can tell right now Russia hasn't tried at all.  This on top of the pretty obvious war crimes that happened already in this war is literally guaranteeing that 1) more weapons, money and munitions keep flowing from the West, and 2) there is no renormalization after this...so enjoy being a rump state of China...seriously, start teaching your kids Mandarin.  
I can't believe how f#cking stupid they are, indeed.