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I get my books from a private party. Send me a PM on ACG. I found the book listed here: http://www.labirint.ru/books/275336/ I have some other books in the series (1418 days), which is excellent. Regards

Anyone read Russian? Goncharov's book ОПЕРАЦИЯ «БАГРАТИОН» (ISBN 978-5-9533-5544-5) has tons of information on the battlefield(s), opposing forces, and the course of the operation. Regards Scott Fraser

I suspect the German side was/is more popular because for decades, we never got the Soviet side. We got the American history and the German history and were told that everything the Soviets had or did was crap — they were the enemy. That's changed today. The more one knows about the Eastern Front (even the term is German) the more evident it is that the Soviets pulled a rabbit out of their hat to defeat the Germans by 1945. How they won is more interesting than how the Germans lost. Regards Scott Fraser

Well said. Regards Scott Fraser

I found I had to log in to Google to see the images. Regards Scott Fraser

Greetings. BTW, I found another photo ( a fourth) of Lukin's tank, too late for Charles' book, but useful nonetheless. See you there. Regards Scott Fraser

That's a thing of the past. During the Soviet era, L-L was denigrated or dismissed as unimportant. More recently, there has been considerable research into Soviet archives and "revisionist" historians have done much to put L-L in its proper perspective. Today there are quite a few Russian books on Lend-Lease that detail the equipment that was provided, how it was deployed, and assessments of its impact. No big deal. Internet forums are like that. My own opinion is that it had nothing to do with disregard for casualties but rather that it was simply deemed necessary to concentrate limited resources on the production of tanks, before trucks, locomotives, etc. That much is on the record, and evident in procurement policy. The decision was taken in 1941, at a time when Soviet industry had virtually collapsed. If that meant infantry rode tanks instead of trucks, then so be it. It was necessary to win the war, and in that, it succeeded. As for the rest, I don't know what resources are at your disposal and so should not comment. I do know there is a constant stream of material coming out of Russia and that it takes effort, experience and language skills to stay on top of it. I follow that, collect some of it, and as I said before, I can suggest a number of (Russian) titles that may help to fill in details regarding specific equipment or operations, whatever the case may be. The offer stands. Regards Scott Fraser

Much depends on the timeframe. Soviet combat units did have limited organic transport, but generally, motor transport was organized into independent Transport Brigades which were seconded to combat units as the need arose. The Red Army was chronically short of tractors, so most of the effort went into moving guns and supplies. Once they reached the Front, infantry walked, as they did pretty much everywhere. Nonsense. That's like saying GIs were so soft they had to have trucks to ride around in. More to the point, it speaks to how the Soviets chose to utilize their limited industrial resources. The automobile industry was put to work building tanks, first T-60 and T-70s and later the ubiquitous SU-76. They still continued to produce trucks, but in smaller numbers. Many of these ended up in Guards Mortar (Katiusha) regiments, either as weapons platforms or as ammunition carriers, as did many L-L trucks. American vehicles of any description were extremely rare before 1944. About 3000 M3A1 Scout Cars were received. As in other armies, they were used primarily in reconnaissance units and as staff vehicles. It was not uncommon to see them hauling 57mm AT guns. Of the 1200 halftracks received, most were used to haul artillery, particularly the 76mm ZiS-3, 85mm 52K AA gun and 100mm BS-3 AT gun. It's not hard to know how they were utilized, if you know where to look. There has been considerable investigation into the workings of the wartime Red Army in recent years. It is no longer enough to make assumptions and justify them on the basis of "there are no records" because there ARE records, copious records, that spell it all out. I can suggest several books on the topic to whoever it is on your research staff who reads Russian. Regards Scott Fraser

