Zeleban

We spread out, raised the drone. Yes, we corrected ourselves so as not to clog the radio channel with chatter. There were no conversations on the radio. A minimum and only on business. Everyone knew what to do and so on.
              We barely had time to throw a couple of mines to hit the targets, and armor and infantry rushed past us. The heart was pounding. The tanks have already finished their work and left. Our infantry was approaching enemy positions, we (mortar battery), AGS calculations, fuel... Everyone was shooting at the enemy.
But the enemy also started shooting at us. The first shell flew 100 meters from us, the guys immediately looked at me. Were they shooting at us? Maybe. But was it possible to drop everything and hide? No. I began to shout that this is not our fault, that the enemy simply missed and will now redirect.
And for everyone to immediately continue shooting. At the same time, I detected explosions and corrected them. It was clear that they would not be able to work on all our fire means at the same time. And therefore it was necessary to shoot as much as possible.
              There was complete chaos around. Everyone and everything was shooting. Projectiles were flying, everything was exploding, and the infantry reported that they were landing on enemy positions. At that moment, we were already moving to the next positions and shooting there. Ammunition consumption was crazy, but it looks like our plan worked.
The enemy threw a couple more shells at us and switched to infantry. After assessing the available ammunition, I asked the guys to bring us more. Ours secured new positions, there was a couple of minutes of rest before the next attempt. It was terribly hot.
              Later, we received a command to change our position even closer. We piled into pickup trucks and drove in the direction of the front. Our next fire was almost at the place where "zero" was literally just recently ("zero" - the closest position to the enemy).
              I was thinking only one thing while driving. F**k this platoon, f**k this army. Why am I not on the 120th mortar, which is far from the front. But I said out loud that the enemy had fallen and everything was going well for us. The people had to be encouraged
              During that day, we changed positions many times, and even then almost all of our positions were where the enemy had been before. That is, the front was moving. And we also buried the suspension on the car. Armored vests, sleeping bags, sometimes automatic weapons, RPGs, the bodies of the occupiers were lying in the forest strips...
              But at some point we could no longer move on. Everyone stayed where they were. Shells were constantly flying, during the day we took significant hits from enemy artillery a couple of times. They shot well and did not spare the projectiles at all.
              We spent the night in the forest, we were given ammunition and food. In the morning, they went to look for new firing positions and the road. It was necessary to make sure that the road was not mined. We immediately prepared our firing positions near the holes that the enemy once dug.
              We came close to Ternovi Pody. We could not go further. Why? You will understand when I write the next thread. It was the end of August, beginning of September. Then the total pressing of the enemy with artillery began. Everyone was shooting and from everything. There were days when we fired 100+ mines per day from one mortar.

Okay, to distract everyone from conspiracy theories, I’ll translate a very interesting article by a Ukrainian mortarman about his participation in the Kherson offensive. The article gives an understanding of the offensive tactics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces:
              According to my personal belief, the defense forces in our area switched to active assaults in the second half of August.
              It all started with the fact that our battalion was removed from its position and another battalion took its place. We moved a little, regrouped.
                 I was infinitely "lucky" and at that moment two commanders of the unit were dismissed from the unit. That's probably why they said to me: "Congratulations, you're the platoon commander? You'll provide people with information, you'll control it." The last thing I wanted was for someone to die under my command.
              At the briefing, everything looked optimistic and wild at the same time. I understood that it was a high bet that the enemy would run away. Considering the fact that we had both 120 and 82 mortars, I was put in command of 82. Because they have to be much closer to the contact line. And the line, in turn, will move. So the guys will have to constantly move to get to the targets. When I came and outlined to them the task that was set for me, in their eyes you could clearly read something like: "what are you, stupid!?".
           The task was as follows. While the long-range artillery was working on the enemy's artillery, the forces of the battalion and several guns of the brigade had to destroy the enemy and press them to the ground so that our infantry could storm. In particular, we had to suppress the enemy's machine gun units.
             Everything was supposed to happen like this: Our infantry loaded on the armor and went bluntly (the effect of surprise, quickly, ammunition on the armor) to the enemy positions. At that time, the artillery works against the enemy (machine guns, ATGMs, automatic grenade launchers) preventing our infantry from being destroyed.
              When it was clear from the drone that our infantrymen were approaching the nearest enemy positions, we shifted our fire to their next positions and pressed them to the ground. In order to immediately reach the planned targets, we had to drive very, very close to the contact line. So close to where they used to walk at night or run if it was daytime. At that moment, I explained to the guys that this must be done, because if we do not suppress machine guns, grenade launchers and ATGMs, then our guys in armor will simply be destroyed. Was I scared? Yes. Only fools are not afraid. I explained the work to everyone as much as possible, we determined in advance the points from which we would shoot, how, where and when to move.
              The battle began: first the artillery worked, Grad's, then a couple of tanks rolled out, they hit the enemy's position with direct fire. Since the enemy was very busy with tanks, we drove into the first line of fire almost unimpeded.

