Machor

RU mil historian on the current issues of VDV
Summary - RU military finally discovered that their ideas for VDV use are wrong. Parachuting into a combat zone from a transport plane is suicidal. VDV light armor is too light to survive on the modern battlefield. 
I need to note that this issue was widely discussed in RU military history circles ages ago but apparently RU High Command ignored it until it was too late. 

Even if we were to consider them the sole (or even primary) reason for the Japanese surrender, I don't think the atomic bombings can be considered a counterexample to the lesson that terror bombing does not work. The 20s and 30s theory of terror bombing was that bombing cities would break the populace's will to resist and drive them to rebel or flee. This is not what happened in Japan...one can argue that the atomic bombings pushed the political and military leadership to a decision point, but not that they broke the civil population's will in any way that forced the government's hand.
As far as the USSR's entry into the Pacific war is concerned, I think it's both-and, not either-or, and even then there are other factors which probably played a major role. Contrary to the "official narrative" having been that the atomic bombings led to the surrender, there has always been a school of thought that the naval blockade was the real reason for Japan's capitulation (one can guess the inter-service rivalry affiliation breakdown of that debate). I think it's probably safe to say that the collapse of Japanese war industries due to the combined effects of the blockade and bombing, the appearance of nuclear weapons in the equation, the Soviets entering the war, impending famine due to the blockade and U.S. diplomatic signalling that the Allies would let Japan keep the Emperor as a constitutional monarch all contributed to some degree...

well, we know why Bolivia is on the list... they need to insure a good supply of pharmaceuticals.

Dropping by with Coke & Stripper news:
Ukraine war: Russian investigator says 92 Ukrainians charged
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62287502
 

Shevchuk's "Умирали пацаны" - "The boys were dying" was the first song that I thought about when this war started, and one would understand why by looking at the lyrics; but first, the song itself:
Shevchuk wrote this song after visiting the front during the First Chechen War, and here he's singing it to footage he himself shot in Chechnya:
My attempt at a translation:
 

Shevchuk's "Умирали пацаны" - "The boys were dying" was the first song that I thought about when this war started, and one would understand why by looking at the lyrics; but first, the song itself:
Shevchuk wrote this song after visiting the front during the First Chechen War, and here he's singing it to footage he himself shot in Chechnya:
My attempt at a translation:
 

Shevchuk's "Умирали пацаны" - "The boys were dying" was the first song that I thought about when this war started, and one would understand why by looking at the lyrics; but first, the song itself:
Shevchuk wrote this song after visiting the front during the First Chechen War, and here he's singing it to footage he himself shot in Chechnya:
My attempt at a translation:
 

Shevchuk's "Умирали пацаны" - "The boys were dying" was the first song that I thought about when this war started, and one would understand why by looking at the lyrics; but first, the song itself:
Shevchuk wrote this song after visiting the front during the First Chechen War, and here he's singing it to footage he himself shot in Chechnya:
My attempt at a translation:
 

Shevchuk's "Умирали пацаны" - "The boys were dying" was the first song that I thought about when this war started, and one would understand why by looking at the lyrics; but first, the song itself:
Shevchuk wrote this song after visiting the front during the First Chechen War, and here he's singing it to footage he himself shot in Chechnya:
My attempt at a translation:
 

Interesting, it wasn't posted before so worth to note Ukrainians hit something (probably EW/radar device) in Enerhodar using Warmate drones. Their appearance is relatively rare so it was probbaly high-value target. Loitering ammo start to be slowly seen over battlefields.

So Kherson...ooo boy.  Well first off, I am buying off on the whole "traitor" theory that Kherson was likely sold-out, that or the UA simply got stretched too thin but this is the major southern axis so I do not see how they did not prioritize it - maybe they did and Russians down this way actually demonstrated talent.  Why?
Well because on paper this city should be damn near impossible to take from the South:

By my eyes there are roughly 5 crossing sites that one can pull from Google.  The Dnieper is a deep old river so I cannot tell if there are any fording sites but I doubt it.  Wiki says the Dnieper runs at about 1.5 m/sec which is fairly slow and easily swimmable and pontoon-able.  However, Kherson is right on a major delta stretch, to the point that a second river breaks out called the "Konka" (sp?).  Anyway this is a major water obstacle, like Rhine river "major".  The river itself ranges from 500-1000m but that is not the rub, it is the delta - that is a very angry and hungry looking swamp that looks like the mouth of a Dune Sandworm to mobility.  Sure you can pontoon the bridge but those wetlands look like they will eat Divisions, we are talking major road and causeway work in order to sustain.
As I said there are 5 possible crossing sites: 
-Starting on the far left, there is a possible amphibious run between Sofiivka and Rybal'Che but this is also a major undertaking.  That is a 12km run so we are basically talking D-Day but there is infrastructure on either side to support (I am not sure about the shoreline, would need to do an MSFS flight).
- Then we have the Antonovskiy Bridge that the UA is currently turning into swiss cheese.  That is a 1000m crossing without the bridge and a lot of greenish looking swamp hell on the N bank.  Tough.
- We then have what looks like a rail bridge called "Antonivsʹkyy Zaliznychnyy", not sure if it still up but it is about 6km upstream from the Antonovskiy.  If the UA did not blow that one up it will have to go as well (did a quick check but cannot see if it was already).
- Next is what I think is the only decent amphib/pontoon site along this gawd-awful shoreline.  Just on the western outskirts of L'vov about 34 km up from the Antonovskiy there is what looks like a viable crossing site.  The south bank aint great but this is a hydro-electric line crossing so road infrastructure is there (note would have to do a second small bridging op about 1km to the east on a small inlet), which takes one up to an old monastery in Korsunka.
- Last, is the road bridge at the Kakhovka hydro electrical station.  Looks modern and solid.
After that further upstream the Dnieper expands out and although one could find a decent shore line we are basically back to D-Day.
So What?  Well it is like Stalingrad, a city with it back to a major obstacle coming from the UA side.  All war is communication and retaking Kherson will send big political signals in all directions.  It would be a clear sign that the UA can do offensive in a major way, which should assist in shoring up the cottage-cheese spines of some in the West.  It would also be a major blow to Russia, effectively undeciding that entire front.  I am sure they will try and sell it as "we withdrew for the good of the people" noise but even the most doe-eyed Russian believer will have a seed of doubt planted.  
So to the big question: how does the UA take Kherson? Well a couple schools of thought, first a Western solution:

Coming from the Western School of Manoeuvre, the game here would be to cut off Kherson and choke it out, without having to do heavy urban combat.  So Shape, Manoeuvre, Isolate and Attrit would be the order of the day.  A big armored led spearhead thrust down from the North across all that wonderful tank country.  A bounce crossing on those two eastern sites, complete with SF, Airmobile snaps and then swing westward and cut the Russian LOCs completely.  Meanwhile keep the pressure on Kherson from the North, while using deep strike to Fix supporting forces.  Very nice, so long as one has air supremacy.  
I will say it now, if the UA can do this, the war will be over much sooner than anyone thinks. As I have noted before, I have grown allergic to big bold strokes in this war.  The biggest issue, beyond establishing pre-conditions, is time-space-force.  That is about a 130 km thunder run and would likely take a couple modern heavy divisions to pull off, maybe three.  I do not think the UA has that kind of force, nor are they going to get the pre-conditions to support it.  I have no doubt that pundits will start drawing stuff like this...use it for profiling purposes.  I pray to god that the UA could pull off this offensive but I also do not think he is listening...very unlikely.  So what could a UA offense look like?

