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This thread, methinks, very much needs to be put back on the track. Am not going to attempt to respond by individuals, so am going to address this by specific issues.

Yom Kippur War IADs effectiveness
 
IAF CAS losses were so severe vs Egypt for days that Israel terminated them altogether. They didn't resume until IDF tanks, which had crossed the Suez Canal, drove into the SAM zones and systematically shot up the SA-2/3/6 SAMs and dense AAA, of which the most notable AAA was the "airplane eater" ZSU-23/4. DEAD Israeli style. Against Syria, the story was much the same, but in both cases, Israeli CAS was effectively out of the war until the SAM problem was addressed, of which the pacing element (and eye waterer to defense types in the US and) was the lethality of the highly agile, mobile SA-6, a weapon against which the IAF had no ECM capability whatsoever. None. The SAMs were sufficiently deadly to force IAF planes to fly low, placing them in the deadly embrace of radar directed AAA, not to mention a plethora of SA-7s. The US provided Israel with as many as 40 F-4s and definitely 46 A-4s as replacements for terrible air losses. What's not generally known is that the US provided Israel with numerous complete tail end assemblies for A-4s. Why? The planes were eating SA-7s, but barely getting back home. Spare part planners never envisioned such a situation, so the IAF suffered major virtual attrition as a result. The IAF started the war with 440 combat planes and lost, depending on which numbers are used, 107-387, but I don't know offhand whether the US supplied additional planes over attrition during the resupply effort.
 
Given the above, I'm having real problems signing up for the "lessons of the Yom Kippur War." Likewise, I'm having similar problems with GW I. There were other factors at work other than those enumerated including: precision destruction of a key Iraqi air surveillance radar, the removal of which allowed the entry of the Stealth fighters and more visible friends. Inter alia, this resulted in the pinpoint destruction of the key Syrian AD HQ, spectacularly shown time and again on strike vid broadcast worldwide. Even in unbroken state, the IADS had very little capability vs Tomahawks which are, many don't realize, pretty stealthy in their own right, let alone when whizzing down the boulevard so low details on the weapons were clearly visible. This isn't the famous footage, but it gets the idea across.


 
The US went into GW I with not merely with superlative intel on Iraq's IADS, it went into battle with a direct conduit right into the IADS situation center, thanks to a physical hack into the fiber optic trunk line from the front, a hack put into place by a brilliant US SpecOps mission. Reportedly, the US was able to show, or not show, IADS HQ whatever it desired, but the hack is believed to have been used as a generator of enormous numbers of false targets. I firmly believe it's dangerous to draw sweeping conclusions without a fundamental understanding of what was going on to begin with. I recall the mighty MOD himself came out from Russia with his experts to figure exactly this out. One such insight was a demand for a weapon capable of downing a HARM attacking a defending SAM site. Pantsir, anyone? Tunguska itself has substantial capabilities vs things like GBU-15, LGBs, JDAM, JSOW and Tomahawks.
 
Now, let's look at the Vietnam War, shall we? It's fashionable to deride NVN's IADS as ineffective. This is based on another faulty premise. That premise is that the aggregate performance figures reflect how the national IADS performed historically throughout. Not the case. What you're seeing are the effects of a lot of really bad outcomes late in an otherwise impressive career.  When the US first ran into the SA-2, the SA-2 was killing 0.5 planes per engagement. 0.5! Indeed, there were several cases of two planes downed in one shot. What broke the back of the NVN IADS was a masterful CIA op called HA/BRINK or HABRINK. What was that? The CIA slipped people into Indonesia's SA-2 warehouses and obtained the relevant guidance link frequencies, allowing the US to pretty effectively jam the SA-2. Why Indonesia? The Indonesian SA-2s were identical to the NVN's SA-2s! Sure, evasive maneuvering, Wild Weasel, Iron Hand played their part, but HA/BRINK was what undid the IADs as far as SAM coverage. By late in the war, Linebacker II, jamming, better tactics, SEAD and other means had so degraded and cowed the SAMs that they were blind launching (no radar at all, optical direction only)  dozens of SAMs at once, and that's why the overall numbers look so bleak. That wasn't the case through much of the air war over NVN and the DMZ. We lost a family friend and his WSO to an SA-2 over the DMZ. It came out of the clouds below, so they had no chance to see the launch and evade. Boom!  Two wall entries on the Vietnam Memorial.
 
For a more informed view of Russian SAM operational effectiveness than what I've seen in this thread, please see Carlo Kopp's analysis here. Kopp has some scathing things to say about how the Arabs not only fundamentally disregarded a throughly thought out Russian doctrine, but did some things which would've been comedic had they not been so hurtful to the using force! Suggest interested parties also look at what specific threats the newer generation SAMs were designed to defeat, what their tactical-technical characteristics are and how that applies to the ability to detect, localize, engage and kill them. Makes rather sobering reading. A Serbian captain with his ancient SA-6 unit not only survived a major SEAD/DEAD campaign, but also cost the US the stunning loss of an F-117, damage to a second one and an F-16.
 
As a longtime student of military history and a former defense professional, I deem it folly to expect the USAF to be able to so thoroughly control the skies that Russian CAS and similar can't operate. US AAA threat is risible, so there's no real dense AAG penalty for operating in the weeds to make it really hard vs both fighters and Patriot to engage it, and SU-25s have survived hits by things much worse than MANPADS. Russia's not going to sit idly by and let the US/NATO gin up its air power before striking, so the force ratios, for a time, at least, are not going to be pretty. Contrary to popular opinion, the AWACS supply is quite limited, and people need to remember that these vital birds can stay aloft only so long before they have to be replaced to keep a given area in coverage. The harder they're flown, the less reliable they become, and the worse the even more critical highly trained control crews perform. Tired radar operators miss things. That. of course, presumes the plane ever gets airborne to begin with, A single Russian sniper armed with, say, an OSV 12.7 mm rifle, could ruin NATO's day at places like Geilenkirchen, which when last seen, had a whole 5 E-3As. It's even worse with JSTARS, where there are but a handful of planes in total.
 
