G.I. Joe

Regarding the "death of the tank", I'm just listening to a Twitter room with general Jarosław Gromadziński, who used to be a commander of 18th Mechanized Division (one that is being rearmed with M1s), and now is vice-chief of Ukraine Defence Contact Group. You might assume that he knows a thing or two about tanks, and how these work in UA from sources other than accessible to us. And his points are:
- war in Ukraine proved that the tanks is anything but dead, in fact tanks are indispensible and form a core of any serious action
- the tactics of tank usage have changed and times of whole battalions rolling through an open field are definitely over, but there's no offensive operations without tanks
- regarding Polish army adaptation of K2, he favors the "light" for the future K2PL, sacrificing some (side) armour for mobility
- hard-kill APS is a must and non-negotiable going forward
The whole discussion was about something else and these points weren't argued for, but he treated them as axioms when answering other questions.
Edit: 
He made an interesting indiscretion - according to him, there's more than 600 NATO-caliber artillery pieces in Ukraine at the moment. That is way more that I thought, I was placing the number at ~400.

I am not sure where everyone is from but the opinions on this thread kind of do impact the war.  First of all some are close to policy makers and are drawing on this conversation to inform decisions at higher levels.  Second, and more importantly, we live in western democracies so the opinions of the people count very much.
I totally agree on trying to keep it above the belt, but informed decision is central to the democratic process and every conversation matters.  Western democracies are not ruled by prime ministers and presidents - we rule them.  And small conversations like the one's here are happening all over the internet and in every bar.  If forum members go forth with a better view of the truth, or as best we can determine, then we have in some small way tried to make things better.  This is why mis/dis information really needs to be hit hard, all of it. We cracked down on Bio Black sites, economic myths and a boatload of Russian lies and propaganda being pushed from some circles.
We can be passionate, we can disagree but we should never become an echo chamber or any value we have in the bigger conversation, that will impact foreign policies at some point, will be lost.  

I gotta be brutally honest here, and with due respect to the good general - the last person I would trust with an assessment of armour performance and trajectory within this war and beyond is a modern armoured general officer.  Or even a Cbt Arms officer at this point.  History is filled with examples of service general officers seeing what they want to through the lens of their service culture.  Cavalry hated tanks.  Battleship captains slagged carriers. 
I mean I am sure the man knows what he is talking about but I have heard so much biases coming out of western land forces on this one.
I am waiting for an assessment of what the tank is actually doing because nothing is matching what doctrine says, or at least very little.  I mean the RUSI report of tanks in the indirect role blew my mind.  I don't think the tank is dead but its role is definitely going to evolve - we talked about that a few times now.

And tracing an AK something something on its fifth, or fifteenth owner is is not an exact science either. Actually given that Russia and Ukraine, or proxies acting on their behalf, are BUYING everything available on the global market I am deeply suspicious of the the basic idea that there are more weapons floating around Africa right now.

I cannot get over how right this sentence is.  Bring them into NATO - arm the living daylights out of them.  Get them to teach us about corrosive warfare and unmanned systems.  But all of this is post-war or if this war goes on for 2-3 years, do it in parallel.
This, is deterrence.

I do want to remind everyone that opinions in this thread are not determining whether Ukraine gets more or less support. Unless half the forum members are actually prime ministers and presidents and have kept mum about that for all these years. The discussion about what countries are/are not doing should be a whole lot more detached for that reason. No one here is pulling any strings and regardless of what we say this forum isn't changing the facts on the ground.

So maybe we should all step back from this sniping and recalibrate the discussion.

