domfluff

In Normandy, that's possibly true, but I don't accept that for CMFB. They're incredibly powerful, but the US has the tools to deal with them. Like a lot of things it comes down to manoeuvre - if you're in a head on engagement at range, then you're playing into their strengths. Anything where you can get flank shots with a 76mm represents a ton of wasted points. Based on the above screenshots, I'm not sure that occupying the village was a good idea. Sure it's the objective, but that matters for precisely one turn of the game - the last one. It's really open and a massive, obvious target, so trying to hold it directly seems daft. It's not clear where the setup areas were on that map, but covering the approaches to the village from multiple directions is more important than holding the village itself.

It's not the computer specs that people are worrying about, it's the amount of management required - for some, the company-level hits a sweet spot for the effort:time ratio. That doesn't mean that's the only valid opinion.

Nope. That was on a list of planned features a while ago (judging by some mentions in the CMSF 1 manual), but not something that's actually happened. It's something you could fake by passing save files back and forth and designating control of some parts of the force, but it's not something that the game supports.

With any move, you should be determining how confident you are in the move's safety. That will determine how slowly you can advance (i.e., how much you bound, and what proportion of your force is stationary at any time. In the hypothetical extreme situation where you're anticipating contact from an unknown position, and the surface was literally flat, you'd want to be moving with as little of your force as possible, with the rest of it able to provide cover. In this kind of situation, answers like "use smoke" are limited in usefulness, since it's hard to make a real plan for something you don't know about. It also means that, in this hypothetical, recon by fire is probably not possible, since you just don't have the information for it to be effective. That means that all of the supporting units need to have line of sight to the scouts - you won't know precisely when the scouts will come under fire. The purpose of the supporting units, then, is to be capable of spotting and responding to the incoming fire. When the scouts get fired at, they will likely cower in place. Typically the scout unit won't be the one to spot the enemy, since they're too busy being shot at, but the supporting units have no such problems. The plan then is for the company to suppress and destroy the revealed positions, bounding towards the target when suppression has been achieved ("fire and movement"). That's not particularly pretty or subtle, but it's the way to deal with this kind of hypothetical billard-table landscape. We're making a big assumption that our company has more firepower than the enemy. If not, there may not be much we can do, and the only way would be to break up this asymmetry (through smoke, use of micro terrain, whatever). Since that's always going to be a risk, it's always best practice to use the terrain in your favour - shortening engagement ranges, or bringing your company strength against a portion of the enemy.

So as mentioned I'm suspicious of the translation. I think it's also important to take it for what it is - a highly staged and idealised training film. I think it's worth comparing this to the US films of a similar nature, which are abstract and "biased", but still contain some useful information, at least in the broad strokes. So for this, I'd assume that the action depicted is not an impossibility. It might be on the wrong scale (although I'm not sure about that), or overly optimistic, that kind of thing, but presumably the make-up of forces isn't stupid, which means it's useful to try to understand why they're being used in that way.

You might well be right. Still, it's hard to find solid, conclusive evidence to the contrary (there's some bits and pieces, as per the other thread), and the short ranged ones can be used for the above. They're still not amazing, but they do make some sense. Prior to mopping up they still have their MG, so I suspect that's their primary role most of the time.

Screwed up text usually means that there's a missing patch or two somewhere - make sure this has the right version, and maybe re-download.

Might be his best: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNjp_4jY8pY In general, he's a tanker who knows his stuff. He's also a consultant for World of Tanks, which biases some of it, but that's generally a minor problem.

That's definitely an issue though - it's a high-commitment tactic, and one which can fail badly. There can be advantage in gaining the initiative, so I can see why.