And this discussion is without taking into account Russian missile hard kill systems or jamming. Put it this way, for every long range sensor we deployed, the Russians deployed countermeasures. Jammers vs the E-3A, the TR-1's SAR, JSTARs. I used to have some SECRET diagrams of the E-3A radar display under jamming. Thanks to steerable antenna nulls, the system performed very well in the face of one or two jammers, but after that things progressively fell apart. It was entirely possible to jam the E-3A so effectively that entire (pizza slice wide) sectors were blind. Additionally, the more jamming energy received, the shorter detection range becomes, totally compromising the vast volumetric region a Sentry ordinarily controls. This allows even crude Stealth weapons a veritable free ride through the defenses.
 
If memory serves, the wartime scenario over West Germany envisioned only two E-3As up, covering the entire region. What happens if one doesn't show up, is shot down or is jammed so effectively it can't do its job? How many would likely be available to support ops in Ukraine, and how much coverage, even best case, would be lost just to keep things like S-300PMU and S-400 from simply devouring them? The Russians also have the Il-76 MAINSTAY, their Gen 2 AWACS. Nor, as a look at page 3, #46 in that thread will show, is that by any means the limits of what's going to be faced. The Russians are building a combined function aircraft able to handle everything but undersea warfare from an AWACS perspective. I'd argue that Russian force effectiveness will be greatly enhanced by even the vanilla MAINSTAY of the Cold War period, never mind what it's evolved into since. Patriot will assuredly be a key Spetsnaz target, and if it goes down, there's no way the Air Force can handle the flood which would ensue. SAMs are 24/7 systems, but planes, even with in-flight refueling, have to go home sooner or later. There is no in-flight replenishment of munitions, LRUs or crews. And who's to say that the planes keeping the Russians away in one place won't suddenly be retasked elsewhere, leaving the poor ground force commander in the denuded zone in a Heinz factory sized pickle?!
 
What are the MCRs (Mission Capable Rates) for the F-22A under high sortie conditions?  We already know the F-35 is compromised practically across the board when it comes to just about every combat metric, so why should MCR  or sortie generation rate be any better? It'll probably break a lot, not least because it'll be anything but a mature system. We know how those tend to be. As a mature system, the F-14 Tomcat was running ~65% MCR. This meant a two-carrier CVBG could use only one CVN on a given day for strike--because the other could do nothing but conduct FAD to keep both alive! Doubtless the numbers these days are better, bit I think they nicely illustrate the main issue. Complex things, and the F-35 is super complex and broken to start, are iffy at best to depend upon. The more you stress a complicated system, the faster it breaks, not necessarily in ways anticipated, either. Given this incredibly important issue, does it really make sense to make campaign success dependent on breaking the Russian Air Force via aerial combat, as seems to be the general expectation?
 
I don't have the latest numbers and all the tech specs for what I fervently hope are upgrades from what I knew of US capabilities, but I do know the overall situation should give serious pause to US/NATO planners, operations and combat personnel. There is a strong case to be made for a real integrated US tactical air defense a la Russe or similar. I close with a cautionary tale from my Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix days.
 
The FAD (Fleet Air Defense) Section Head vs His Boss, the Operations Analysis Department Manager.
 
My section head, Bill Knight, ran OPFOR--Tu-22M BACKFIRE & SOJs (Stand Off Jammers); his boss, Dave Spencer, had the FAD for a BLUFOR CVBG (carrier battle group). Site of battle? Navy tactical simulator in Monterey, California. Each side had its own war room, and there was a separate Control room where all was known. The stakes? A good bottle of wine and gloating rights on Monday. Event was part of a threat conference the weekend immediately before Monday.
 
OPFOR objective:
 
Penetrate FAD screen and launch long range Mach 3+ AS-4 KITCHEN ASCMs to hit and destroy CVNs (in the days before AEGIS was deployed)
 
BLUFOR objective
 
Use CAP and DLI (Deck Launched Interceptors) to destroy OPFOR before it can reach the missile release line.
 
Execution: BLUFOR
 
BLUFOR radar detects jam strobes on expected threat axis and gleefully commits both CAP and available DLI to attack OPFOR. Once in range, and operating in HOJ (Home ON Jam) mode, salvos of Tomcat launched Phoenix missiles kill the jammers, clearing the radar scopes. Dave Spencer exults, thinking he has destroyed the attackers and won a crushing victory.
 
Execution: OPFOR
 
Bill Knight fully anticipates BLUFOR commander's battle plan and uses it to destroy him. OPFOR demonstrates with SOJs, getting exactly the response he anticipated, but sends the actual striking force, without SOJs, around to the back door, conducting completely unhindered AS-4 missile attacks. The SOJs and crews blown to bits? Regrettable losses necessary to fulfill OPFOR commander, Bill Knight's, operational intent.
 
