BletchleyGeek

I think there is a bit of a failure to communicate real life context here.  If a nation could 85% quantify war deterministically they would likely be able to rule the planet.  With our current methods, even with technology, I doubt we could do better than 25% on predictive accuracy, and Inam being generous.  This is a competitive space to say the least, where a few percentage points would be enormous.  So while people are debating 100%, the reality is that 50% could make someone a superpower basically overnight.
I am not even talking about deterministic or predictive.  I am talking “indicative” - ie we know what we are seeing when we see it.  We employ metrics and units in warfare all the time, translating then into real information advantage as operations are occurring it also a competition space, we are seeing it right now in Ukraine.  Anyway, it was a wonderful journey and I think I have landed on an answer, but we don’t need to unpack it, I will save it for work.

"Photojournalist Evgeniy Maloletka flees from a field inflamed by a Russian army bombardment, in the Kharkiv region, July 29, 2022. MSTYSLAV CHERNOV / AP"

As an absolute statement, that is wrong. If that were true, 'Unternehmen Barbarossa' was the best plan ever - it killed a lot of enemies.
You state these things as if they are always true. But they are only sometimes true. Measures must be evaluated in context.

@Aragorn2002
I would like to make a correction to the widespread misuse of chess as a metaphor, but not for pedantic reasons - I think it's something worth keeping in mind when playing CM or any other tactical wargame:
Most chess games between grandmasters end in a draw. You do not win at chess by outsmarting your opponent; you win by waiting for him or her to make a mistake, and capitalizing on it. If neither player makes a mistake - and grandmasters rarely make mistakes - the game ends in a draw.
From Wikipedia:
"In chess games played at the top level, a draw is the most common outcome of a game: of around 22,000 games published in The Week in Chess played between 1999 and 2002 by players with a FIDE Elo rating of 2500 or above, 55 percent were draws. According to chess analyst Jeff Sonas, although an upward draw rate trend can be observed in general master-level play since the beginning of the 20th century, it is currently "holding pretty steady around 50%, and is only increasing at a very slow rate". Draw rate of elite grandmasters, rated more than 2750 Elo, is, however, significantly higher, surpassing 70% in 2017 and 2018.
In top-level correspondence chess under ICCF, where computer assistance is allowed, the draw rate is much higher than in the over-the-board chess: of 1512 games played in the World Championship finals and the Candidates' sections between 2010 and 2013, 82.3% ended in a draw. Since that time, draw rate in top-level correspondence play has been rising steadily, reaching 97% in 2019."

It's rather the other way round: in chess, you hit as hard as possible. There are only two parties - a zero-sum game. Your win is the loss of the other.
In war, there are more parties and people have to live on the battlefield afterwards. If this war had been chess, Russia would have just nuked Ukraine into oblivion.

Given the recent discussion on the state of Russian technology and engineering, will this be modelled in CM?
It is claimed to be the barrel of a BMP. Posted on the Ukraine reddit (no video to worry about autoplay) but without information on it's original source.
If it's bogus, it is still an interesting way to troll the Russians.
 

Its that time of the week again and another relevant topic for conversation is available from Perun. ☕
 

Look at the numbers, it's not like the pandemic exactly ended  

"Ukrainian soldiers fire a shell from an M777 howitzer on a front line, in the Kharkiv region, Ukraine, July 21, 2022. GLEB GARANICH / REUTERS"

On one hand, Greens have the worst stance on nuclear power, on the other hand, their stances on Ukraine are quite hawkish, but looks like they can bend dogma towards reality.
On one hand, I dislike strongly the need by Germany to slow approach their Ukraine military assistance, on the other, as long as they keep the UKR economy and government afloat with money at least, and maintaining some sort of anti-Russia, pro-UKR stance, letting them get their gas from Russia is fair enough. Russian money is worthless if it can't buy them military equipment and it cannot be underscored that the UKR economy is wrecked completely, and that EU funds are essential for keeping the country afloat economically while they fight the Russians.
 
