domfluff

I linked one above...

Given the aneurysm that this kind of discussion apparently gave Steve during CMx1, and the lack of discussion of QB prices since CMx2 has existed, I'm not surprised. What does disappoint me, is that in this thread there is no attempt to understand why this kind of system might exist. There's a lot of projection, and assertions about what a points-buy system is supposed to be, but little attempt to empathise or see another point of view.

General rule of thumb: Soviet training tended to be good, but only at perhaps one specific thing at once. Command and control was heavily centralised, so the top level was very sophisticated, and the lower levels necessarily simple. That tends to mean that if you can control the operational tempo and structure of the engagement, Soviet tactics can be very effective. This will mean that the questions asked of the commander of a Soviet tank platoon are necessarily simpler than that of their NATO equivalent - they just aren't given as much to do.

Aside from what The_Capt says above, there's also a mathematical reason why three tanks would be preferred for a platoon. The reason usually given is that three tanks are more efficient, because there will be less chance of two tanks targeting the same target at the same time (and therefore wasting shots). One example of this kind of testing: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA395368.pdf Where the three tank platoons were demonstrated to be more survivable, and of about equal effectiveness, despite their smaller numbers, although the conclusions were concerned with the noisy data. Since the three tank platoons are supposed to be used as a single unit, on-line, it doesn't really make a ton of sense to go to four or five, in the Soviet context, where there is always going to be another unit available to support a move. In the NATO context, this situation is reversed - the combined arms company is supposed to be able to fight independently (and possibly overrun), so it's very important that a tank platoon can operate without the requirement for external help - that means splitting into two groups (either 2/2 or 2/3) is much more important in that context. So yes, mainline tank platoons were 3 tanks, because the minimum unit you'd engage with would be a tank company (and more realistically larger than that). The tank platoons that were supporting formations like the Forward Security Element would have to operate in a more flexible fashion, so four-tank platoons would make more sense.

I like this idea. It might be a good idea to have a theme, or just leave it freeform.

If the US Department of Defense pick up Combat Mission: Professional, I'd bet that would include some of the Pacific DATE factions (Olvana, North/South Torbia, etc.).

Which would suggest that their current QB rarity settings are too low - since from memory the M901 has zero rarity in all four years.

My understanding was that Cold War released exactly on time (presumably at much effort), and that this release window was specified by Slitherine in order to tie into their intended release date on Steam.

@Drifter Man Sounds great, especially the last point. Not relevant to these tests, but since I was thinking about them, you might want to try these later. There are two outstanding mysteries which don't have good answers yet: 1) What effect on direct-fire accuracy, if any, does the Leadership stat have? The manual talks about Leadership increasing accuracy of fires, but Josey Wales' soft factor and C2 tests did not show a conclusive advantage. 2) If there is no effect on accuracy, what are the differences between motivation and leadership for clearing suppression? Motivation level and Leadership in Josey's tests appeared to do the same job - they mostly cleared suppression at a faster rate. If they are identical in effect, then that's important, as Leadership levels cost more than motivation in QB terms.

As you in particular are extremely aware, you can approach this with CMSF. I do think that the focus of CMSF is actually a little confused - clearly the setting references both wars with Iraq at times, and much of Task Force Thunder is a "blitz" style, "Road To Baghdad" sprint. There are plenty of scenarios and content which are set post-occupation, but there are quite a few which are weird combinations of both - where the stated mission and forces are that of a coordinated NATO response to a state-level threat, but the objectives are more COIN oriented. I do think the lack of any higher level campaign mechanics would be the largest limiting factor here - an insurgent force "losing" a battle, but getting some good propaganda footage might still work out to be a "win", and you might have a situation where both sides "win". That kind of nuance isn't really what CM is good at, fundamentally. One idea I've been throwing around for a while is using a system like an Engel Matrix game to control that. Matrix games cope with that kind of fuzzy inputs and outcomes extremely well, and would be rules-light enough to not get in the way of the generated CM battles.

The system could definitely be improved - in fact, I'd suggest that it can never hit a state where it couldn't be improved. Doesn't meant that things can't be tweaked. For some prior context for comparison: Clearly a different time, and a different game, but the song remains the same. I do think the examples given in that thread are a little more contentious - comparing a CMx1 Stuart to a CMx1 Stug III can't really be a good measure for anything, because they serve fundamentally different roles. That also speaks to the issue with points-buy in general - if it's invalid to compare a scout vehicle to an assault gun (or AT gun, depending on usage) due to their role, then it's also not a good assumption that any two random vehicles which cost the same can trade evenly with each other. Points have no concept of context, especially in CM's permissive QB structure.

