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Grigb

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Posts posted by Grigb

  1. 1 hour ago, Letter from Prague said:

    I'm more concerned with him mobilising million semi-skilled or skilled workers info drone, missile and ammo factories.

    There is already a significant shortage of skilled workers that already hurts the economy badly. Significant part of skilled workers either ran abroad or were already mobilized. Mobilizing more skilled workers means RU business has to close or start full scale sabotage of mobilization efforts.

    First mobilization hurt economy badly, second could kill it outright. 

  2. 8 hours ago, IMHO said:

    Seems like you are prone to making swift and uneducated judgements. The tag says "There's no place to cowards in this world" and the poor guy is in Russian Army uniform yet in Ukrainian warming coverall. If it's not a total set up. If it's authentic it's Wagner hanging his own, they did have brutal rules. So just open Google translate before meting out justice.

    Oh, FFS...

    First,

    Mobiks use whatever they can find. Cold is a cold. While I am not knowledgeable enough about this matter for UKR units I am confident that UKR soldiers rarely do the same. Supply is better, RU clothing is often inferior and dangerous (flammable), but most importantly You will attract dangerous attention from your own boys.

    In RU army enemy clothing does not attract anybody's attention. In the beginning supply was awful and many RU units literally got everything they could from captured UKR supply depots. Now supply is somewhat better, but RU clothing is inferior, dangerous and looks bad. Even RU generals prefer to weas UKR western style uniform

    lapin.jpg

    lapin.jpg

    Infamous general Lapin (sitting)

    So, while we can't tell for certain who it was, the chances of it being RU are substantially higher than those of the UKR (If it's authentic).

    Wagnerites [real ones] don't exist for about half the year. However, even they did not do so in public, which was harmful for Prig's Myth. More significantly, everyone knew someone foolish who had simply vanished into thin air, so they didn't need that kind of public reminder.

    Second,

    it is somewhat strange. It is unofficial punishment (and waste). To do that local commander must take the initiative and responsibility which is frowned upon in RU army. It is more preferable to call in men from special units who deal with it via torture and intimidation. Why execute someone who can still walk and take part in count formations, and meat assaults? You put him in an earth pit or lock him in a basement and leave him there for a week. After a week you ask him if here is motivated enough to become loyal soldier of the motherland. If not, you beat him and leave him for another week.

    Here is pit from Chechen war

    UfxWYA.jpg

    And here is Basement
    eYV7fZ.jpg

    These punishments are simple, can be organized anywhere, can be used to detain but also to torture. And you can always claim that you are doing nothing, just detaining the victim. And if the story gets big you blame local soldiers for incompetence. 

    Why do it that way? BTW, older generations despise that since Soviet propaganda frequently reminded Soviet citizens that only Fascists would do so, displaying German executions from WWII. If it's authentic it was done by somebody brutal and who did not want higher ups to be involved.

    I thought about it and the answer is most likely it was done by RU PMCs Veterans or similar. Murz quote

    Quote

    A rabble consisting of former prisoners [zeks], drug addicts and looters, are hiding behind the backs of the mobilized of our regiment, [they were] “carrying assault operations” without being present locally. After we capture the combat fortier, they come, shot a video report, take weapons, armor plates from the dead, everything valuable, both from the soldiers of Russian Army and from the enemies, and return into the “grey zone", leaving us on the line of contact.

    The Veterans are carrying out looting, drinking, and narcotics operations. They do not want higher-level or special unit to become involved (typically special units include Military Police) since these basterds will undoubtedly want their cut. So, how do you quickly and brutally punish noncooperative mobik if you are a group of zeks? Phot is the answer.

  3. 4 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

    Possible scenario: UKR SF got to a few miles from the base where they could hit the A-50 coming to land. Man portable IR seeking SAM launched (e.g. Starstreak) but hits flare. Base air defence launches and hits A-50. Either they were trying to intercept the UKR missile, confused about the situation  (fog of war) or just panic. A-50 trying to avoid IR missile behind is hit by radar guided missile from the front. 

    That's possible - there was rumor that RU AD shot at the same time at something different. 