Battle Resolution 
 
About the time Dave Spencer was celebrating his great victory, Control informed him  his triumphant Tomcats would begin ditching shortly. Seems both of his carriers had been sunk by Bill Knight, and no fixed airfield, or even another carrier, was anywhere to be had. This was the end. I have no idea what the wine was, how expensive and delectable, but the wine of victory was thoroughly savored by my section head, for he had wiped the floor with Dave, who possessed an awe inspiring Ph.D. in Military Operations Research, from Harvard, no less. Come Monday, though, his customary arrogance and aura of superiority were gone. He walked about head down, visibly depressed and like a man in a daze. He couldn't believe what had happened to him; so catastrophically at the (perceived) moment of victory.
 
Summing up, I believe the expectation that the US would almost immediately own the skies over Ukraine to be on the scale somewhere from delusional clear up to clinically insane. Such expectations seem to be predicated on a largely incompetent opponent who hasn't a prayer of prevailing vs western military might and training. Additionally, this seems to be predicated on the notion that Russian pilots are no better than Arab pilots and would be flying planes just about as capable relative to US combat aircraft. Does the US have some nice toys? Absolutely. But how many will actually be usable--and stay usable--over the course of the envisioned campaign? Is it reasonable to assume that other US foes are going to lie doggo so the US/NATO can fight Russia absent other military crises? I think not. And has anyone here bothered to look at the Russian approach to BVR aerial warfare in a very heavy jamming and rapidly maneuvering target environment? Once you have, consider this notional engagement, but with as many as 4 x AAMs targeted on each Raptor. This engagement presumes, too, that AWACS isn't attacked and downed or badly crippled. Nor does it recognize the existence of a technology called forward pass, in which missile shooters simply salvo missiles on command of aircraft whose far superior sensors allows guidance of those weapons even though the shooters can't see the target. All of a sudden those numerous not Stealth planes become a real threat, making the already enormous missile loads of Russian Stealth fighters many times larger than can be carried. 


 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

We were talking about something cool, and then nooooooo, another student of military history knows better.
 
Just in short, I do enjoy how impenetrable Russian IADS is, and how NATO will struggle with it, but supremely unstealthy last generation Russian fighters will zip on through NATO/Ukrainian IADS and kill  all the mens.
 
Carrying on in good order though!
 
 
Who died and appointed you to be thread-Stalin?  It was off track and we were happy there talking about much more relevant topics like how cool Longbow 2 was.
 
Re: IADS examples.
 
Super-off topic!  The question was never "will NATO bomb the Russians?" because the answer to that is fairly well agreed by all parties to be "Yes, eventually."  The million dollar question was if the Russians could bomb NATO.
 
And apparently given your able defense of large SAMs and the 2S6, the answer is "no, all Russian pilots will die shrieking in their canopies as they are violated from every direction by PATRIOT and 2S6 fire because IADS is the end all"
 
However I do not think that was your intent, so carrying on in good order.
 
Effectively the realistic outcome of any ADA component is to raise the difficulty of bombing something, but like all defenses, given effort and proper equipment they can be breached.  Anyone with a basic understanding of military workings understands defense is the stronger form of military operations, but it is never the decisive one (or, even if the defensive fight was important, what decided the matter was the follow-on offensive, or threat of same no matter how anemic it was).  The Israelis had to suffer through the slings and arrows of both first generation ATGMs and SAMs once they'd moved beyond babby's first missile stage.  However, as time and time again has proven, the IADS builds complexity into the operation, but to act as if they were the be all end all is a shallow reading of military history.  Hanoi still rocked with bomb blasts, Israeli jets still snake and naped their way across the desert.  Like all defensive, reactive ways of warfare, they're only good if you can follow up the breathing room they've given you.
 
Which gets to relative strength.
 
Here's what the Russian Air Force can muster circa around now:
 
830 "fighter" type planes (includes multi-roles and assumes the Russians would potentially commit MIG-31s offensively)+60 additional PAK-FAs maybe+100 claimed MIG-35 starting initial small number service claimed 2016
535 "Strike" type planes (planes with unambigiously strike-only role, chiefly SU-25 and SU-24)+89 claimed SU-34s
For amusement:
16 A-50 AWACS type planes
19 IL-78 aerial refueling planes+31 on order
 
Here's what the USAF brings to the fight:
1,473 "fighter" type planes (F-16, F-15s minus Es, F-22, F-35s in inventory)+1763 F-35 on order)
534 "Strike" type planes (F-15E, A-10C)
32 E-3 Sentry (AWACS)
16 JSTARs (Sort of AWACS for ground)
417 refueling planes (KC-135, not bored enough to look up KC-46 procurement)
 
USMC could bring if invited
229 Fighters (F/A-18s, to be replaced by F-35s)
99 Strike (AV-8, also to be replaced by F-35s)
 
USN if they get sick of the ocean
998  fighters (F/A-18A/B/C/D, and F/A-18E/Fs) 
117 Dedicated SEAD (EF-18G) 
 
Here's what our special relationship would show up with should Her Majesty deem fit:
 
125 Fighters (Typhoon)
102 Strike (Tornado)
6 AWACS (E-3 Sentry as operated by RAF)
 
Deutchland
 
109 Fighters (Typhoons, to eventually become fleet of 143)
116 Strike (Tornadoes) 
 
Merde. It is time for zee French:

135 Fighters (Rafales, remaining Mirage 2000s in fighter role)+37 additional Rafales if the Navy shows up.
84 Strike (Mirage 2000s in strike units)
4 AWACs (French owned E-3s)
 
Za naszą i waszą wolność!
 
80 Fighters (MIG-29, F-16)
23 Strike (SU-22)
 
"I swear guys!  THIS time we're going to pick a side and stick with it!"
 
