Grigb
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Posts posted by Grigb
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Quick question - do we have topic regarding Israel? I am subscribed to the RU channel of David Gendelman. He writes short but informative posts that clarify some aspects of Israel operation.
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20 minutes ago, Kinophile said:
Of the unimproved model, no?
The problem here isn't the missile or its flight characteristics. It's more about targeting.
According to my approximate calculations, following missile launch, A-50 must descend to 3000m to avoid observation by ground radar. Once A-50 is below 3000m, the missile must operate autonomously. Mashovets said that the S-200 missile can utilize A-50 radar tranmission as guidance, but the natural instinct of any RU radar operator is to switch off the radar.So, for reliable success, the missile must be capable of targeting A-50 on its own in the presence of EW while evading RU AD fire.
We're talking about developing an incredibly capable missile in around two years while under RU fire.
They might combine a Western head with an S-200 body. That would be simpler and faster. In addition, they would not require radar since they could send target data straight to the missile via the western data link. Still not ideal: the body is not stealthy, and you must handle liquid fuel not far from the front line. However, that would explain why ambushes are so rare.
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Just now, Battlefront.com said:
Quick note here. If Ukraine expands the bridgehead even 5km the threat of FPV drones to river crossing decreases dramatically. Pushing it 20km and it's all but gone.
Bridgeheads, now and as before, are a chicken and egg situation. You can't expand a bridgehead unless you have a proportionally secure method of crossing the river, but to get a reasonable means of crossing you need to push back the enemy from being able to target it.
Drones make things vastly more complicated for the force trying to cross the river, no doubt, but it doesn't inherently change the basic nature of river crossings.
Steve
And If we consider only a few locations, RU drones are not a major issue for Ukraine. That Magyar crew disables 70% of the drones that RU sends to the Krynki area.
UKR has the ability to minimize drone damage for a few crossings.
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1 hour ago, Rokko said:
Can someone queue me in on the S-200? I wasn't aware that this was some kind of ultra-long range AD system. Why was it seemingly retired without replacement (for engaging targets at that range) and are there comparable Western systems? What I gathered so far is, that S-200s were apparently used as static emplacements (although apparently not in this case), which presumably made them vulnerable.
Arab-Israeli conflicts and Vietnam demonstrated to Soviet AD generals that AD complexes must be maneuverable. The unwieldiness of the S-200 was regarded as a key drawback. In addition, dealing with the liquid field was painful. So, when S-300 became available, they withdrew S-200.
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Unfortunately, no.
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1 hour ago, Kraft said:
The value of Krynki is that it is a very defensable position that funnels russian vehicles either through the few completely straight forest roads where they can bog down or get hit by drones or through the veery long river road, which is exposed and easily observable, leading to quick discovery and annihilation of russian forces.
The top UKR drone commander Magyar and his team defend Krynky. They didn't defend Avdiivka. Patriot or S-200 defended Krynky. They never defended Avdiivka itself.
The UKR command appears to value Krynky substantially more than we do. BTW, Putin personally monitors the Krynky issue. What do the Ukrainian command and Putin know that we don't? -
2 minutes ago, Kinophile said:
Interesting:
They are talking about altitude 9,000-10,000.
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Alexe Kopytko, collegue of UKR Mashovets wrote several posts about losses. I am not going to translate them as they are aimed at the general public. However, I am going to translate relevant information.
UKR is a significantly more open society and country. So, it is much easier to find and count deaths using open sources. The oldest community in Ukraine that monitors War deaths is "The Book of Memory of those who fell for Ukraine".
Quote from the UKR news article [I recommend but I am not going to translate for now due to lack of time] about UKR losses up to November 2023
QuoteSumming together all of the data on the Defense Forces' combat and non-combat casualties, we can claim that on the day of publishing [23 November 23], there were 24,500 verified dead (deceased), whose identities are known, 15,000 missing, and 3,400 POW.
Second article [for the same period]
QuoteAs you can see, the majority of those who died were between the ages of 26 and 45. And there aren't many persons above the age of 56 or under the age of 21...
The Book of Memory of Those Who Fell for Ukraine includes 146 women in its list of the deceased...
Thus, according to data publicly disclosed by one of the defense department's heads, the Armed Forces have more than 820,000 military troops by October 2023. There are 117,000 officers, 178,000 sergeants, 516,000 troops, and the remainder are cadets...
That is, we today [23 Nov 23] have 820,000 military men, excluding the National Guard of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service, combat units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SBU, and so on. It is apparent that the overall number of Defense Force fighters exceeds one million...
How unrecoverable losses of 50 or perhaps 70-80 thousand relate to a million troops, taking into consideration health commissions working for almost two years? If we merely talk about dry facts and military statistics, we get a good result. One may say that the Ukrainian army' "living force" is essentially intact...
