Maciej Zwolinski

Come on, I thought we were all wargamers here😉 .Why would anyone call the period between XIII and XV cent. anything but "High Medieval"? The age of the fully matured feudal system and on the battlefield, the ascendancy of the armoured knight. When every army was made up of Kn (S), Bow (X) and Sp (I).

Was he Ukrainian though? Some of things he wrote did not seem like things a disgruntled Ukrainian would write, more like an active Russian supporter. One way or another, those comments were also pure troll and fully justified a ban regardless of where he hailed from.

Substitute "patriots and local elites" for the loaded term "nationalists"  and you would be right; that is the way every conquest happens. Eliminate those who care about the idea of their nation and those who have ambitions to lead in their community and the rest will follow whoever is the new tyrant just to save their lives and households. Then in a couple of generations an effective genocide may happen because that "majority" will be happy to speak Russian and take orders from the new governor appointed from Moscow, and they will be Ukrainians no more. That is the Russian way since the Middle Ages - probably the first victims were the Ugric tribes in the North, then various Turkic groups which just started to settle down South-East of Moscow in XVI century, and then the Russians went on their merry way from Vladivostok to Królewiec doing exactly the same thing.
This is also exactly why some nations do not want to surrender and go on fighting - because that group of "nationalists" who care about more than the next meal is large enough to overcome the objections of the indifferent others.
And on a more personal note - that "argument" is in essence an appeal to surrender to tyranny, based on cowardice, pusillanimity and stupidity. It made me actually (slightly) nauseous to read something so nakedly depraved 🤮.
 

Substitute "patriots and local elites" for the loaded term "nationalists"  and you would be right; that is the way every conquest happens. Eliminate those who care about the idea of their nation and those who have ambitions to lead in their community and the rest will follow whoever is the new tyrant just to save their lives and households. Then in a couple of generations an effective genocide may happen because that "majority" will be happy to speak Russian and take orders from the new governor appointed from Moscow, and they will be Ukrainians no more. That is the Russian way since the Middle Ages - probably the first victims were the Ugric tribes in the North, then various Turkic groups which just started to settle down South-East of Moscow in XVI century, and then the Russians went on their merry way from Vladivostok to Królewiec doing exactly the same thing.
This is also exactly why some nations do not want to surrender and go on fighting - because that group of "nationalists" who care about more than the next meal is large enough to overcome the objections of the indifferent others.
And on a more personal note - that "argument" is in essence an appeal to surrender to tyranny, based on cowardice, pusillanimity and stupidity. It made me actually (slightly) nauseous to read something so nakedly depraved 🤮.
 

Substitute "patriots and local elites" for the loaded term "nationalists"  and you would be right; that is the way every conquest happens. Eliminate those who care about the idea of their nation and those who have ambitions to lead in their community and the rest will follow whoever is the new tyrant just to save their lives and households. Then in a couple of generations an effective genocide may happen because that "majority" will be happy to speak Russian and take orders from the new governor appointed from Moscow, and they will be Ukrainians no more. That is the Russian way since the Middle Ages - probably the first victims were the Ugric tribes in the North, then various Turkic groups which just started to settle down South-East of Moscow in XVI century, and then the Russians went on their merry way from Vladivostok to Królewiec doing exactly the same thing.
This is also exactly why some nations do not want to surrender and go on fighting - because that group of "nationalists" who care about more than the next meal is large enough to overcome the objections of the indifferent others.
And on a more personal note - that "argument" is in essence an appeal to surrender to tyranny, based on cowardice, pusillanimity and stupidity. It made me actually (slightly) nauseous to read something so nakedly depraved 🤮.
 