76 Fighters (Typhoons)
134 Strike (Tornadoes, AMX International)
 
Ukraine:
50 Fighters (operational and on hand, others broken/in storage)
15 Strike (remaining operational SU-25s)
 
NATO
18 AWACS (E-3s "owned" by NATO)
 
These numbers:
 
Total commitment by all parties involved. Obviously not the case in event of war, each of these parties to include Russia will be forced to commit platforms to protecting other fronts  It's safe to assume this will equally effect all countries involved, and NATO is much better able to spread forces around at this point.
The only numbers that include F-35s are the USAF simply because I got bored of adding those in quickly
Russian "new" planes only count confirmed orders.
Only USAF tankers are counted, again this is a boredom thing on my end.
Russian and USAF strategic bombers are excluded.  It's doubtful any of those assets would be used for CAS, and very likely, at all for fear of causing some sort of "is this B-1 heading towards the Russian border dropping bombs on a bridge, or is it carrying nukes?" situations.
This excludes a large number of NATO countries.  I simply stuck to countries we've gotten some indication might show up in CMBS.
 
You can see the massive disparity in air power, capabilities, and numbers.  There are more USAF F-16s alone than all fighters in the Russian inventory, and significant numbers (nearly 50%) of Russian strike fighters are SU-25s, which given how everyone's crowing how dead the A-10 would be over Ukraine, I think it's safe to say they're not any more likely to survive terribly long either.  Additionally the 60 or so AWACS type platforms vs the 16 or so A-50s is a massive disparity in surveillance and command and control capability.  And bluntly russian SOF can only get lucky so many times, while risking the fact that "Chechen separatists" may suddenly appear in western Russia and do the same before disappearing to never be heard from again.
 
Some more random one off key points:

 
 
Who knows, there's only about 180ish of them I think, there's going to be a TON of other high end fighters in the air though, and the stealth isn't going to be as important for CAP over friendly lines.
 
If memory serves, West Germany isn't a country any more, and the hypothetical war of 1988 is not the hypothetical war of 2017.
 
Irrelevant to a painful degree.  Finding a tank company gone to ground is something much harder to do than finding a CVBG.  While standoff is going to be important, the defender's ability to acquire Russian aircraft will be much greater than Russian aviation's ability to acquire NATO ground forces.  Simple reality of finding a plane in the cold blue sky over a tank on the cluttered green earth.
 
Says the man who thinks tanks are aircraft carriers.  
 
As I have shown there is a MASSIVE difference in NATO capabilities and Russian capabilities.  And we know unambigiously USAF/USN/USMC avaitions, and several of their NATO counterparts fly significantly more than their potential Russian opponents. 830 Russian fighters to the 3,312 fighters NATO could call on, even assuming mirror capabilities is simply not a fight the Russians are going to be able to manage.  And ESPECIALLY something the Russians will not be able to manage over PATRIOT (from various NATO allies and US Army sites), MANPADs, Ukrainian ADA, etc, etc, etc.  The idea an SU-25 is going to live long enough to make a pass is possible, leakers can happen.  The idea it's not going to be part of his posthumous medal for valor is positive madness.  
 
Even assuming leakers, the odds that an SU-25 or SU-24 is going to get over US forces, make more than one pass, and survive to return to friendly lines is even more insane.  With Russian IADS, it's going to be hard for US forces to bomb Russian forces as much as we'd like.  Russian strike pilots would do well to jettison their landing gear on takeoff to save weight, because god knows they wouldn't be needing them again if they make it to the FEBA.  The war in the Ukraine is not a war of national survival.  The Russians would not be desperate enough to simply throw away aircraft they cannot afford to lose by the dozens to achieve tactical level strikes (especially considering each of those 830 fighters that follows the SU-25s it was trying to protect crashing to earth is one less fighter to stave off the 991 dedicated strike craft+ 3000ish now bomb carrying fighters from NATO). 
 
Given this force, this literal swarm of current generation airframes, something like a yankee imperialist 2S6 is a stupid, stupid, stupid waste of money.  We're best served by the might of our winged bretheren, and saving our pennies to make sure those flyboys get all the crew rest they need instead of pretending it's still 1989 and paying for Chaparral 2 or Son of Linebacker.  

Excal does have an IMU that performs only bit worse than GPS guidance. It only kicks in once the GPS signal gets jammed, so the error is minimized.

First computer games I ever played (this is elementary school) were Novalogic's Armored Fist 2 and F-22 Lightning II, in equal amounts.  The more I think about it, the more a whole lot of things start to make sense because of that...
 
Totally viable, but it's very context dependent.  You'd have two options, either high altitude to stay above the engagement envelope, or a low "toss."  With a high altitude engagement, any sort of SHORAD isn't going to reach you.  Even the missiles on Tunguska or the SA-13 won't be able to touch you.  Even the Pantsir missiles would be unlikely to reach you at 30k feet.  The problem then becomes your visibility to Strategic SAMs (or SA-11/SA-15 style systems) so you need a plan to deal with those.  A LGB is better against mobile targets because it can adjust on the move, whereas your non GBU-54 (Laser JDAM) goes off coordinates.  You can easily find and guide a target from altitude with a pod, and if not then there are multiple ways someone on the ground could guide the bomb in.  It doesn't even need to be a guided bomb really, air defenses and especially their sensors are very fragile (even on armored chassis) so a near miss with a non-guided bomb will still likely knock that system out, at least for a while.  CBUs are even better because only one bomblet needs to hit to pretty much gaurantee a mission-kill.