 

By and large, money is a terrible motivator. It's a great way to get people to start something (new job, sign a contract, join the army) but it's not what keeps people in the game when the game gets tough.
Motivation is a famously tricky and slippery concept though, which folks have been pondering for quite a while.
"in any 20-man platoon, there will be 6 gutful men who will go anywhere and do anything, 12 'sheep' who will follow a short distance behind if they are well led, 4-6 who will run away."
LTCOL Lionel Wigram, 1943
https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=We1HZDUTpdEC&pg=PA238&lpg=PA238&dq=wigram+gutful+men&source=bl&ots=HeHzOzGH1K&sig=ACfU3U315irwUvSjZBZ4knb_nj1dkaxg3A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwisgOy79Ir5AhVF6nMBHWH3BSEQ6AF6BAgiEAM#v=onepage&q=wigram gutful men&f=false
Wigram was the guy who started battle drill in the UK, early in WWII. He recognised that the existing training was wildly inappropriate, and while he was developing and running his battle schools he had occasion to think abut combat effectiveness, a lot. He had even more chance to think about it after he annoyed Montgomery, was demoted, and sent to lead a rifle company in Italy. Wigram was killed in action there. Gutfully.

you would know

So Kherson...ooo boy.  Well first off, I am buying off on the whole "traitor" theory that Kherson was likely sold-out, that or the UA simply got stretched too thin but this is the major southern axis so I do not see how they did not prioritize it - maybe they did and Russians down this way actually demonstrated talent.  Why?
Well because on paper this city should be damn near impossible to take from the South:

By my eyes there are roughly 5 crossing sites that one can pull from Google.  The Dnieper is a deep old river so I cannot tell if there are any fording sites but I doubt it.  Wiki says the Dnieper runs at about 1.5 m/sec which is fairly slow and easily swimmable and pontoon-able.  However, Kherson is right on a major delta stretch, to the point that a second river breaks out called the "Konka" (sp?).  Anyway this is a major water obstacle, like Rhine river "major".  The river itself ranges from 500-1000m but that is not the rub, it is the delta - that is a very angry and hungry looking swamp that looks like the mouth of a Dune Sandworm to mobility.  Sure you can pontoon the bridge but those wetlands look like they will eat Divisions, we are talking major road and causeway work in order to sustain.
As I said there are 5 possible crossing sites: 
-Starting on the far left, there is a possible amphibious run between Sofiivka and Rybal'Che but this is also a major undertaking.  That is a 12km run so we are basically talking D-Day but there is infrastructure on either side to support (I am not sure about the shoreline, would need to do an MSFS flight).
- Then we have the Antonovskiy Bridge that the UA is currently turning into swiss cheese.  That is a 1000m crossing without the bridge and a lot of greenish looking swamp hell on the N bank.  Tough.
- We then have what looks like a rail bridge called "Antonivsʹkyy Zaliznychnyy", not sure if it still up but it is about 6km upstream from the Antonovskiy.  If the UA did not blow that one up it will have to go as well (did a quick check but cannot see if it was already).
- Next is what I think is the only decent amphib/pontoon site along this gawd-awful shoreline.  Just on the western outskirts of L'vov about 34 km up from the Antonovskiy there is what looks like a viable crossing site.  The south bank aint great but this is a hydro-electric line crossing so road infrastructure is there (note would have to do a second small bridging op about 1km to the east on a small inlet), which takes one up to an old monastery in Korsunka.
- Last, is the road bridge at the Kakhovka hydro electrical station.  Looks modern and solid.
After that further upstream the Dnieper expands out and although one could find a decent shore line we are basically back to D-Day.
So What?  Well it is like Stalingrad, a city with it back to a major obstacle coming from the UA side.  All war is communication and retaking Kherson will send big political signals in all directions.  It would be a clear sign that the UA can do offensive in a major way, which should assist in shoring up the cottage-cheese spines of some in the West.  It would also be a major blow to Russia, effectively undeciding that entire front.  I am sure they will try and sell it as "we withdrew for the good of the people" noise but even the most doe-eyed Russian believer will have a seed of doubt planted.  
So to the big question: how does the UA take Kherson? Well a couple schools of thought, first a Western solution:

Coming from the Western School of Manoeuvre, the game here would be to cut off Kherson and choke it out, without having to do heavy urban combat.  So Shape, Manoeuvre, Isolate and Attrit would be the order of the day.  A big armored led spearhead thrust down from the North across all that wonderful tank country.  A bounce crossing on those two eastern sites, complete with SF, Airmobile snaps and then swing westward and cut the Russian LOCs completely.  Meanwhile keep the pressure on Kherson from the North, while using deep strike to Fix supporting forces.  Very nice, so long as one has air supremacy.  
I will say it now, if the UA can do this, the war will be over much sooner than anyone thinks. As I have noted before, I have grown allergic to big bold strokes in this war.  The biggest issue, beyond establishing pre-conditions, is time-space-force.  That is about a 130 km thunder run and would likely take a couple modern heavy divisions to pull off, maybe three.  I do not think the UA has that kind of force, nor are they going to get the pre-conditions to support it.  I have no doubt that pundits will start drawing stuff like this...use it for profiling purposes.  I pray to god that the UA could pull off this offensive but I also do not think he is listening...very unlikely.  So what could a UA offense look like?

Attrition-to-Manoeuvre, not the other way around.  The UA could compress Kherson and pull in a lot of RA in reaction.  With their superior ISR and deep strike they could do a lot of damage in depth - given the ranges, this whole thing at Antonovskiy could be a setup for ATACMS arrival.  If they start hitting EW, then UAS are also back on the menu.  As they compress Kherson, their artillery will pull in range as well.  As they pull and bleed the RA, an opportunity to do a North South offensive opens up but only take it to the bridge at the hydro-plant, while cutting every crossing.  You might bag the RA forces to the east.
The major problem with this one is Kherson itself.  If the RA is trapped like rats, they will fight like them.  The UA could break itself in a city of that size (which they know after Mariupol).  My guess is that they will simply bleed the RA white here, hitting them once again along the entire length of the RA operational system.  This presents the modern dilemma of "stay and bleed out" or "withdraw, preserve force and lose the city", either way, so long as the UA can keep pulling the RA in and killing them in numbers while they try and hold onto Kherson it is a winnable situation.
Key will be setting operational conditions and holding onto them.  Deep strike, deep strike and deep strike.  They need to keep hitting RA logistics to keep the RA guns silent and then the UA guns can go to work on the rest without fearing overwhelming c-btty.
How is it actually going to go down...no idea.  In fact it might not happen at all, the whole thing could be a feint.  But one thing is for sure, it has got the Russians wondering.  And on the battlefield uncertainty on your opponent is a useful thing. 

Fact is whole of Europe / Nato 'neglected' their military apart from pounding on failed states ;-). The big exception is USA and their MIC. 
Obviously Poland for example was less neglient than Germany, however it is indicative that Poland feels it is now in urgent need of vast masses of military hardware which only one nation can provide in the desired timeframe. 
Personally I hope Europe will learn to stand on it's own legs and not (again) depend fully on USA. Cooperation between allies is of course a good thing.
FWIW France mainly was trying to get a European army and that's what would/could be much more effective militarily imo. But politically.... difficult. 
Instead of various countries with 30-50 airframes and a few hundred tanks max all with their own infrastructure/training/acquirement/etc, an integrated European army could be among the most powerful in the world. 
It's more sustainable long term imo instead of Poland (or other single countries) becoming a huge military hub in record breaking time. 
Because buying a lot of stuff with debt is one thing, maintaining them and keeping the forces trained well and operational for a long time is another thing. How much will the people of Poland be willing to spend on defense in let's say 10 years?

