ikalugin

That industry did not receive any significant domestic arms orders prior to the GPV2015/2020.

On the air war - this all depends on scenario. Ie what kind of presence does NATO (or specific NATO members) deploy? Because the proposed measures essentially imply direct and full Russia-NATO war, if not on Russian/NATO soil, which brings a lot of implications I don't like (such as nuclear dimension). On the PRC - basically if before Ukraine Russia was thinking about staying sort of on the fence between the East and West, recent events have firmly pushed us east wards, de facto completing an alliance with the PRC. Such alliance is not only economical (currency swaps, energy and more importantly other industries deals) but also semi defensive in nature at the moment. Morever attacking Russia directly in such situation would lead to en mass use of tactical nuclear weapons (~1000 weapons in the first wave), which would sort of defeat the point of China going north. Not that it needs to - the conditions for Chinese companies to do business there are good anyway, and who would ever wish to live in place like Yakutsk (except Russians ofc) anyway?

Actually this was already sort of derailed by me - current discussion is set around 2015 scenario I think.

Is it just me, or are there quite a few new members here? (paranoid mode)

I think that everyone should just stop fuelling the OT.

Actually, I would go an check the numbers/sources.

On Ukrainian figures. This statement: http://112.ua/glavnye-novosti/v-ramkah-mobilizacii-v-2015-godu-planiruetsya-prizvat-104-tys-chelovek-poltorak-170696.html States that they plan to mobilise 50k troops for 90 days, and intend to keep the desired force size - 104k (and this is total, all things included in the Armed Forces of Ukraine). There were other (yet to be decided on) waves of mobilisations in late spring/early summer and late summer/early autumn, but they were not yet confirmed. That statement was after this one: http://112.ua/obshchestvo/matios-v-2015-godu-pod-mobilizaciyu-popadut-200-tysyach-ukraincev-170217.html Stating 200k being mobilised over the 2015. Even though both could be correct, they would imply that: - in best case scenario Ukrainian Armed Forces by spring-summer campaign would be made in half from the relatively green troops (there are funding problems to train and equip those) because the troops of the first mobilisation would have just finished basic training (less that 3 months in their units). - In worst case scenario (which I don't really believe in), they expect to suffer extreme casualties and rebuild their Armed Forces 2-3 times during 2015. It could also refer to the creation of 100k strong "reserve" army (a pool of reservists could be useful for them I guess). In my opinion the 1st statement is closer to the truth, and hence would imply that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would go through a phase of quick growth, which would decrease the overall troop quality.

What do you count in those 235k-250k figures?

Well does Russia need a numerical superiority better than that, considering the better quality of the units and huge advantage in terms of force multipliers, if it has limited political objectives? Note, my scenario is not in 2017 (which is far away and quite honestly I can't say with certainty if the conflict would be ongoing at that point), but rather occurs during the spring-summer campaign of 2015 (probably closer to summer due to the obvious need to publish the final scenario before the time line comes up). It also does not include any direct and extensive military intervention by NATO, atleast not in the mobile phase.

I think is that you have wrong basic assumptions. Which appear to be: - that Russian Troops pool is limited to the contract holding troops. - that the Ukrainian units (especially National Guard battalions and Territorial Forces battalions) have fixed, homogeneous OOBs which could be used in top end calculations. What I am currently trying (and it is not an easy task) is to work through the available data to determine if (for example) the specific battalion is of platoon or regiment strength and its type (infantry, mechanized), as well as to determine the equipment tables for the Ukrainians (by looking through pre conflict inventory/losses/gains). Ukrainians are a horrible, horrible mess and working through their stuff (with referencing the numbers I get) is hell work.

16 up to strength BDs (from 4 CAAs) would be ~80k strong force alone. Factor in the VDV, the special forces, the Black Sea Fleet, the support forces (various), the separatist forces (in fully mechanised corps structure, I discount the units that stayed in their militia form as of low combat capability - mainly used for economy of force type operations and rear security) and you would have a numerical superiority against the CTO Forces + non CTO participating VSU Forces.

Is that a challenge for political discussion?

I think that this approach is faulty and that basing the calculations on the actual OOBs (ie counting the real life units that would either be send to Ukraine theatre or stay else where) is a far superior approach. This is what I am currently doing. When I have a semi finished version I would post it here (and elsewhere if so requested). This would allow us to have not only the manpower numbers, but also the equipment tables, the unit histories (ie how often they go onto the exercises of various kinds) and other pieces of valuable information, which would later be used to write up the scenarios. The very general outline of the envisioned invasion force by me would be: - 4 CAAs, 1 from the Western MD (Moscow grouping), 2 from the Southern MD (without their BDs deployed abroad), 1 from the Central MD (strategic reserves). - all of the VDV units. - Black Sea Fleet and it's organic units. - Specnas units from the Western, Southern and Central MDs. - Air Force groupings from the Southern and Central MDs, partially from Western MD. In the full version this would be broken down to the brigade level, with OOBs for those, equipment tables for the brigades and and above, support units, manpower figures, possibly munition and fuel expenditures - you name it.