A low level approach with a toss is the other option.  A guided bomb makes this very effective in terms of accuracy, and even un-guided bombs can still hit accurately thanks to the computer systems on the aircraft.  This let's you approach from low (nominally beneath Strategic SAM engagement envelopes) and thus sneakier, but simple physics will tell you that you get better range dropping from altitude.  There's a good chance of being within missile range of most SHORAD systems (not so much MANPADS), so this is best done in a manner where you can dive back behind cover.  You will also need someone else (plane or otherwise) to designate the target if you're using lasers. 

As you can see, there are tradeoffs between the two methods, and either one still leaves you at risk.  Bombs play by the rules of physics, so you can only get so much range out of them and you're going to be going against a missile that is attempting to burn up to your altitude.  It really just depends there.  The better solution is HARM (for Radar) or Mavericks.  There are other standoff weapons too.  Much better standoff range for SHORAD systems, and both are more of a "sure thing" as you put it due to their accuracy, warhead, and range. 

I second the motion for standoff air mission option!!
 
I was thinking about it the other day while reading this thread after playing a couple of missions
 
It is somewhat strange it is not there in some form, given the capabilities of the systems involved and all the effort put into them to do exactly the opposite of what they do in game right now,
 
It is like giving the tanks a range limit of 1000m for no good reason other than to add suspense

My terrestrialy inclined friend here is correct. A dead jet is a useless jet. The dynamics and nature of air vs. land warfare means it's probably far easier to sneak a company of Abrams into Red Square than it is to get a 4 ship of F-16s to the Russian-Ukrainian border.
The type of CAS mission where it would be absolutely 100% necessary that the strike gets through to save ground forces is the type of mission that will get tasked a heavy SEAD and CAP escort to establish local and likely temporary air superiority for a one time strike. Any other strike will result in unacceptable losses to the aircraft and low probability of success. It just won't be worth it. The USAF already hates the CAS mission and has structured itself for the strike and interdiction missions when it has to go air to ground. (Interdiction is behind the lines attacks on enemy ground forces, like bombing troop columns - not something that happens in CM). Those types of missions will feature the heavy escort with lots of planning. My own USN, if committed, would assist in winning the air war before thinking of going air to ground. I don't want to get personal, but you have an USA tank officer (the ground pounder in need) and a USN F/A pilot (the cowardly flyboy who carries the bombs and missiles) saying how this would go down. Its worth considering.

Again, a dead plane does no one any good. A live plane can kill a Sukhoi today and tomorrow so that it can kill tanks next week when there are no more sukhois. I cannot emphasize this enough.

Pardon the double tap, but I missed a not SHORAD silliness post that was worth talking about.
 
I agree right now it's very "if any ADA piece is in the game, you better park the planes until further notice."  As a stupid idea:
 
Have a new set of strike options.  Like how you set "heavy medium or light" you'd have another tab that would be something like "close" or "standoff" 
 
Close is what happens now.  The platform closes to attack and destroy things and enters the ADA envelope.  
 
Standoff is the platform launching weapons from outside of MANPAD range.  For rotary wing, only helicopters with standoff type weapons (like the radar guided Hellfires) can do this, and weapons like cannons or rockets will not be employed.  They also can no longer self spot (picture it that they don't see enough of the battlefield to engage targets without someone being able to talk them onto it)  Fixed wing is similar, "dumb" weapons are not employed, missiles and guided bombs only (assuming idiots loop type attacks for the bombs).  Fixed wing will only do point targets (again, at standoff they're going to struggle to spot a tank motoring around, they need the spotter to find the target, and likely designate or feed GPS coordinates to them).
 
In standoff, MANPADS would simply be useless.  Vehicle ADA (missiles only) would engage at a much reduced efficiency.
 
The counter to this would be something like the EW level.  There'd be an "air threat" level, with settings like "Blue Air Dominance, Blue Air Superiority, Air Parity, Red Air Superiority, Red Air Dominance" to simulate the fighter and larger SAM effects.  Dominance is basically one side owns the sky and can fly whereever it wants.  Superiority means the side that holds it has an advantage, but the other side can still push out strikes and attacks occasionally.  Parity means the battle is ongoing and it's no man's sky.
 
The effects on air strikes would be one of the following: 
 
Successful Strike. Bombs away!
Evasive.  Airstrike is aborting to avoid being engaged, will be available again later.  
Engaged. Airstrike is under attack, it is no longer available for the mission as it has jettisoned munitions and is bugging out
Destroyed. Some F-22/SU-27 pilot is smiling like an idiot right now.
 
The different air threat levels would dictate which one of these was more likely.  Under Blue Air Dominance, unless a MANPAD or on map ADA piece gets a shot off, Blue Air Strikes will arrive.  Under Air superiority there's like a 10% chance of engaged, 20% chance of evasive, while under air parity it'd be 5% Destroyed, 15% Engaged, 25% Evasive, with it getting worse under the Red superiority/dominance (launching an airstrike in enemy Air Dominance should be something nuts like 20% destroyed, 30% engaged, 30% Evasive).
 
Edit: I do have to add, those numbers are just as examples. It's not like I did any more to come up with them than think for a second and ask "what sounds good?"
 
It'd allow for a more realistic Blue-Red air strike dynamic.  

I think this is something Battlefront needs to address. ADA vs Helicopter needs a defiant "re balancing" in order to be realistic, AH-64s specifically are way way too vulnerable. Adding the option to make fast jets immune to ADA during scenario creation is also sorely needed. 

I think this is something Battlefront needs to address. ADA vs Helicopter needs a defiant "re balancing" in order to be realistic, AH-64s specifically are way way too vulnerable. Adding the option to make fast jets immune to ADA during scenario creation is also sorely needed. 