Okay, to distract everyone from conspiracy theories, I’ll translate a very interesting article by a Ukrainian mortarman about his participation in the Kherson offensive. The article gives an understanding of the offensive tactics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces:
              According to my personal belief, the defense forces in our area switched to active assaults in the second half of August.
              It all started with the fact that our battalion was removed from its position and another battalion took its place. We moved a little, regrouped.
                 I was infinitely "lucky" and at that moment two commanders of the unit were dismissed from the unit. That's probably why they said to me: "Congratulations, you're the platoon commander? You'll provide people with information, you'll control it." The last thing I wanted was for someone to die under my command.
              At the briefing, everything looked optimistic and wild at the same time. I understood that it was a high bet that the enemy would run away. Considering the fact that we had both 120 and 82 mortars, I was put in command of 82. Because they have to be much closer to the contact line. And the line, in turn, will move. So the guys will have to constantly move to get to the targets. When I came and outlined to them the task that was set for me, in their eyes you could clearly read something like: "what are you, stupid!?".
           The task was as follows. While the long-range artillery was working on the enemy's artillery, the forces of the battalion and several guns of the brigade had to destroy the enemy and press them to the ground so that our infantry could storm. In particular, we had to suppress the enemy's machine gun units.
             Everything was supposed to happen like this: Our infantry loaded on the armor and went bluntly (the effect of surprise, quickly, ammunition on the armor) to the enemy positions. At that time, the artillery works against the enemy (machine guns, ATGMs, automatic grenade launchers) preventing our infantry from being destroyed.
              When it was clear from the drone that our infantrymen were approaching the nearest enemy positions, we shifted our fire to their next positions and pressed them to the ground. In order to immediately reach the planned targets, we had to drive very, very close to the contact line. So close to where they used to walk at night or run if it was daytime. At that moment, I explained to the guys that this must be done, because if we do not suppress machine guns, grenade launchers and ATGMs, then our guys in armor will simply be destroyed. Was I scared? Yes. Only fools are not afraid. I explained the work to everyone as much as possible, we determined in advance the points from which we would shoot, how, where and when to move.
              The battle began: first the artillery worked, Grad's, then a couple of tanks rolled out, they hit the enemy's position with direct fire. Since the enemy was very busy with tanks, we drove into the first line of fire almost unimpeded.