Substitute "patriots and local elites" for the loaded term "nationalists"  and you would be right; that is the way every conquest happens. Eliminate those who care about the idea of their nation and those who have ambitions to lead in their community and the rest will follow whoever is the new tyrant just to save their lives and households. Then in a couple of generations an effective genocide may happen because that "majority" will be happy to speak Russian and take orders from the new governor appointed from Moscow, and they will be Ukrainians no more. That is the Russian way since the Middle Ages - probably the first victims were the Ugric tribes in the North, then various Turkic groups which just started to settle down South-East of Moscow in XVI century, and then the Russians went on their merry way from Vladivostok to Królewiec doing exactly the same thing.
This is also exactly why some nations do not want to surrender and go on fighting - because that group of "nationalists" who care about more than the next meal is large enough to overcome the objections of the indifferent others.
And on a more personal note - that "argument" is in essence an appeal to surrender to tyranny, based on cowardice, pusillanimity and stupidity. It made me actually (slightly) nauseous to read something so nakedly depraved 🤮.
 

Substitute "patriots and local elites" for the loaded term "nationalists"  and you would be right; that is the way every conquest happens. Eliminate those who care about the idea of their nation and those who have ambitions to lead in their community and the rest will follow whoever is the new tyrant just to save their lives and households. Then in a couple of generations an effective genocide may happen because that "majority" will be happy to speak Russian and take orders from the new governor appointed from Moscow, and they will be Ukrainians no more. That is the Russian way since the Middle Ages - probably the first victims were the Ugric tribes in the North, then various Turkic groups which just started to settle down South-East of Moscow in XVI century, and then the Russians went on their merry way from Vladivostok to Królewiec doing exactly the same thing.
This is also exactly why some nations do not want to surrender and go on fighting - because that group of "nationalists" who care about more than the next meal is large enough to overcome the objections of the indifferent others.
And on a more personal note - that "argument" is in essence an appeal to surrender to tyranny, based on cowardice, pusillanimity and stupidity. It made me actually (slightly) nauseous to read something so nakedly depraved 🤮.
 

Substitute "patriots and local elites" for the loaded term "nationalists"  and you would be right; that is the way every conquest happens. Eliminate those who care about the idea of their nation and those who have ambitions to lead in their community and the rest will follow whoever is the new tyrant just to save their lives and households. Then in a couple of generations an effective genocide may happen because that "majority" will be happy to speak Russian and take orders from the new governor appointed from Moscow, and they will be Ukrainians no more. That is the Russian way since the Middle Ages - probably the first victims were the Ugric tribes in the North, then various Turkic groups which just started to settle down South-East of Moscow in XVI century, and then the Russians went on their merry way from Vladivostok to Królewiec doing exactly the same thing.
This is also exactly why some nations do not want to surrender and go on fighting - because that group of "nationalists" who care about more than the next meal is large enough to overcome the objections of the indifferent others.
And on a more personal note - that "argument" is in essence an appeal to surrender to tyranny, based on cowardice, pusillanimity and stupidity. It made me actually (slightly) nauseous to read something so nakedly depraved 🤮.
 

Substitute "patriots and local elites" for the loaded term "nationalists"  and you would be right; that is the way every conquest happens. Eliminate those who care about the idea of their nation and those who have ambitions to lead in their community and the rest will follow whoever is the new tyrant just to save their lives and households. Then in a couple of generations an effective genocide may happen because that "majority" will be happy to speak Russian and take orders from the new governor appointed from Moscow, and they will be Ukrainians no more. That is the Russian way since the Middle Ages - probably the first victims were the Ugric tribes in the North, then various Turkic groups which just started to settle down South-East of Moscow in XVI century, and then the Russians went on their merry way from Vladivostok to Królewiec doing exactly the same thing.
This is also exactly why some nations do not want to surrender and go on fighting - because that group of "nationalists" who care about more than the next meal is large enough to overcome the objections of the indifferent others.
And on a more personal note - that "argument" is in essence an appeal to surrender to tyranny, based on cowardice, pusillanimity and stupidity. It made me actually (slightly) nauseous to read something so nakedly depraved 🤮.
 