I actually disagree with that interpretation of rule 25, somewhat. "Dismount only when Anti-tank gun fire or terrain forces you to do so, and no bypass is possible" If you watch that translated training film: In particular, watch what they're actually doing, rather than what the translation says they're doing. The panzergrenadier platoon is being used as a quick reaction force, supporting a Panzer platoon, and with some attached flame halftracks. The scenario is that of a breakthrough, and the panzergrenadiers are there to cut it off and shut it down. In the film (obviously it's staged, but presumably it's at least as applicable as a US training film), the Panzers take fire from hull down on an overlooking ridge, and the halftracks flank and isolate the infantry to clean up. The priority is to clean this up as fast as possible - which also makes the flame halftracks make a ton of sense (will get back to that). In that scenario, if you were to dismount as soon as possible, the infantry would have taken position behind the ridgeline, and the enemy would have been engaged relatively safely. The issue is that there's a fair chance that the action it wouldn't have been decisive, and instead the enemy follow-on forces could have reinforced. Keeping them mounted until they arrive in combat forces them to be a lot more dynamic and bold with mobility, and creates a decisive situation. Point about Flame halftracks - rubbish? In the film, the panzergrenadier platoon is accompanied by two flame halftracks, which are shown to have the limited range we see in CM. The point of them, I think, is that they're there to mop up the last shreds of resistance fast, and make sure no-one is around for when the main infantry re-take the line. They're not there as an assault element, and the range doesn't matter quite as much - the battle is already won, and you just need to make sure that the ground is safe.

Excellent. Since this is an advice thread - a couple of things occur from the above: Those AFVs look too close together, and far too close to the town. That's not necessarily a risk, but it's not making the most efficient use of the asset - they could control the same space, and cover each other (you definitely want a pair of them covering the same area), but control far more space with them, and keep them firmly out of bazooka range. That kind of positional advantage (the goal of manoeuvre warfare, essentially) is pretty important - you can sometimes turn a fair fight into an unfair one, just by moving things around.

"Tactics is making the enemy fight in two directions at once". I forget where I read that, but current field manuals emphasise looking to put the enemy in a dilemma.

Artillery can have an effect on AFVs, but it's not very effective. It'll absolutely degrade systems, hurt exposed crew and immobilise armour, but it's rare to score a killing hit with one in-game. That's probably under-modelled. The reason to do it anyway, particularly with mortars, is to kill tank commanders or get them to button up.

I'm sorry, I'm not sure what your problem is here. It feels like you're intentionally taking this in bad faith, and it's getting a little tiresome. To respond to the above: "Should I avoid playing some scenarios". That's not what I said, nor what I intended, as I'm sure you're aware. The initial comment was about the correct use of the tool, and if the tool is being used incorrectly, it's not going to have the intended results. If a scenario forces you into a frontal assault against the odds, then you're not performing correct function, and won't have a good result. "Suppression unlike spotting is more or less an exact science in CM". CM is a game of hidden information. You can never be 100% certain of the state of everything. In a controlled test, it's certainly possible to get close to deterministic results, although variance in accuracy will always render that probabilistic. The lack of perfect information will make that significantly worse, which would inevitably be the case with suppressing suspected enemy positions. Good recon helps, but it's never going to catch everything. Fundamentally though, the crux of the argument is: From both a doctrinal and game perspective, running up Strykers into small arms range, particularly in an urban environment is a bad idea. Do you think that's wrong? Why?

Would I walk them for a kilometre under heavy fire? No, that sounds daft. Would I run the Stykers forward under heavy fire? No, not that either. You have 120mm mortars for a reason. That kind of frontal assault against a fortified enemy doesn't sound like the kind of thing you'd want light infantry for in any case, but if you were forced to do so, then the ideal would be to use that mobility to isolate the area. "One feature away" doesn't have to be literal, since that one feature could be the next city block or whatever. In any case, the idea of disembarking within small arms range seems like rolling the dice - you'd be relying on your suppression to be effective and complete, and doesn't leave any margin for error. If this was a hypothetical situation where light infantry were advancing across flat, open ground to an entrenched opposition, forced into a frontal assault? "Don't have a battle" is the relevant Terry Pratchett quote, but really the only choice there is to dismount at distance and fire and movement your way in slowly, accepting the casualties. The main advantages of the Stryker are mobility and C2. That's what they're for, and why they're useful. Your dismounts will have a better view of the battlefield (i.e., contact markers) than other dismounts will, allowing them to react faster to them.