Sweet.  I'll give it a whirl once I figure out how to make mods work in the first place! (reading manual, part of my brain just isn't quite wrapping around it!)
 
Tank/IFV name addendum:
 
1. The name is supposed to match the Company the tank belongs to.  Given that tank companies now only exist as the second two line companies in a Combined Arms Battalion, I hope you like C and D names (I went with Darwinian Selector myself).  There's H names too, but that's generally the Battalion Commander's tank.
 
2. Bradleys if they have names (this is uncommon) have them across the rear bustle rack under those ammo cans.  Infantry companies in a CAB (so all Bradley infantry companies) are all A or B companies (most awkward name combo goes to "Beast" and "Beastmaster" in the same platoon)
 
3. Tanks are rarely un-named as a rule.  Bradleys are rarely named, but there's nothing forbidding it.
 
4. Some units buck the names having to follow the A/B/C/D convention entirely, and especially when it comes to deploying, a vehicle might be "Dauntless" in the motorpool, but "Murder Inc" when it's about to cross the berm into crapastan.

Updated version is on my dropbox.
 
Link is below:
 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/zl2v1667xnvk5bz/SG_MSV_Uniforms.rar?dl=0

Here's my issue with this:
 
Just because the Russian Air Force is not the Iraqi Air Force does not ensure they will be successful somehow as WAVES OF NEVER ENDING PAK-FAs USE LASERS TO CRUSH AMERICA.
 
No one here is claiming the hapless Russian Air Force will be handily swept from the sky over the course of 20 minutes.  What we are saying is the Russian Air Force as a smaller, less technically capable force, in the face of a larger, more experienced, more technically advanced force is not likely to be able to conduct air strikes in numbers dangerous enough to require building a dedicated ADA platform to be built.  And further, given this reality of the Russians being the high-tier threat, and not being likely to be able to penetrate the CAP without punishing losses, with the remainder of threats falling far, far, far short of even this modest threat, makes an SHORAD vehicle a huge waste of money and time.
 
 
I want you to take that attitude to any other job, and not get laughed at.
 
YOU ARE A DOCTOR AND A PRODUCT OF THE MEDICAL INSTITUTION.  I WILL CURE THIS WITH THE MAGIC OF GEMS BECAUSE I READ IT IN A BOOK AND I HAVE PLAYED VIRTUAL SURGEON SEVERAL TIMES GOOD SIR
 
Or possibly:
 
I have built many model planes, and you sir, are a product of the engineering insitution and do not understand the genius of a jet powered biplane.  I've read books, and I own all the microsoft flight simulators.
 
 
The amount of effort and time spent on those IADS networks, vs the ability of them to stop the bombing force was pretty far out of proportion.  They made the attack uncomfortable, and sometimes lethal for individual planes, but like all passive defenses they could be reduced (and destroyed in the case of Yom Kippur and Iraqi in 1991) or simply are unable to inflict enough damage on the attacker to preclude continued attack (again, SAMS or not, Hanoi had a lot of bombs in the weather forecast, shooting down one or two bombers a night didn't effect that).
 
But I'm glad you brought up Vietnam!  Please explain to me how the helpless Americans were not bombed into submission by the NVAF despite a lack of US ADA (well, Dusters aside but they had other jobs)?
 
 
Camouflage.  Taking halts in locations with concealment.  Hoping the USAF is doing its job.  If Stinger teams are attached to the Company locating them in the most advantageous terrain.   In terms of being a tank/infantry system, your best defense is the enemy doesn't see you.  If it's a leaker SU-27 being chased by F-22s it's likely not going to live long enough to take the time to find me from 20,000 feet, or acquire me if he's bobbing up and over hill masses.
 
This would even be true with a more robust ADA asset like a Linebacker.  I don't want planes to see me.  They will see me if I pop off missiles  or put rounds in the air though, which could bring the harm my way.  Stinger, or even older systems like Vulcan and Chaparral are low enough p/k that unless I am 100% in danger, enemy is coming for us, I'm not going to draw attention to us.  
 
If we're talking about helicopters same drill, unless they're coming my way/obviously are attacking my position. If that's the case we'll volley fire MPAT, a kill is doubtful (especially given the limited elevation of a tank gun) but the amount of crap that'll put in the air runs a good odd at causing a mission kill, or strongly encouraging the enemy to leave.  Even sabot wouldn't be a bad choice, it's short shot to hit time makes it attractive, and the FCS can hack a helicopter at speed.  
 
If the helicopter is on approach and outside the engagement window of the tank gun, massed .50 cal fire will do in a pinch, again the FCS on the CROW can hack if.  If we've got SLAP loaded it'll ruin faces pretty well, but even standard .50 cal will do a lot of damage if massed on a helicopter (while Hinds and the like are armored against that sort of weapon in places, the fourteen or so of those coming off the company is enough to knock out weapons, shred rotors, brown pilot's pants, and generally encourage them to leave right now.
 
But otherwise the best thing for a ground unit to do is stay out of sight, out of mind, and report REDAIR to higher and hope you're about to make a USAF Pilot's day.  

Things would have to be going incredibly, ridiculously over the top wrong for someone to successfully blow all 2000+ of tactical aircraft into irrelevance. And if they did so, there isn't a battalion-level air defense system in the world that would stop them from rolling us, given the limitations on those systems.
 
The fact that these systems actually work and consistently down aircraft in CMBS is about the most unrealistic thing in the game.
 