We spread out, raised the drone. Yes, we corrected ourselves so as not to clog the radio channel with chatter. There were no conversations on the radio. A minimum and only on business. Everyone knew what to do and so on.
              We barely had time to throw a couple of mines to hit the targets, and armor and infantry rushed past us. The heart was pounding. The tanks have already finished their work and left. Our infantry was approaching enemy positions, we (mortar battery), AGS calculations, fuel... Everyone was shooting at the enemy.
But the enemy also started shooting at us. The first shell flew 100 meters from us, the guys immediately looked at me. Were they shooting at us? Maybe. But was it possible to drop everything and hide? No. I began to shout that this is not our fault, that the enemy simply missed and will now redirect.
And for everyone to immediately continue shooting. At the same time, I detected explosions and corrected them. It was clear that they would not be able to work on all our fire means at the same time. And therefore it was necessary to shoot as much as possible.
              There was complete chaos around. Everyone and everything was shooting. Projectiles were flying, everything was exploding, and the infantry reported that they were landing on enemy positions. At that moment, we were already moving to the next positions and shooting there. Ammunition consumption was crazy, but it looks like our plan worked.
The enemy threw a couple more shells at us and switched to infantry. After assessing the available ammunition, I asked the guys to bring us more. Ours secured new positions, there was a couple of minutes of rest before the next attempt. It was terribly hot.
              Later, we received a command to change our position even closer. We piled into pickup trucks and drove in the direction of the front. Our next fire was almost at the place where "zero" was literally just recently ("zero" - the closest position to the enemy).
              I was thinking only one thing while driving. F**k this platoon, f**k this army. Why am I not on the 120th mortar, which is far from the front. But I said out loud that the enemy had fallen and everything was going well for us. The people had to be encouraged
              During that day, we changed positions many times, and even then almost all of our positions were where the enemy had been before. That is, the front was moving. And we also buried the suspension on the car. Armored vests, sleeping bags, sometimes automatic weapons, RPGs, the bodies of the occupiers were lying in the forest strips...
              But at some point we could no longer move on. Everyone stayed where they were. Shells were constantly flying, during the day we took significant hits from enemy artillery a couple of times. They shot well and did not spare the projectiles at all.
              We spent the night in the forest, we were given ammunition and food. In the morning, they went to look for new firing positions and the road. It was necessary to make sure that the road was not mined. We immediately prepared our firing positions near the holes that the enemy once dug.
              We came close to Ternovi Pody. We could not go further. Why? You will understand when I write the next thread. It was the end of August, beginning of September. Then the total pressing of the enemy with artillery began. Everyone was shooting and from everything. There were days when we fired 100+ mines per day from one mortar.

On one fine day, I was concussed when an enemy shell exploded literally a meter from a hole into which I jumped at the last moment. Then another stone flew into my ribs and I thought with relief that now I was wounded and would go to rest.
              But it was just a stone, and all I got was a very bad headache for the next few months. When the very active phase of the assault ended, the service was established, then I finally transferred to Petrichenko's gang to fly the Mavic. How it was and what it cost is a separate story.
              It was there that we encountered the moment when the enemy left Kherson. Yes, the enemy left in November. But in my opinion, these were the first steps towards them leaving. In the next thread, I will tell how they left, how we entered the villages, how I climbed the enemy's positions and how I almost died.
              Were there any wild moments? So. Were there any problems? So. But let me tell you about them after the war. Not to go storming Pisky now.
 
 

M882 ARV resqued from battlefield damaged Bradley. Likely this was under fire, because M882 got some fragments at side hull. But crew completed own mission - Bradley soon will be in "hospital" and return to beat Ruissians again. 
In previous days in Stepove area near Avdivka five Bradleys were damaged.
 

Okay, to distract everyone from conspiracy theories, I’ll translate a very interesting article by a Ukrainian mortarman about his participation in the Kherson offensive. The article gives an understanding of the offensive tactics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces:
              According to my personal belief, the defense forces in our area switched to active assaults in the second half of August.
              It all started with the fact that our battalion was removed from its position and another battalion took its place. We moved a little, regrouped.
                 I was infinitely "lucky" and at that moment two commanders of the unit were dismissed from the unit. That's probably why they said to me: "Congratulations, you're the platoon commander? You'll provide people with information, you'll control it." The last thing I wanted was for someone to die under my command.
              At the briefing, everything looked optimistic and wild at the same time. I understood that it was a high bet that the enemy would run away. Considering the fact that we had both 120 and 82 mortars, I was put in command of 82. Because they have to be much closer to the contact line. And the line, in turn, will move. So the guys will have to constantly move to get to the targets. When I came and outlined to them the task that was set for me, in their eyes you could clearly read something like: "what are you, stupid!?".
           The task was as follows. While the long-range artillery was working on the enemy's artillery, the forces of the battalion and several guns of the brigade had to destroy the enemy and press them to the ground so that our infantry could storm. In particular, we had to suppress the enemy's machine gun units.
             Everything was supposed to happen like this: Our infantry loaded on the armor and went bluntly (the effect of surprise, quickly, ammunition on the armor) to the enemy positions. At that time, the artillery works against the enemy (machine guns, ATGMs, automatic grenade launchers) preventing our infantry from being destroyed.
              When it was clear from the drone that our infantrymen were approaching the nearest enemy positions, we shifted our fire to their next positions and pressed them to the ground. In order to immediately reach the planned targets, we had to drive very, very close to the contact line. So close to where they used to walk at night or run if it was daytime. At that moment, I explained to the guys that this must be done, because if we do not suppress machine guns, grenade launchers and ATGMs, then our guys in armor will simply be destroyed. Was I scared? Yes. Only fools are not afraid. I explained the work to everyone as much as possible, we determined in advance the points from which we would shoot, how, where and when to move.
              The battle began: first the artillery worked, Grad's, then a couple of tanks rolled out, they hit the enemy's position with direct fire. Since the enemy was very busy with tanks, we drove into the first line of fire almost unimpeded.

