domfluff

Now, in terms of the platoon sergeant - in CMCW, the HQ element is two men, and I suspect there's a good argument for making that a one man team, and giving the HQ BMP a fixed three man crew, with the third sitting in the commander's seat. My statement about this "not being for spotting" - this will clearly help spotting and be a C2 link. The main thing I rankle at are the (historically very common on this forum) suggestions about splitting off a scout team to occupy these seats, or to buy Strela teams to do the same. This will let you use a BMP a bit more like a worse Bradley, but it won't help you use the BMP like a BMP.

Yeah, or more accurately close vocal C2 range, which is 6 spots. 4 is a good rule of thumb though, since stuff will vary in motion. 6 actually matches the manuals, because 6x8 = 48m, and the squad shouldn't be further than 50m from it's support. The point was that there's been quite a bit of discussion recently as to what the role and purpose of IFVs are. In term of "fighting mounted" - one thing the Soviet campaign in particular makes extremely clear is that the Soviets can never afford to slow down, and dismounting is a huge expenditure of time. The reasons for that are twofold really - one is the speed of US artillery (you can adjust onto a position in two minutes), and the other is the absolute need to maintain tempo - you need to create situations where your opponent is trying to react to the thing you did two steps ago, so can never really catch up with you. It's all OODA loop stuff, really, but there's some great practical examples. For one of those examples: This was Pete playing a randomised Quick Battle Map, with random forces, and an AI plan he had put together. Despite that giving the AI every disadvantage possible (QB AI is always going to be terrible) - the AI won this engagement, and Pete gained little to no information about what was happening. Now imagine his hypothetical response to that - does he commit reserves to the couple of spots he's managed to get? If so, there's a good chance that those forces just won't be there anymore, and that the Soviet army rumbles onto another similar engagement. So "fighting mounted" - the main idea I was trying to get across is "not dismounting unless you absolutely have to". Firing ports are a supplement to that, but it's not like that's the main purpose of the infantry or the BMP - if you can avoid dismounting at all, you probably should, because the penalty for dismounting too early is often that you've wasted the asset. (This specifically applies to BMPs in the Soviet context during CMCW, mind you - the other periods and especially other doctrine are vastly different things).

It's interesting looking over period manuals objectively, and seeing how undeveloped the US (at least) offensive doctrine was, by comparison to the thought put into the defence. I wonder whether the opposite was true for the Soviets.

But yeah, broadly this is in line with all of the above.

Chrome offers auto-translation, which is pretty good:

I'm still a little sad we'll never see Centurion bullying Panthers.

We'll see how it shakes out. One interesting distinction is that where US doctrine is pretty much defined by TOW (kill zones are at TOW range and more or less stop at Dragon range before packing up and falling back, with the M60s floating in the middle of those), the BAOR was really built around Chieftain, and the range and power of the 120mm. (Similarly, the Germans being built around Leopard and Marder, and the focus on mobility to create depth). I suspect it will be impressive in isolation (or at least compared to the M60A1), but any advantages might well be lost when compared to the better Soviet armour. I expect it' might be a major problem for T-62 and T-55 though.

Chieftain was pretty much the biggest and scariest thing around... for a brief period in the sixties (and assuming it didn't have to move all that much). The heaviest Soviet armour was arrayed against it for a reason. Chieftain should have heavier armour than an M60 and have better penetration, at least compared to the earlier ammunition types. Whether that "heavier armour" will be noticeable versus the 115mm/125mm, and whether the penetration will be noticeable versus the T-64+ I'm a lot less certain.

The Soviets had three defined uses for smoke. Smoke was used on their positions to screen movement, it was used on the enemy to shape the engagement, and it had a third defined use, for deception (I have an anecdote about that). Yes, thermals change this equation, but that's true for everything in Cold War. If you're trying to blind the enemy, you certainly want to use smoke rather than relying on dust. If nothing else it lasts longer. The important thing with smoke is that you never want to be moving or fighting through your own smoke, so smoke missions should be used to create temporary local advantage by shaping and defining space. The "deception" anecdote was a cold war pbem, on a map that was divided down the centre into two distinct halves. I decided to swing my attack to the right, but I dedicated a couple of on-map mortars to laying down a smoke screen on the left. On discussion after the match, that smoke meant that my opponent was expecting a push down my left, and so didn't think he could afford to move the forces on that side away... two mortars had managed to tie up half of his force, and in addition half of his air assets were covering that approach... Now, that kind of thing is never going to work against the AI, of course, but its still a pretty cool story.