Attrition-to-Manoeuvre, not the other way around.  The UA could compress Kherson and pull in a lot of RA in reaction.  With their superior ISR and deep strike they could do a lot of damage in depth - given the ranges, this whole thing at Antonovskiy could be a setup for ATACMS arrival.  If they start hitting EW, then UAS are also back on the menu.  As they compress Kherson, their artillery will pull in range as well.  As they pull and bleed the RA, an opportunity to do a North South offensive opens up but only take it to the bridge at the hydro-plant, while cutting every crossing.  You might bag the RA forces to the east.
The major problem with this one is Kherson itself.  If the RA is trapped like rats, they will fight like them.  The UA could break itself in a city of that size (which they know after Mariupol).  My guess is that they will simply bleed the RA white here, hitting them once again along the entire length of the RA operational system.  This presents the modern dilemma of "stay and bleed out" or "withdraw, preserve force and lose the city", either way, so long as the UA can keep pulling the RA in and killing them in numbers while they try and hold onto Kherson it is a winnable situation.
Key will be setting operational conditions and holding onto them.  Deep strike, deep strike and deep strike.  They need to keep hitting RA logistics to keep the RA guns silent and then the UA guns can go to work on the rest without fearing overwhelming c-btty.
How is it actually going to go down...no idea.  In fact it might not happen at all, the whole thing could be a feint.  But one thing is for sure, it has got the Russians wondering.  And on the battlefield uncertainty on your opponent is a useful thing. 

Some news from mental asylum 
Deputy of one of the Moscow municipal districts got 10 days of arrest due to a repost of New York Times article from 2 of May 1945 about Hitler death.  Distribution of extremist materials. Article 20.3 of the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation.
The author of the original tweet posted the article with the word meaning: "It's time". However, he already escaped, so RU fascists came for the guy who reposted it.
 
But the most mental case happened with RU legendary leader of legendary group DDT. During live concert in Ufa Yuri Shevchuk said: "Motherland, [my] friends, is not the president's ass, which you have to slabber and kiss all the time. The motherland is a beggar grandmother at the train station selling potatoes. This is the motherland" Immediately after the concert he was questioned and a case against him was started.  
The hilarious part is that the judge is facing huge dilemma - he cannot rule for Shevchuk but ruling against him means judge and by extension RU gov believe that RU motherland is indeed the president's ass, which you have to slabber and kiss all the time.
Well, they are transferring his case between departments back and forth delaying the court hearing. 

Interesting video about analysis of T-72 by West Germany during the reunification.

Not going to read too much into this but still an interesting video from Putin's meeting with Erdogan.

They did precisely that- Romans did fought in phalanx earlier, and by 4th cent BC they resorted to smaller units quincunx mainly because of battles with local hillybilly tribes in Central Italy like Samnites, Lukanians and other Oscans. Other factor was recruitment system, when warriors from allied polities fought under one banner in new smaller maniples/cohorts. Which is one of many ancient examples btw how constant elements of warfare are always here, and seem to be banal- but they were quite a discovery back then:
1. Battlefield environment shapes military culture and tactics
2. Political/social system is always connected to military one
3. Military knowledge can be comprehend, rationalized, retought and reshaped again (quite an achievemnt back then, when battles were giant hack and slash melees)
Of course, there was very important element of military thought that start to appear in classical antiquity- combined arms, at which especially Hellenistic commanders excelled and seem to be rarely present in earlier pre-state warfare. Good use of light infantry and cavalry were always a massive factor and could bring victory against superior, close-packed mass of heavy formations. Serious studies about their importance only recently started to appear, as our sources often underestimated their role in favour of hoplites/legionaires.
I know Turney-High, the other will check. On Roman (and generally ancient) military culture there is accessible, very interesting book Soldiers and Ghosts by J.Lendon. It basically shows how Romans were successfull because they married virtus (manliness, personal bravery) and disciplina (broadly obedience, but also knowledge of tactics and of technology). This is more or less what we talke about here.
Definitelly, their whole systems of fighting and waging war was very alien to modern concepts.
No less fascinating is how some pre-gunpowder societies adapted when met with Europeans. It struck me when I started to read on them  how often it was these "savages" now armed with rifles and/or horses that were actually victorious on battlefields in New World(s) over  "modern" heavy formations. Iroqis, Dakotas, Siouxs, Maori, Apachi- all have quite impressive list of victorious engagements when using their own adaptive tactics. They were usually only beaten on strategic level (could not securre logistics- food) or by relentless fortification efforts.
 
