ikalugin

While the video is horrible/bad http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=y81o6iWDKtE#t=130 It does illustrate the point.

To elaborate on Internal Troops (as they would be the militarised organisation taking care of any separatist movements): - they were in 2013 170 thousand strong, expected to be fully proffesional by 2015 (not sure how it works out, but still) http://www.ng.ru/regions/2013-03-10/1_voiska.html - they have heavy weapons, sufficient to fight insurgency (IFVs, APCs, artillery pieces and various other arms, troops are essentially motorised infantry), no organic tanks though. - There were around 17k special forces (in 2010, I don't think that that has changed) within the Internal troops alone (much less in MVD in general and lets not forget the FSB). http://argumenti.ru/army/n222/47582 Sure not all of those forces could go to Caucasus (because they also have other functions), but that is the point of the Caucasus area security forces - they do not require the Armed Forces to conduct their counter terrorism/insurgency operations.

Military inertia (ie the same reason why US forces were in CENTAG and not NORTAG). Georgia is checked by 2 brigades stationed in South Osetia and Abhazia (those are actually reinforced brigades), plus the local militias, plus the base in Armenia. What kind of uprising? Something that 27k troops (Internal Troops in the North Caucasus area only) with 700 AFVs, artillery can't handle? Ahh, I forgot all other non Armed Forces units stationed there.

Why keep any Army units in Caucasus (apart from those deployed abroad ofcourse)? Security there is done by the MVD/Internal Troops/FSB and many, many other organisations (both federal and local in nature). I can't even remember the last time the Army unit had to participate in some form of operation there (counter terrorism wise).

Steve, in manual it says that Russian units are filled to full strength using reservists. What is the stance on the reserve units?

This depends on the SEAD force available to the Blue side and the AD forces available to the Red side. In general it is fair to estimate that: - HIMADS systems are highly mobile and employ shoot and scoot tactics. - that the areas they operate in are covered by SHORAD/CPGM systems. - that Red side utilises decoys/spoofers (such as Gazetchik) extensively. - that Red side uses ECM equipment to support operations of it's AD network (for example to deny data links). Current level of the HIMADS systems would be: - strategic SAMs S300PM2/400. - high end tactical S300V4, BukM1-2, BukM2. In a 2017 scenario this changes to: - strategic SAMs S350/300PM2/400. - high end tactical S300V4, BukM1-2, BukM2, BukM3.

Ahh, the air war thread. Well a few thoughts on the matter: - first of all, strikes against Russia proper (or NATO proper) would be a bad idea (I assume that Ukraine is not in NATO, as it is not directly mentioned in the manual), as this would lead to undesirable escalation (to nukes in Russian case). I guess you could use this as political hand wave sort of thing, though to be honest I think that a limited war scenario (as in limited to Ukraine) is better than a total and nuclear one. - we don't know what kinds of US/NATO assets we get in theatre. Thus, unless those assets are clarified it is difficult to know the specific correlation of forces and means. - this is the 3rd time Western Airforce would face a modern AD network. The systems in theatre are not 20-30 year old ones (obsolete and completely exploited by the ESM systems), they are numerical and are operated by a competent force. - NATO would either need to operate from far away bases with tanker support (which itself would be vulnerable to attrition), or operate from Ukrainian air fields and come under the Russian PGM strikes (from TBMs and CMs, which would be ground launched). - the initial operations would be focused on winning the air war (ie defeating hostile aircraft and support means), not on providing CAS duties. So, atleast initially, Blue ground forces should assume that they would not get overwhelming CAS support. I could list the specific AD systems, their units and numbers for a 2017 scenario if you are interested.

I think currently there are precision direction finding sensors available to Shtora, allowing rotation of turret in the direct of the threat emitter. How accurate those are I am not quite sure.