Yeah, but probably just foxholes. Overhead cover is either not modelled, or abstracted (sadly)

A clearer idea of how that works, and why the implementation in Black Sea and Cold War is what it is: Leaving behind the Platoon Sergeant in one of three BMPs is a thing which is done, for coordination and especially to man the radio. It's not done for spotting, and doesn't need to be - that's a very different thing.

Oh, and that foxhole time would assume the ground is soft, obviously. I think 2 hours is the typical textbook standard, but that will depend on ground conditions and motivation.

1-3 hours is reasonable for basic fox holes. Wire, mines and overhead cover are something you'd add later, to improve a position you're occupying for a while. Timings from this for some guidance: http://www.wargaming.co/professional/details/britisharmy1956.htm Dispersal times: 1 Hour to deploy for defence 5 Hours to deploy and properly dig-in, which implies digging slit trenches. If taking over a previously dug-in position, that takes 1 hour, if the position was previously an enemy position, 3 hours If the above unit remained in place for 24 hours, this position would be improved with wire, mines and 18" of overhead cover.

As an aside, I do think it's ironic that this comment about US bias was on a youtube video that might have included some of the most positive and pro-Soviet tactical discussion that I've ever heard in relation to Combat Mission. Or at least that was my intent when I was recording my part of it. I'm aware that Hapless is personally still not currently 100% convinced that the Soviet approach can work, and that the deficiencies and limitations can be overcome in the context of a Combat Mission Quick Battle. I am convinced that the Soviets can work, and work well in that context, particularly in the 1979-1980 period. The more advanced kit you add (broadly, the more thermals you add, but there's more to it than that), the harder time the Soviets will have, and the less like Cold War and the more like Shock Force the game becomes. In addition, the better Soviet kit in this earlier period exceeds the capabilities of US kit by all of the most basic measures (mobility, firepower, armour, etc.), and quite a few of the softer ones as well (the RPG-7 is an incredibly important and versatile weapon in this time period, the Soviet man-portable ATGMs are equally effective to TOW in practical terms, but significantly more agile. The BMP has a ludicrous amount of firepower in one space. The mentality is quite different - you need to be proactive, and your role as top-level commander is more difficult, because more weight is being put onto you to conceive and manage the battle on the large scale. I've never wanted to leave a dismount in the BMP for spotting. This is not doctrinal, and it's also not a good idea, since you need to make the use of the limited squad that you have. BMPs shouldn't dismount at all in an ideal situation, and when they do dismount (close terrain, strong AT opposition) it's vitally important that the squad and BMP remain within close supporting distance of each other, within four action spots. The infantry are your eyes, and when the BMP is fighting in this supporting role, it's primarily going to be area-firing at partial contacts or suspected positions. "Fighting mounted" doesn't mean using the firing ports as a primary weapon, and nor is it primarily an NBC concern - dismounting takes time, and the one thing the Soviets really lack is time.

So a suggestion around that point: Long ranges happen. Whether you're aiming for a close range engagement or not, you'll have to start at long range and move closer, so it's important to be able to contest at these ranges, even if it's not your ideal situation. I suspect the main advantage of ATGMs for the Soviets are the limitations of their main gun FCS. Since the Soviets couldn't compete in microtechnology, there was no way for a Soviet FCS to match a US one of the same period, so a logical alternative was to rely on a human "FCS", and a man-guided weapon.