My understanding of Stryker doctrine was that the vehicle is supposed to be dismounted one terrain feature away from the target. In close terrain, the manual talks constantly about infantry leading on foot through built-up areas, with the vehicle providing close support. Now, "ICVs can provide protection to Infantry by negating the effects of enemy small-arms weapons, either by driving Soldiers up to a building or by covering the Infantry while moving behind it along a street." is the strongest counter-argument from "SBCT Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad". I'd argue that that's still a really bad idea, at least in CM, and relying on a Stryker as armour or cover is pretty far down the list of correct procedures. Essentially, I don't think it's ever a good idea to engage with loaded Strykers within Small arms range. I'm also not sure how you guarantee in an urban environment that there are zero RPGs, when a single one would be disastrous.

So, I have. Some observations and assumptions: Tanks seem to aim at other AFV's centre of mass. This can and will miss through various factors, but I'd bet some money that you could model the results as a bell curve away from the CoM. That's then the game mechanical advantage to being Hull Down - some percentage of shots will hit the earth, which will be more than the percentage that would have missed anyway. This might seem obvious, but I think it's worth stating. Assuming that is true, I think it's sensible to assume that soldiers also aim at the centre of mass, meaning that the mechanical of cover is to block this in a similar percentage sense. We know that shots have penetration values, so not all cover protects against everything, but it's reasonable to guess that the foxhole model blocks small arms and fragmentation. In testing, small arms fire that hits these obstacles doesn't seem to penetrate. Picture grabbed quickly from CMMODS: One thing that's worth noting is that the top two photos are taken from a raised angle. If you're shooting into a bell curve around the centre of mass, then the chaps in the foxholes above are very dead, with the foxhole providing little to no cover to direct fire. The chaps behind the sandbag are from a lower perspective, and would be better protected - more than half (but still nearly half) of the shots should hit the sandbags instead of meat. The end result is that with a well placed fortification (and placing fortifications properly is *hard*), you're only going to be gaining percentage points of survival - at best you're perhaps doubling the number of shots it takes to kill a chap, and you can't rely on that. You could and can make a case that the player models are over-exposing themselves, but that's what we can do with the tools that we have. It's also worth talking about mortar fire. From previous discussion, mortars and other indirect fire are modelled as an explosion radius, followed by a random number of ray-traced "fragments" that'll fly out randomly from the impact point. That will mean that obstacles will protect better against indirect fire than they will against direct fire, since the fragments are going to be starting from ground level. They'll quite possibly still be awful against direct hits (since I doubt they help with the explosion) or airbursts, but they'll help with ground-impacting mortars fragments. Again, it'll be a percentage, but it'll be better odds than against small arms.

I mostly use target arcs for three things: The main one is to get them to hold fire, which I use constantly, especially with HQ units and scouts. Second one is the target armour arc for maximising AT weapons, particularly in ambush situation. The other use-case is when I want to save some reaction time with a tank turret. Tank turrets will turn to face the centre of an arc, so if you're in a situation (e.g., in a city) where you are going to come around a corner, you can pre-turn your turret towards where you're going to want it, saving some seconds of traverse time. My technique for doing that is to look at it from above, and judge (from the final position, when the tank will reveal itself) what the clock direction is to the suspected target position. E.g., "When this tank clears this corner, the enemy building will be at 2 o'clock". Then, I set the arc from the same camera position, where the tank currently is. Typically I'd make an arc that has some margins - if the target is at 2 o'clock, I'd perhaps set the arc from 12 to 4 o'clock. Anything where the suspected position is in the centre. Arc radius should be longer than you think you need. Arcs are relative to the tank, not the map, but do not pay attention to the AFV's facing. The end result is that the AFV will turn it's turret to face the building, and will advance around the corner pre-aligned. Ideally, I'd also set a target command at the exposed point, which will take advantage of the pre-alignment and open up straight away. (Really-ideally, this isn't a good spot for a tank to be in, so I'd rather not, but sometimes it's important.)