Back to the topic- reportedly Russian plane shot down near Kahkovka.
https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1549465609896923137

Very true, however agency was also dangerous (still is) as it was how formations failed and collapsed.  It is super interesting to look back at warfare back and then and see it as far more complicated than we assume.  The Roman’s likely wrestled with the balance between agency and formation as much as we do.  For more on pre-civilization warfare Turney-High and Lawrence Keeley have laid down some foundational works.  The punch line was that historically speaking when small-high agency met large formation mass, mass won…eventually.  And then the Romans built what looks like smarter more agile mass, which makes me wonder if they did not inculcate some of the tribal approaches.
I am sure official histories tell how colonial wars were sideshows quickly forgotten but that is not really how military culture works.  We tend to admire those we fight, particularly if they do it well.  The lessons of our opponents tend to leech into the bloodstream.  We definitely saw this one the North American continent with the (re) invention of Light Infantry mirroring indigenous warfare and in most cases fighting along side them.
I personally find tribal based pre-history warfare fascinating, but that is me.

He is really running out of options indeed.  Its going to be a long year for our neighborhood too.

@panzermartin
Anything that Erdoğan does or doesn't do from now on leads back to this:
He can no longer win an election without going full Lukashenko. If he loses, he goes to jail.

@panzermartin
Anything that Erdoğan does or doesn't do from now on leads back to this:
He can no longer win an election without going full Lukashenko. If he loses, he goes to jail.

@panzermartin
Anything that Erdoğan does or doesn't do from now on leads back to this:
He can no longer win an election without going full Lukashenko. If he loses, he goes to jail.

Very nice summarise. However, just to clarify (not nitpicking) from pre-modern perspective not all close order infantry units devoid soldiers of agency; very nature of close combat in pre-gunpowder era made impossible to turn warrior into automaton, regardless how strict was discipline (the only exception seem to be Macedonian phalanx- but not necessarly its Greek counterpart). This is one of the breaktroughts in our understanding of pre-modern close combat that was put forward in lats 30-40 years thanks to works Keegan, V.D. Hanson or Goldsworthy. Btw. we just lately started to "unchant" our understanding of ancient Greek/Roman warfare from "mechanical" and "disciplinarian" Prussian school- it's mindblowing how these guys still influence our understanding of how Ancients foughts. That is, among others, why I always hate when somebody writes about "fighting machines" when describing any military structure before XIX cent.
If we get back to Antiquity, actually first "mission command" idea came with Romans. Their manipules were much more flexible and elastic than phalanxes, and we have plenty of specific instances when even lower commanders (centurions or younger officers) acted on their own bringing victory against more static/dispersed enemies. So there is nothing new under the sun here- it was expicitly stated by Polibios and in several other works.
Concept of soldier as "background to his musket" started to appear late in XVI/XVII cent. after which then developed into classical codified linear drill maybe around 1700+. Only by this time size of  "killing zone" was usually enough for soldiers to stand down in line, concentrate on loading his musket and praying the other one side will broke down first, even despite human debris of his comrades being splashed around. Even M.Foucault-hardly a military historian- had some very interesting concepts that this automatization of presence came together only because change in power structures/military technology during Enlightment. Before that battlefields were still full of "free-roaming" gentlemen with halbards and swords that were rather only roughly formed.
If I remember works on history of Enlightment Military concepts (would need to search for titles) they claimed that at least in British and French Empires lesson from frontier, colonial warfare were collectively forgot every time or deemed unsutaible for european battlefields. Only French-Prussian war and Boer wars changed attitude somehow, when it was simply impossible to keep long and dense firing line as basic formation. But could be wrong here.
Yeah, words marked. Not that they are especially wise, since you clearly are biased and have no idea what the issue is about. Early in war there were apparently behind-door talks when Germany stated it will be able to replace at least part of our tank fleet if we gave our tanks to Ukrainians in reasonable time, but as it came out it was just another example of scholzing. Sorry, but everybody would prefer 100 dusty US marines Abramses in 3 years than one Leo2 every month in a decade. And regardles of your opinion, all NATO higher officers seem to agree frontier state needs sizeable mechanized force if it borders with Russia/Belarus. Independence of Baltic states also hangs on Suwałki gap, so I wouldn't be so arrogant when describing those concerns.