On one fine day, I was concussed when an enemy shell exploded literally a meter from a hole into which I jumped at the last moment. Then another stone flew into my ribs and I thought with relief that now I was wounded and would go to rest.
              But it was just a stone, and all I got was a very bad headache for the next few months. When the very active phase of the assault ended, the service was established, then I finally transferred to Petrichenko's gang to fly the Mavic. How it was and what it cost is a separate story.
              It was there that we encountered the moment when the enemy left Kherson. Yes, the enemy left in November. But in my opinion, these were the first steps towards them leaving. In the next thread, I will tell how they left, how we entered the villages, how I climbed the enemy's positions and how I almost died.
              Were there any wild moments? So. Were there any problems? So. But let me tell you about them after the war. Not to go storming Pisky now.
 
 

On one fine day, I was concussed when an enemy shell exploded literally a meter from a hole into which I jumped at the last moment. Then another stone flew into my ribs and I thought with relief that now I was wounded and would go to rest.
              But it was just a stone, and all I got was a very bad headache for the next few months. When the very active phase of the assault ended, the service was established, then I finally transferred to Petrichenko's gang to fly the Mavic. How it was and what it cost is a separate story.
              It was there that we encountered the moment when the enemy left Kherson. Yes, the enemy left in November. But in my opinion, these were the first steps towards them leaving. In the next thread, I will tell how they left, how we entered the villages, how I climbed the enemy's positions and how I almost died.
              Were there any wild moments? So. Were there any problems? So. But let me tell you about them after the war. Not to go storming Pisky now.
 
 

We spread out, raised the drone. Yes, we corrected ourselves so as not to clog the radio channel with chatter. There were no conversations on the radio. A minimum and only on business. Everyone knew what to do and so on.
              We barely had time to throw a couple of mines to hit the targets, and armor and infantry rushed past us. The heart was pounding. The tanks have already finished their work and left. Our infantry was approaching enemy positions, we (mortar battery), AGS calculations, fuel... Everyone was shooting at the enemy.
But the enemy also started shooting at us. The first shell flew 100 meters from us, the guys immediately looked at me. Were they shooting at us? Maybe. But was it possible to drop everything and hide? No. I began to shout that this is not our fault, that the enemy simply missed and will now redirect.
And for everyone to immediately continue shooting. At the same time, I detected explosions and corrected them. It was clear that they would not be able to work on all our fire means at the same time. And therefore it was necessary to shoot as much as possible.
              There was complete chaos around. Everyone and everything was shooting. Projectiles were flying, everything was exploding, and the infantry reported that they were landing on enemy positions. At that moment, we were already moving to the next positions and shooting there. Ammunition consumption was crazy, but it looks like our plan worked.
The enemy threw a couple more shells at us and switched to infantry. After assessing the available ammunition, I asked the guys to bring us more. Ours secured new positions, there was a couple of minutes of rest before the next attempt. It was terribly hot.
              Later, we received a command to change our position even closer. We piled into pickup trucks and drove in the direction of the front. Our next fire was almost at the place where "zero" was literally just recently ("zero" - the closest position to the enemy).
              I was thinking only one thing while driving. F**k this platoon, f**k this army. Why am I not on the 120th mortar, which is far from the front. But I said out loud that the enemy had fallen and everything was going well for us. The people had to be encouraged
              During that day, we changed positions many times, and even then almost all of our positions were where the enemy had been before. That is, the front was moving. And we also buried the suspension on the car. Armored vests, sleeping bags, sometimes automatic weapons, RPGs, the bodies of the occupiers were lying in the forest strips...
              But at some point we could no longer move on. Everyone stayed where they were. Shells were constantly flying, during the day we took significant hits from enemy artillery a couple of times. They shot well and did not spare the projectiles at all.
              We spent the night in the forest, we were given ammunition and food. In the morning, they went to look for new firing positions and the road. It was necessary to make sure that the road was not mined. We immediately prepared our firing positions near the holes that the enemy once dug.
              We came close to Ternovi Pody. We could not go further. Why? You will understand when I write the next thread. It was the end of August, beginning of September. Then the total pressing of the enemy with artillery began. Everyone was shooting and from everything. There were days when we fired 100+ mines per day from one mortar.