As individual squads? Sure, and particularly with points-buying lists like in Quick battles. As a formation, not so much. If you're looking at how to use Stummels in the context of a panzergrenadier unit (e.g., a platoon attack), then you need to understand the context of how they're intended to be used - the squads are smaller, they lack in AT weapons, etc. It's not a unit that's supposed to be working independently, it's something that's supposed to be a supporting arm. They're also very expensive, so exist in small quantities, and as a quick reaction force - if you use panzergrenadiers to hold a line, they're a waste of a resource, in exactly the same way that using any specialised infantry (paratroopers, mountain troops, recon units) to do generic infantry tasks would be.

They're comparable to the MGS Strykers in CMSF. Which is to say that I end up losing a lot of them. Still, breaking down the theory: - Panzergrenadiers only make sense when paired with armour, so consider them in that context. They're a supporting arm to the armour, and the armour is what defines the engagement. - Panzergrenadiers do the things that armour can't do. Enter complex terrain, spot well, and (most importantly) call in indirect fire, particularly on AT guns. - Typically, Panzergrenadier roles in a CM context might (among other things) include hunting down isolated AT guns after the Panzers have won the engagement. That means they can concentrate on a relatively small target, and bring their considerable firepower to bear at once, which is important since they don't necessarily have the depth to survive an extended engagement. Other roles include a quick reaction force to an enemy breakthrough, which similarly needs to defeat the enemy quickly to have any real success. - Stummels are direct fire support, and are integral to the infantry formation. That means they'll be available when the tanks are off doing something more important. They're not your first choice for the job. - All the halftrack weapons (MGs and the 75mm KwK 37) are supposed to be used in the infantry assault. This means ideally hull down, some distance away from the target (500m-1000m, perhaps), and concentrating fire. Multiple 75mm rounds and Mg fire should be enough to suppress essentially any isolated target, allowing the infantry to do their thing. - Speaking of halftracks, the number one tip I have for their use in CM is to *not* unbutton them, and to keep the engagement to their front. The halftrack gunners will pop up to fire by themselves, then hunker down again when they're done. Keeping the fire forward means that the gun shield can do it's job - shots from outside the fairly narrow frontal arc will result in dead gunners really quickly.

Combatintman has a scenario (Qarmat Ali QRF) for CMSF 1 that manages to replicate ineffective RPG accounts surprisingly well. You're marching over a massive bridge, and tons of RPG rounds can fly at you, mostly ineffectually. This is down to both skill level, and the ranges that the engagement happens at. to Quote George MC's AAR on this one: and From the sounds of the AAR, he over-committed, and lost more than he should have done, but the main narrative of the mission is the RPG-to-dead-Warrior ratio is extremely lopsided.

Well, exceptional was in the context of something other than an attack. They were still expected to bound to the target - "Assault" should be SOP for them. The combination of fire from the LMG and (really importantly) massed Brixia fire is how that's supposed to actually achieve anything.

It'll be the team that has the equipment on the tab. Or should be, at least. "Anti-tank" is not necessarily a meaningful title in a CM squad.

It's not a question of capability, but doctrine. The Italian platoons are two ten-man squads and an HQ. One squad has two LMGs and is the base of fire, and the other has the balance of grenades and is the manoeuvre element. The manuals talk about splitting these only in "exceptional" circumstances only, so this is the logic behind not allowing them to split. The reason why you can use Assault commands is that the same manuals talk about advancing that way (fire and movement) when under fire, so this is how CMFI ended up with this model. It's a nice compromise which maintains the awkwardness of the TOE.

Should be the same platoon. I believe it's the "same formation", which is the units that highlight when you click on the unit. That also implies that if you attached (scenario editor/quick battle) an individual team to a platoon, representing a company MG or whatever, then they would be able to share, in the same way that this alters their C2 links.