Firmly not Cold War, but some NTC AARs do exist publicly: https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2017/JUL-SEP/pdf/10)TN3-Courchaine-Stryker_txt.pdf

The general trend (which has been echoed by a lot of the literature) is that by the late eighties the Soviets wouldn't really have had a chance. How much of that carries over to the tactical level is an open question, but I do think the trend is definitely going against the Soviets by this point, for a number of reasons, most notably perhaps are the US advantage in microtechnology. You can see some of that in 1982, even - the more thermals you add to the game, the more Shock Force-like the battles become. It would be cool to see the influence of ERA on things, but I suspect you'll start to lose what makes CMCW particularly interesting. I don't think the advancements are all one-sided, but they seem to be heavily weighted in the favour of the US. For that reason, if there was to be an extended timeline, I think I'd be more interested in an expansion to the timeline which went earlier instead.

Attacking into Javelins is one of the unsolved problems of Black Sea, and it's tough. It's also why I tried to separate out the "What about the US" from the above, because the situation is so asymmetric that it breaks most of the rules. It's not quite as bad, but it's a similar situation to CMSF - being competitive with the Syrians vs US is so far outside of "normal", that it's actually a distraction. Along those lines, I don't accept that it's okay to expect to lose at least 9 tanks, or at least the intention has to be to do everything possible to not have that occur. How to avoid that is firmly non-trivial - again, you can do everything right and still lose, and anything you do wrong will be severely punished. You're right about the Grey Eagle, but the US has significantly worse anti-air options in CMBS than the Russians do. You also *always* want to have air defence in a Russian force, probably down to the company level (and ideally leaning on at least medium Electronic Warfare), because these are aspects that are your advantages - it's not coincidence that both of those are central to their planning in general. Now, again, "How to beat the US with the Russians in Black Sea" is fundamentally a different question to "How do the Russians play similarly/different in Cold War compared with Black Sea?" - the former really doesn't have any good answers in the game or real life (although is fascinating, and well worth discussing), whilst the latter has some firmer grounding, I think, and it's what the above is what I was trying to offer an answer for.

I think you're actually missing the point here - the above reference to FM 100-5 refers to a pre-1973 version (possibly the 1968 version), which indeed doesn't take into account the Soviet lessons learned from the 1973 war. The later material absolutely does, and CMCW is fully using that material. There's no change needed here, because CMCW is up to date. The first training scenario is the most basic of building blocks, and in any case is not reflected in anything of the above quote, which is vastly different in scope, scale and intent. A battalion is not a division, and doesn't have the same concerns or areas of responsibility.

(It's worth noting that the above is talking about the regimental and divisional level - CMCW focuses on battalion level stuff, so is the tactical sharp end, rather than the operational fluidity.) So, I think it's important to learn the right lesson from those training scenarios. The basic "attack" scenario represents the most basic form, and it's really intended to teach two lessons - the importance of co-ordinating with your artillery, and the value of mass (i.e., the first tank to spot usually wins an engagement, but if you have enough tanks then one of them will get the first spot). These principles are still true for the Russian army today, but this structure of attack was not the expected default, even then. The default assumption, as above, was that the usual tactical fight would be the meeting engagement - rapid attacks from the march. The core principles of mass and fires are as true there are they are in the basic attack, but their implementation was much more fluid, complex and subtle. So, to give you an idea of what that should look like, based on a currently-running game of this I'm playing as the Soviets: http://www.wargaming.co/professional/details/britisharmy1956.htm In that game, I have a division, and I'm approaching a German town bisected by a major river running north-south. I chose to advance on two axis, with one regiment on each, preceded by recon. The regiments had orders to attack anything they find directly from the march. The north regiment made visual contact, so the remaining parts of the division (engineers, two more infantry regiments and the tank regiment, all headed south. What this means from an operation/ooda loop standpoint is that the north regiment will make contact, and might well bounce off (attacking from the march isn't great, and a regiment attacking a defensive battalion from the march doesn't have great odds in that ruleset). This regiment will then recombine and reform, and make a more formal attack, which is likely to succeed. This gives the NATO player a real decision to make - they have no contact with the south forces at all, so they will have to decide whether they reinforce the north, and how much of their reserves are committed in that direction. The whole point of this north attack is to buy time in the south, to screen and engineer a way across the river, and to bypass and surround the town. This fluid, multi-axis approach is exactly what the above is discussing, and is represented in CMCW very well. A good discussion on this kind of thing (same chap who publishes the above ruleset): https://20thcenturywargaming.wordpress.com/2013/06/16/why-cold-war-warsaw-pact-tactics-work-in-wargaming/