That's the most sensible statement posted here. The tanks and airplanes get the headlines, but the most significant contribution Lend-Lease made was to Soviet industry, through provision of scarce metals, additives and chemicals, as well as the transfer of technology in refining, metallurgy, and with machine tools, etc. To put it another way: the fact that Lend-Lease made it possible for Soviet industry to build more Soviet equipment, of better quality, was more important than the American equipment that was sent. As for whether it was decisive? Certainly not, except in the American history of the war. Lend-Lease has been heavily politicized since the start of the Cold War, and it remains so in western histories. Contemporary Russian historians are at least a decade ahead of western historians in revisiting the history of the German-Soviet War and more recent Russian publications put Lend-Lease in a much more appropriate context. Lend-Lease allowed the Soviets to focus their production on critical sectors, to the exclusion of items that could be shopped from abroad. That meant more tanks and aircraft, Soviet tanks and aircraft, every one of which was needed for victory. Lend-Lease shortened the war my a year, perhaps two, saving millions of Soviet AND AMERICAN (and British) lives. It was selfish altruism, of the best kind. More to the point, the aid received from the USA, which was most of it, did not start to arrive until 1943. Many historians, including myself, will insist that whatever slim chance Germany had of defeating the Soviet Union was gone after 1941. German victory depended on destroying the Red Army AND toppling the regime within a few weeks of the invasion. Barbarossa failed to achieve those objectives. From that point, it was only a matter of time before the USSR, with the advantages of geography, population and industry, came back to rally, rebuild and drive the Nazis back to Germany. Lend-Lease made it possible for that to happen in 1945. Without Lend-Lease, it would still have happened. Regards Scott Fraser

My bad. The forum software makes linking difficult. Regards Scott Fraser

You might also enjoy this: Tomb of the Panzerwaffe. The authors are both highly regarded among contemporary Russian historians. I have many of their books in Russian, including this one. Regards Scott Fraser

Anyone serious about reading Russian military books is well advised to get hold of the Alford dictionaries, two volumes: http://www.amazon.com/Russian-English-Scientific-Technical-Dictionary-Volumes/dp/0080122272/ref=sr_1_13?ie=UTF8&qid=1393347446&sr=8-13&keywords=alford+dictionary There are military terms as well as vocabulary from many other disciplines. Regards Scott Fraser

Try anad find V.L.Goncharov's book on Bagration ISBN 978-5-9533-5544-5 It is in Russian, but is an excellent single-volume source on Bagration. I don't know where 1gv.msd was fighting --- information that would help -- but there is info in it on 1gv.sd as part of 11 Gv Army, 3rd Belorussian Front. Regards Scott Fraser

His book on German weapons is online. http://lib.rus.ec/b/347378/read#t15 Enjoy Scott Fraser

It has way too much detail, like reading actuarial data. Losses are listed for both civilian and military casualties, broken out by cause and age and so on. There are lots of tables. Here's a link to his follow-on book, which is expanded to cover Soviet/Russian loses in the XX Century. You will be able to see what I mean. http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/poteri.txt#w06.htm-_Toc536603358 Regards Scott Fraser

I think it unlikely. I know from working alongside them that the Soviets were meticulous in maintaining their paperwork, something deeply rooted in their system. At this point, there has been enough time for their records to be thoroughly investigated, as is the case with the ground forces. My own area of interest is Soviet armour, so I haven't kept up with the literature regarding aviation, but from what I have seen, VVS archives have been explored as thoroughly as have those of the Active Army. Anything as controversial as the clandestine use of P-63s would be public now. There have been more embarrassing revelations. No, but that's deliberate. Not just anyone gets to go into government archives anywhere. It's the same with Kubinka, which is a museum but also an active military base. There is a process, but legitimate researchers can get through the red tape. Regards Scott Fraser

Soviet losses are documented in Krivosheev's book Великая Отечественная без грифа секретности. Книга потерь, which has just been republished. There is lots of detail. It may be online, too. It has become a standard reference on the Red Army. http://www.ozon.ru/context/detail/id/25614968/ Regards Scott Fraser

A canny developer would integrate an air sim into the ground sim. Nowadays games are played online by 'clans', so why not put a dozen 'pilots' together with a dozen 'tankers'? Regards Scott Fraser

AFAIK, the best single (English) source on the VVS is still Von Hardesty's Red Phoenix (Smithsonian, 1982), which has recently been updated and reprinted as Red Phoenix Rising (Uof Kansas). I haven't read it in a while, but there is some information in there on the development of VVS close-support tactics. http://www.amazon.com/Red-Phoenix-Rising-Soviet-Studies/dp/0700618287 Regards Scott Fraser