Substitute "patriots and local elites" for the loaded term "nationalists"  and you would be right; that is the way every conquest happens. Eliminate those who care about the idea of their nation and those who have ambitions to lead in their community and the rest will follow whoever is the new tyrant just to save their lives and households. Then in a couple of generations an effective genocide may happen because that "majority" will be happy to speak Russian and take orders from the new governor appointed from Moscow, and they will be Ukrainians no more. That is the Russian way since the Middle Ages - probably the first victims were the Ugric tribes in the North, then various Turkic groups which just started to settle down South-East of Moscow in XVI century, and then the Russians went on their merry way from Vladivostok to Królewiec doing exactly the same thing.
This is also exactly why some nations do not want to surrender and go on fighting - because that group of "nationalists" who care about more than the next meal is large enough to overcome the objections of the indifferent others.
And on a more personal note - that "argument" is in essence an appeal to surrender to tyranny, based on cowardice, pusillanimity and stupidity. It made me actually (slightly) nauseous to read something so nakedly depraved 🤮.
 

I am wondering if this is coordinated with the recent Ukrainian bout of strikes on RUS air defence assets. Focus on the enemy's AD makes great sense if you have, or are planning to have, enough air assets to switch to other targets soon enough. Otherwise exchanging your inventory of missiles and other air assets for the enemy's air defence seems not particularly helpful to the overall war effort. Like this old joke about soviet thieves who robbed a liquor store - the Militia caught them and they were being interrogated: "Where is the vodka?" We sold it!" "Where is the money?" "We spent it all on vodka"

I think this list contains 2 points which were major contributors not only to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but to the Soviet state collapse in general.
The first one is the economic situation, which is kind of obvious. Soviet economy peaked in 1950s when it looked like SU can give the Free World economies a run for their money, but then it could not and started failing. There is however one potentially pertinent point: AFAIK the Soviet economy got a large boost in 1970s when the Middle East fuel crisis made fuel prices soar and Russian oil &gas exports actually became the Soviet economy, the rest paling into insignificance. During the 1980s a high price for oil became the make or break factor for the Soviet economic results, and their ability to support their budgets, and it is so today for the Putinist Russia. End of 80's is increased stabilisation in the Middle East, increased US  political influence among the oil producing countries, increased US domestic oil production, which creates the perspective of fuel prices going down and staying low for a long time. At that, Soviet economy tanked to the bottom & the rest we know. This makes me wonder, if at the beginning of the 2022 invasion there was a way to repeat this successful formula and wage the economic warfare against RUS in a more effective way which would already be giving significant results.  In the actual scenario, the Western counries tried to decrease their imports of oil and shrink the demand for RUS exports that way. That makes sense, however mostly in the long run. I am wondering about doing the opposite and increasing supply. Unfortunately, the Biden administration at the time was acting strongly against the oil economy, thus creating the opposite trend to the 1980's trend discussed above: conflict with Middle Eastern oil producers, ban on increasing the domestic production. I am wondering, if adopting a more flexible approach re this could have worked better. Temporarily increasing supply and driving the oil price down below the levels profitable for Russians would make them spend their reserves quicker and then force them to adopt war economy measures which are very damaging to the general economic power and potentially unpopular.
The second is less obvious. In Poland after the historians got at the post-communist archives it became quite apparent, that the commies were not particularly concerned about the hearts and minds of "the working folk of the cities and countryside", as they had been officially referred to. They were  procedures for when the proles mutiny.  What really became a problem, is that the members of the political and security apparatus themselves started to be sympathetic to the regime change. The fact, that they were the kings of the communist world and much better than the rest of the society stopped mattering as much as the fact, that in absolute terms, the colonels of militia and chairmen of local party organisations were worse off than even the lower strata of the societies in the West.  The nail in the coffin were the results of the 1989 elections (which had been intended by the commies to be just a tactical retreat and the Polish United Workers Party had very much been intended to remain the dominant political power) except not as much in general, but in the "special voting circuits" - in military and militia garrisoned units, among prison guards, etc. The opposition won even there. The obvious conclusion was that the threat of using military force as the communists BATNA became void, soldiers would not fight for them, so the gig was up. With regard to the present situation in the Ukraine war, the parallel is that it is perhaps not necessary to change the heart of the ordinary Russian on the street. But finding a way to turn the low-and middle management of the Russian state and power apparatus against Putin could be it. For the avoidance of doubt, the individual sanctions against top oligarchs will not work, too simplistic and too restricted, we are not talking about turning a few selected people against Putin, but a whole group. I actually have no idea how to achieve this.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