This is example of good planning and lucky development. But somebody will tell after the war about Davydiv Brid...
Maybe best picture to Kherson liberation Day

Okay, to distract everyone from conspiracy theories, I’ll translate a very interesting article by a Ukrainian mortarman about his participation in the Kherson offensive. The article gives an understanding of the offensive tactics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces:
              According to my personal belief, the defense forces in our area switched to active assaults in the second half of August.
              It all started with the fact that our battalion was removed from its position and another battalion took its place. We moved a little, regrouped.
                 I was infinitely "lucky" and at that moment two commanders of the unit were dismissed from the unit. That's probably why they said to me: "Congratulations, you're the platoon commander? You'll provide people with information, you'll control it." The last thing I wanted was for someone to die under my command.
              At the briefing, everything looked optimistic and wild at the same time. I understood that it was a high bet that the enemy would run away. Considering the fact that we had both 120 and 82 mortars, I was put in command of 82. Because they have to be much closer to the contact line. And the line, in turn, will move. So the guys will have to constantly move to get to the targets. When I came and outlined to them the task that was set for me, in their eyes you could clearly read something like: "what are you, stupid!?".
           The task was as follows. While the long-range artillery was working on the enemy's artillery, the forces of the battalion and several guns of the brigade had to destroy the enemy and press them to the ground so that our infantry could storm. In particular, we had to suppress the enemy's machine gun units.
             Everything was supposed to happen like this: Our infantry loaded on the armor and went bluntly (the effect of surprise, quickly, ammunition on the armor) to the enemy positions. At that time, the artillery works against the enemy (machine guns, ATGMs, automatic grenade launchers) preventing our infantry from being destroyed.
              When it was clear from the drone that our infantrymen were approaching the nearest enemy positions, we shifted our fire to their next positions and pressed them to the ground. In order to immediately reach the planned targets, we had to drive very, very close to the contact line. So close to where they used to walk at night or run if it was daytime. At that moment, I explained to the guys that this must be done, because if we do not suppress machine guns, grenade launchers and ATGMs, then our guys in armor will simply be destroyed. Was I scared? Yes. Only fools are not afraid. I explained the work to everyone as much as possible, we determined in advance the points from which we would shoot, how, where and when to move.
              The battle began: first the artillery worked, Grad's, then a couple of tanks rolled out, they hit the enemy's position with direct fire. Since the enemy was very busy with tanks, we drove into the first line of fire almost unimpeded.

On one fine day, I was concussed when an enemy shell exploded literally a meter from a hole into which I jumped at the last moment. Then another stone flew into my ribs and I thought with relief that now I was wounded and would go to rest.
              But it was just a stone, and all I got was a very bad headache for the next few months. When the very active phase of the assault ended, the service was established, then I finally transferred to Petrichenko's gang to fly the Mavic. How it was and what it cost is a separate story.
              It was there that we encountered the moment when the enemy left Kherson. Yes, the enemy left in November. But in my opinion, these were the first steps towards them leaving. In the next thread, I will tell how they left, how we entered the villages, how I climbed the enemy's positions and how I almost died.
              Were there any wild moments? So. Were there any problems? So. But let me tell you about them after the war. Not to go storming Pisky now.
 
 

