Eddy

Latest preliminary lessons from RUSI. Haven't read it yet but appears to about the intelligence and unconventional war
Preliminary Lessons from Russia's Unconventional Operations During the Russo-Ukrainian War, February 2022-February 2023 (rusi.org)

Speaking of negotiation options and culmination, I found this one of the better blog posts out there on the topic.
 
https://samf.substack.com/p/still-bakhmut?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
 

This ties in a bit with this good article I read (  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putins-forever-war : free to read) concerning with how Putin is attempting to make this appear as an existential as one of his strategies to keep the war going.
The article itself is looking at the war from Putin's perspective as an authoritarian leader and argues it is in his interests to keep the war going. The arguments made will be nothing new to anyone who has read all of the 2,224 pages (jeez - TWO THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOUR!!!!!!) of this thread but I found it helpful to see them laid out in one place and have them backed up by academic research.
Well worth the read IMHO. 
Spoiler: The conclusion is send more and better weapons to Ukraine btw.

This ties in a bit with this good article I read (  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putins-forever-war : free to read) concerning with how Putin is attempting to make this appear as an existential as one of his strategies to keep the war going.
The article itself is looking at the war from Putin's perspective as an authoritarian leader and argues it is in his interests to keep the war going. The arguments made will be nothing new to anyone who has read all of the 2,224 pages (jeez - TWO THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOUR!!!!!!) of this thread but I found it helpful to see them laid out in one place and have them backed up by academic research.
Well worth the read IMHO. 
Spoiler: The conclusion is send more and better weapons to Ukraine btw.

This ties in a bit with this good article I read (  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putins-forever-war : free to read) concerning with how Putin is attempting to make this appear as an existential as one of his strategies to keep the war going.
The article itself is looking at the war from Putin's perspective as an authoritarian leader and argues it is in his interests to keep the war going. The arguments made will be nothing new to anyone who has read all of the 2,224 pages (jeez - TWO THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOUR!!!!!!) of this thread but I found it helpful to see them laid out in one place and have them backed up by academic research.
Well worth the read IMHO. 
Spoiler: The conclusion is send more and better weapons to Ukraine btw.

This ties in a bit with this good article I read (  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putins-forever-war : free to read) concerning with how Putin is attempting to make this appear as an existential as one of his strategies to keep the war going.
The article itself is looking at the war from Putin's perspective as an authoritarian leader and argues it is in his interests to keep the war going. The arguments made will be nothing new to anyone who has read all of the 2,224 pages (jeez - TWO THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOUR!!!!!!) of this thread but I found it helpful to see them laid out in one place and have them backed up by academic research.
Well worth the read IMHO. 
Spoiler: The conclusion is send more and better weapons to Ukraine btw.

This ties in a bit with this good article I read (  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putins-forever-war : free to read) concerning with how Putin is attempting to make this appear as an existential as one of his strategies to keep the war going.
The article itself is looking at the war from Putin's perspective as an authoritarian leader and argues it is in his interests to keep the war going. The arguments made will be nothing new to anyone who has read all of the 2,224 pages (jeez - TWO THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOUR!!!!!!) of this thread but I found it helpful to see them laid out in one place and have them backed up by academic research.
Well worth the read IMHO. 
Spoiler: The conclusion is send more and better weapons to Ukraine btw.

Don't think this has been posted before:
Indian Air Force not getting any delivery of S400s this year. Could be because they are being allocated to Ukraine. Or it could be that the Russians are having trouble producing them because of sanctions.
 
