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I posted this above: The link goes to an interesting article discussing the famine in detail. In one paragraph, it lists the amount of grain sent by the central authority to various regions of the Ukraine. Down the page, it states: Documents from Soviet archives indicate that the aid distribution was made selectively to the most affected areas, and during the spring months, such assistance was the goal of the relief effort. A special resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine for the Kiev Oblast, from March 31, 1933, ordered peasants to be hospitalized with either ailing or recovering patients. The resolution ordered improved nutrition within the limits of available resources so that they could be sent out into the fields to sow the new crop as soon as possible.[41] The food was dispensed according to special resolutions from government bodies, and additional food was given in the field where the laborers worked. Wiki is usually reliable, but everything on the internet must be taken with a grain of salt. However, if such documents exist, they would put things in a different light. In any case, the famines will always be controversial. Regards Scott Fraser

Note that I prefaced my remarks with "On the face of it..." At some levels, Collectivization made sense. That's not to say it was a good policy. Stalin was unabashedly against free enterprise. In the NEP, Lenin had relinquished the ban on private land holdings in belated recognition that without the profit incentive, productivity collapsed. One of the first things Stalin did was remove the ability of individuals to own land or small businesses. People who did so were labelled 'wreckers', 'saboteurs' and 'enemies of the State' and were persecuted ruthlessly. Stalin may have seen them as a threat to Soviet authority, since that was his typical response to threats, but either way, Stalin removed the limited opportunities for private enterprise that the NEP allowed. State capitalism became the norm. As for the famine, certainly Stalin did great damage to existing agriculture by persecuting the Kulaks, driving them from their land and amalgamating their holdings into vast Sovkhoz and Kolkhoz. The point I was trying to make is that the drought of 1932 and 1933 arrived in the immediate aftermath of this dislocation and destruction, and that it was the drought itself that made everything so much worse, driving the death toll into the millions. Stalin could not have anticipated that, despite the fervent belief by some that Stalin was the Devil incarnate and capable of anything — including, it would seem, controlling the weather. For that reason, I find it somewhat disingenuous to accuse Stalin of "deliberately murdering millions of Ukrainians". That rhetoric fits in well with the perceptions of the devout anti-Communists, but it is not an accurate description of events. Millions died, yes, but they died from a famine that was caused by a natural catastrophe, a global drought. The fact that this came on the heels of Collectivization made it many times worse, definitely, but the scale of the catastrophe was beyond anyone's ability to predict or to control. With that in mind, I don't think it accurate to accuse Stalin of "deliberately" murdering "millions" of Ukrainians. Make no mistake — I am not a "fan" of Stalin nor do I endorse much of what he did. Stalin will forever be an enigma, bit some things are still very clear. Stalin was a sociopath, ruthless and brutal, without a shred of compassion or mercy. He ruled with an iron fist, remote from others, in an atmosphere of paranoia where it was as dangerous to be his "friend" as it was his enemy. As great as his deeds may have been, his misdeeds were even greater, and history will remember him as one of the most vile tyrants of the last century. That much needs to be said. Regards Scott Fraser

I worked aboard deep-water Soviet trawlers between 1984 and 1989. The crew came from all over the Soyuz and there were a few who had experienced the war. Chernenko was GenSec at first, then Andropov briefly, then Gorbachev. There was a Commissar aboard, a political animal, not a fisherman, who watched over things and said his job was "morale". After Gorbachev, there was still a Commissar, but now he was a fisherman, not KGB, someone who could actually function as second in command. It was a very interesting period to observe. Regards Scott Fraser