That's quite a layered question, with some curveballs thrown in, so bear with me: Firstly, sourcing: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot Spots/Documents/Russia/2017-07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau-Bartles.pdf In some respects this is apparently (and unsurprisingly, since it's five years later) out of date by now, but it's absolutely relevant for CMBS. In there, you can see that the majority of the fundamentals of Soviet doctrine have survived intact into the modern day - attacking on-line for maximum mass, the focus on meeting engagements, on counter-attack in the defence, etc. In this sense, CMCW lets you see those fundamentals very clearly, in their intended context, before you translate them to a new one. First curveball - there's a large difference between Russia vs Ukraine and Russia vs the US here. The latter is significantly more asymmetric, so ends up breaking a lot of the rules or otherwise forcing you out of where you want to be. That's essentially why things like Javelin exist, of course - they're supposed to be disruptive technology, aimed at plausible opposition. Will focus on Russia vs Ukraine then, with some notes on the US at the end. Second curveball - I'm not convinced that all Black Sea scenarios capture or represent the main tropes of hyper-modern warfare as well as they could. Arguably that's true for all CM titles, but I suspect it's inevitably a little worse for Black Sea, due to the speculative nature of everything. As an example of that, Between Two Fahrbahns in Cold War. That's scenario that's great fun to play from either side, plays well H2H, and it's perfectly competent... but isn't terribly representative of "Cold War", and doesn't really make an argument, express a concept or investigate a tactical problem of the period. The same scenario might as well have Shermans vs Panzer IVs and it would work equally well. So, what defines Black Sea? Philip Karber has a definition of the real combat in the region as "high intensity combat on a low density battlefield", and I think that core idea should also define CMBS. As a basic rule of thumb then - it's pretty common to use a Quick Battle map that's one size larger than your force. In Black Sea I think that should really be two sizes larger by default. That same thinking can/should apply to scenarios, but it's intended as a quick representation of the idea. The other difference in theme is that in Cold War the operational tempo is paramount. Typically the tactical battlefield is not something that needs to be taken, it's something that needs to be move through, as fast as possible. This is part of the reason why the Soviets could be (had to be) comparatively free with casualties - gaining operational freedom is the goal here, and the tactical-level losses are acceptable. This is not true for Black Sea. The Russian army is smaller, more casualty-adverse, and isn't screaming towards the Rhine at maximum velocity. This means you'll be more interested in capturing objectives, and can't afford to take the losses. In addition, the Russian army has significantly improved equipment. Much better spotting and C2, faster call-in times for artillery, ERA and APS, drones to call in massed fires, etc. They also have pushed assets down to lower levels - not as much as the US do, but significantly more than the Soviets, meaning that small units are significantly more capable and independent. The Russian air defence is significantly better than the US, so they should have drone superiority (and the US have nothing that can shoot down Zala at all). So how do you marry these two ideas? Soviet fundamentals, whilst being casualty-adverse? This is perhaps the major problem to solve as the Russians, but a lot of it comes down to controlling your engagements. You still want to be attacking on-line, with maximum firepower against a subset of the enemy, but you want to be careful as and when you engage, and to control that engagement with overwhelming firepower. An actual engagement might only last a minute or two, and a battle might be a lot of sneaking and manoeuvre, followed by a brief period of devastating fires. High intensity, Low density. The first mission of the Russian campaign in the core game is indicative, I think. This is fundamentally a Soviet doctrinal meeting engagement. This is identical in concept to Miller's training scenario from CMCW, or the first mission of the Soviet campaign in Cold War, but the differences start to become apparent. In the Russian campaign scenario, you have all the elements of that meeting engagement - you have a recon platoon, followed by a Forward Security Element of a BMP-3 company and a tank platoon, and they should be doing the same fundamental job. The differences really start when the follow-up to that FSE is a single tank company, and not an entire battalion. That means that you're inherently more limited in how you can approach this. The approach I took with this was to advance with the recon platoon and get spots along the route of contact, then advance at the speed of the fireplan. The FSE wants to march into a valley, so, suppressing the high town objective on the valley's far side is what allowed the follow-on tank company to take up a base of fire on the right side hill, on-line, and dominate the valley with fires. The FSE can then approach into the valley floor, preceded with drone-summoned fires on the central objective, and with covering fires on likely enemy positions to the flanks. This FSE can then bypass, surround and reduce the central objective, before moving on to take on the others to the conclusion. At each stage the fundamentals are the same - your fire plan is paramount, and in each bound you're attempting to go fires-first, maximising firepower at every engagement. So, how about the US? Well, Abrams, Bradley and Javelin represent disruptive technology, that will do terrible things to you. The fundamentals remain identical, but you can do everything right and still lose sometimes, and anything you do wrong will be punished severely. Fighting javelins is about firepower and the terrain read - they're systems used on foot, and the modern US infantryman doesn't like mortars anymore than anyone else does, so denying potential javelin positions is as important as anything. Abrams need to be engaged from the flank where possible (ideally from two angles at once), and Bradleys are near-psychic in their spotting, so you need to engage them quickly and decisively with excellent recon - you never want to get into an engagement where you don't already have spotting contacts.