The "Book of Memory of Those Who Fell for Ukraine" database includes information on 2,266 fallen officers from Ukraine's Armed Forces, Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Guard, State Border Guard Service, and other military levels. Approximately 100 additional dead officers have yet to establish their military ranks, hence they are not included in these numbers...
There are many junior officers among the deceased, particularly lieutenants, senior lieutenants, and captains. Despite the emotional impact of young people's deaths, the losses of junior officers are not critical for Ukraine's Armed Forces. First and foremost, because of the vast number of conscripted second lieutenants (graduates of military departments), sergeants, and higher-ranking officers who are assigned to junior jobs.
Another interesting fact: from 2014 to 2021, the proportion of officers who died was 13.7%. Today, it is 9.6%...The following conclusion should be derived from the information gathered by the community "Book of Memory of Those Who Died for Ukraine" and from information stated by representatives of the state authority...The amount of combat and non-combat losses experienced by Ukraine throughout the 21-month conflict had no significant impact on the country's defensive capacity.
From Kopytko posts
QuoteI am not sure what category is included the number - 31 thousand deceased [Zelensky number]. [Those who died] Only during battle? All who died? I could guess, but I don't see the point.
However, I know that the figures tossed in [by RU propagandists] in the summer [2023], "70 thousand killed, 120 thousand wounded," which are being used as a comparison, are rubbish...So, we have 50-55 thousand [losses] as the most, whereas they have 45 thousand as the lowest.
Russia conceals the casualties; the true number of dead/killed, according to indirect signs, might be four times more than officially reported...The President cited a total of 180 thousand killed Russian servicemen. According to our own methodology, there is a comparable number of people killed. The order of the numbers is same, however there may be accounting peculiarities. For example, those L-DPR citizens who have previously formally served in the Russian army or who have died [for all causes], as well as those who died in the army for different reasons, all might be or might not be included. Total unreturnable losses might be significantly bigger (particularly discharged owing to serious wounds) [comparing to both numbers - from Zelensky or from Kopytko].
Military experts believe that Russia will lose the war if the loss ratio is one to five. We may make an informed judgment that the current unreturnable loss ratio is between 1 and 3.5/4. Although the Russians have more of our POWs, they also have a disproportionate number of missing people.
That is, our condition is difficult, but the enemy's situation is tense. The numbers debunk the idea that defeating Russia is impossible. We are very near to the edge. That is why I repeat: unity and concentration of all forces are required; there is no hopelessness. And [we need] weapons.
I am confident that the major partners' analysts understand all of these calculations and report them to their superiors. As a result, postponing political choices appears even more disgusting and counterproductive.…
The President stated that it will be extremely difficult in March and April. I've already mentioned that there are direct parallels with the spring of 2022. The most dreaded month was May, when armament decisions had already been made yet everything was almost expended on the front lines. To help and not make things difficult [for us], these should be the fundamental values for the foreseeable future.
Zelensky numbers are close to actual numbers. UKR is nowhere near the defeat.
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2 minutes ago, Kinophile said:
Is any data on the ranking breakdowns of desertions?
No. but we have:
- 40% mobiks
- 50% contract soldiers who signed contract after start of the war
- 10% contract soldiers who signed contract before start of the war
- 10% others
Mobiks and contract soldiers can be privates or low-ranking non-commissioned officers only. As a result, officers could only make up 10% of the total.
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RU Nats video about effectiveness of fish nets.
Quote...anti-drone nets are working. They are all full of holes [caused by drones]. Angry neighbors [drones] frequently get into them. I wanted to share this news with all of our friends. Your efforts are not in vain; they literally save the lives of our youngsters on the front lines.
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27 minutes ago, Carolus said:
There is an online rumor that Igor "Strelkov" Girkin was found dead in his cell.
Hanged.
RU Nats close to Girkin (including his wife) say it is not true. Lets wait.
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I'm looking at RU MOD directives on how to defend vehicles from FPV. Interesting bit:
FPV-suicide drones
- «Hawk» airplane type - max speed 120 kmh
- «Kross» quadcopter type - max speed 60 kmh [Insane speed]
Warheads
- PG-7L
- PG-7M
- PG-9C
- PG-18
[Bar armor and spall liners are still effective. RU vehicles do not have either that or ERA]
P.S.
I checked it. Well, the directives are not really interesting to us. They describe how to build cope cages and install RU crappy EW devices on various RU vehicles. The diagrams of Cope Cage installation would be interesting if the RU intelligence officers understood how the FVP attacks in practice. But they don't. So, the diagrams have glaring mistakes and are mostly useless.