I want to build on this and hit a cancerous myth that is hijacking this board - the Ukrainian nuclear backstory myth.  Frankly it belongs to be in the outer darkness with the Bio Black Sites.  I also think it is dangerously skewing the views of some members and feeding into some really unhealthy narratives that are counter-productive and likely going to sour things going forward.
So looking this up the myth goes like this:
Back in the mid 90s Ukraine had a big suite of nuclear weapons it inherited from the break up of the Soviet Union.  Rather than hold onto them and being able to provide deterrence to Russian aggression almost 30 years later - Ukraine graciously decided to divest them back to Russia with the brotherly love of all mankind in their hearts.  The US and other nations then promised on a stack of Bibles and pictures of Baby Jesus that should any threat befall Ukraine, they would come riding over the hills like the Riders of Rohan and smote the threat with their mighty hands.  In 2014 - Russia did some shenanigan's in Donbas and Crimea, of which we all know and love, but the West yawned and went "well, are those really threats or is this kind of an internal issue?"  Poor Ukraine struggled on by itself to hold off the rabid Russian Bear until 2022 when it rolled its mangy a$$ over the border.  Ukraine is now calling in that nuclear favour...it is owed and "demands" the US and West honor its obligations and basically give Ukraine whatever it wants, whenever it wants because they gave up the nukes.  Further it is the US and West's fault for this war in the first place because we did not smite Russia back in 2014, so pay up and be quick about it. 
I get the impulse and given Ukraine's position it makes sense.  However, I would offer that "guilt, shame and demands" may not be the best way to go to guarantor the continued Western support Ukraine is going to need for about a decade after this war, let alone out the back end of next year.  But first lets beat up on that myth:
1.   Those nukes were nearly useless to Ukraine as deterrence towards Russia without significant cost and risks.  Yes there were a lot of nuclear weapons but they had never been given over to Ukrainian control, they were housed in Ukraine but Russian controlled the whole time.  Further, they were long range ballistic systems which were nearly useless at the tactical ranges Ukraine needed to deter Russian threats:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction.  Ukraine was a fledging ex-Soviet state and was hardly rolling in cash, so the option to re-tool those weapons was severely limited by resources.  Finally, if Ukraine had said "screw you, we are keeping them and re-tooling them" they would have seen heavy sanctions and possible military action from Russia or the West because loose nukes makes everyone really nervous.
2.  Ukraine was paid to lose the nukes, and freely took the money.  Ukrainian parliament voted overwhelmingly "(301-8)" to take the payoff and get rid of the the things.  This was not arm twisting or coercion, it was opportunism: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/12/05/why-care-about-ukraine-and-the-budapest-memorandum/.  And smart opportunism for that matter because at the time they were more trouble than they were worth.
3.  The famous "security guarantees".  Promises of security for Ukraine.  Not even close.  These were assurances, which is diplomatic speak for "mayhaps", and Ukraine knew it.  The Budapest Memo is not a security guarantee or collective security agreement, not even close.  https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/12/05/why-care-about-ukraine-and-the-budapest-memorandum/  It is a pretty vague agreement that the big powers would not pound on the small powers if they gave up their nukes.  Also the only security resolution mechanism was the UNSC, which of course was presided over by the big powers. Ukraine is a sovereign state and had its big boy pants on when it signed this thing and knew it was tying its security on the UN Charter - https://www.icanw.org/faq_on_ukraine_and_nuclear_weapons.  Which is great so long as a UNSC nation isn't the one to violate the freakin thing.
The US did promise to assist Ukraine should their sovereignty be threatened but the details of that assistance were never made concrete.  Frankly, given the assistance post-2014 and now I think the US is living up to its end of the agreement.