Okay, to distract everyone from conspiracy theories, I’ll translate a very interesting article by a Ukrainian mortarman about his participation in the Kherson offensive. The article gives an understanding of the offensive tactics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces:
              According to my personal belief, the defense forces in our area switched to active assaults in the second half of August.
              It all started with the fact that our battalion was removed from its position and another battalion took its place. We moved a little, regrouped.
                 I was infinitely "lucky" and at that moment two commanders of the unit were dismissed from the unit. That's probably why they said to me: "Congratulations, you're the platoon commander? You'll provide people with information, you'll control it." The last thing I wanted was for someone to die under my command.
              At the briefing, everything looked optimistic and wild at the same time. I understood that it was a high bet that the enemy would run away. Considering the fact that we had both 120 and 82 mortars, I was put in command of 82. Because they have to be much closer to the contact line. And the line, in turn, will move. So the guys will have to constantly move to get to the targets. When I came and outlined to them the task that was set for me, in their eyes you could clearly read something like: "what are you, stupid!?".
           The task was as follows. While the long-range artillery was working on the enemy's artillery, the forces of the battalion and several guns of the brigade had to destroy the enemy and press them to the ground so that our infantry could storm. In particular, we had to suppress the enemy's machine gun units.
             Everything was supposed to happen like this: Our infantry loaded on the armor and went bluntly (the effect of surprise, quickly, ammunition on the armor) to the enemy positions. At that time, the artillery works against the enemy (machine guns, ATGMs, automatic grenade launchers) preventing our infantry from being destroyed.
              When it was clear from the drone that our infantrymen were approaching the nearest enemy positions, we shifted our fire to their next positions and pressed them to the ground. In order to immediately reach the planned targets, we had to drive very, very close to the contact line. So close to where they used to walk at night or run if it was daytime. At that moment, I explained to the guys that this must be done, because if we do not suppress machine guns, grenade launchers and ATGMs, then our guys in armor will simply be destroyed. Was I scared? Yes. Only fools are not afraid. I explained the work to everyone as much as possible, we determined in advance the points from which we would shoot, how, where and when to move.
              The battle began: first the artillery worked, Grad's, then a couple of tanks rolled out, they hit the enemy's position with direct fire. Since the enemy was very busy with tanks, we drove into the first line of fire almost unimpeded.

We spread out, raised the drone. Yes, we corrected ourselves so as not to clog the radio channel with chatter. There were no conversations on the radio. A minimum and only on business. Everyone knew what to do and so on.
              We barely had time to throw a couple of mines to hit the targets, and armor and infantry rushed past us. The heart was pounding. The tanks have already finished their work and left. Our infantry was approaching enemy positions, we (mortar battery), AGS calculations, fuel... Everyone was shooting at the enemy.
But the enemy also started shooting at us. The first shell flew 100 meters from us, the guys immediately looked at me. Were they shooting at us? Maybe. But was it possible to drop everything and hide? No. I began to shout that this is not our fault, that the enemy simply missed and will now redirect.
And for everyone to immediately continue shooting. At the same time, I detected explosions and corrected them. It was clear that they would not be able to work on all our fire means at the same time. And therefore it was necessary to shoot as much as possible.
              There was complete chaos around. Everyone and everything was shooting. Projectiles were flying, everything was exploding, and the infantry reported that they were landing on enemy positions. At that moment, we were already moving to the next positions and shooting there. Ammunition consumption was crazy, but it looks like our plan worked.
The enemy threw a couple more shells at us and switched to infantry. After assessing the available ammunition, I asked the guys to bring us more. Ours secured new positions, there was a couple of minutes of rest before the next attempt. It was terribly hot.
              Later, we received a command to change our position even closer. We piled into pickup trucks and drove in the direction of the front. Our next fire was almost at the place where "zero" was literally just recently ("zero" - the closest position to the enemy).
              I was thinking only one thing while driving. F**k this platoon, f**k this army. Why am I not on the 120th mortar, which is far from the front. But I said out loud that the enemy had fallen and everything was going well for us. The people had to be encouraged
              During that day, we changed positions many times, and even then almost all of our positions were where the enemy had been before. That is, the front was moving. And we also buried the suspension on the car. Armored vests, sleeping bags, sometimes automatic weapons, RPGs, the bodies of the occupiers were lying in the forest strips...
              But at some point we could no longer move on. Everyone stayed where they were. Shells were constantly flying, during the day we took significant hits from enemy artillery a couple of times. They shot well and did not spare the projectiles at all.
              We spent the night in the forest, we were given ammunition and food. In the morning, they went to look for new firing positions and the road. It was necessary to make sure that the road was not mined. We immediately prepared our firing positions near the holes that the enemy once dug.
              We came close to Ternovi Pody. We could not go further. Why? You will understand when I write the next thread. It was the end of August, beginning of September. Then the total pressing of the enemy with artillery began. Everyone was shooting and from everything. There were days when we fired 100+ mines per day from one mortar.