  4. 51 minutes ago, Tux said:

    Not surprising. There are just so many things that seem wrong with the FF theory:  

    1. The A-50, of all types, would be in constant contact with air defence units;
    2. An A-50 does not resemble a drone or missile;
    3. The A-50 was manoeuvring and releasing countermeasures when the ‘SAM’ in that video was launched - surely any SAM crew in the area would therefore be aware that the AWACS was being targeted and hold their damned fire?
    4. As far as I’m aware Russian SAMs do not have an IR seeker head, so the flares and a missile apparently striking one do not make sense;

    and there are more…

     

    I completely agree. But we have following video:

      

    8 hours ago, Kraft said:

    New video, looks like this was local AA

     

    This is undoubtedly a Russian military facility. And someone is launching a missile not far away from the camera (to the hilarious surprise of the man behind camera). The only option I can think of is that UKR SF have adamantium balls and launched missiles from very close to a Russian military facility.

    If the facility is RU AD-based, that explains why RU is so fond of blaming AD again; only higher-ups would know the truth. The vast majority of RU officers would simply know that missiles were fired from the direction of the RU AD base, indicating that these MF made a mistake again.

  5. 5 hours ago, Kinophile said:

    S-200 comes from UKR media and some local UKR sources. It cannot be reliably verified but personally, judging by the way it is presented I believe it is planted by UKR intelligence. Also even modified S-200 is still big old missile that RU AD should be able to counter. RU AD is bad (cannot counter StromShadow) but should not be that bad.  

  6. 3 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

     @Grigb is one of the best contributors to this thread. Just sayin'.

    ****

    VERIFICATION REQUEST. Is it true Russia only has one more A50 AWACS?  Or is this yet another Sushko disinfo special?

     

    RU Nats says there are 6 remaining, however it appears they are referring to the total number. According to UKR Mashovets' UKR colleague:

    Quote

    These aircraft have been produced since 1985, but as of today there is no production in Russia. There are 9 such aircraft in the Russian Aerospace Forces, but 1 of them is undergoing endless modernization, 2 require repair, 1 was damaged by an Bumblebee attack drone in Belarus, and on January 14 1 of them went into an eternal dive – was shot down.

    In truth, only 4 A-50 aircraft were completely operational before February 23, 2023...were

    The average cost of one such aircraft is $400 million, but given their scarcity and difficulties of manufacture, it is significantly more, and if I say you should double it, I am unlikely to be inaccurate.

     

  7. 6 hours ago, IMHO said:
    1. You're a kinda week or two late with the news.
    2. It was A-50 and Il-22. Seems like A-50 didn't make it and Il-22 was able to survive.

    A-50 and IL-22 were hit in a previous incident.

    jFgW9l.jpg

     

    Yesterday, only A-50 was hit:

    TBRsKI.jpg

    Yesterday, there was confusion over the number of planes and helicopters hit because initial yesterday's videos showed two separate fires and one witness claimed that one fire was caused by a helicopter.

    Separately, some UKR channels claimed that IL-22 was also downed but later these claims disappeared (probably confused it with previous incident). Nobody else claimed IL-22 or anything else was hit. 

    There is a small probability that the second fire was from another plane. But it is small.

    6 hours ago, IMHO said:

    You sure you can a be a reliable and referencable source if you missed these basic things?

    Ae you sure you are capable of judging other's work if you missed these basic things? 

  8. 24 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

    Wait, I think there might be confusion of which plane where. There's reports of both A-50 and a transport plane. For example, liveuamap places the A-50 near the front and the transport deep in Russia.

    Is it one plane or two?

    It's possible Ukrainian air defense shot down the A-50 neaby and something else happened with the transport plane.

    • According to the most reliable reports, A-50, which was somewhat deep in Russia (see my drawing above), was hit. There were reports of two planes or one plane and one helicopter hit, however it appears that A-50 been broken into two parts, which were misidentified as two planes.
    • There is a report based on video of broken parts that it was not A-50 but IL-76 transport airplane. I am waiting verification on this one.
    • The UKR AF claims to have downed the A-50 and IL-22 command post. I am waiting verification on this one.
    • Also, there are reports that Su-34 in Kherson negatively gained altitude. 

    One thing is certain: the RU Day of the Fatherland Defender was a great success. If you know what I mean.