I think this list contains 2 points which were major contributors not only to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but to the Soviet state collapse in general.
The first one is the economic situation, which is kind of obvious. Soviet economy peaked in 1950s when it looked like SU can give the Free World economies a run for their money, but then it could not and started failing. There is however one potentially pertinent point: AFAIK the Soviet economy got a large boost in 1970s when the Middle East fuel crisis made fuel prices soar and Russian oil &gas exports actually became the Soviet economy, the rest paling into insignificance. During the 1980s a high price for oil became the make or break factor for the Soviet economic results, and their ability to support their budgets, and it is so today for the Putinist Russia. End of 80's is increased stabilisation in the Middle East, increased US  political influence among the oil producing countries, increased US domestic oil production, which creates the perspective of fuel prices going down and staying low for a long time. At that, Soviet economy tanked to the bottom & the rest we know. This makes me wonder, if at the beginning of the 2022 invasion there was a way to repeat this successful formula and wage the economic warfare against RUS in a more effective way which would already be giving significant results.  In the actual scenario, the Western counries tried to decrease their imports of oil and shrink the demand for RUS exports that way. That makes sense, however mostly in the long run. I am wondering about doing the opposite and increasing supply. Unfortunately, the Biden administration at the time was acting strongly against the oil economy, thus creating the opposite trend to the 1980's trend discussed above: conflict with Middle Eastern oil producers, ban on increasing the domestic production. I am wondering, if adopting a more flexible approach re this could have worked better. Temporarily increasing supply and driving the oil price down below the levels profitable for Russians would make them spend their reserves quicker and then force them to adopt war economy measures which are very damaging to the general economic power and potentially unpopular.
The second is less obvious. In Poland after the historians got at the post-communist archives it became quite apparent, that the commies were not particularly concerned about the hearts and minds of "the working folk of the cities and countryside", as they had been officially referred to. They were  procedures for when the proles mutiny.  What really became a problem, is that the members of the political and security apparatus themselves started to be sympathetic to the regime change. The fact, that they were the kings of the communist world and much better than the rest of the society stopped mattering as much as the fact, that in absolute terms, the colonels of militia and chairmen of local party organisations were worse off than even the lower strata of the societies in the West.  The nail in the coffin were the results of the 1989 elections (which had been intended by the commies to be just a tactical retreat and the Polish United Workers Party had very much been intended to remain the dominant political power) except not as much in general, but in the "special voting circuits" - in military and militia garrisoned units, among prison guards, etc. The opposition won even there. The obvious conclusion was that the threat of using military force as the communists BATNA became void, soldiers would not fight for them, so the gig was up. With regard to the present situation in the Ukraine war, the parallel is that it is perhaps not necessary to change the heart of the ordinary Russian on the street. But finding a way to turn the low-and middle management of the Russian state and power apparatus against Putin could be it. For the avoidance of doubt, the individual sanctions against top oligarchs will not work, too simplistic and too restricted, we are not talking about turning a few selected people against Putin, but a whole group. I actually have no idea how to achieve this.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