Result of Sunday strike on pension "Chaika" in Lazurne, Kherson oblast. Pinpoint accuracy - destroyed Russian low-altitude radar 48Ya6K-1 "Podlyot" for S-300/S-400



And how it looked

 

Well it was a matter of time until someone brought this up.  Watching the video now and it kinda sounds like an academic semantics argument up to the 1 hour mark.  I really like the link back to the 19th century and colonial wars but did not hear the most interesting leap.  Auftragstaktik, as a concept as we envision it...no matter where it came from has a very long history in "the way of war of the savages".
If one studies pre-history warfare, indigenous warfare and/or war amongst horse borne tribes from the steppes to the American West, "mission command" was simply an extension of a way of life.  Warrior based culture did not have hierarchical chains of command we see in modern militaries.  For example, in the Comanche culture a war leader was followed only as long as he was winning, often by extended family members.  There was no legal constraints nor punishment for leaving a war party; there were for cowardice in battle, but this was a cultural stigma as opposed to a formal legal mechanism.
In Europe, Central Asia and the Far East as armies got bigger the ability to move and fight larger formations required a whole system of command, control and training - we invented "formation" so that mass human power could be marshalled, sustained and directed. To do this we had to remove human agency from those standing "on the line".  Tales of 19th century officer standing tall as cannon balls flew at their heads is a poignant example of the power of formation and conformity.  This system worked great for phalanx, pikes, muskets and rifles - mission command was relegated to the cavalry as an enabler arm for the most part.  And when cavalry was decisive it had to mass up old school regardless and take the guns to the front.
Then we ran head long into massed firepower and the whole thing came apart.  Mass was just a quick road to "mass death", as was proven repeatedly on the Western Front.  In WW2 we invented armor and mech and suddenly the main thrust of warfare could move, quickly.  So Mission Command, or at least the original idea was designed to build on this new ability to move and allow for initiative and agency in a hybrid modern military form.  I like to think we got the idea from the colonial wars of the 19th century and its philosophical influence on a generation of officers in the late 19th century. 
And then it got political.
My hypothesis is that modern "Mission Command" as a cornerstone of Manoeuvre Warfare a la Cold War was more sales job than actual military doctrine.  The idea is still seen in modern doctrine where Manoeuvre Warfare - empowered by Mission Command - allow friendly forces to exercise initiative [aside: it also plays well as an extension of 'democracy' but isn't] to go along with all that new found mobility.  This combination means much smaller (and affordable) forces can dance around and through much larger ones to create effect.  This whole thing built up into AirLand Battle as an idea; however, remained largely untested.  It did however become a cult as the entire west, following the US, bought into the uni-polar philosophy of Mission Command and Manoeuvre as how we will defeat a larger, dumber and more command constipated opponent.
As I said...where was the proof?  We got hints of it in the Arab-Israeli war, Gulf War and '03 but these were not definitive, particularly the last two as mass airpower appeared to play as much, or more a role than the land doctrines.  Then we had all sorts of COIN/interventions where nothing worked, Mission or Detail Command did about as much as air supremacy in Afghanistan.  The Taliban employed it far better and more than we did but it worked for an insurgency likely because of its root in tribal based warfare to start with.
And now we have this war, and why so many are watching so closely.  Is Mission Command delivering?  Is Manoeuvre War delivering?  What are the trends and where do thing seem to be going?  My guess today is "its complicated".  There are definitely signs the UA is employing a form of this to effect, we saw this in Phase I; however, there are also signs that on the digital battlefield higher may know more than lower due to modern ISR and as such Detail Command may be back on the rise.  Attrition warfare is clearly not going anywhere, so fast cheap and easy wars may have been a mirage all along.
So what?  Well what we do not know about warfare as a result of what we are seeing in Ukraine is growing, not shrinking.  I do not know if Mission Command and Manoeuvre Warfare will survive as concepts - we will definitely hold onto them tightly as we have invested a lot into them.  My sense is that something else is emerging from this war that we can only see peeks, shades and outlines of based on events so far.

It seems that Russian pundits are reading this thread as well, and are doing everything in their power to prove Kraze right.
I feel the 500 HIMARS that Poland wanted to buy should be properly tested in field conditions before delivery ... in Ukraine, for example.

None of this kind of extremist language should surprise us anymore at this point. It should just help remind us that arming Ukraine is the right thing to do.