So as far as legal obligation, there is not one, never was. Ukraine took the money and avoided becoming a pariah by trying to become a nuclear power.  The US and West have actually delivered on assistance, to the point that Ukraine is winning this war.  Further there is absolutely zero obligation to assist Ukraine in its reconstruction after this war.  Here we are relying entirely on the good will and self-interests of the West, which is shaky ground on a good day.
What is true is the moral obligation.  How the EU got itself upside down on this whole Russian energy thing is beyond be, especially after 2014.  Hell Europe is still buying Russian oil: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Europe-Is-Buying-All-The-Russian-Oil-It-Can-Before-Banning-It.html.  So ya, we definitely did not walk the walk on defending democracy or human rights in Ukraine against an obvious threat...we took the payoff.  But before anyone jumps on that one...big.boy.pants.time.  That is how the world works, as crappy and unfair as it is.  We have been doing business with dictators and autocrats all over the world - Saudi Arabia looking at you - and turned a lot of blind eyes in many countries.  Ukraine is getting the platinum response, it is about as good as it gets for an outside nation to be honest and if there is a shift in the political winds it could be cut off pretty quick.
So "DEMAND" all you like; however, you are not entitled beyond the good will of the West and a self-interest need to ensure the global order holds against Russian aggression. You want to come on this forum and conduct a regular routine of western bashing - Germany is literally on a weekly clock - just know you are doing service to Russian interests when you do.  You want to get emotional, totally understandable but 1) do not create or support mis/dis information in doing so, it is counter to everything we try to do here and 2) hold your own politicians to account when this is over, Ukraine has a obligation to itself and the decisions that led to this are not all on the West, and 3) remember that guilt and shame is not your best play here.
Let me finish by perhaps expanding on the Western point of view - well US/5EYES as I cannot say I am privy to the entire western bloc.  We are exhausted.  30 years of cat herding and dealing with everyone else's problems has not been rewarding.  Sure we got the power and money, but for the love of gawd the endless whining and biting has really taken a shine off the whole thing.  Terrorism, intra-state wars, insurgencies and now Russia is being a total dick and pushing us to the edge.  There is a sentiment in the western power bases that we are sick of the rest of the world and its bullsh#t.  Tired of spending endless streams of money and people on countries we wouldn't look for on a map, time zones away. 
Then there is the pandemic: the US lost nearly 1.1 million people, and with excess deaths that number could be over 2 million - https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#datatracker-home. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid19/excess_deaths.htm
And at the end of all that we get a global economic recession in the making.  So ya, snapping your fingers and waiving a Budapest Memo in our faces is likely to backfire really quickly.  The US is incredibly divided right now, and frankly so is Canada as a result of COVID impacts.  Good will for Ukraine is solid and damned well better hold; however, it is not guaranteed in the least.  So no, you need not grovel or "by your leave here" but maybe just try and remember who is on your side in this thing and sometimes we can disagree and even say "no" without going all millennial.
This thread stood up for reality when everyone thought we should get ready to bail and run on Ukraine -just this week I heard a retired Canadian 3-star say "there is no way Ukraine can secure victory in this conflict".  We stood against the crazy conspiracy theories on it all being Ukraine's fault.  We stood against mainstream "big money" analysist when they wrote the UA off.  And we should stand for the truth even when we don't like it.  If we can't do that then we should just close up this thread and we can all go to the Reddit threads of our choice and bask in those echo chambers of ignorance.