There are many cases of airmen claiming to shoot down aircraft that were not in theatre. One of the most famous is Finnish ace Oiva Tuominen, who claimed to have shot down a Soviet Spitfire when there wasn't a Spitfire within a thousand miles. P-63s were kept in reserve until spring 1945, when they were assigned to VVS-PVO (Anti-aircraft Defense) regiments, along with Spitfire Mk.IXe and the La-7. Like the Soviet Spitfires delivered in 1944, they never saw combat. The first unit to receive them was 28 IAP VVs-PVO stationed at Vnukovo, outside Moscow. Other units to receive the aircraft were 39 IAP, 17 IAP and 21 IAP, all PVO units. Apart from that, they were used to reequip the 12 Air Army in the Far East, based at Choibalsan and later Ulan-Ude. The only combat recorded was on August 15, when two aircraft of the 117 IAP (190 IAD) downed a Ki.27 and Ki.43. Talk of the P-63 being "secretly" used against the Germans is just that --- talk. There are no "secrets" anymore. Such use could not be conducted without the sanction of VVS headquarters, which means a paper trail, nor could it continue without logistics, which would involve another paper trail. There is no paper trail. The archives have been open for twenty years. In that period, numerous researchers have been through the files and so far have not mentioned any such use. The circumstances are unusual enough that if it had happened, it would be known and written up loudly in recent Russian publication. So far, nothing. P-63 units: 17, 21, 28, 39, 781, 821, 888, 940 IAP VVS-PVO and 6 IAP VVS-VMF (Pacific Fleet). Regards Scott Fraser

The rounds available for the ZIS-3 were: UOF-354M (УОФ-354М) - steel HE fragmentation round OF-350; 6.2kg, 680m/s, direct range 820m, (indirect 13,290m). OU-354AM (УО-354АМ) - cast iron HE fragmentation round O-350A UBR-354A (УБР-354А) - a/p tracer round BR-350A; 6.5 kg, 655 m/s, eff. range 780m. UBR-354B (УБР-354Б) - a/p tracer round BR-350B UBR-354P (УБР-354П) - sub-caliber HVAPDS a/p tracer round BP-354P (arrowhead form); 3.2 kg, 950m/s, eff. range 940m. UBR-354N (УБР-354Н) - sub-caliber HVAPDS a/p tracer round BR-354N (aerodynamic form) UBR-354 (УБР-354) - a/ tracer round BR-354 (improved armour-piercing) UD-354 (УД-354) - smoke round ROF: to 25 shots/minute. There are tables in Shirokorad's book for effective distances and thickness of armour. Suffice to say, there are also many photos of Panthers and Tigers with holes in the side and turret from the ZIS-3. There are also photos of holes caused by the 57mm ZIS-2, which had better a/p characteristics than the F-34 of the T-34-76. Effective range against the side or turret of a Tiger I was 500m for the 57mm, 800m for the 76mm. The bottom line is that the Red Army had tens of thousands of guns that were capable of taking out German tanks, even the Panther and Tiger. It is wrong to think the only effective counter they had to the Panther and Tiger were the heavy assault guns. Regards Scott Fraser