I think this list contains 2 points which were major contributors not only to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but to the Soviet state collapse in general.
The first one is the economic situation, which is kind of obvious. Soviet economy peaked in 1950s when it looked like SU can give the Free World economies a run for their money, but then it could not and started failing. There is however one potentially pertinent point: AFAIK the Soviet economy got a large boost in 1970s when the Middle East fuel crisis made fuel prices soar and Russian oil &gas exports actually became the Soviet economy, the rest paling into insignificance. During the 1980s a high price for oil became the make or break factor for the Soviet economic results, and their ability to support their budgets, and it is so today for the Putinist Russia. End of 80's is increased stabilisation in the Middle East, increased US  political influence among the oil producing countries, increased US domestic oil production, which creates the perspective of fuel prices going down and staying low for a long time. At that, Soviet economy tanked to the bottom & the rest we know. This makes me wonder, if at the beginning of the 2022 invasion there was a way to repeat this successful formula and wage the economic warfare against RUS in a more effective way which would already be giving significant results.  In the actual scenario, the Western counries tried to decrease their imports of oil and shrink the demand for RUS exports that way. That makes sense, however mostly in the long run. I am wondering about doing the opposite and increasing supply. Unfortunately, the Biden administration at the time was acting strongly against the oil economy, thus creating the opposite trend to the 1980's trend discussed above: conflict with Middle Eastern oil producers, ban on increasing the domestic production. I am wondering, if adopting a more flexible approach re this could have worked better. Temporarily increasing supply and driving the oil price down below the levels profitable for Russians would make them spend their reserves quicker and then force them to adopt war economy measures which are very damaging to the general economic power and potentially unpopular.
The second is less obvious. In Poland after the historians got at the post-communist archives it became quite apparent, that the commies were not particularly concerned about the hearts and minds of "the working folk of the cities and countryside", as they had been officially referred to. They were  procedures for when the proles mutiny.  What really became a problem, is that the members of the political and security apparatus themselves started to be sympathetic to the regime change. The fact, that they were the kings of the communist world and much better than the rest of the society stopped mattering as much as the fact, that in absolute terms, the colonels of militia and chairmen of local party organisations were worse off than even the lower strata of the societies in the West.  The nail in the coffin were the results of the 1989 elections (which had been intended by the commies to be just a tactical retreat and the Polish United Workers Party had very much been intended to remain the dominant political power) except not as much in general, but in the "special voting circuits" - in military and militia garrisoned units, among prison guards, etc. The opposition won even there. The obvious conclusion was that the threat of using military force as the communists BATNA became void, soldiers would not fight for them, so the gig was up. With regard to the present situation in the Ukraine war, the parallel is that it is perhaps not necessary to change the heart of the ordinary Russian on the street. But finding a way to turn the low-and middle management of the Russian state and power apparatus against Putin could be it. For the avoidance of doubt, the individual sanctions against top oligarchs will not work, too simplistic and too restricted, we are not talking about turning a few selected people against Putin, but a whole group. I actually have no idea how to achieve this.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

I think this list contains 2 points which were major contributors not only to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but to the Soviet state collapse in general.
The first one is the economic situation, which is kind of obvious. Soviet economy peaked in 1950s when it looked like SU can give the Free World economies a run for their money, but then it could not and started failing. There is however one potentially pertinent point: AFAIK the Soviet economy got a large boost in 1970s when the Middle East fuel crisis made fuel prices soar and Russian oil &gas exports actually became the Soviet economy, the rest paling into insignificance. During the 1980s a high price for oil became the make or break factor for the Soviet economic results, and their ability to support their budgets, and it is so today for the Putinist Russia. End of 80's is increased stabilisation in the Middle East, increased US  political influence among the oil producing countries, increased US domestic oil production, which creates the perspective of fuel prices going down and staying low for a long time. At that, Soviet economy tanked to the bottom & the rest we know. This makes me wonder, if at the beginning of the 2022 invasion there was a way to repeat this successful formula and wage the economic warfare against RUS in a more effective way which would already be giving significant results.  In the actual scenario, the Western counries tried to decrease their imports of oil and shrink the demand for RUS exports that way. That makes sense, however mostly in the long run. I am wondering about doing the opposite and increasing supply. Unfortunately, the Biden administration at the time was acting strongly against the oil economy, thus creating the opposite trend to the 1980's trend discussed above: conflict with Middle Eastern oil producers, ban on increasing the domestic production. I am wondering, if adopting a more flexible approach re this could have worked better. Temporarily increasing supply and driving the oil price down below the levels profitable for Russians would make them spend their reserves quicker and then force them to adopt war economy measures which are very damaging to the general economic power and potentially unpopular.
The second is less obvious. In Poland after the historians got at the post-communist archives it became quite apparent, that the commies were not particularly concerned about the hearts and minds of "the working folk of the cities and countryside", as they had been officially referred to. They were  procedures for when the proles mutiny.  What really became a problem, is that the members of the political and security apparatus themselves started to be sympathetic to the regime change. The fact, that they were the kings of the communist world and much better than the rest of the society stopped mattering as much as the fact, that in absolute terms, the colonels of militia and chairmen of local party organisations were worse off than even the lower strata of the societies in the West.  The nail in the coffin were the results of the 1989 elections (which had been intended by the commies to be just a tactical retreat and the Polish United Workers Party had very much been intended to remain the dominant political power) except not as much in general, but in the "special voting circuits" - in military and militia garrisoned units, among prison guards, etc. The opposition won even there. The obvious conclusion was that the threat of using military force as the communists BATNA became void, soldiers would not fight for them, so the gig was up. With regard to the present situation in the Ukraine war, the parallel is that it is perhaps not necessary to change the heart of the ordinary Russian on the street. But finding a way to turn the low-and middle management of the Russian state and power apparatus against Putin could be it. For the avoidance of doubt, the individual sanctions against top oligarchs will not work, too simplistic and too restricted, we are not talking about turning a few selected people against Putin, but a whole group. I actually have no idea how to achieve this.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