Excellent overview as always. The recent discussions on training times brought something that's been in the back of my head for a while into focus: the main reason Ukraine hasn't gotten Western fighter aircraft is probably that the Ukrainian Air Force can't afford to pull a bunch of pilots out of the fight in the middle of a war.
Achieving a meaningful operational capability would mean full squadron strength, so that would require at least close to 20 aircraft once some margin for error with a few spare airframes is built in. And it would also require a ratio at least close to two pilots per aircraft, so that would mean about 40 pilots...even if we're wildly optimistic and say conversation training could be done in a month, the shortfall in available strength in the interim would be too big. There might be a way to cycle pilots through conversion training in small groups, but that becomes a long process with a less satisfactory result and adds a longer workup period once the new fighters arrive in Ukraine.

But with a logistical cost that Ukraine may have not been able to bear without damaging other aspects of its warfighting capability. Also...isn't this the forum that's been pretty clear on the idea that the tank is not what it was on the modern battlefield? And doesn't Ukraine have *more* tanks now of Russian vintage than it did at the start? Why the fetish for Leopards that won't materially change the war? What am I missing? 

OK OK OK OK, Mr "I'm right because I actually know things"  😀  I have come around to your thinking on this.  Keep feeding in stuff they can use now.  It's not the best but it doesn't have a 6-12 month lead time and is still really effective.  And there's an actual war going on right now that could be decided in 6-12 months w more supply of the tools that are in the system already.  After the war can upgrade UKR army so that if RU tries this again in 5 years, it would be a heaping mess of burned out armor before it went 10km.
It's kinda like sherman tanks & TDs in WW2 -- not the best but for a whole host of manufacturing and logistical and reliability and training and maintenence reasons it still made the most sense to keep using them.  Upgrades ongoing as were deemed possible w/o disrupting the 4000 mile long supply chain.
(emoji translation:  that was a compliment)

Gotta love how you are pulling numbers out of thin air without references or declaring your expertise.  I guess an internet connection is all anyone needs these days.
So you are talking about bringing up tank crews trained on the T-72s and converting them to the Leo 2 in a week?  And cold training new crews in 3 weeks for drivers and 3 months as gunner loaders?  So you came from a TDO position in an armored school? Which one?
Sure you could compress training on conversion but risks go up dramatically.  For example a driver with a weeks training is not going to have time to know how to handle mine ploughs and rollers, so first hillock taken to fast is going to knock out minefield breaching capability.  Then there is river crossing/snorkeling - that is a major hurdle and training bill not to get crews drowned...but there are no rivers in Ukraine...no problem.  As to your logistical plan of "send back to Poland", if the drivers and crew are lightly trained that is going to happen a lot more often because they will not know 1) how to avoid damaging the vehicle and 2) how to do first line repairs.  And then there is the "how do you train maintainers?" issue but why confuse the issue with facts?
The Pz2000 took about a solid month to get them out in ones and twos: https://eurasiantimes.com/german-monster-pzh-2000-breaking-down-in-fight-against-russia/  And of course we have reports of them breaking down along with a lot of the other western kit we sent in - not all of this is going to be crew training issues, as war is a contact sport, but it likely is not helping.  The Pz2000 and other artillery were critical system that were thrown into the fight over the spring and summer, not the formed formations one would need to turn western armour and IFVs into to really make a difference.
To take 100 Leo 2s and turn them into a coherent fighting force e.g. a Regiment or Battlegroup, that can do what everyone here wants them to do, from crew training, through troop and squadron, to combat team and battlegroup and finally in a formation context is going to take 6-12 months at best, if you do not want the thing flopping around the battlefield breaking itself.  OR, here is a crazy idea...we give the UA the equipment it is already trained on and organized to fight on as a priority.  We then pepper in critical systems that provide immediate payoff and can play to the ISR strengths we are also providing and give the critical range extensions - e.g. HIMARs.  We will take risks with some systems but wholesale re-tooling of the UA ground force while it is in contact in the middle of a war is a very dumb idea.
 

Replace "Russia" with "China", replace "energy" with "manufacturing" and the paragraph sadly still makes a lot of sense. 🤑 and  .

It is well worth considering where we'd be on that score had Ukraine folded and Russia was able to quickly over run the country. Every calculation on Taiwan right now would be different.

So the 2014 - it is all the West’s fault argument. Well first of all Ukraine’s faltering democracy was not on us, high levels of corruption and one helluva crappy military did not really make Ukraine a sound investment to be brutally honest.  Second, the West did what it could - provide assistance to Ukraine on many levels and helped them rebuild their military to pretty much do what is is  doing now.
Beyond that, not sure what else we were supposed to do besides sanctions - which definitely could have been more robust but there you go.  Look basically Ukraine was not that important to the West in 2014, most couldn’t find it on the map. We were dealing with ISIL and the Arab Spring.  Russia kept enough ambiguity in its little dance to keep us divided on response - and in the end we were ticked off and made symbolic gestures and angry noises.
I am not sure what you would be looking for, airstrikes?  I mean Russia’s actions were illegal and a challenge to the global order but not enough to really get us going.  In fact if they had played it cool we likely would have simply forgotten about the whole Crimea thing and Donbas looked like a domestic situation.  And then Putin went all Saddam H in 2022.