The famine in the Ukraine during the 1930s is still very controversial. It became highly politicized in the years that followed, largely due to the work of Ukrainian expatriates who still exploit it ruthless in their anti-Soviet propaganda. Stalin, somehow, gets credit for the drought and resulting collapse of Soviet agriculture in 1932 and 1933 that led to so many deaths by starvation. What is forgotten, or skipped over, is that during 1932 and 1933 there was a global weather event that caused drought worldwide, and the resulting collapse of agriculture on a global basis. These are the years of the Dust Bowl in North America. If Stalin is to be blamed for the mass starvation of Ukrainians in those years, then the hundreds of thousands of Okies who fled to California to escape starvation must be collateral damage, eh? As always, the truth lies between the extremes. Collectivization was a ruthless policy that forced many from their homes, not just in the Ukraine, but all over the USSR. The consolidation of agricultural lands and introduction of mechanization began in earnest in 1930, when the regime started to forcibly expropriate grain from rural areas to feed the cities, which were mushrooming in size. Nearly two million 'kulaks' were sent into exile, including most of the successful farmers. The peasants pushed back, naturally, which led to widespread hoarding, an increase in the level of violence, a decrease in grain production, and general chaos in the agricultural sector. Many peasants simply refused to plant crops. This is the background to the 'Holodomor'. When the drought came 1932, agriculture collapsed completely. This was the start of the wave of famines that killed so many people throughout the USSR. It is wrong to think this affected only Ukrainians — that, again, is another part of Ukrainian propaganda. The famine affected everybody, including those in the cities, who had their rations reduced to a minimum. It is also wrong to think that the regime did nothing to alleviate the situation. In May 1932 there were 116.2 million tons of grain sent to the Ukraine, along with 700 tractors. There is another Wiki here on the Causes of the Holodomor where that is mentioned. Some observations: Stalin saw industrialization as the key to the USSR's future. There was no Soviet industry when Stalin gained power in 1928. Through the Five Year Plans, the USSR was dragged kicking and screaming into the Industrial Age, well enough, at least, to be able to repel Hitler by 1945. This is why the urban areas were of first importance in the decision-making process. On the face of it, Collectivization made sense. The land was distributed among many small holdings, discontinuous parcels of land that made the use of machinery impossibly expensive and inefficient. By consolidating holdings, it would be possible to use machinery and institute "industrial farming". This fit in well with another Soviet icon, the tractor. The USSR had finally started building tractors in 1930, and they wanted to use them. That said, the implementation of Collectivization was brutal and ruthless, criminal, for lack of a better word. It was typical of Stalin, who was always cold and calculating and scrupulous. That's on him, certainly. And that was what set the stage for the mass famines in 1932 and 1933, the years of drought. That's where the controversy lies. It is easy to indict Stalin for uprooting, exiling, and sometimes shooting the Kulaks. That's what set the stage by destroying the existing agricultural regime. It is more difficult to accuse him of "slaughtering millions" when the famine itself was the result of the same drought that hit Oklahoma. I think we must assume that the weather was beyond Stalin's control, which suggests that the scale of the disaster, thousands versus millions, was not within his control and hence, could not be part of his plan. In criminal law, the argument goes to intent and premeditation. You be the judge. As I said, there is still lots of controversy. Stalin will always be controversial. Regards Scott Fraser

It's worth noting that the principal contractor for the Soviet government was the NKVD. They would be doing the construction work, at the same time (!) as they were building new fortifications along the Molotov Line, building new airfields (complete with dispersal points, fuel bunkers, ammunition bunkers, AA emplacements, control towers, barracks, etc.), repairing bridges and roads, etc. The NKVD wore many hats. They were also the government's landlords, they formed the Customs and Border Guards, there were NKVD regiments and battalions that fought alongside regular Red Army troops, and of course ran the intelligence agencies, prisons, and death squads. That said, the NKVD, despite its reputation, was just like every other part of the Soviet bureaucracy — very slow, complex, tedious, woefully inefficient, compounded by overlapping jurisdictions and jurisdictional rivalries. The construction work was hampered by lack of supplies, equipment and manpower, irrational planning, contradictory orders, lengthy delays, and so on, so typical of the whole schmozzle. It's not a coincidence that the construction work along the western frontier was many months behind schedule in June 1941. Regards Scott Fraser

