ikalugin

The issue is that Black Sea is a small place and is dominated by the AShM launchers and strike aircraft based in Crimea. As such you don't need high end aircraft to deliver strikes against any naval grouping in the Black Sea if you are based out of Crimea - multi role and strike Flanker variants would suffice. As to the US/NATO air power - it is by far more convenient to fly out of Poland and other NATO states, or even from the bases in Ukraine itself. If Russia and US are fighting an open war (in Ukraine) then attack on the US carrier forces in theater would be completely logical, especially if they are used for strikes in said war, and thus are not really an escalation. On the straights - even though the agreements were infringed by US a number of times, there were never truly violated during the cold war. Thus (especially considering the aforementioned factors) I seriously doubt that USN would operate out of the Black Sea.

Well the idea indeed was to use the improved conventional munitions (cluster variants of grad and smerch, I don't think that there was one available for uragan), seaking AT submunutions (delivered by bombs, aforementioned MLRS systems and Oka-U). However the more important development I think, more or less completely missed by the western specialists, was the deployment of new C3 system - Manevr, as well as a variety of recon assets (BRMs and others) which could interface with it via a data link. Morever there was ample work on the airborne component too - a JSTAR equivalent (only directly linked via a data sharing network to the C3 system, allowing transmission of radar data down).

No, the force is meant to stay around 1M mark. The defficincy in manpower comes from the decrease in the conscript flow, which is at the moment is sort of being fixed by increasing amount of contract holders. Your article is (largerly) outdated, I could not see the reference to the 305k figure, as this statement here: http://itar-tass.com/armiya-i-opk/1637620 talks about 295k figure contract troops in Q4 2014. In general NVO newspaper is know to be of poor quality and should not be viewed as a reliable source of information. I would strongly reccomend to look into the original sources of any numbers given in that newspaper (of the Izvestia newspaper for that matter). Some things, such as the reasons for the improvement in the flow of contract troops into the Armed Forces (improvement in the Armed Forces prestige, living conditions) are true, however they forgot possibly the most important point - a soldier and more so an officer in Russian Armed Forces earns higher than average wage, has access to state sponsored mortgage, has simplified entry procedures into higher education institutions and many other social bonuses.

Before 2008 Russian Armed Forces did not receive major batches of equipment (tanks included), even though development process was active at the time (new T80U derivatives and mods, T72B mods, T90 derivatives and mods). Post 2007 there were 2 large programs introduced - GPV2015 and more ambitious GPV2020. Under those programs rearmament, specifically rearmament of Ground Forces has began with the then available equipment types (T90A, BMP3 and so on), upgrades to existing weapons (T72B variants, development and installation of new C3 systems) as well as development of new generation equipment types (Armata, Kurganets, Bumerang). Under separate programs the companies (and factories) selected for producing those new items of equipment received money for retooling (mostly complete pre Ukrainian events). Because those new items of equipment were expected soon (production beginning in 2015) the decision was made to save money and procure various upgrades (such as the T72B3) to keep the manufacturers funded and their workforce in place. Note, that the rearmament went by the MD, first was the Southern MD (received T72B(A), T90A, BMP3 and other such items, it's rearmament could be viewed as essentially complete), now the Western MD was rearmed (with the T72B3 and other items), then the Eastern MD was intended to receive new arms (Armatas - and new line up in general), then the Central MD. VDV did not receive much in terms of new gear (they did get the new C3 equipment, plus a small number of new vehicles, but that's it), due to the shift of "small elite nucleus" to the "all round excellence" concept of Armed Forces. Thus, barring some horrible accident happening, I doubt that the production of the new generation of vehicles would be postponed, as the factories have already retooled for their production, definitive variant reached and funds for the said production were already allocated. That said I could not discount the possibility that Armata (and other new vehicles) could evolve a lot during their production and initial service, a practice quite common for the Soviets for example.

On the assault breakers - did you know, that Soviets were developing (and to an extend deploying) their own reckon/strike and reckon/fire complexes?

Steve, where did you post it (the video you refer to)?

That contradicts the notion of Russian Armed Forces being built around the 50k strong elite nucleus, which appears to be one of the basic assumptions regarding Russian Armed Forces in this game. Not that the notion is true post 2008 (it is not), where there was a clear shift from small elite (and professional) nucleus with large cadre cannon fodder shroud to all round competent/combat ready Armed Forces.

This study is about Soviet Armour in general and not the T64, is it?

I guess I would just keep out of this thread for a while and get down with research - should have the initial partial version by Tuesday.

To keep their independence (from Russian Goverment) for ideological reasons (some view Russian policy in Ukraine as not pro active enough) and/or private interests (keeping power/influence). Steven, would it be of interest If I provide research results regarding current and probable future status of Ukrainian forces, properly referenced and all? (Well maybe not quite to strict standards of high academia, but I could get it there if need be and would certainly try to peer review it first). In any case I would look into building up on said research to write up a scenario, quite possibly together with truly glorious design of crocodile.

My point about clearly stating the vehicle types compared still stands, as M1A2 is still an M1A2 and not M1A2 SEP V2. And comparing M1A2 (not prototyped by 1991? Ok) with Armata is still fairly inflammatory in my opinion.

There is nothing in the "turret" warranting armoured protection, because everything in it (scope apertures, primary and secondary armament) is not possible to protect frontaly with armour as it would impede their functionality (ie scope apertures could not see through armour).

Panzerkrautwerfer, this is why I have explicitely asked to state the version discussed. When talking about M1A2 you are talking about the 1991 vintage tank, not the more modern version of it. This is also why I have viewed the post as potentially inflammatory - as it implied a comparison between a 2015 vintage and 1991 vintage tanks.