Agreed all around.
The general point I'm trying to get across is that looking back and saying "USA suxxxx!!!" or "the West betrayed Ukraine!!!!" or "Ukraine had it coming!!!" is absurd. Countries act within the envelope of what they can reasonably accomplish under given political, military and economic constraints. The US isn't magically able to go "poof, here's a military for you" or the EU couldn't wave a wand and easily get 28 countries to move in lockstep any more than Ukraine could have wished away its strategic position, limited resources or corruption issues. Instead, all of the above try pretty hard to do the best they can with what they've got and what they think they know. And conditions in any given day or year change and *matter*. 
Sorry to lecture but the above is pretty damn important folks if you prefer solid analysis to endorphin fueled venting.

Not that "escalatory", as I imagine these will be mostly used for CAS, but indeed with a potential to make a difference when breaking these fortified defence positions. I mean, TOS-1 looks really scary, but a couple 2000lbs GBUs is scarier still.
With Patriot and now JDAM announced, and Biden's administration making it clear that they approve, and even encourage Western armor deliveries, I'm under the impression that after the election the gloves came off a little bit, don't you think?

Boom, JDAMs for Ukraine!
Article does not specify how exactly these are to be employed, but hanging them from MiG-29s, perhaps the Slovakian ones that were just retired and are reportedly awaiting the journey to the UA front would make the most sense. I guess either toss bombing from low altitude, or hopefully long range launches with JDAM-ER kits would be the preferable tactic. Looks like fixed RU defense positions will become less useful...  

Keeping the nukes was not a realistic option for Ukraine.
__________
Ukraine never had the ability to launch those missiles or to use those warheads. The security measures against unauthorized use were under Moscow’s control. The Ukrainians might have found ways around those security measures, or they might not have. Removing the warheads and physically taking them apart to repurpose them would be dangerous, and Ukraine did not have the facilities for doing that. Nor did Ukraine have the facilities to maintain those warheads. For only one example, the tritium in those warheads has a 12-year half-life and needs to be replaced regularly.
Ukraine did not have the technical infrastructure to maintain a nuclear arsenal. It would have had to spend billions to build that infrastructure.
__________
https://nucleardiner.wordpress.com/2022/02/06/could-ukraine-have-retained-soviet-nuclear-weapons/

Or get guarantees rather than assurances. Like NATO partners have. It's not 100%, but what is, in the world of international relations? Given the efforts expended for a nation that has "assurances", I'm more encouraged now to believe that Western powers actually consider "guarantees" to be as binding as they're meant to be. It's probably necessary for the maintenance of the structures that have improved material well-being across the world since WW2.