 
 
There is very little realistic or simulation-like about CMBS' depiction of air defense.

Its a question of resource allocation.  Is the best use of the Armies limited budget 1) An ATGM that will beat all current and next gen APS 2) A raven sized drone that can survive in a high threat environment, or some equivalent capability. 3) A better APS system for our own vehicles 4) Attempt to do the Air-Forces job.  Please submit your ordered list of priorities.

The TOW-2B is very spoof resistant.  Like I would not count on countermeasures saving you at all.  But at the same time there's a chance that it's just the perfect day for Shtora to work as planned.  I've had a TOW go wild, but wasn't really sure if it was a spoofed target, or just a natural SGT Butterfingers messed up the shot.  

Red 4 (tank platoon call signs: 1 is Platoon Leader, 2 and 3 are just the "regular" tanks, with 4 being the Platoon Sergeant) was actually likely the only reason Red Platoon was still functioning.  Great NCO.  Red 1 was some sort of lesser nobility in his home country which made the unfortunate combination of "not a good tactical leader" and "convinced he was better than mere NCOs."
 
I cannot emphasize how much effort we all put into him.  We were actually his second go at being a platoon leader after he was fired from one of our sister units.  I was convinced that he just hadn't gotten a fair chance, that maybe he was someone that his last unit just hadn't given the sort of time and attention to mature into a good platoon leader.
 
After few months of trying very hard we replaced him with a new LT.  Fairly smart, knew to listen to Red 4.*  Wasn't as excited about tanking as my White/Blue 1s, but again was simply the weaker of strong leaders rather than the anchor around someone's neck.
 
In a shooting war though, I'd likely have fired the first Red 1, put someone like my Master Gunner in as the tank commander for the 11 tank, and left Red 4 as the Platoon leader because god knows he was basically doing the job anyway.  
This is totally off topic.  Red 4 was just a good enough of a tanker/NCO that I feel like I should make the point of illustrating he was good, just saddled with one of the worst Platoon Leaders I ever worked with.
 
*Really.  He wasn't my strongest Platoon Sergeant in terms of overall NCO duties, but he was the best tanker in the Company.  

Serious answer:
 
Shouldn't be. Right now the only "real" M113s left are used by HQ units only (1SG's vehicles mostly), or are the ones kitted out with stretchers as ambulances.  There's still the command post and mortar carrier versions, but other than those they're more or less extinct. In a few years they'll all be replaced with similar vehicles based on the Bradley.  Also please never call it the Gavin again.  
 
Sparky Answer:
 
The M113 ULTRA GAVIN III will be the only surviving combat vehicle from the collection of WHEELED DEATH TRAPS and ARMY BIG DOLLAR WASTE TANK.  All US Army ground systems, personnel, and buildings will be replaced by GAVIN series of vehicles, mounting ULTIMATE WARRIOR GAVIN SKY-SOLDIER men, with dual SKS and bikes for SILENT RAPID TRANSPORT on ALL TERRAIN.  USAF will also be replaced by flying Gavins, and Navy will be replaced once GAVIN based SLBMs have matured enough.  All will be GAVIN.  

Missed this.  The "battle carry" round usually reflects the sort of threat environment, and is usually mixed across the platoon/company.  Which is to say, it's Iraq 2004, we're all carrying HEAT rounds, while in a tank heavy environment something like a 2 sabot to 2 AMP rounds per platoon, or even having the spearhead platoon just roll all sabot is realistic.   
 
Sabot isn't a bad choice either way, it may not catastrophically kill BMP type targets as often, but it'll still ruin the vehicle pretty easily, and I'd rather kill a BMP with a suboptimal round, than ping an AMP off of a tank.  Also worth remembering the Abrams doesn't lack for anti-troop MGs (and honestly anti-light armor with the CROWS), so the AMP isn't always the go-to round.  

Again, I will emphasize, a lack of US air control is not defacto Russian air control.  There are many forward bases available, many with their own NATO aligned air wings.  The USAF for all its faults can surge into theater pretty quickly, and odds are Russian strike fighters will have a life expectancy that makes the old cold war A-10 life expectancy seem like practically dying of old age.  
 
The USAF simply is a better trained, equipped, and more ready force.  If there's a US ABCT in the Ukraine, there's already going to be fixed wing augmentation in theater.  The most pragmatic, and realistic situation is the Russian resistance is such to force the USAF to focus on eliminating the Russian air defense threat, but the question is how long it'll take before those defenses crack, not by any rational observer if the Russians will be able to fly meaningful strike missions.

Still genuinely unfun for all parties.  
 
Russian helicopters have to expose themselves a fair bit more to actually engage ground targets, while Apache users and some of the other NATO CCA guys can engage very effectively from standoff, making a lot of the ADA disparity less important to who's helicopters fly where (or to further illustrate, there's less shooting back at the Russians at the short-range realm, but the Russian short range ADA assets have a lot less to shoot at).  While hunting helicopters with fixed wing assets as proven tricky historically, at the same time, you're looking chiefly at the question of the helicopter being killed by fixed wing.  On the other hand the fixed wing just has to be dangerous enough to make the rotary wing be evasive to achieve a sort of mission kill vs actually shooting the helicopter down.
 
It's also worth noting that the Hind flight profile given the size, speed and altitudes employed will put that airframe at much greater risk to air intercept compared to MI-28/KA-52 platforms.  Further unlike Russian fixed wing, barring extraordinary measures such as replacing ordinance with fuel Russian rotary wing will have to deploy forward from the kind of locations NATO would be able to attack without going onto Russian soil.  This is equally true for NATO rotary wing, but NATO for reasons stated earlier is more likely to be able to get bombs on those targets.  
 