    [EDIT]

    • Rybar's map depicts a crashed A-50 near Mariupol. But it was dated 15.01.24. Probably something like this has caused the misunderstanding.
    • Looks like IL-22 was not confirmed
    • It is still possible that there are two planes. The reports are conflicting and confusing. Nobody seems to know right now.
  9. 23 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

    This solves the biggest problem seen with shotguns... size.  Every soldier needs the ability to take out a drone, but you can't give every guy a shotgun.  Having one soldier within a platoon may help with the logistics, however the reality of how dispersed units are this isn't practical.

    This thing is small enough that a unit on the defensive could easily have a couple of crates of them to hand out.  Looks light and compact enough that each soldier could carry one.  Yes, more weight for the poor bastards to tote around, but desperate times call for desperate measures.  And with Ukraine being on the defensive for the next year it's less of an issue since soldiers will mostly fight from prepared positions where everything doesn't have to be carried 100% of the time.

    I hope this proves effective and can get out there in large numbers quickly.

    Steve

    Imagine an underbarrel setup where the shot is initiated by a proximity sensor. Soldier has to point it in the general direction and push the trigger to activate the sensor. Once the sensor detects the drone, it fires 2-3 rounds in rapid succession, leaving you with 2-3 more in case of a second attack.

  10. 6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

    At this point better than nothing I suppose.

    Well, let's look at the data we have.

    FPV attack on a RU soldier

    RU comment

    Quote

    I have frequently said that if there is visual contact with the FPV and you know where it is flying [and] what the operator sees, you can fool it. The operator has significantly less reaction time, and the reaction itself is slowed down. Escape from the FPV is simpler in an open place with room for maneuvering and sight than in a house or a dugout.

    Another FPV attack on a RU soldier

    • 00:05 start of first attack
    • 00:15 before RU soldiers quickly moves out of the way
    • 00:16-00:18 view from another drone - RU soldeir quickly moves away, UKR operator of the first drone decides to abort attempt and pulls drone up
    • 00:19 UKR operator dive down again RU soldier quickly moves to a different direction
    • 00:20 UKR drone misses RU soldier and hits ground nearby. A soldier is wounded in leg and hand (not criticaly) and survives.

    Interesting description of the whole attack:

    • First drone hit other target - a group of troops nearby (on video from 00:00 to 00:04) reported damage, one died
    • The soldier was wounded by a second drone between 00:04 and 00:20The third drone fell nearby, quote "flew round and then fell... simply fell nearby"
      The fourth drone exploded near the car where the solder was placed, "glass got broken...we waited for the driver and then left"

    Cheap mass-produced FPV drones aren't as quick or nimble as many thinks. Attacks using these low-cost drones are not as effective or devastating as many imagine.

    Finally, the prototype was evaluated by a Ukrainian FPV operator, who stated that the army should be armed with them. it is not 100% protection, but it is definitely more effective than people think.

  11. I looked over the less interesting questions from the UKR former tanker interview and to see what could still be noteworthy. So, below is part 2.

    Quote

    Tanks

    • Latest Belgian 105mm AP round can pierce T-72b [at unknown range, probably combat].
    • He says that UKR does not have the newer 105mm round. [Looking at the way he talks, they have but few.]
    • UKR received sufficient heavy transporters to move NATO tanks and heavy SPGs. So, transporting NATO vehicles is not a big problem [commenting on question whether the shift from Soviet-style light tanks to NATO heavy tanks caused any complications].
    • Regarding [RU propaganda] claim that heavy NATO tanks are unsuitable for UKR soil conditions - wrong. UKR swamps and cold are nothing but conditions you need to take into account when planning operation.
    • They discuss how, on Donbass soil [when wet], T-72 struggles but T-64 does not. It's because the T-64 has a better track and roller design. Regarding Challenger and Leopard, UKR did not experience serious issues [AFAIR, Challenger had minor issues in similar conditions].
      Says that many of these problems are caused by driver mistakes, NATO tanks have automated transmission that adjust to soil resistance. So, there are fewer mistakes [than with RU tanks].
      [At the time of the interview] there is no information on Abrams' experience because they just came.
    • Regarding the Abrams fuel issue, he explained that, according to UKR MOD discussions with tank maker, AFU has two options: adjust logistics to handle aviation kerosine or use diesel, which will reduce engine life. The decision is up to MOD.