Seriously you are approaching the line where I normally get paid with this list.  But here are some short shots because I love you guys that much:
1.  Could be either to be honest.  How the Russians vacate the occupied regions will matter in the post-war narratives, but in the short term either will do - negotiated likely gives the best chance of keeping Russia from collapsing, maybe and depending who one talks to.  Defeat in detail and total collapse a la Kharkiv would remove any doubt of Ukrainian victory but may trigger a Russian identity crisis of epic proportions.  An orderly withdrawal set us up for “stabs in the back” myths.  Neither is great strategically to be honest but one second to midnight at a time.
2.  Tough one, only guaranteed allied pressure and ultimatums will be at the Russian border - UA punching into Russia in a ground incursion is definitely off the table.  So are the pre-Feb 24 borders enough?  At what point does the west get bored of this and calls for a stop?  Pre-2014?   Not sure.  One thing is sure, Putin needs to be gone before any of this becomes an option.  He is never going to accept the pre- Feb 24 borders as it means after all this they gained nothing - he will be tossed out a window and he knows it.  While I suspect pre-Feb 24 is the minimum western allies will accept.  Who blinks where and when is one of the biggest unknowns in all this.
3.  Sanctions will likely stay in place until a level of reparations are agreed and warcrimes prosecution is conducted - if we renormalize with Russia without that then shame on us, and the western order is going to look weak and shaky.  After Bucha, blatant civilian targeting across Ukraine and numerous other warcrimes, if we let that slide then the LOAC is in tatters and so is western credibility.  Russia get re-normalization if they agree.  We can start buying gas again etc and perhaps return to whatever weird normal comes next.  Russia could simply say “Screw you” and continue its slide into a third world nation.  China and India may do business with them but Russia will get taken to the cleaners as their negotiating position will be incredibly weak.
4.  Sure it could.  This is Steve’s point - with enough Russian war dead the people in Russia may simply buck.  More likely is a drug deal with some elites to depose him will be made and we get a bunch of gangsters with slightly cleaner hands. Total military defeat will definitely do it but in that scenario the risk of total collapse of Russia goes up in my mind. Transition of political power will likely not be orderly or peaceful in a total military defeat, or at least the risks go up.  But the old bastard has had 20 years to solidify power and surround himself with dependent power players.  Tough and tall order to remove him early but that is where we are.
5.  Definitely. If Ukraine takes back the occupied regions by force, they are going to lose people doing so. Handing them back over to the international is very unlikely at that point.  Better to have Russia pull out before that point and we get a chance to sell ZOS concept.  The risk to occupation is one can go from being the “good guy” to bad in an afternoon.  If Haikduk is right and they simply go quietly - fantastic, but I have my doubts.  If they do go all insurgency (partisans is the wrong word) it is going to get ugly right when Ukraine needs the full support of the international community for reconstruction.  Better to make them someone else’s problem for a few years until the see what western investment looks like and beg to reintegrate with Ukraine rather than by force.  This sucks as there are a lot of people simply caught in the middle in those regions but this is ugly work when one gets into ethnic based conflicts. However this goes down Ukraine will be selling Ukraine in how it deals with those regions make no doubt about that. First hint of abuses and guys like Macgregor will be all over Fox News screaming about “Ukrainian Nazis” and why is the US spending billions etc.  Hell they will make it up anyway but real abuses may swing moderates - really hard to keep hands clean in an insurgency.
6.  Entry into NATO will be critical and we will waive whatever “rules” we have to in order to make it happen. Ukraine needs to be squarely in a western orbit after all this in order for this to be a clear western “win” for the rules based order.  I am sure Turkey and a few other nations will make duck  sounds but the US can buy off or break arms when it has too.  Victory for the West is Ukraine inside NATO - hell they are already better armed than half of NATO, with NATO weapons and training.  We mess that up then we risk the point of this entire war and the political level in NATO knows this.
7. Sanctions.  And at the rate things are going removing Russia’s state sponsor of terror designation - if Russia goes on this list - https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/. They become pretty toxic pretty fast.  US has not pulled this trigger yet but the EU has https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20221118IPR55707/european-parliament-declares-russia-to-be-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism
All that stays in place until the conditions we are talking about are met - even after the shooting stops.  I am not an economist but this does not look good:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/
Now imagine that after 5 years, 10 years?  At some point they will hit bottom but Putin is not a Kim, and the Russians will likely not accept becoming North Korea either.
So navigating to this point is going to be incredibly hard and fraught with failure points, with cliffs on either side.  For example Russia may not negotiate and Putin hangs on too long. Then the Russian collapse will be worse, Russia in free fall.  Less likely but possible if Russia drags this out until western resolve falters.  Or we fail on the follow through and leave Ukraine hanging on reconstruction. Or someone really missteps and the conflict widens.
I am often afraid people think this is easy and simple - destroy the RA, they will leave, Russians will pick a new government and we can all get back to normal.  Normal has left the building.  Navigation of this crisis is incredibly hard.  We need to keep the west together on this through the war and well beyond in the face of a recession and political divides. Ukraine has to win the war and the peace afterwards while landing on its feet facing west. Russia needs to lose but not too much, and have a relatively soft landing.  Russia needs to get back in line and re- normalize.  All of these concepts are in tension and could fly apart very easily.  Oh and the spectre of a 70 year old pin head triggering WW3 is still out there.  This is a strategic minefield if there ever was one - makes the Cuban Missile crisis look quaint.