I think this list contains 2 points which were major contributors not only to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but to the Soviet state collapse in general.
The first one is the economic situation, which is kind of obvious. Soviet economy peaked in 1950s when it looked like SU can give the Free World economies a run for their money, but then it could not and started failing. There is however one potentially pertinent point: AFAIK the Soviet economy got a large boost in 1970s when the Middle East fuel crisis made fuel prices soar and Russian oil &gas exports actually became the Soviet economy, the rest paling into insignificance. During the 1980s a high price for oil became the make or break factor for the Soviet economic results, and their ability to support their budgets, and it is so today for the Putinist Russia. End of 80's is increased stabilisation in the Middle East, increased US  political influence among the oil producing countries, increased US domestic oil production, which creates the perspective of fuel prices going down and staying low for a long time. At that, Soviet economy tanked to the bottom & the rest we know. This makes me wonder, if at the beginning of the 2022 invasion there was a way to repeat this successful formula and wage the economic warfare against RUS in a more effective way which would already be giving significant results.  In the actual scenario, the Western counries tried to decrease their imports of oil and shrink the demand for RUS exports that way. That makes sense, however mostly in the long run. I am wondering about doing the opposite and increasing supply. Unfortunately, the Biden administration at the time was acting strongly against the oil economy, thus creating the opposite trend to the 1980's trend discussed above: conflict with Middle Eastern oil producers, ban on increasing the domestic production. I am wondering, if adopting a more flexible approach re this could have worked better. Temporarily increasing supply and driving the oil price down below the levels profitable for Russians would make them spend their reserves quicker and then force them to adopt war economy measures which are very damaging to the general economic power and potentially unpopular.
The second is less obvious. In Poland after the historians got at the post-communist archives it became quite apparent, that the commies were not particularly concerned about the hearts and minds of "the working folk of the cities and countryside", as they had been officially referred to. They were  procedures for when the proles mutiny.  What really became a problem, is that the members of the political and security apparatus themselves started to be sympathetic to the regime change. The fact, that they were the kings of the communist world and much better than the rest of the society stopped mattering as much as the fact, that in absolute terms, the colonels of militia and chairmen of local party organisations were worse off than even the lower strata of the societies in the West.  The nail in the coffin were the results of the 1989 elections (which had been intended by the commies to be just a tactical retreat and the Polish United Workers Party had very much been intended to remain the dominant political power) except not as much in general, but in the "special voting circuits" - in military and militia garrisoned units, among prison guards, etc. The opposition won even there. The obvious conclusion was that the threat of using military force as the communists BATNA became void, soldiers would not fight for them, so the gig was up. With regard to the present situation in the Ukraine war, the parallel is that it is perhaps not necessary to change the heart of the ordinary Russian on the street. But finding a way to turn the low-and middle management of the Russian state and power apparatus against Putin could be it. For the avoidance of doubt, the individual sanctions against top oligarchs will not work, too simplistic and too restricted, we are not talking about turning a few selected people against Putin, but a whole group. I actually have no idea how to achieve this.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