Have been avoiding this thread, but some points of order: 1) Points values are derived from a formula (allegedly), and we do not know what this formula is. 2) Rarity points are an abstract, descriptive label, which applies a multiplication of those points. Under Loose rarity: "Standard" and "Common" are 0, "Uncommon" and "Limited" are x 1 "Rare" are x 2 Under Standard rarity: "Standard" is 0 "Common" is x 1 "Uncommon" is x 3 "Limited" is x 5 "Rare" is x 8 Under Strict rarity: "Standard" is 0 "Common" is x 1 "Uncommon" is x 3 "Limited" is x 7 "Rare" is x 16 (There is a "hypothetical" rarity as well, but that's unusual enough not to bother with here). So a tank costing 302 points, which is labelled as "Uncommon" will cost 302/906, if playing on Strict. 3) Points-buy is a terrible system which is always wrong, in any use-case ever. It's also usually the least-worst option available. The typical problem is that it has no knowledge of context. Saying "these things are equivalent if hull down" is completely backwards, since that's not how the CM points system works at all - it's devoid of this kind of context, and relies on the model (as far as we know). Likewise "these things are functionally equivalent and should be the same price" isn't any more true. Now, to engage with the point of the thread (aside from chuckling mildly about a thread about Quick Battles in Normandy being put in the General section of the site): 4) There are some good fundamental points made in this thread, but I do think the way in which they have been made is pretty poor, and really detracts from any case you'd like to make. I do agree that the Stug III seems overpriced, and I have a suspicion about why this is. We don't know the formula for deriving these prices, and I suspect it's actually very complex. I suspect it might, for example, take each and every armour facing, and applies a weighting to them (so a thick rear armour would be worth less than a thick frontal armour). We know that in CMx1, turrets came at a high premium, so I suspect the turret tax was lowered for CMBN. The combination of those two speculations might explain the Stug III pricing. The Stug III has relatively thick frontal armour, and (due to the lack of turret), fewer armour plates to average out. That will mean that the frontal armour might well take up a disproportionate amount of pricing here. Further, the lack of a crippling turret tax would further separate the values of this compared to a Panzer IV or Sherman. Now, whilst I agree that the Stug III seems overpriced (and many of the linked discussions about this contain some pretty poor arguments for this), I'm not sure I agree with the Panzer IV comments to the same extent. Further, even if this was "fixed", this would mostly have the effect of pushing the issues somewhere else - points-buy is always, always wrong, it's just a question of where and how much. Quick Battles in general seem to have a lower priority for BF. The AI system isn't designed for them, the auto-selection weighting system is nonsensical, and given how CMRT, CMBS and CMCW all share the same pool of QB maps for the most part, it doesn't seem to be something that particularly matters. There are some alternatives, but most of them would require some major design work to implement in a meaningful way, and I suspect that's not really worth the (considerable) effort, rather than this, presumably mostly-automated process. As an example, a formation-based approach could work - pitting reasonable/plausible formations against each other (a Soviet FSE vs a screening US Cavalry platoon would be a simple example). The Quick Battle TO&E situation is baffling in the first place - I don't really know why certain things are removed (like the higher level artillery that would typically be in place). Equally why there isn't a "custom" TO&E option for points. AI auto-selection would best be improved by zeroing out a lot of the weightings, or providing set templates to work from, to at least give the impression of some logic. Still, all of that is heavy design work, and is neither quick nor cheap. For something (multiplayer in general and quick battle in particular) which is apparently a low priority for Battlefront, it certainly doesn't surprise me that there are some vehicles in some of the titles which cost a bit more than they should.

BMDs are in CM: Afghanistan, but that's currently the only place they exist. From what we know about the upcoming Black Sea module, Russian airborne forces are planned, which would imply the BMD. Since there would be some model cross-over with Cold War, and a Cold War module is coming up, that's also a possibility there, albeit one more speculative. One outlier that could be in Black Sea (but not Cold War) would be the 2S25 Sprut-SD. That's a light, air-droppable tank which fires the same ammunition as the T-90. There are a tiny number of them that exist, so the rarity cost would be high, but that's an interesting option. (Oh, and the BMD-4 should be on that list for Black Sea)

Notably, this is also the correct usage for BMPs post-dismount - if you do dismount (and you definitely shouldn't in all cases), then keeping the BMP within 4 action spots of the dismounts is the correct procedure in most cases. Equally, the BMP should be area-firing at partial contacts, but that's secondary.

Yes, this is horizontal sharing in action. Partial contacts upgrade to full contacts, so if you have 10 sets of eyeballs spotting without ports to look through, the infantry will spot first, then share this contact with the armour.