Ukraine Volunteer is 76 years old, and quite an outlier.
The UA special forces took him in because of  Russian fluency and a basket of skills (EOD particularly) they can't get easily. And he keeps up with the younger guys.  Sounds like he also had a Ukie SoF mate while contract soldiering in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 2000s who spoke for him.
....Ref my prior posts on this, or just read the 50 odd posts in the blog which will convince you this is not a fake.
The guy is amazing.

Thanks to post this. For those, who lasy to open the thread I briefly tell about article
- First batch of Neptune missiles were taken from factory for several days before the war
- First usage of Neptune was not in April when "Moskva" has been sunk, but on 26th of Feb. Three missiles were launched at three large landing ships, which sailed toward Mykolaiv. Russians had intentions to make bridgehead near Mykolaiv or between Mykolaiv and Odesa. Missiles route have to be over Odesa, so for safety reasons their route was put on 120 m altitude instead 4-5 m. Russian detected missiles and probably intercepted all (or they missed). Also allegedly they mistakingly shot down own fighter jet, covering the convoy over the sea and hunting for the missiles too. But for Russians appearance of AS-missiles turned out total surprize, so convoy has broken the mission and returned back. 
- after first launches, battery commander was very dissapointed and ordered to check all missiles, why no one didn't hit a target. Turned out all missiles had defect with the same part, which wouldn't allow to activate warhead. Naval Command claimed this was factory sabotage, but representatives of DB "LUCH" rejected this and soon all parts were repaired
- UKR militaries, who were sources of this article, rejected any NATO assistance in Moskva attack. They tell UKR hasn't any problems with detection of so large target, all problems were only with targeting, because Neptune hadn't in that time own over-the-horizon radar (though missiles can be targeted by coordinates). 
- Bayraktar crews rejected to fly to Moskva, because there were low clouds through which TB2 can't work and to fly lower the clouds would be mean alsmost 100 % loss of valuable equipment.
- The weather helped us. Clouds were so low, that usual radar signal, reflecting from the clouds and water, rerached Moskva in 120 km from the shore and showed the thick mark on display. After seconds of hesitation, commander ordered salvo. The lauch was also from Odesa oblast area. 
- "Moskva" almost didn't activate own AD equipment, because possibly commander was sure in such terrible weather no one jet oe TB2 will not fly to attack them (also here already was posted a document of technical conditions revsion of "Moscva" for January 2022, where many critical radar and AD systems had many malfunctions or were even not in working conditions). 
- The ship could be rescued, but the evening and night storm didn't allow other vessels to approach. When on next morning the sea was already calm, there was too late.
The photo of the same historical launch
   

And that is why we support Ukraine. But if as you say yourself, we want to avoid a potential nuclear exchange, there are limits to what we can do.
True. And let's be honest neither the US nor any other country is in NATO out of kindness but because we all think it is in our best interest. And even the US have yet to prove they would actually go to war for their allies if push comes to shove. I don't see why you would take that for granted but doubt other countries.
 
Because NATO is a defensive alliance and has exactly one red line: NATO territory. There isn't even really a mechanism how NATO as a whole would support Ukraine militarily if it wasn't to be just something each country does voluntarily.

That's what I have been thinking, down at the CM Tiny battles end of the combat spectrum.  Forget the Big Push that bogs down and gets blasted by arty or air: it's five thousand ambushes or envelopments, all along the front, on average yielding a RU:UK casevac ratio of, say, 3:1.
The Russians have been hugely short of combat infantry throughout this war; that was by design (career soldiers were mainly specialists, to be augmented by mobik grunts). To me, that's the essence of why the BTG failed, hard.
They've clearly learned since April that screening and patrolling around your positions and vehicles is NOT optional.
But their VDV and spetsnaz have been worn away, and it looks like Wagner is going that way now.  Where are the cadres to train the new guys in fieldcraft and get them to survive the first bumps?
 