John, none of this is a revelation. In May 1941, Stalin ordered a general mobilization as well as the immediate expansion of the Red Army, which included expanding the draft, recalling forces from the Far East, and sending everybody west. The Red Army was swelling at a feverish rate, despite the fact there were few junior officers and almost no NCOs and not enough new tanks or aircraft. The level of training was abysmal, as was the state of repair. Either way, all this was headed west in June, with many units strung out for hundreds of kilometers along the railway line. That was typical of the shambles the whole Army was in. That was its purpose, its raison d'être, to absorb the attack and do as much damage as they could until help (the Second Echelon) arrived. The Second Echelon, or actually the Only Echelon, since the defensive force structure was so far from complete. In reality, the Second Echelon didn't exist except on paper. Here's a book by Roderic Braithwaite. He is a journalist who provides an interesting account of the situation following Barbarossa. His focus is on civilians, in large part, but he writes well. There was an atmosphere of tension in Moscow, many young people were joining up or being conscripted, so there is no doubt that the expectation of war was in the air. It's an interesting read. Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War Der Alte Fritz has the goods on the Soviet railway system. He has posted a lot of pertinent information on Armchair General in the RKKA Forum. I'll try and roust him to see what he has to say about Soviet rail capacity. It varied in different areas because of the trackage. Suffice to say that the railways were totally overwhelmed. Presumably you have an open mind. I think if you read either Glantz's or Gorodetsky's book, you will see how tenuous Suvorov's thesis is and understand how it collapses completely when compared to archival material, including orders, strength returns, requisitions, transport orders. etc. The proof is not there, and there would be stacks of documents if it were true. I have no doubt that Stalin became resolved to a war with Germany as early as May 1939, after the French and British did nothing when Hitler marched into Prague. But the timing is manifestly impossible for any attack in 1941, given the state of the Red Army. The leadership was aware of that state, although the severity was greatly underestimated, and they were urgently trying to get defenses in order. All of it makes sense, but only in a longer timeframe. Regards Scott Fraser Regards Scott Fraser

Here is the Wikipedia article. It was a major counterattack by the South Western Front at the end of June 1941. There were thousands of tanks involved, basically the entire strength of Army Group South versus the entire South-Western Front. The battle went on for days between Dubno and Brody along the axis of the German advance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Brody_%281941%29 Regards Scott Fraser

I had to laugh when I read this. I approve, and agree. It's almost like debating Rezunites. Regards Scott Fraser

Grow up, dude. History is about facts. Clearly you didn't bother to read the review of Murphy's book on History-Net, or you would know it was not "snark off an Amazon review" but an objective, if critical assessment by a reputable historian. There are many useful reviews there. Suvorov is old news. His claims have been refuted many times by Russian historians who have been through the archives. I have posted links to several Russian articles that are online, and have recommended two books that have been published by reputable Anglophone historians with far more credibility than either you or I can claim, including David Glantz, generally considered to be one of the most knowledgeable people in the world regarding the Red Army in the Second World War. If you truly believe Glantz is somehow a charlatan, I fear there is no hope for you. That said, this thread is about books. Suvorov is off-topic. Regards Scott Fraser

There's no reason to disbelieve him. There were certainly preparations to move the government to Kuybyshev, but Stalin stayed in Moscow. The Kremlin appointment logs make that clear. I've read that the Soviets tried to reach the Germans through the Swedes in the wake of Barbarossa and it went nowhere. IMHO, anything in 1942 would be disinformation. Once the USA was in the war, it was a fight to the finish. In one of the articles I linked, Stalin is quoted as saying in 1940 that there would eventually be a coalition with Great Britain and the USA that would crush Germany. Once Germany declared war on the USA, that coalition became a reality. I think that would completely remove any incentive to sue for peace. Compounding that, by 1942 the brutality of German occupation policy was known and it was already a fight to the death. Regards Scott Fraser