    Tactic and organization

    • Says that operating in pairs is more effective. Even with Soviet tank formations, the AFU attempts to integrate them. Says that practice demonstrates that when one tank completes a mission and the second tank covers, the second tank frequently prevents the enemy from firing on the first tank. Says this NATO's tactic is more thought out.
    • Says that RU in the Chechen conflict also employed combat pairs and even combat triples.
    • Except in extremely rare instances of 5-6 vs. 5-6 tank battles, company-sized battles [and above] do not occur.
    • Says that they have returned to the WWI tank mission of providing pure infantry support to seize enemy trenches. They occasionally utilize tanks as SPGs, although now that they have more shells and proper SPGs, they do so less frequently.
    • Says, there will be no armored divisions because the AFU only uses brigades. The economy cannot support formations larger than an armored brigade.
    • Claims that the greatest number of tanks RU has ever had on the frontline is 2300-2400, with 70% of them combat capable.
    • Brigades are supposed to have armored battalions, and divisions are supposed to have regiments, but most likely will have armored battalions (not enough tanks), unless brigades are united in Corps, in which case there will be armored regiments or even armored brigades (however, both regiment and brigade have the same number of tanks: 94).

    Miscellaneous

    • Both Leopard 1 and 2 have equipment to determine vertical angle to enable indirect firing (better than on RU tanks). [Commenting on the question of employing Leopard 1 for indirect fire]
    • Commenting on which tank should Ukraine pick in the future - Ukraine should persuade the US to commit to local Abrams production at the A2SEP/4 level. However, that is unlikely to happen, thus the only choice is Leopard.
    • Explains that the future UKR IFV will carry 6 infantrymen due to the increased size of the infantry kit.
    • Commenting that the RU 30mm cannon (2A42 from BMP) is good for clearing tree lines, he prefers to use one 40mm airburst round rather than fifty 30mm.

     

  12. Recently, I noticed that my UKR listening skills have improved noticeably. With the aid of translators and some effort, I can watch and translate UKR videos. So, let check the following interview with UKR AFV expert (former AFU tank officer)

     

    Quote

    How did western tanks show themselves in the war in Ukraine?

    Challenger 2

    • Challenger 2 used in Airborne-Assault Brigade.
    • There is 1 company in the Brigade
    • Tank is akin to very powerfull sniper rifle
    • Very powerfull protection
    • Crews training is very good
    • Crews are delighted
    • Crews who previously trained on T-80b say Challenger 2 way better - more powerful rounds, accuracy, reliability of equipment, engine
    • Cannot say whether antitank rounds are as powerful as UKR media claimed because as they do not have as many fields with size of 4 km [to chekc it in battle] and because as soon as a RU formation realizes that Airborne-Assault Brigade present they avoid engagements [with Challengers]
    • Disadvantage: too few of them
    • Weight 60 ton is not a big issue - they do not have many places (where fighting is) where bridges need to be specifically build or reinforced to use 60 ton

    Leopard 1

    • Old tank. Old technology and a weak engine.
    • There are several issues that arise as a result of the lengthy retirement (shortest 15 years, longest 30 years). There is an issue with steel fatigue. Several characteristics have been lost. Electronic problems [limited utility].
    • All of the above need great effort to utilize Leopard 1 without resulting in major losses.
    • However, the L7 gun is good, and current 105mm ammunition is superior to typical Soviet and Russian 125mm ammo.
    • He saw photos of Svinets 1/2, but none had been found inside the captured tanks.
    • Not all RU tanks accept Svinets. Not every Russian tanker is familiar with Svinets.
    • They will most likely receive Kontakt-1 (After Leopard 2A4)

    Leopard 2А4

    • They were concerned that the protection of 2A4 was inadequate [compared to modern UKR tanks]. They were wrong.
    • Protection is good. NERA isn't worse than Kontakt 1 or 5.
    • They did upgraded Leopard 2A4's protection with Kontakt 1.

    Leopard 2A4 ERA upgrade

    • Claims decision to install ERA had been discussed and agreed upon with tank designers.
    • Portions of Leo 2A4 [November 2023] are significantly improved with ERA.
    • The back of the turret, which is not covered by the ERA, will be secured with nets (against drones).
    • Discusses the fact that ERA cannot be used to cover all surfaces owing to armor thickness requirements. Some surfaces may be protected by boxes with tankers stuff. However, discussions with the tank manufacturer are necessary, which can take time.
    • As a consequence of UKR requirements, there may be a new modification of Leopard.