No infantry, no army.

So you are suggesting pulling the US more directly involved in this war so we can basically ping away at strategic targets within Russia “just a little bit more”?  The risk to opportunity costs are pretty upside down on this.  As I said before Ukraine has every right to strike legitimate military targets within Russia and obviously has a level of domestic ISR to do so. However, this is harassment fires that create uncertainty and doubt, which is not small, but Ukraine is already capable of this on its own.
Supplying longer range HIMARs without ISR support will limit their employment to what Ukraine can already prosecute or risks Ukraine leaning in and taking risks we are not comfortable with.  I have no doubt if the US supplies ATACMS today there will be people on this board screaming for “more ISR support so Ukraine can widen its target set” in another month or so.
A strategic offensive is not something one “nibbles away at” in ones or twosies - you claim to want a quick end to this war (strategic end) and that Ukraine needs long range precision fires to target in-Russia targets (Means) but they are going to do it incrementally (Ways)? - this is a flawed strategy with all the risks of escalation and none of the payoff?  You have under prescribed the risks to fit your narrative but it does not fix a fundamentally flawed strategy.
Your limited Russian airfield is a classic example of amateur military planning - ok, we execute a “limited campaign” against a single Russian airfield with strategic bombers, “1-4” was the number you quoted.  Let’s unpack this one:
We give Ukraine a few dozen ATACMS and they go ahead and do this campaign on their own - no western ISR.  Ukraine now has to validate the target and do BDA all on its own.  We have definitely escalated things by providing the weapons but can keep our hands clean from direct targeting.
Ukraine goes ahead and hits the target - you will all feel better I am sure.  They hit some infrastructure, damage the airfield and take out 4 Russian strategic bombers - huzzah!
Well this will definitely create some uncertainty for Russia which is not small, they will react and likely pull assets back lengthening flight times.  This will definitely be an escalation as it is now targeting their ability to defend themselves from NATO but it might make life harder for pounding Ukrainian cities.
Ok, now what?  Russia has over 500 TU-95s:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupolev_Tu-95 . So the actual damage to the fleet is minimal.  Airfields also take a lot to knock out so the actual damage to that airfield is going to be temporary.  Finally, we have done nothing to actually affect the Russian strategic bomber system.  It’s production, maintenance, fuelling, arming and C4ISR.  We have damaged an airfield and knocked a few platforms.  The Russians will pull back, take a little longer and burn a little more fuel (which we also did nothing about) and still hammer Ukrainian cities with abandon.
What we did do is escalate this war.  Likely reinforced Putin’s narrative that this is an existential war for Russia against NATO pretty significantly, and Russia will likely continue to escalate strikes against Ukrainian cities.
So in a month or so, you and others will be demanding a broader campaign to hit “all Russia’s airfields in ATACMS range!!”  There will be all sorts of upside down risk calculations because - once again - no one has offers any educated assessment of where the Russian escalation threshold actually is.  A larger counter AirPower campaign will require western ISR support and pull the US further into direct involvement in this war while steadily marching towards a plausible Russian escalation threshold we cannot fully define.
More bluntly put - we are breaking our opponents hands and arms right now.  It is slow and painful but working.  If you want a fast end to the war you are going to have to hit the body and head, hard and fast - no sidestepping or weasel-ing out of that reality.  Russia has nuclear strategic deterrence and a doctrine behind it:https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf. That is a pretty grey and broad doctrine btw.  So if we start striking it’s head and body we are on a slippery slope to someone pulling out a gun in this bar fight. 
The end to this war is not about making you feel better.  It is about negotiating with a reality nobody wants but can live with. Russia is already on the ropes within Ukraine, the operational campaigns have been brilliant and are working.  If we are going to do anything more double down on that because any “quick and easy” magic new platform/weapon solutions aren’t quick or easy.