On one fine day, I was concussed when an enemy shell exploded literally a meter from a hole into which I jumped at the last moment. Then another stone flew into my ribs and I thought with relief that now I was wounded and would go to rest.
              But it was just a stone, and all I got was a very bad headache for the next few months. When the very active phase of the assault ended, the service was established, then I finally transferred to Petrichenko's gang to fly the Mavic. How it was and what it cost is a separate story.
              It was there that we encountered the moment when the enemy left Kherson. Yes, the enemy left in November. But in my opinion, these were the first steps towards them leaving. In the next thread, I will tell how they left, how we entered the villages, how I climbed the enemy's positions and how I almost died.
              Were there any wild moments? So. Were there any problems? So. But let me tell you about them after the war. Not to go storming Pisky now.
 
 

It is very interesting how a former intelligence officer, while in prison, managed to organize and carry out one of the most complex operations of our time. Despite the fact that he had only a few childishly naive failed operations.

It is very interesting how a former intelligence officer, while in prison, managed to organize and carry out one of the most complex operations of our time. Despite the fact that he had only a few childishly naive failed operations.

It is very interesting how a former intelligence officer, while in prison, managed to organize and carry out one of the most complex operations of our time. Despite the fact that he had only a few childishly naive failed operations.

Makes sense. Aircraft turbine engines must be replaced at specific numbers of operating hours, for example 1,500 flight hours (just an example as it’s been more than 30 years since I built-up helicopter turbine engines). It takes around 100 work hours just to assemble the components. That doesn’t include building the components such as an axial compressor. Let’s say the compressor is a seven-stage compressor, each stage must be assembled with blades, seals, , etc. individually, then assembled together. From there, it has to be spin-tested to balance it. Then, it goes down the line to have bearings and bearing races (and sometimes other components). Then the engine engine has to be assembled and tested before being “canned” and shipped.
To give you an idea of how long a helicopter engine might last during a conflict, I was assembling helicopter engines in January of 1991 when the first Iraq war began. In February, we were starting to see engine that had been replaced because there was glass on the gas generator blades that provided power to the rotors.

I remember there was a discussion here about the effectiveness of mine-resistant boots in case of a mine explosion. Here are the results:
 

I remember there was a discussion here about the effectiveness of mine-resistant boots in case of a mine explosion. Here are the results:
 

The situation on the left bank of the Dnieper from Konstantin Mashovets:
You can treat the active actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the Dnieper in any way you like. Consider this a “PR gamble with blood”, a pointless waste of resources, or seriously consider the possibility of a “breakthrough to Crimea” in this direction.
But so far, real events indicate that the Russian command in the Crimean-Tavrian direction, at least, received a significant “headache” that was clearly not planned by them. This is already a fact, no matter how you evaluate and interpret it.
As far as I understand, everything there is going exactly “according to plan”, however, obviously not to the Russian one:
- At least 2 tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the road and railway Antonov bridges have already turned into 1, but more than the previous two. Moreover, apparently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding him quite tightly.
- In the area of the village of Krynki, units of the enemy’s 26th motorized rifle regiment apparently still hold part of the forest south of the village and the north-eastern part of the village itself, but the situation there for the Russians is clearly developing, somehow “in the wrong direction.” Moreover, even the Storm-Z, driven from the direction of Korsunok, does not help. In turn, several units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade of the Russians tried to “probe the Ukrainian bridgehead” in this area, as they say, head-on, impudently, but it turned out unsuccessfully for them.
- In at least 2 places, the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the section between Oleshki and Novaya Kakhovka managed to cut the coastal road that goes from Novaya Kakhovka to Oleshki, which, in itself, is a little strange. But it will be even stranger if Ukrainian units go to the next road E-58. And they have such an opportunity, in which case the situation will change completely, radically.
– Along the Podstepnoe – Peschanivka line there is also some “vanity and disorder”. In the area of Chaika Island, the enemy (probably units of the 177th separate marine regiment and the 171st separate airborne assault battalion from the 7th airborne assault division) are trying to hold the first position of the main line of defense. It is quite possible that separate units of the enemy’s 205th Infantry Motorized Rifle Brigade are also involved there. But, despite this, even judging by open sources, the situation there is also heating up for the enemy, especially north of the village of Podstepnoe.
In short, the enemy somehow did not have an effective line of defense from the Dnieper flood plains. How does Teplinsky and Company react to all these events? Of course, in the typical Russian style:
 
- Transferring additional forces and assets to the “dangerous area”;
- Organizing and conducting numerous series of attacks in 24/7 mode.
Moreover, the introduction of formations, units and subunits into battle occurs in the same way as always, “as they concentrate and deploy.”
 