200m is extremely close range. CM does unintuitive things with armour at ultra-close distances, presumably to model how bad the local situational awareness can be/the limited FOV of vision slits. That's true for all factions, but I wonder if that effects unbuttoned commanders as well. Speculation, certainly. Honestly, I think I'm less of a proponent of the Soviets, and a more a proponent of doctrine in general, and trying to understand the context and intended use for everything - it's just that in this case the Soviet stuff was the focus, since the approach was misunderstood. I'd do the same thing for the US and their use of ATGMs, or the BAOR and Chieftain, as and when appropriate.

Yeah, as a conceptual/target range example of that: Ran this test a few times. This is two T-90AM (APS) platoons versus an M1A2 SEP 2 (APS) platoon. Since the above Abrams is approximately twice the value of the T-90 in Quick Battle points, the Abrams have the advantage in points here (4:3). The T-90 were given a drone for spotting contacts, and were set up about 800-900m away, offset as above, and would approach into hull down. In each test, the T-90s win, typically losing a single T-90 in the process. Often this engagement only takes a single turn to play out, but sometimes smoke lengthens this. So... like this, basically, just in a more generic sense.

M1A2 Abrams and Javelins in Black Sea are disruptive technologies, and trying to work out what to do against them is one of the core problems you need to solve - there really aren't any reliably good answers. The T-90AM and AT-14 can both penetrate an Abrams frontally... but probably won't. Both of them will happily go through the sides, and both are significantly cheaper - you will usually have more of them. This means that the basic, generic idea has to be to coordinate an attack simultaneously from at least two different directions, ideally with at least 90 degrees displacement between them. If this was two T-90 platoons, then each would attack on-line, and at the same time, and would need their flanks screened, presumably by infantry. To make this work requires excellent reconnaissance (drones do a lot of work here), excellent counter-reconnaissance (this is well developed by the Russians in general, but even just thinking in terms of drones - the Russian anti-air is superb, and can easily blind the US from the air), and great coordination (this one is on you).

I suspect the T-62 (1975) might actually be the best value-for-points in CMCW (Hapless was using the '72 versions). It doesn't have the massive uptick in armour or the 120mm gun that the T-64 and higher have, but you can get 3 T-62 (1975) for 2 T-64B in a Quick Battle, and that adds up fast. It does mean that to make use of that you need the terrain/plan to allow you to get multiple guns on target. Where things are more complex or fluid that will inevitably reward individual quality. I don't think it's a coincidence that the (late-CMCW) T-80 tripled the number of periscopes the Commander has to look out of since priorities and the relative value of things changed.