    Possible future upgrades

    • Individual EW is a must.
    • Communication and command/control systems.
    • Upgrades are beneficial, but the primary focus should be on crew and unit training up to battalions and brigades' headquarters.
    • Comments that while international partners are aware of changing war requirements, it takes 6-8-10 years for the next generation of tanks to appear. So, they do learn from UKR and their own mistakes, but the results will take time to appear.

    Leopard 2A6

    • Upgraded version of 2A4 and 2A5. Better commander control owing to the upgraded Commander Panoramic sight, which has its own thermal imager. It allows commanders to better survey the battlefield and find targets faster than gunner.
    • Improved protection. Reuleaux or beak [turret armor kits] offer significantly higher protection. They've seen several vids of the 2A6 battling two RU tanks at once and winning.

    Stridsvagn 122 or Non-German Leopards repair and maintenance peculiarities

    • They recalled from previous interview how the Leopards of Canada, Portugal, and Spain are almost the same from the repairman point of view.
    • All Leopards from different nations have the same German critical equipment (such as electronics). As a result, repairmen see little difference. There are some differences in weaponry (such as MGs), although they are not critical.
    • Stridsvagn 122 like Leopard 2A5, not 2A4.

    Leopard Programmable and AP rounds

    • Programmable rounds might be delivered to the brigade that uses Leopard 2A6 vehicles. Upgrading of other tanks' guns is possible, but seems unlikely to happen [soon].
    • Says they do not have any information regarding using programmable rounds in combat [laughing]
    • Foreign AP rounds used by gun of the Leopard 2A4 penetrate absolutely all RU armored targets appearing on the battlefield at max effective range (3.5 - 4 km).
    • Germany did give UKR DM53 and the other top one (they do not remember the name)

    Leopard 2 vs AT launchers and Kornet ATGM

    • For a long period, UKR extensively studied Kornet and even created [anti]Kornet training.
    • Captured RU Kornet featured a 10x zoom instead of 12 or 20 as advertised by RU for the export version.
    • Optics quality is poor. According to RU captured instructions, the field of view can vary between 5.5 and 8 degrees.
    • According to what UKR experts told him, RU does not have schemas [don't know what it is] and enough lenses to make uniformed sight. They make do with whatever they have. They manage to keep the zooming level consistent, but field of vision suffers.
    • Statistically speaking, artillery is responsible for the majority of losses, followed by aircraft and drones. AT weaponry - current tanks and ATGMs on the battlefield (including Metis, Kornet, Fagots, and Konkurs) come last. Kornet is responsible for less than ten percent [November 2023].
    • Claims RU admits that the quality of Kornets varies and that their capabilities are not always as good as they [soldiers] might expect.
    • There is a psychological aspect: Kornet does not have a remote control [like Stugna]. So, if you shoot at target from 4 kilometers away, the operator will be under fire for an extended period of time.
    • RU expended the bulk of the Soviet ATGM missile stock.
    • Engine problems plague a portion of the Soviet missile stockpile. The speed of missiles and engine activation time vary, impacting performance. Soviet-made MANPADS are also impacted.
    • RU solely checks these missiles' electronics. They do not inspect explosives/engines.
    • Claims that RU military reporters say that [because of the difficulties above], just three out of 11 missiles manage to reach the target [I have not seen RU reporters mentioning that, but I may have missed it].

    Tanks vs FPV and Lancet

    • Cope Cages must be employed in the absence of another counter.
    • Powerful EW that completely blocks control of all types of drones [FPV depends on Mavic for target location] is necessary.
    • Simple Small weapons firing against drones (by squad/platoon) results in significant ammunition expenditure.
    • EW is the primary counter (every tank should have it), but he believes that in the absence of EW, the UKR would design cope cages similar to what Russia demonstrated at recent military exhibits - polyamide meshes covering not only the turret but also the transmission and driver compartment.
    • Discuses that explosively formed penetrator employed by new Lancets and other weapons] at range of 10 m with 60-70-80mm caliber and height 10m is enough to penetrate the top of the turret of UKR tanks (35-45mm).
    • Commenting on the new Lancet attack approach (explosion at 2m with a 45-degree trajectory angle at the turret top) - everything is dependent on operator training and how RU will decide employ Lancets. However, the overall technique is workable.
    • FPV is a modern production weapon, making it more reliable than RU Soviet ATGMs. As a result, it will be made in large quantities, and will become more important than ATGMs [he discusses the RU situation].
    • Drones are responsible for 5% of losses but this is only beginning
    • The main threats are artillery and aviation. And mines where the density for an area of 10 m by 100 m to 150 m is 10-15 AT mines since the Ukraine does not have enough mine rollers. Also, although the UKR began mass production of rollers, not every tank driver will dare to move forward, especially after 1-2 explosions (severe psychological strain).
    • He likes KMT-7 because it has a knife that may be utilized if the rollers are destroyed. However, UKR does not have them.