Stalin's speech to the Academy was significant in that it was the first time that Germany was publicly labeled a threat. Up to that point, Soviet propaganda had described Germany in positive terms. There was no timetable announced. The speech is consistent with Stalin's decision in March 1939 to prepare for war. That decision was premised on the four years it would take to get a new generation of tanks and aircraft into service and that takes us to 1943. There is no question that Stalin intended to attack Germany — the question is when. To answer that, the first place to look is the Red Army. The Soviet defensive strategy is a matter of record, a three-tiered defense in accordance with "deep battle", which included a counterattack and invasion of German-held territory if the Germans attacked. That's a big if. For the most part, RKKA deployment in 1941 is consistent with that strategy. It was assumed that a German attack would come in the south, toward Kiev and the Ukraine, so the Kiev OVO had priority in the delivery of new tanks. Elsewhere, tank brigades were driving worn out junk, some of it dating back to 1932. Mobilization had begun but was months away from completion. Tank production was increasing slowly and outside a few select units, neither the drivers nor mechanics had touched any of the new tanks. The Stalin Line had been abandoned, with the guns removed to use in the Molotov Line along the new border. The NKVD was the prime contractor for fortifications, airfields and other facilities. They were months behind schedule, particularly with airfields, which contributed to the wholesale destruction of aircraft on the ground in June. The troops were new conscripts, there were not enough NCOs, there was no fuel or ammunition allocated for training — it is indescribable how scrambled and incomplete everything was in 1941. Many of the units had only partially arrived, with their weapons or tools strung out for hundreds of kilometers along the railway line. The more you read about it, the worse it gets. All in all, it simply boggles the mind. The Germans could not have attacked at a better time. The reality is that the Red Army was so dysfunctional in 1941 that they could barely conduct defensive operations against the Germans. Launching a general attack was impossible. The only place where they were not overrun immediately was in the south, where Kirponos had the tanks and took the initiative to mount a spirited defense against the Germans, briefly, until they were overwhelmed by events. Kirponos was dead by then. It's a good story. Recall that there was an enormous volume of trade between Germany and the USSR. Both Stalin and Hitler relied on it. There is nothing sinister about improving the transportation infrastructure, on either side of the border. The Stalin Line was obsolete, overtaken by events. The border had moved west hundreds of kilometers. There was no point in keeping the guns there when they were needed for the Molotov Line. Common sense. There were many generals who can be skewered for their performance in June 1941. Some of them were even shot. The overall level of competence was abysmal, generally, which is just one more manifestation of the half-baked state of the Red Army. Suvorov tends to make mountains out of molehills, but it's all a matter of context. It is still not a realistic scenario. After you finish Suvorov, check out Gorodetsky's Grand Delusion. He is much more readable than Glantz (Stumbling Colossus) and offers a different point of view. Regards Scott Fraser

Here is a better link. I have consolidated the tables so they are easier to find. It is an HTML document, so online translators can be used to determine the content. http://moto.hobby-site.com/junk/tables-all.html Regards Scott Fraser

Near Dubno and Brody, June 1941, when Army Group South clashed with the tanks of the Kiev Special Military District. Regards Scott Fraser

Why is that, Jason? Because I don't subscribe to the Cold War version of history? Is it because I believe Suvorov is a charlatan? Or is it because I discount the book you recommend after reading a critical review that concludes the author is making things up? I read Russian and German. I learned both languages so I could use Russian and German documents when I research the war between the Russians and Germans. That way I don't have to rely on interpreters and spin doctors and can draw my own conclusions from the historical record. As far as I'm concerned, that is a much better modus operandum than relying on the suppositions of some spook halfway around the world. By the same token, I am also skeptical when I read books on the Nazi-Soviet War written by people who do not have those language skills. That is not to say they are wrong, but they are not as close to the truth as those who do have those skills. It's all about proximity, Jason. When the people in the trenches (the Russians) are reporting something different from what we (Anglophones) were taught thirty years ago, it is worth taking note. As it transpires, what we have been told differs from what the Russians are discovering after poring over old documents, significantly, in some respects. It is certainly food for thought, and sometimes it puts events in a completely different light. Is it revisionism? Sure, but history is a living thing, and it is changing constantly as we discover new facts and form more conclusions. Every grad student writing a dissertation is trying to bring new insights to an old story. Revisionism is the norm. Eventually the new Russian history will be absorbed and incorporated into our own history, but that will be decades from now. For the moment, all we have is the collective work of David Glantz. Regards Scott Fraser

Maybe in the hope that some people can read Russian? Some people do. The people who know the most about the Red Army are the Russians. The links are to articles by prominent Russian historians who challenge Suvorov, for one reason or another, after reviewing the documents held in TsAMO and other archives. Suvorov's allegations sparked considerable debate in Russia, with the result that people went looking to see what proof there might be among documents of the time. These articles are part of the result. They are there for anyone who can read them. Regards Scott Fraser