Serviceability rates are what they are. Both the Germans and Soviets struggled with production quality at different times and in each case it had an adverse affect on their combat capabilities. Why are you defending the Panther? It was just another German tank, complete with its own set of strengths and weaknesses. What about production rates? In the beginning, they built more Pz.IV than Panthers, because they didn't build Panthers. By the end of the war, they were building more Panthers than Panzer IVs, by a small margin. So what? Now Panthers are the main enemy on the battlefield? I think not, since all the StuGs and JgPz. are also around. My point, you may recall, was that equipment on the battlefield did not necessarily mirror production, unless you assume 100% losses every time you build a division. That's not how it happened. By mid-1944, the Soviets were building more T-34-85s than T-34-76s, by a large margin, but there were still thousands of T-34-76s on the battlefield. ROFLMAO! No disrespect,, but any argument based on classifying tanks as "light", "medium" and "heavy" is specious. The definitions changed as the war went on and there is no common criteria in how they are labelled. Consider the IS-2, the Panther and the M26. They are each very close to the same size and weight. One is a "medium", one is a "heavy" and the last started out classed as a "heavy" and then became a "medium". Go figger. Exactly. In 1939, both the Pz.38 and Pz.35 were perfectly acceptable "medium" tanks, by the Wehrmacht definitions of the time, but by 1943 they lightweghts. The goalposts had changed, and they kept changing throughout the war. Making it more problematic, not everyone was using the same terms for various tanks. Where does a "cruiser" or "cavalry" tank fit in? My argument, you may recall, was that to focus on how awesome the Panther was ignores the reality of the situation vis-a-vis how well the Red Army was able to dispatch enemy armour, and vice versa. My point was that the ZIS-3 was a very capable weapon, and should not be ignored. There were thousands of them in Red Army regiments: organic, in AT brigades and on SU-76s, as well as the guns in T-34s and KV-1s. To think that only large-caliber guns mattered, that the Panther was the only German tank around, or that German infantry all rode in halftracks is pure fantasy. I suppose that's okay on a gaming forum, but I am an historian, and that's not how it was. For those who read Russian, seek out Shirokorad's opus on Soviet Artillery, Энциклопедия Отечественной Артиллерии ("Harvest", Minsk 2000) There are descriptions of each weapon as well as tables for performance with different ranges, angles and ammunition. Red Army made rather a science from studying holes in tanks, and the results are included. So is everything else you ever wanted to know about Russian artillery, 1400 pages. It is definitive. Regards Scott Fraser

One can only generalize. There is a timeline that runs through all of this. The composition of various armoured formations, both Soviet and German, was changing constantly to reflect operational experience. Production rates likewise changed throughout the period. Those theoretical numbers were affected by losses and production shortfalls, and more important, by serviceability rates. Anyway, by late 1944, the Germans had several tiers of formations, with different levels of equipment. The top-heavy equipment complement that Das Reich or Grossdeutschland enjoyed was hardly typical of the situation. As late as February 1945, an example, the 21 Pz.Div. was rebuilt per the 1944 tables, with two companies of Panthers and another two of Pz.IV, with seventeen tanks in each unit, plus a Flak.Pz troop. When the StuGs and tank destroyers of the infantry regiments accompanying the PzDiv are included, the percentage of Panthers drops off. The 76mm F-34 and ZIS-3 were still extremely effective weapons against the majority of AFVs it may engage, including the Panther and Tiger from the side or rear. That weapon was very common, both towed and mounted in the SU-76 or in tanks, and should not be discounted. That was my main point. I'm not suggesting that. The Panther was a dangerous opponent. It was as big as an IS-2, btw, not really a "Medium" tank like the Sherman or Pz.IV or T-34. It was feared by Allied tankers, much like the Tiger, so they had an impact greater, perhaps, than their numbers warrant. That is their legend. Anyway, to focus on "Panther vs T-34-85" denies the reality of the war. There were scads of lighter vehicles around, particularly with the Germans, who relied more and more on cheaper assault guns to replace tanks. Moreover, tanks are only the most glamorous element of ground warfare. Wars are still won by infantry. Regards Scott Fraser

Path of least resistance, and probably clamour from the marketing gurus. I'll wager that there will be a KURSK module, a STALINGRAD module and a BARBAROSSA module. I'll also wager that each will be another $60. Patience, grasshopper. Scott Fraser

I appreciate what you are saying, but Pz.Kpfw.IV / StuG IV / Jagd.Pz. IV production still exceeded Panther and Tiger production right up to May 1945. Moreover the complement of individual units did not necessarily reflect production ratios. Strength returns from different units varied widely. The essential point is that the notion that the Panzertruppen were mainly equipped with Panthers and Tigers is a myth --- the most numerous vehicles right up to the end of the war remained the StuG/Jagd.Pz IV and Pz.Kpfw.IV. Regards Scott Fraser