Yes. You're misunderstanding some key ideas here, most notably about game design. I find GNS theory to be a useful (albeit flawed) tool to talk about game design - gamism, narrativism and simulationism, and defining games by their intent. A simulationist game, which Combat Mission is, has to prioritise the model above all, then fit things around the model. It would be anathema to the concept to, for example, increase the penetration of the 75mm Sherman because they're having a hard time getting through the front of a Panther - this kind of gamist change would be fine in something like World of Tanks, or something similarly arcadey, but not in something simulationist. Now, things are on a spectrum, so nothing is purely one or the other, but the CM model is simulationist by intent. Compromises to gamism therefore mostly do not arrive from compromising the model, but instead in scenario and campaign design - selecting or crafting scenarios to demonstrate a tactical problem, a historical action or a conceptual point. The point on Soviet doctrine was a "this is how this equipment is supposed to be used, and therefore why this deficiency doesn't need to matter". Soviet equipment is typically pragmatically designed, and typically very good, if it's being used for the specific task it's intended for. Outside of that context, it starts to look a lot worse - if you use a Soviet equipment like American equipment, you're going to be frustrated. A BMP is not a Bradley, they are two different vehicles with very different capabilities, use-cases and effects. This mentality is due to a number of things, but primarily it's down to pushing command and control decisions centrally, rather than distributing them - it means one can manage a large army, including a large number of conscripts, and train them well in specific and narrow fields. The contrast is that the US method was to push down combined arms and C2 to the lowest levels possible. So, no, I don't think that Battlefront has a pro-US agenda, and I believe that your constant declarations that they do are wholly without evidence or reason. The point of this response is that you've taken something I've said as being in support of this ideological position, which it most definitely is not.

If what you're getting from quoting me is 'to simulate "Soviet doctrine" of concentration of mass Battlefront decided to make Soviet units more blind', then you're fiercely missing the point of what I was saying.

Cold War was due on Steam in April.

The definition of Machine Gun classes has evolved considerably over time, and a definition based on round size is only really applicable to the post WW2 world. HMGs were originally a sustained fire weapon, so mounted in some manner, for example a tripod. Usually this would be belt-fed and water-cooled. Those were the key definitions, rather than calibre. MMGs were a later evolution, and were primarily air-cooled. They were still belt-fed and tripod-mounted, and intended to be fired from fixed position but they were a little more mobile, due to the lack of a need for the water cooling system, but would not typically be fireable from a bipod. LMGs were generally magazine fed and very mobile - providing limited sustained fire capability on a squad level. These would have bipods. The GPMG by definition, is an air-cooled Machine Gun, belt fed and with the emphasis on sustained fire, but capable of being fired from a tripod or bipod, and performing both roles. Unlike an MMG, the GPMGs tend to have a quick-change barrel, often due to having lighter barrels to begin with. Clearly this is an MG which is more mobile than an MMG, but less capable of sustained fire over time, so it can do both roles (but tends to do them worse than the specialist weapons). Since WW2, there's been a further emphasis on the calibre of bullets fired. SAW/LSW is fundamentally similar to an LMG, but it's firing an intermediate cartridge, for example. The M2 and DShK then are now classified as a "HMG", since there's now a good reason to separate out those terms, but this does represent a redefining of the term. WW2 was a transitional period in that respect, so many so-called "HMG" in WW2 might be more properly considered "MMG" under the current definitions.

Elvis uses two of them, like Van Damme in that commercial.

Ah, gotcha - "CM doesn't model any of that (doctrine)" is "CM doesn't model the differences in radio use", rather than "There's no difference in doctrinal behaviour between factions in CM". Yes, I believe this is correct. the C2 model is very sophisticated, and more complex than possibly anything else out there, but it's not quite *that* sophisticated. I suspect it doesn't do a bad job of faking it though - particularly in the modern titles with radios everywhere, and various battlefield management systems.

Awesome, thank you. Will digest.

Yes, it absolutely does. The most obvious effect is in Cold War. The US pushes combined arms down to the company level - if the M150's spot the incoming armour, then the tanks will hear about it very quickly. The Soviets instead mostly do not, and their combined arms layer is at the battalion level (e.g., that ATGM formation is probably attached at the battalion level, so has to go through more steps, and often worse steps, to spread to the equivalent tank platoon). That has a lot of consequences, some of them subtle but it does mean that the Soviets will tend to suffer at the smaller unit level, comparatively speaking. That's quite aside from differences in optics, number of crewmen (all else being equal, a three man tank crew will spot worse than a four man tank crew, since the autoloader can't tell you what it sees), and quality or quantity of radios. That TO&E structure is entirely due to doctrine, and has a strong effect on the outcome of how information is shared, and ultimately how spotting will work.

As far as I'm aware there haven't been extensive tests on exactly how much a partial spot can improve spotting, but it's such a significant upgrade that it's really self-evident in practice. You really don't ever want to send in a tank platoon into an engagement without letting them know what they're expecting.

That's the big thread, but it's really key to "how to play CM" in a lot of ways. The C2 sharing is sophisticated, and it has some obvious consequences. As a simple one, one of the reasons why you want recon elements embedded at the battalion level, and not added as single vehicles directly into a lower formation (Czechmate is an example of that), is that the correct units at the correct place in the C2 chain will share their information much more efficiently, and they can do their job much better. This is especially important in the hyper-modern scenarios in CM, because winning the information war is often more important than winning the physical one (or should be, in a scenario which really understands what CMBS can be about).