We are talking, first of all, about two main formations that the enemy obviously intends to use to “liquidate the Dnieper crisis” - the 70th motorized rifle division from the 18th combined arms army, as well as the 7th airborne assault division

And finally, assessments of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the part of the enemy.
Several Russian publics, more or less adequate (and therefore not very well known “in their own family”), quite unanimously came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had planned, organized and worked out their actions through the Dnieper in advance. I won’t point them out now, so as not to advertise the enemy, but I will point out that they argued their conclusions quite adequately:
- The Russians were unpleasantly surprised by the speed and efficiency of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units, especially in the area of increasing their efforts. “First, 2-3 sabotage groups are found there, then they form a platoon, and after a couple of days, when they have gained a foothold, they begin to transport mortars there and a company already appears there, and so on.”
- Also, they came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian command had found an opportunity, in some still unknown way, to ensure the replenishment of their advanced units and organize their logistical support, in sufficient quantities and with appropriate efficiency (otherwise the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces would not have been able to conduct intensive combat operations on the bridgeheads for a more or less long period of time, and they, in addition, manage to expand them).
- It is also obvious that the width along the front and the main areas and directions of active actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “through the Dnieper” were not chosen at all by chance. They are clearly tied to the nature of the terrain, the composition and operational formation of Russian troops, even the water level and the most successful and convenient places for landing and hidden advance in the floodplain are taken into account. The Russians come to the conclusion that they are dealing with a carefully planned and prepared, especially in the field of intelligence, operation to seize and hold bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. Although, of course, they believe that by “restoring order” and “concentrating efforts” they have a significant chance of eliminating them.

For those who have forgotten, let me remind you that I already wrote that from the 7th Airborne Division in this direction, until recently there were essentially only three battalions (171st separate air assault battalion, 104th separate tank battalion and 162nd separate reconnaissance battalion). The main forces of the division (3 of its air assault regiments) were, at one time, transferred “near Verbovoe” to take part in flank counterattacks against the advancing Ukrainian group.
Well, now, given the fact that with the “flank counterattacks” in the Tokmak direction, nothing meaningful happened anyway, and the Ukrainian marines staged a fatal counter-strike for the Russian motorized rifles and mobs in the Dnieper floodplains, Monsieur Teplinsky clearly demanded from his “senior commanders” return this formation of airborne troops “back” to him. Let me remind you that the regular position of this general is commander of the airborne troops of the Russian Federation.
However, the fact is that the Russian command is now unable to pull out the main forces of the 7th Airborne Division from under Verbovoy in the Tokmak direction “purely physically.” The division's 108th and 247th air assault regiments are closely involved in the fighting. And the 56th Airborne Regiment, which has already been reorganized “almost anew” 2 times, can send “to Teplinsky” right now no more than 2 of its battalions. Although, probably, “a little later,” this Feodosian rabble will go to the Dnieper in full force (if it hasn’t already).
As for the 70th Motorized Rifle Division, 2 of its motorized rifle regiments are ALREADY involved - the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment is still unsuccessfully trying to push our marines back from Krynki to the flooded areas, and the 28th Motorized Rifle Regiment is probably included in the second echelon of the tactical group operating along the line Peschanka - Podstepnoe, north of the village of Radensk, somewhere southwest of the village of Chelburda. At least one small infantry regiment and another tank regiment (tp) of this division are also “roaming somewhere.”
A month ago there was information about the tank regiment that it was continuing to be “reformed” in northern Crimea, and the motorized rifle regiment was allegedly concentrated in the area of Skadovsk.
Be that as it may, the enemy will soon be forced to “deal with the problem of Ukrainian bridgeheads” on the Dnieper. After all, if they leave this issue to chance, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will still be able to get a section of coastline on the right bank of the river, where the bulk of Russian artillery will not reach. It’s not for me to explain to you what it will be.
Naturally, it still has to be reliably covered from the air. On this score, I also have certain, far from unfounded (judging by the information coming from the troops) hopes.