I think this list contains 2 points which were major contributors not only to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but to the Soviet state collapse in general.
The first one is the economic situation, which is kind of obvious. Soviet economy peaked in 1950s when it looked like SU can give the Free World economies a run for their money, but then it could not and started failing. There is however one potentially pertinent point: AFAIK the Soviet economy got a large boost in 1970s when the Middle East fuel crisis made fuel prices soar and Russian oil &gas exports actually became the Soviet economy, the rest paling into insignificance. During the 1980s a high price for oil became the make or break factor for the Soviet economic results, and their ability to support their budgets, and it is so today for the Putinist Russia. End of 80's is increased stabilisation in the Middle East, increased US  political influence among the oil producing countries, increased US domestic oil production, which creates the perspective of fuel prices going down and staying low for a long time. At that, Soviet economy tanked to the bottom & the rest we know. This makes me wonder, if at the beginning of the 2022 invasion there was a way to repeat this successful formula and wage the economic warfare against RUS in a more effective way which would already be giving significant results.  In the actual scenario, the Western counries tried to decrease their imports of oil and shrink the demand for RUS exports that way. That makes sense, however mostly in the long run. I am wondering about doing the opposite and increasing supply. Unfortunately, the Biden administration at the time was acting strongly against the oil economy, thus creating the opposite trend to the 1980's trend discussed above: conflict with Middle Eastern oil producers, ban on increasing the domestic production. I am wondering, if adopting a more flexible approach re this could have worked better. Temporarily increasing supply and driving the oil price down below the levels profitable for Russians would make them spend their reserves quicker and then force them to adopt war economy measures which are very damaging to the general economic power and potentially unpopular.
The second is less obvious. In Poland after the historians got at the post-communist archives it became quite apparent, that the commies were not particularly concerned about the hearts and minds of "the working folk of the cities and countryside", as they had been officially referred to. They were  procedures for when the proles mutiny.  What really became a problem, is that the members of the political and security apparatus themselves started to be sympathetic to the regime change. The fact, that they were the kings of the communist world and much better than the rest of the society stopped mattering as much as the fact, that in absolute terms, the colonels of militia and chairmen of local party organisations were worse off than even the lower strata of the societies in the West.  The nail in the coffin were the results of the 1989 elections (which had been intended by the commies to be just a tactical retreat and the Polish United Workers Party had very much been intended to remain the dominant political power) except not as much in general, but in the "special voting circuits" - in military and militia garrisoned units, among prison guards, etc. The opposition won even there. The obvious conclusion was that the threat of using military force as the communists BATNA became void, soldiers would not fight for them, so the gig was up. With regard to the present situation in the Ukraine war, the parallel is that it is perhaps not necessary to change the heart of the ordinary Russian on the street. But finding a way to turn the low-and middle management of the Russian state and power apparatus against Putin could be it. For the avoidance of doubt, the individual sanctions against top oligarchs will not work, too simplistic and too restricted, we are not talking about turning a few selected people against Putin, but a whole group. I actually have no idea how to achieve this.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Provided that 1) the political decision to supply the Ukraine is still in force (if I am getting too optimistic about this, I remind myself of the time, when the US Wilson's administration was fundamental in setting up the League of Nations and then the next administration declined to join); 2) the Ukrainians themselves do not throw in the towel. 
In broadest of terms, the Russians have at least 3 ways to win this war: (1) political victory in the US; (2) political victory in Europe; (3) military victory in the Ukraine (UKR morale collapse & suing for peace included here, as it would be a consequence of military losses most likely). They will be working hard on all these fields simultaneously.