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2 minutes ago, Kraft said:
I dont understand what you mean.
Data is jan23->jan24, so ~3 months of heavy city fighting would be included.
This was done by convicts and the dats shows the lowest desert numbers at that time, with which the '10' fold had been calculated.
Also we are talking about a number that at its monthly highest, is a quarter of the daily killed and maimed, if taking the official estimates.
We are talking about army corps at most, and it might have an impact for a few months at most.
There is also the issue of latency. It is tough to desert from the front line. It is considerably easier to desert from the rear. Most Wagnerite deserters would flee once Bakhmut's attack ended, and they were settled in rear areas (end of summer). But by that time, it was a shattered army corp. The impact cannot be that significant.
Whether we consider Wagnerites or not, the trend of large increases in desertion during the last year is significant (if we use the limited data from the project).
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Avdiivka. RU fighters tested UKR Humvee armored windows. Windows withstood 3-4 close hits without penetration. Any further hits though most probably would result in penetration.
What's interesting is that they used Igolnik cartridges.
Quote7N39, codename "Igolnik" cartridge, is an experimental cartridge with an armor-piercing bullet. The bullet core is a pointed alloy of tungsten carbide (92%) and cobalt (8%), formed by pressing metal powders and sintering. It penetrates a 24 mm thick ST3 sheet at a distance of 100 meters, the 6B23-1 bulletproof vest plate at 100 meters, and the 2P steel armor plate at 550 meters.
P.S. @Battlefront.com I think you will need that data for CMWW3
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8 hours ago, Kraft said:
A possible data issue, they account for Mobik vs Contractmeat, but not Wagner - if they are not included it heavily skews the results, as Wagner did most of the meatwaves and in in of itself had a very effective deserter suppression method.
Real Wagnerite group do not exist for like 6 months. And the majority of them stopped participating in combat after their withdrawal from Bakhmut 9 month ago.
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26 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Anyone else hearing about an uptick in Russian desertions?
We don't have actual numbers to evaluate it. What we do have is the number of deserters who contacted the organization that assists RU deserters. It is a small set, but it is all I have for now.
QuoteOver the last year, the number of deserters has surged tenfold!
And as a percentage, it is 914.3% (January 2023: 28 deserters vs. January 2024: 284 deserters).
Also I have heard that number of desertion court cases is also increased.
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Some numbers:
- Ukrainian military analysts Taras Cmut: cost of classic ATGM missile is 30 000 USD. You can get 25 good combat FPV drones or 20 very good combat FPV drones.
- Top UKR drone unit commander Magyar: 5 FPV crews block the tank company's [10 tanks] advance with preparatory mining and persistent patrolling, as well as the quick employment of attack weapons [drones].
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1 hour ago, Letter from Prague said:
Of course we would need aggregate view to be able to estimate better how this is going strategically, and I don't know if there's any numbers in OSINT sphere.
We have GrigB Intelligent Translation Services. During next week, the Russian Statistical Service will release a fresh report. Over the weekend, Russian opposition economist Milov will assess the campaign's strategic impact. If nothing bad happens on my end, we'll have a summary by Sunday night.
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5 hours ago, evilcommie said:
I just don't see how Ukraine will be launching any more offensives given the disparity in Artillery Ammunition supply vs the Russians.
The artillery situation there is not as dire as we believe. Agent 13th reported three days ago.
QuoteThe Antonovsky Bridge [second UKR bridghead] is close, [UKR] electronic warfare is fully operating there, the faggots are sitting beneath the bridge, and everything is well there. They dug in well.
They come in at night and rotate every 3-4 days; [our] artillery is unable to hit them and does not shoot much in order to avoid disclosing [its position to the enemy], and [there is an artillery shell] limit...At the very least, UKR CB has been successful there.
4 hours ago, The_Capt said:Well they would need to field an offset, which would be FPVs or some such. No one has ever achieved firepower superiority (let alone dominance) using UAS but if it is going to happen anytime soon it will be in this war. It will be a test of “massed precision beats everything” if the UA can create and project the mass.
I watched a new RU video regarding FPV drone suppression. The most fascinating remarks, however, are those concerning the current situation:
- UKR took Million Drones program seriously
- Reports from different [front] locations say that life of RU fighters is getting worse and harder [due to FPV drones]
- [Situation] is getting hotter [for RU troops]
- Unlike RU, UKR regularly suppresses control of RU drones because RU drones en masse are not prepared to counter EW. UKR drones are prepared [RU FPV programs are seriously lagging behind UKR]
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36 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Now that is interesting. This was a c-C4ISR move, clearly. Russia does not have the same space based capabilities. Now what else will Ukraine do to blind and numb-out Russian command and control? One A50 is a start. And what is the endgame here? Make space for Ukrainian local air superiority? Oh my, wouldn’t that break minds?