This actually shows that you had a pre conceived view of how events were unfolding, which (possibly) affected your views on the matter. I, for example, was expecting a civil war in Ukraine more or less ever since the first Maidan, which in turn has affected my views on the matter, as the evidence that I have perceived also managed to fit the picture. And no, I don't watch state media at all (though I know people who run it). If I may be so direct, to (hopefully) end or atleast limit the further derailment into political/historical side of things. We (as in mine, those of the people who share my views, bilateral relations to the administration of this forum and a number of other forum members) could go around this problem in the following ways: - you could ignore our input or even prosecute us (ie ban) for expressing our views (for example on the grounds of us supporting terrorism of whatever). I doupt this would happen, as this forum appears to be civil and administration to have high standards. - we could keep our subjective views, based on our preconceptions and the materials that we have accessed over the time. While discussion is possible, due to the rather extensive differences it would be difficult to contain and keep civil, especially to a number of less patient forum members. Note that the views that are not backed up by proper, academic research (which has to be neutral and reviewed) are ultimately subjective in nature, and your appeals to authority (of yourself) do not help our discussions I think. - we could try to focus on objective side of things and constructively discuss such matters as the military-strategic balance in various given scenarios, something that I am working on at this moment. As I am not aware of any such efforts being done previously within this community, atleast not on the proper semi academic level. p.s. possibly, should you wish to discuss politico-historic stuff there should be a thread or subforum for such matters, otherwise it is quite possible to do that in private. Please message if you wish to continue in that direction, I would try to avoid such discussions further more, unless specifically asked on those matters.

If such troops were participating in a Russian Civil war, I would classify it as (foreighn) intervention, on the lines of the one that happened in early 20th century. 2nd Chechen war was justified because Chechen State has attacked Dagestan, which was a part of Russian Federation. This it was not an internal conflict, but an external one. Important note - I classify current events in Ukraine as a civil war which stemned from Soviet dissolution and Russian actions within it as intervention. The problem here is that we appear to have opposite views on this matter, hence I think that it should not really be discussed, at least in this thread, as the matter is both political in nature and potentially inflammatory.

I could be wrong but I think that such operations were ongoing through out the cold war.

Steve, I would not count such operations as invasion, no. Otherwise I would have to classify: - Lybia. - First Chechen war. And a number of other conflicts as invasions. In general I think that you have a very strong pro loyalist (and anti Russian) bias, but I could be wrong, as I do not know your selection of sources.

Well then we have to agree to disagree on our evaluation of the geopolitical consequences. About the separatists - the point that you miss is that currently the bulk of troops (the new brigades/corps) comes from local population, not foreign volonteers/specialists.

I would recheck this, but I think that we count professional officers separately. Thus those numbers you have would be changed somewhat. I (and BTR probably) would look into this, and probably provide specific OOBs/numbers soon (I would do this eventually anyway as part of the current scenario work).

The technicalities do matter, thus I would classify the current situation as supporting a proxy war against Ukraine (by using separatists), rather than an invasion of Ukraine. While you may say that there is no difference, I would argue to the contrary, as this for example leads to important geopolitical consequences. Russian leadership understands this, and this is why there are ongoing efforts to create viable separatist Armed Forces, both from the veterans of local militias and new local volunteers, with expensive support. This support includes: - technical specialists/instructors. Technically they are their under their own free will, but their ability to go there is not restricted (ie they have a quiet approval of their activities). - advisors to the local commanders at above battalion level. - equipment and weapons. - supplies (various, not only combat related). Not only is there a process to create aforementioned Armed Forces (via creation of brigades-corps, with unified command, competent advisors, conducting training exercises with organic arms at various levels and so on), but to improve the local defense related industry (improving operation of AFV repair plants, creating some minor key defence production lines, ect) and to fund it via local money (by selling the local coal to Ukraine for example).

Well NATO had their legal intelligence gathering people in the E.Germany, who would sometimes take a risk and infiltrate the Soviet basing areas (the risk was great b/c Soviet sentries would shoot to kill, and get a free leave for doing so).

antaress73, "Voentorg" and "Northern Wind" are the terms you were thinking about I would say.

Why would it? It is fairly average in my opinion, though that is understandable.

Crimea (at this moment anyway) is seen as Russian mainland/home soil by Russia. This was made abundantly clear by Putin on a number of occasions (such as the Address to the Federal Council in Q4 2014). To that end (as we did in 2008) we have found some legal justification (ie that transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was not legitimate in the first place). Thus going in full force into Crimea is a bad, bad idea, unless you are looking into a total war scenario. I would post the 2017 Crimean forces a bit later, however I would add that in the scenarios that I envision Crimea plays as one of the primary jump off points for rapid invasion of Ukraine (to isolate the CTO Forces in consort with a north-south push, to secure Odessa area.

Well such an extensive attack would be viewed as all out aggression against Russian home soil, leading (according to our military doctrine and current political line anyway) to immediate nuclear escalation. So things are... complicated. Time period?