     

  13. I want to discuss that RU DOLBOYEBIZM  with formations of troops on a training ground within HIMARs range. I was reading the RU Nat conversations and came across an interesting comment. As usual, RU Nats were arguing that RU generals should be executed. Then one man added, "Don't make blind claims about generals. These formations are common. They [training ground officers] do it regularly, and not only for generals".

    I began to wonder why they did it (if it was true). The explanation is actually rather simple: an AWOL problem. There is minimal transportation on the front lines, thus little opportunity to go AWOL. The training grounds are different. It is several dozens of kilometers behind the front line. There are many more possibilities for transportation, including civilian cars.

    So, how do you know if somebody is missing? You regularly arrange soldiers in formation and count them. Why can't subordinate commanders count soldiers in small groups and report back to you? Because that is the RU army. Your subordinate commander is full of BS; they take bribes and declare that everyone is present. The only accurate method is to count soldiers oneself.

    Dolboyoby. 

  14. 5 hours ago, Butschi said:

    Yeah, thanks again, a polite discussion is just not your thing, is it?

    It is you who poison the debate by using inappropriate term in regards of F-16 implying somebody in this debate somehow considers F-16 to be a magical weapon. I will repeat - nobody in the debate you currently participate in assigns any magical properties to F-16 yet you insist on using Wunderwaffe reference.

    You disrespect the debate but complain about my hostility. 

     

    5 hours ago, Butschi said:

    I obviously called the F16 "the next Wunderwaffe" in reference to the military utility of the real historic Wunderwaffen

    Which is wildly inappropriate because none of your opponents considering or referring to or implying F-16 to be magic weapon. 

     

    5 hours ago, Butschi said:

    and in reference to all the other systems, like Leopards, that were praised before as certainly war winning.

    I do remember several weapons being praised on the level that can be certainly be called as "War Winning". I do not remeber anyone expected that a certain weapon would be able to deal with the threat it was not supposed to deal with. 

    Let's take Leopard. Everybody expected Leopards to give UKR dominant, war winning edge against apropriate targets. Nobody expected Leopards to swiftly defeat helicopters or planes. 

    Did Leopard give UKR the ability to dominate in land battle? Let's look at the data we have.

    The brigade's attack and our tankers [looks like platoon] ran into an ambush by a t-62 tank company. It was hidden very well. Moreover, it was so camouflaged that even thermal imagers could not detect it. There were multi-layered mats. And 115mm armor-piercing sub-caliber shells from a distance of about 800 m were used to shot head-on at leopards 2A4. Leopards withstood more than one hit. Some tanks had two hits, some tanks had three hits.

    The available data shows Leopards gave UKR dominant, war winning edge in land battle against threats tank is supposed to handle just like public expected. 

    The real issue is different - your unfounded belief that Leopards were referred to as war winning weapons becasue public expected Leopards to defeat threats they were not supposed to handle.

     

    5 hours ago, Butschi said:

    Look at the internet, it's full of the poeple using exactly this reference as a warning that F16s will not fundamentally change the situation in this war.

    And who exactly here needs this warning? Whom do you warn if, as I said, nobody considers F-16 magic weapon here? 

     

    5 hours ago, Butschi said:

    I am happy to learn why this is a wrong assessment but no, I'm certainly not literally the only one.

    Insisting on calling F-16 "the next Wunderwaffe"? I do not see anybody else doing it here. If somebody somewhere calls F-16 a magic weapon you are certainly free to use the Wunderwaffe reference, there

     

    5 hours ago, Butschi said:

    Patriots aren't F16s, though, and I was talking about the latter.

    You stated quote: F16s are just the next Wunderwaffe that won't fundamentally change the situation. I gave you facts about how a single weapon system performing the same task that appropriately armed F-16 supposed to do, fundamentally changed the situation.

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