The known facts amongst other things are: - gun type used and it's approx capabilities (I did mention 20+ percent advantage over the L55 muzle energy wise, didn't I?). - general layout, which improves the armour protection compared to the previous tanks by its own virtue, even without the new technologies being added. Sure there may be no precise figures for the protection levels for example, but there is sufficient information to make conclusions on how it compares to known Russian designs and thus by extension - to Western ones.

Can you please expand this comparison then, possibly providing some numbers into this comparison? P.s. when you intend to talk about a specific tank variant, then please specify the variant.

Is this comparison of a 2015 vintage tank with 1991 vintage tank intended to be inflammatory?

-Other- 3d drawings depict not Armata but a separate project by Omsk, this confusion comes from a cannon manufacturing company showing models of various AFV projects, which included this Omsk project. The object 187 hull is not only different in form to the T64 derivative hull and precludes the weak zone forming in the driver's hatch area, but allows increase in the front hull armor thickness per same vehicle length reserve allocated. Obj 187 pattern hull could be seen here: http://otvaga2004.mybb.ru/uploads/000a/e3/16/42560-1-f.jpg This means that per same vehicle length (which I strongly believe would actually be greater on Armata, as it is likely to use 7 road wheels like obj 640 and 195), considering mass increase for the frontal armour, it is obvious that the armour array would have both increased LOS thickness and mass.

I said that it was an artist's impression. I won't go about the T-90MS (as it is another topic and not relative in any case to this forum, as the MS is the export designation), and would concentrate on Armata. As to the (front) hull - it has been desighned on the lines similar to the obj 187, something you should be capable of noting even from that most imperfect model (ie the front hull is completely different from the old T64 related developments). The point of this change is to get rid of the driver's hatch weak area (which was there since the first T64). Morever, as I have already said, the tank gets rid of turret armour but keeps the total mass at around the same level (55t class). This means that the hull would be further reinforced when compared to the T90AM (new shape, doesn't have the weak zones of T90AM) and obj 187 (increased thickness due to more mass being allocated to the front hull, new tech level). And this does not preclude Armata fielding new technologies such as new/improved materials, new ERA and others, those additions would further improve the already strong basic design, allowing the tank to remain competitive in the future.

Regarding the T14 vs M1A3 matter - Armata by the nature of it's layout alone would provide at least comparable protection (due to the shift of armour mass from turret into the hull). 2A82 gun (the new 125mm gun) is said to have at least a 20 percent advantage over the L55 gun, providing about the same level of muzzle energy as this new gun you are talking about. The idea behind Armata was to create a common chassis for a number of vehicles (such as the tnks, IFV, SPG and so on), building upon the obj 195 program I do not see why it is viewed as "poor man T95".

The funds are already allocated (under GPV 2020 program), at least 24 (LRIP vehicles) have already been produced. This year full scale production of Armata begins, as well as of other items (such as Kurganets IFV). The sources for the production numbers have been already provided by me in another thread, they come from the contracts for maintaining those vehicles in the "parade" grouping, the contracts for the Armatas has already been awarded and such, thus strongly suggesting that the vehicles in question already exist in that number.

The short reply (would write the large one during the day, as it is 0057 local at the time of me writing this): I think our positions regarding the state of Ukrainian Armed Forces (and CTO Forces in general) are opposite (yours being optimistic and mine being pessimistic). Thus what I think we should do is to clarify a number of specific topics and then discuss those factually (ie with sources provided to back up our statements), as otherwise our discussion appears to boil down to a matter of perception, which is (sadly, as we are all humans) is unacceptable to being clouded by bias. Would it be helpful if I clarify the Russian part, as it appears that you have a certain number of gaps in your knowledge of Russian Armed Forces, especially post 2008 reform began, not equipment wise, but in the areas such as the concept of operations, development trends and so on, as I have a more immediate knowledge of the matter? One another question - how fluent are you in Russian (Ukrainian)? What kinds of sources do you find acceptable?

Dear lord, we are into the long post war. I would reply with another one. p.s. do you mind me not quoting? I do that to keep my replies shorter.

@Battlefront.com (the admin) (btw is there any other convenient way to call you?). In which way is Ukrainian Air Force being reconstructed? How many modernised aircraft were procured, how many were repaired (and as Crimea and the spring-summer-autumn campaign has shown the technical readiness of Ukrainian Air Forces was horrible)? Are the flight hours for Ukrainian pilots increasing? As far as I am aware there has been no evidence of Ukrainian Air Force improving it's technical or combat readiness, much less improving it's quality. She is not a government spoke person, but rather a founder of "Gruz 200" organisation, I wrote sufficiently about it. Why couldn't Russia devote the bulk of it's Air Force against Ukraine? 080808 war experience is not entirely relevant to our conflict, if only because we assume that Russia would prepare for an armed intervention (something we did not do before the events of August, lack of specialist equipment and intelligence played it's hand). It is again not comparable to the Yugoslavian conflict, as the Serbian forces dispersed on purpose, due to the lack of ground operation element, which is obviously not going to be the case in our scenario. Could you please share that information regarding rearmament of Ukrainian Armed forces with us? As far as I am aware there are no major real rearmament programs.

It is assumed that Russian occupation would happen over pro Russian territory, thus the danger of insurgency being low.

Comment on the topic - MT12 is not a WW2 design, but a 50s smouth bore, high velocity gun and it did get a fairly modern DU sabot in the 80s I think.