Btw, 45th regiment has been expanded into a brigade. http://itar-tass.com/armiya-i-opk/1682653

On the Naval Infantry forces - there is a brigade plus a bunch of various battalions available in theater (I would assume that the later are doing security duties and thus hand wave them). The brigade could be used in a push out of Crimea north wards or participate in naval assaults. Some VDV units historically were sea lifted (in 080808 war they were sea lifted to Abhazia).

Russian Black Sea Fleet in the time frame is centered around: - 7 Kilo series submarines (6 new, one fresh out of upgrade/repair). - Cruiser BG (Slave class + 1-3 new Frigates). - various small ships (missile boats, but those are capable of using modern AShMs and long range CMs). - land based AShMs and air power. So while that grouping may well be stuck around Crimea (under friendly air cover and that sort of includes approaches to Odessa), USN would find it difficult to operate in the Black Sea in my opinion, especially if it would operate within the confines of the treaties.

Well so far I count 13 MRR brigades in the first line Russian force, 1 MRD, 1 Tnk brigade, 1 TD + lots of other stuff. Still early work in progress though. This is without dipping too much into the Central MD, without mobilisation of reserve units, without taking the forces from eastern or north-western directions.

But, ok, if the scenario in the manual is just glorified flavor text, then so be it.

It looks like I missed the post about the NATO members in the vanilla scenario. Steve, why and in which capacity does Italy participate? US, UK and Poland seem ok, but there is the question of basing the forces forward. You have mentioned NATO deployment forward, I know about it, but perhaps you would provide a list of those forces forward deployed, it would ease the workload me (and my partners) have regarding the 2015 scenario.

My point is that depending on a strategic->operational picture we would get the tactical missions (ie the scope of the game). If the scenario (in the way it is written in the manual) does not seek to explain those important strategic matters, then what was the point of including the specific maps (of operations), time lines of events into the scenario? The reason why I bother asking is because there are a lot of apparent underlying assumptions (such as the ones about the air war and the NATO force size), which require clarification of the specifics, as those assumptions are not entirely clear to me. This is all within the confines of the vanilla 2017 scenario ofcourse.

Then this thread serves no purpose I guess.

Well, the problem here is that it is assumed by a number of people that Ukrainian side (with it's foreign support) would have atleast air parity, if not air superiority over the theatre. This, the participation of multiple NATO brigades, implies en mass NATO engagement into this conflict, hence why I look to confirm the assumed scale of said participation and reasons for it. Is it under article 5? If so, then did Ukraine join NATO (not mentioned in the manual)? If so, then which countries have decided to aid Ukraine and in which way (article 5 does not force anyone to aid the defence of an ally with the force of arms)? If it is not under article 5, then under what grounds did NATO intervene (it did not in Georgia for example)?

I read the manual, there is enough data in it, hence the question. What does the "NATO expeditionary force" consist of exactly? Why was the amphib landing possible in Odessa? Why is there a NATO forces there in first place, did Ukraine invoke article 5? ect. Because from what I see - there is no binding reason for NATO to intervene (as Ukraine is not said to be a member of NATO at the beginning of the Russian invasion).

Could you please clarify the extend and nature of NATO participation in the conflict (in your 2017 scenario)?

Steve, I have insider knowledge on those deals. But then I guess that is where we end this.

Resources are finite. Growing demand for them (due to the increase in the expected standards of living) in the east and south-east asia would bring many conflicts in the future.

The oil deal was fine I was told, especially considering what happened to oil prices recently. But the oil deal is not the important one - the others sighed at the same time are. You appear to assume that growing Chinese geopolitical ambition would not prompt it to challenge US/collective West in the future. They don't need carriers to expand into the Russian Far East or Siberia, or Central Asia for that matter. But then that is a whole other can of worms.

On the air war - that still depends on the level of NATO involvement, as there are no binding obligations on the members to participate even if Ukraine does invoke article 5. This is why I would ask for a specific scenario to pass judgement.

If I may allow a short derailment. Well, where (and when) did PRC act against Russian core interests in the recent past? Russian and Chinese interests coincide, atleast in the current geopolitical situation.

Set piece battle (in my understanding) is a battle in a single tactical area.