I think it would permit UKR AF to begin hammering RU Kherson direction troops with JDAMs. The RU Kherson troops are not in very good shape already. The JDAM campaign has the potential to tilt the balance in favor of UKR. And once it is done the overall RU situation in the whole southern operational zone is quite perilous.
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3 hours ago, panzermartin said:
Thanks, It's going to hurt indeed, probably to the point they have to delay or redesign any offensive operations.
What I'm not sure is how good was its radar in detecting incoming missiles or even drones. I think the UKR SU 24 stayed on the edge of the detection zone/AAA before launching their storm shadows.
RU Rybar gave following most probable description of UKR attack on BDK Novorossysk.
- RU did not detect neither take off nor flight of UKR Su-24 from Starokostyantynyv airfield toward Feodosia (target location)
- At 3 AM RU detected missile launch from direction of Snihurivka (direction is not equal to near, usually it means closer to target but on the same axis)
- RU did not detect flight to Kanatovo airfield
- at 4 AM RU detected take off and flight of two planes from Kanatovo airfield to Starokostyantynyv airfield
Analysis
Given Rybar said truth, from the old patrolling area:
- RU could detect air targets at medium (and high) altitudes throughout Central Ukraine
- RU could detect air targets at low altitudes only at the Storm Shadow detection line
- UKR planes could operate at low altitudes undetected during attacks, but for routine operations, they prefer to operate at medium altitudes, even if it means being detected (probably because low flying operations reduce range and are dangerous)
- Monitoring UKR air activity makes it simpler for RU to establish the approximate present location of UKR planes for missile attacks that UKR has minimal possibility of countering
Conclusion
First, Pushing A-50 further away reduces the risk of RU missile attacks on UKR airfields, that UKR cannot defend against. Given the arrival of the F-16 (HVT for RU), it is likely that UKR are providing a "safe space" for the F-16 to operate. Interesting, but it appears that the delay in sending F-16s might be due to the risk of operating them while the A-50 is near, rather than a lack of political will.
Second, pushing A-50 further east brings missile detection range directly to the frontline. It allows UKR planes to fly at low altitude to the front lines undetected, providing support for troops at a considerably lower risk.
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30 minutes ago, dan/california said:
Am I correct in thinking that there is an additional pinch point with regard to who is easier to mobilize? The big industrial/utility/oil enterprises are the easiest place to round up several hundred or several thousand people at a time, but also the most damaging economically?
Yes. And they know it and have done it. Except that rounding up even a hundred people could cause immediate closure of the average RU enterprise like this. So, they were taking maybe a couple dozen males at one time.
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9 hours ago, panzermartin said:
Where do you think the loss of the A50 will hurt the most operationally the RU? Coordinance of gliding bombings, missile /drone warfare , situational awareness in ground? Time for unmanned air balloon radars.
Let's look at detection and early warning ranges.
New sketch based on UKR Mashovets post
Here are detection ranges from A-50 Old Patrolling Route.
Some info
QuoteAccording to the Russians, this "thing" can guide up to 12 friendly fighters through various command algorithms (i.e., "coordinating" and "approving"), and in autonomous control mode (i.e., from the board of A-50U independently [from land HQ]), it can control nearly an entire aviation regiment - up to 30 planes...
As for me, the stats are, to say the least, exaggerated... because this thing rarely guided more than 4-6 friendly planes...
Obviously, the A-50 U aircraft's primary targets were the aircraft of the AFU Air Force. First and foremost, they can carry KRMB (air-launched cruise missiles such as Storms and Scalps, as well as modified Neptunes and a variety of other Ukrainian air weapons that I will not publicly name).
The enemy coordinated the rotation of the A-50\A-50U in such a way that the zone of guaranteed detection of air targets (It might be considered where the boundaries of the detection of cruise missile-type targets begin) totally "covered" the areas where Russian troops operate.
In fact, the enemy intended to establish a continuous and assured radar field over its forces in the Southern Zone. Now take and push back all of these borders and zones... AT LEAST 200 KM TO THE EAST... into Russian Federation airspace over the Krasnodar Kray, as happened immediately after the A-50U hit over the Sea of Azov.
What will happen... At the very least, numerous things simultaneously...
- A guaranteed and dense radar field above Russian forces across the Southern Operating Zone, what...? Right, it will vanish... and there will be instead field with "nice" properties such as "focal" and "limited in height"...- Where do the enemy's guaranteed detection boundaries for aerial and ground targets shift? That's correct, almost to the butt...
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Did not want to bring it here (it is completely separate). But I could not find another topic for that and decided to ask if there is one. Just sad to waste it.