Provided that 1) the political decision to supply the Ukraine is still in force (if I am getting too optimistic about this, I remind myself of the time, when the US Wilson's administration was fundamental in setting up the League of Nations and then the next administration declined to join); 2) the Ukrainians themselves do not throw in the towel. 
In broadest of terms, the Russians have at least 3 ways to win this war: (1) political victory in the US; (2) political victory in Europe; (3) military victory in the Ukraine (UKR morale collapse & suing for peace included here, as it would be a consequence of military losses most likely). They will be working hard on all these fields simultaneously.

I am deeply dismayed that the US is not currently organising a round-the-clock airlift delivering CIA agents from all bull**** posts in the US and worldwide directly to Georgia and Armenia. Hell, Special Forces too. This is a golden opportunity to open a second front, such as the Russians were doing all over Africa and Middle East (I am firmly convinced that Hamas attacks in October 2023 were inspired by Russians). A lot of Georgians are actually up for it, I don't think the pro Russian party is that overwhelmingly strong.
In particular, Russia has a ready reserve pool of hundreds of thousands of people employed in their various security forces and even regular army units stationed in the Caucasus, Siberia, etc. They can redirect them to the army in the Ukraine basically at will. Except if those security units are actually engaged where they are currently stationed in actual security tasks....

I am deeply dismayed that the US is not currently organising a round-the-clock airlift delivering CIA agents from all bull**** posts in the US and worldwide directly to Georgia and Armenia. Hell, Special Forces too. This is a golden opportunity to open a second front, such as the Russians were doing all over Africa and Middle East (I am firmly convinced that Hamas attacks in October 2023 were inspired by Russians). A lot of Georgians are actually up for it, I don't think the pro Russian party is that overwhelmingly strong.
In particular, Russia has a ready reserve pool of hundreds of thousands of people employed in their various security forces and even regular army units stationed in the Caucasus, Siberia, etc. They can redirect them to the army in the Ukraine basically at will. Except if those security units are actually engaged where they are currently stationed in actual security tasks....

Provided that 1) the political decision to supply the Ukraine is still in force (if I am getting too optimistic about this, I remind myself of the time, when the US Wilson's administration was fundamental in setting up the League of Nations and then the next administration declined to join); 2) the Ukrainians themselves do not throw in the towel. 
In broadest of terms, the Russians have at least 3 ways to win this war: (1) political victory in the US; (2) political victory in Europe; (3) military victory in the Ukraine (UKR morale collapse & suing for peace included here, as it would be a consequence of military losses most likely). They will be working hard on all these fields simultaneously.

I am deeply dismayed that the US is not currently organising a round-the-clock airlift delivering CIA agents from all bull**** posts in the US and worldwide directly to Georgia and Armenia. Hell, Special Forces too. This is a golden opportunity to open a second front, such as the Russians were doing all over Africa and Middle East (I am firmly convinced that Hamas attacks in October 2023 were inspired by Russians). A lot of Georgians are actually up for it, I don't think the pro Russian party is that overwhelmingly strong.
In particular, Russia has a ready reserve pool of hundreds of thousands of people employed in their various security forces and even regular army units stationed in the Caucasus, Siberia, etc. They can redirect them to the army in the Ukraine basically at will. Except if those security units are actually engaged where they are currently stationed in actual security tasks....

I am deeply dismayed that the US is not currently organising a round-the-clock airlift delivering CIA agents from all bull**** posts in the US and worldwide directly to Georgia and Armenia. Hell, Special Forces too. This is a golden opportunity to open a second front, such as the Russians were doing all over Africa and Middle East (I am firmly convinced that Hamas attacks in October 2023 were inspired by Russians). A lot of Georgians are actually up for it, I don't think the pro Russian party is that overwhelmingly strong.
In particular, Russia has a ready reserve pool of hundreds of thousands of people employed in their various security forces and even regular army units stationed in the Caucasus, Siberia, etc. They can redirect them to the army in the Ukraine basically at will. Except if those security units are actually engaged where they are currently stationed in actual security tasks....