There's not many scenarios that put Russian aviation as something US ground forces would have to be deeply concerned with on a regular basis.  On occasion yes, and scenarios with some redair are legitimate (representing a lucky Russian mission, the results of a Russian surge to achieve air parity, etc) but SU-24s stacked up to 30,000 feet and a half dozen HINDs swooping in are very dubious.  

Yes.  But it'd be because the Russian Air Force would need to be committed to holding off NATO almost to a plane.  Further the same complications that make heavy NATO CAS doubtful are equally strong, if not stronger against the Russians (given a smaller air force and less capable system for the Russians, robust long range ADA from NATO and more common, and better air defense fighters).  
 
It's not going to be a period in which Russia bombs more or less at will with the US vainly flailing at waves of Russian CAS before a turning of the tide with NATO taking air dominance, it's going to be a bloody messy initial fight in which it's hard for anyone to accomplish air strikes, with Russia not having the strength or capabilities to continue this struggle, followed by a general decline in Russian resistance and increase in NATO capabilities.
 
Russian air defense will make it hard for NATO to bomb Russian forces throughout, but in terms of pushing Russian air strikes onto NATO positions, the number of 2S6s is going to be less relevant than then number of AWACS or recent generation fighters NATO fields.  

There's more than a few "wrong place, wrong time" penetration instances on otherwise very tough tanks.  The .50 cal SLAP penetration should be viewed as a fugitive from the law of averages, and an example of the whole "Alle Kunst ist umsonst Wenn ein Engel in das Zündloch Prunst" thing (translation milage may vary) rather than an example of armor quality.
 
Re: Challenger 2
 
Again, by all accounts I've seen it was an impact under the hull, which on the challenger II was not especially protected at all.  The round partially clipped the lowest sets of ERA, triggering them, but not in a way that'd prevent a penetration.
 
So basically the .50 cal SLAP round again, and improbable event occurring.  You'd struggle to replicate it, and the RPG-29 for all it's lethality is still best reserved for flank shots.  
 
 
This is true.  The irritation for me is that the T-90 is very much a late 90's piece of equipment, and it shows. Having to explain that it is not at all on the same level as a M1A2 SEP V2, or that the hardware mounted on it is last generation/sometimes not even as good as it's late 90's peers is something that's important to understanding the tank vs tank fights in CMBS.  It's not a bad tank, it's just not the same as a M1A2, or even a "almost as good as" M1A2.  It's catastrophic overmatch for the "might as well be 1989" Ukrainian designs, something fearsome against forces without much dedicated modern AT assets, but it is certainly something that is not a high performer in a armor fight vs US armor.  

The recon unit still cannot actually acquire the target for the firing platform.  And the level of visability you get at 5 KM will be entirely inadequate to ensure a hit on anywhere but "somewhere" on the target, assuming other variables remain in favor of missile hit.  The Abrams has proven very resistant to HEAT type rounds, and again when your target is "a blob" your odds in terms of frontage are most likely to be part of the tank that's fairly resistant to hits.
 
And of course, 5 KM sightlines are not at all common.  
 
The one vs one stuff is pretty silly.  But simply put the Abrams is better able to find targets, engage them accurately, and achieve first shot kills within most combat ranges.  The T-90 isn't again, a bad tank, it's just very clearly the best of 1999, stacked up against the various 2007-2014 era upgraded NATO tanks, which means it'll struggle to achieve results in situations where an Abrams, Leo or Challenger would likely succeed.
 
It will however beat the Leclerc, simply because Russian tanks are able to leave the garage for more than five minutes at a go.  

NATO ROE will likely be a lot less restrictive than folks are giving it credit for.  Some things might be on restricted target lists like, national treasures/things important to Ukraine's functionality as a country level industrial locations, but anything else would likely be fair game.   Even then the restricted sort of targets likely would be "do not bomb without confirmation of targets of military nature" vs "do not bomb, even if it's crawling with Russians!" sort of ROE.  In a full spectrum sort of conflict there's a much higher expectation of damage, and a much higher value on destruction of enemy forces.
 
Also worth noting that NATO would be in the Ukraine at the permission of the Ukrainian government, and likely with no small amount of popular support from ethnic Ukrainians (as the separatist movement is top to bottom ethnic Russian outside of the actual Russian passport holders within).  People will be upset the local church did not survive the fight, but they will be happier they're no longer about to become part of the people's republic of Russiastan or whatever it calls itself these days.  This underwrites a much more aggressive military targeting behavior.  

If you had to rank the world's 10 most capable airforces, 1-4 or so would simply be the USAF, 5 would be the USN, then maybe France and the UK, followed by the USMC, then maybe Russia and then some of the lesser NATO countries.
 
There's simply no reasonable challenge to the US military's air control abilities.  Combined with IADS, and hostile fighters there's a chance to keep the various US aviation forces out of your backyard, but the possibility of getting a flight of SU-25s to the target is right up there with snowballs in sulfur lakes survival odds.  
 
 
This.  From my end of things I tend to exclude red aviation, or strongly limit it because I think it's doubtful it'll get on station, or if Russia surges to attain situational air parity, it's going to be for targets more interesting than a tank company or two.  Conversely the USAF in a three month sort of war against a near peer threat is going to focus on air superiority, SEAD, and what high value targets it can hit without going into Russia, before shuffling some of those strike assets to CAS.  So the June fighting would see almost no CAS, July a fighter or two here or there, before August being CAS being fairly common.