ikalugin

So US does not gather intel on it's allies and neutral countries?

Actually it is the R model (R for Ryta radar scope) that had a radar scope, K version could fire an anti-tank missile, but uses regular optics.

I think the quality of non weapons gear depends on if the Ratnik goes into masses or not, as it is a fairly good set of equipment for an infantryman.

I think some people were talking about the scarcity of good targeting pods in Russian use. Here you could see one:

Err was there some sort of offensive content in that post?

I think those are regular BMD4s and not BMD4Ms.

They did not find a Russian submarine, did they? For all we know it could have been an USN submarine, doing an intel run. Or the Swedish Armed Forces looking into getting some money.

Lel, I just go around the media and such circles a lot. For example this guy: Broke one of our chairs with his sheer weight. He isn't fat, just very tall and broad in shoulders.

You may or may not believe me, but there was no propaganda plan and no plans for seizure of areas other than Crimea before Strelkov happened that I am aware of. And most likely such plans (especially media related) would have been known to me. Thus I think you read too deeply into this. The main problem people have is that they think that Putin has some sort of multi level plan for what is happening (partially the result of what our media does ofcourse, but still). There is no such plan. Most decisions are done on the spot or without extensive planning, which is why the Crimea was a political surprise I think (there was no political intelligence on it because there was no intelligence to gather - the decision was an opportunistic gamble and it has worked). p.s. - btw to which pro unity rally do you talk about?

The size of the landing ship is fairly irrelevant considering the direction coastal defense weapons go. Thus either you are out of their range (hundreds of km for AShMs), or you have them suppressed. If later is true it doesn't matter if you drive your landing ship directly onto the coast and offload tanks. Well, why does the Crimean grouping then have a multirole plane regiment and a strike aircraft regiment (which includes Su25 series aircraft)?

Really? On the contrary, with the LSTs the moment they get to the beachhead is the moment when the entire grouping gets there. You don't need to make all those shuttle runs with vulnerable landing craft. LSTs don't have to mass all of that firepower - that is the job for land based air power (both fixed and rotary wing). Not, without the complete supression of the hostile defence system - the smaller landing craft (used by the USMC) are even more vulnerable, as they lack any sort of defences. And without those (very finite) craft the landing operation is doomed, as you can't get the heavy gear onto the beach. I think otherwise, as land based airpower would have all those advantages over the carrier based airpower (if you park your carriers in the Black Sea, which would be strange). Thus the Black Sea Fleet posses more firepower than a USMC forces with a carrier group support.

It would be soon in my opinion.

Well then USMC (when operating globaly) is in the same boat as the Naval Infantry operating out of Crimea (in reference to Ukraine relevant missions), as to all intents and purposes their situation is the same: - USMC relies on carrier based (both organic and that of the USN), Naval Infantry relies on the land based aviation (fixed and rotary wing). - USMC relies on small, unarmed landing craft to deliver it's heavy equipment to the shore in piecemeal fashion, Naval Infantry relies on the same craft, as well as on the LSTs.

Lethal aid is already permitted, so I do not see anything else coming.

What do you define as "defended beach"? In Crimea alone Black Sea Fleet has 1 multi-role fighter, 1 attack plane and 1 helicopter regiment. Considering the distance it has to travel from it's base (in Sevastopol) to it's target (Odessa) - 230km, it could use small landing ships/boats and land based helicopters instead of larger multi-role landing ships of the USMC.

There is nowhere to increase to - this is what Ukrainian media says all the time (about Russian open/public invasion). It would increase the coverage in Western media, which would probably lead to a later political fallout.

Hence why I was referring to the local population (ie the population within the area I was talking about). I don't think that the participation of the western/central Ukraine population would increase, as current informational climate is about as supportive of such participation as it gets (evil Russians invading, glorious Ukrainian troops defeating wiping them out all the time at the Airport and so on), yet there is a very small (proportionally) involvement of population in such activities. While I do not doubt that there would be some casualties in said invasion (and later partial occupation), I do not think that they would be comparable to those of Chechen wars.

Define "opposed landings".

USMC gets tanks, though then the "Aghanistan" pattern VDV units had them too.

Bulk of the work would be conducted by either the forces raised from the locals, or from the Donbas area, or from Crimea, or from the ex Berkut troops. Russian special forces would be there primarily in supporting role. Considering the local mentality (lack of blood feund stuff, passive population) I doubt that the insurgency would be very extensive. One could look at the current crisis and see that most of diversions/bombings appear on Ukrainian territory and not within the People's republics. Considering the common ethnic/cultural make up of the region, I doubt that in other areas that would differ a lot (except in areas such as Dnepropetrovsk - there situation would depend on the kind of deal made with the local elites).

Russia did conduct a purge of local non system opposition (regional nationalists and islamists), some of which did receive funding via NGOs from foreign parties. Political opposition is very weak, there is little to no popular support to those movements. The informational part of the system is very robust, so in short-medium term we should not see any change in this respect. While there is some internal friction within the regime, it is still solid under Putin, regardless of sanctions.

No, I was talking about the BMP3, which could (in theory) be paradroped. Most of the VDV units are not airborne in nature anymore anyway, mainly because Russia has a limited air transport capability at the moment (Russia could air drop one reinforced VDV regiment at a time I think).

True, however you should consider the fact that over half of VDV is no longer considered to be focus on actual paradrops (shift from the airborne to air assault structures) but rather air mobile. In that sense a commonolised vehicle (with the ones that Army uses) may be a good idea, especially considering that BMP3 has been serially produced in recent times (ie it would be cheaper/easier to procure). Other thing to remember - BMP3 is air drop capable in theory.

The numbers are somewhat more, ehem, conservative should we say. To all intents and purposes VDV gets a smaller share of new vehicles under the rearmament program and mostly has to live with modestly upgarded vehicles (such as the BMD2s with new C3 equipment). BMD4M, or a BMP3 with the BMD4M turret (Bahcha series turret) would be a great addition to the VDV, as it allows indirect fire missions to be fired over the C3 cueing, thus allowing usage of the BMD4M as an SPG for the para dropped units. As the BMD4M range for it's 100mm cannon is around 7km, it is an actually useful light artillery piece in that respect.

I think some one asked about the -special forces war- aspect of the war. In that OOB I have 1 VDV Special Forces BDe and 4 Ground Forces Special Forces BDes (probably more actually). While the VDV would go into the Kiev air drops/lifts (and related operations), 2 Specnas brigades would be available for the injection into Ukrainian rear (ie west of Dnepr), the other two would be availiable for the usage as shock troops or for COIN type duties. After the crisis resolution those troops could be used to form the bulk of Russian presence east of Dnepr, conducting the COIN operations there.