While I don't always agree with my fellow countrymen Aragorn, especially politically (or CMRT releases) I think he has a good point. 
How is Poland going to pay for 400 M1 with their turbine engines let alone 500 Himars? 
Personally I have some doubts about many of these things materializing into tangible stuff in the long term.  Sorry but not sorry if I poop on parties, that's our national trait init? 😘
FWIW i hope PL will have 300+ M1A2SEPV3 sooner rather than later and that they will perform in CMBS 2. I don't even care if some EU money will gets utilised for it.
 

Putin meeting Khamenei in Iran.
Just aesthetically speaking what a strange photograph. 

On holidays so no time to watch the video, but it is my understanding that after the lost battle of Jena the Prussian army performed an analysis of what went wrong. Conclusion was that traditional planning and control were simply not realistic as high command was basically trying to manage a war based on info that was already outdated before it reached them. The battlefield was chaos and trying to control it in detail from higher up didn't make stuff any better or probably rather worse.
Later on von Moltke developed the concept (and afaik coined the phrase 'no plan survives first contact with the enemy') mainly as a better way to deal with the chaos and other challenves large scale modern war brought.
 

Not limited to RU Army I'm afraid.
 

Cluster bombing any country is a terrible idea. Cluster bombing your *own* country?
 
All wars end, sooner or later. Tidying up afterwards is hard enough without leaving yourself boobytraps to play with.

For some reason this revived some  really old cold war era   comic book memories
The Russians are reminding me and more of the  Stereotyped Bad guys form the 2000AD series 'Invasion"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion!_(2000_AD)

Well, there are massive differences. Mandate of heaven (or older confucianism) was created mainly  at the courts as legitimacy for already existing power structures. While in early modern Europe Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and others constructed those ideas from "chaos" (especially first two) and did not generally wrote to appease some King.

In my opinion, you can never scout too much... it is something that should be a constant focus, from first turn to last. 
Bottom line, I rarely enter a game with a plan in hand.. I only form a plan after I have done as thorough a recon as possible and uncovered as much about the enemy disposition as I can... still I do not stop there, even after I have decided on a course of action... I continue to scout, as the enemy is constantly reacting, or being proactive.. with out a plan to gain intel on those activities you will be taken by surprise and take unnecessary casualties.
I have written a lot about this subject... here are some links to my blog posts that I think will help answer your questions.. or at least maybe get you to start thinking a little differently about what recon really means. 
Reconnaissance The Patience to See (written by @pnzrldr ) Command Push Recon Pull - my preferred method Platoon Scouts Listening Halts Masked Movement The Decision Process

Torture chambers.  Mass rape.  Genocide.  Threatening their neighbors.  More and more I have to admit this old sailor from the cold war is coming around to the fact that maybe we need to call Ivan's bluff and enter this.  I know it means world war and further the threat of Nuclear war.  I lived through that era and spent 5 years on an aircraft carrier preparing for it and am well versed that there are no winners in that.  But at some point the red line has to get crossed and the world has to say no more.  When the Soviet Union fell I had honestly hoped in the modern world we had seen all the evil that humans could preperatrate on one another, but the reports coming out of "occupied" Ukraine the last couple days have brought me to tears and filled me with so much anger I can hardly control myself.  If I was younger Id already be there doing something carrying the wounded and help the civilians (as I was no soldier) but god damn how much more can we see before we raise our fists?
There has to be more we can do.

Some points of comparison which do make sense and check out:
- [X] Importance of tightly integrated aerial observation and massed artillery fires working in near real time (something the US Army could do in 1944-45)
- [X] Extensive, deep fortifications containing efficiently numerically superior enemy (the JFO fortifications have withstood now 1 month of fires with 21st century tech and seem to be holding mostly)
- [X] Overextended mechanised forces being eventually ground to dust by local "pinprick" counterattacks (happened to the Germans all the time in 1941)
- [X] "Cheap" tank rushes do not work unless coordinated with infantry and artillery (happened to the Red Army a lot throughout the war)
- [X] Urban battles being sinkholes of time, blood and materiel (Stalingrad, Breslau, ... so many to count...)
- [X] Much vaunted militaries looting whatever to keep themselves fed 
...

That's very close to Kherson. I brace myself for what is going to be found there.