I know this has happened in previous wars (IIRC Royal Navy requisitioned a few battlecruisers in FWW for example) but it's probably worth keeping an eye on this to see if there are more instances of this occurring as it may point to production issues.
A little bit more here: https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/mar/23/russia-ukraine-war-live-bakhmut-offensive-slowing-says-us-thinktank-eu-leaders-gather-for-summit?page=with:block-641c5a358f0893440cc9fd74#block-641c5a358f0893440cc9fd74
 

Found this BBC article: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-65012606 Relevant excerpt:
China's President Xi Jinping says the killers of nine Chinese goldmine workers in the Central African Republic (CAR) must be "severely" punished.
Two Chinese workers were also wounded when gunmen stormed a mining site near the central town of Bambari on Sunday.
The local mayor blamed a rebel group for the killings.
But the rebels said Russian mercenaries from the Wagner group were behind the attack.
The Wagner group has not yet commented on the claim.
Its fighters are widely reported to have been deployed to mineral-rich CAR to help government forces defeat the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), an alliance of rebel groups.
So looks like Wagner and CPC are on opposite sides, and both sides are trying to blame the other for the attack.

Article in The Economist backing up what has been said here about the cultural conflict within the AFU between the Soviet-style rigid, sequential, top down thinking and the 'mission command' thinking (I think it's free to read) 
Ukraine’s army must shed its Soviet legacy, says a military expert | The Economist
Interestingly, the author states that in some cases modern technology is hindering, rather than enabling the mission command conducting of operations as the higher ups use the battle information to micro manage the lower echelons. Also states that some junior officers have started to ignore orders from above.    

Put it this way, I wouldn't google it at work!

Put it this way, I wouldn't google it at work!

HR would ever believe you...

Put it this way, I wouldn't google it at work!

This from a Guardian reporter. Could be about right, could be inflated. Time will tell. Would explain why Ukr have decided to stay there tho.

I believe they are launched from Sicily. At least whenever I've looked on Flight Radar that's where they came from. Haven't checked in months though

Kofman gave a talk with a few PowerPoint slides looking back at why the Russian invasion plan failed. It was for a Canadian security conference. I find this to be fairly coherent presentation in which he doesn't try to predict the future.  The first part is a long introduction of Kofman, which I skipped. It was uploaded 3 days ago but I don't know when the conference occurred.
 

Let's talk about the Russian economy. The following are notes from an interview with RU economist Milov. This is the point of view of the RU Liberals, but it is backed up by proof.
 

While I'm here, the Russian economy is literally dying. Due to skyrocketing prices and their reserve fund, they were able to weather the initial storm until Mobilization. But, with mobilization and the implementation of price caps, the RU economy became a sick man with no hope of recovery. Most likely forever.
I'll provide some notes on the health of the Russian economy soon.

A response from Mick Ryan regarding the reports of the Russians modifying their assault tactics
Basically, he's comparing it to the German Stormtroopers of 1918 and positing that without changes to the operational level it won't make that much of a big picture difference. If there is no capability to exploit, then 'chopping a hole' as Ludendorff called it will lead to nothing. And he doubts that RA will be able to create the capability as it's not just equipment that would be needed, but training, changes to doctrine etc, etc. which is difficult at the best of times, let alone in a war. And of course the Ukrainian have a say as well.

I read Aimee Fox's book after hearing her speak at a Western Front Association meeting and found it similarly recalled to mind during current events; in the context of just how hard it is to change your doctrine on the fly during a shooting war.  It's also worth noting that, in the end, the BEF and French armies pretty much gave up on trying to bring about deep strategic breakthroughs, recognising that logistics and technology didn't permit them. They got their late war results by breaking into the defences while staying within their own artillery range  and leaving the Germans the options of retreating or making a costly counter-attack. I don't think the Russians have the capability even  to do the break in bit. I suspect their operational art has regressed to about 1915.

Good point. I hadn't even considered the strategic level as I don't think the RA will be able to do the learning at the operational level. Not necessarily because 'Russia sux' but because it is so difficult to do, especially while fighting a war. 
I recently re-read Dr Aimee Fox's Learning to Fight about how the British & Dominion armies went about learning in the FWW and the complexities of it - vertical vs horizontal, formal vs informal, Western front vs other fronts, exercise vs pamphlet etc. They had to try to overcome pre-war prejudices, snobbery between fronts (Western Front thought they had nothing to learn from other fronts), snobbery from British towards Canadian and Australian, traditional vs modern, learning the wrong lessons etc. They just about managed it but it took four years. And despite what can be garnered from Blackadder, those armies were open-minded, keen to learn organisations (well most of them). 
The long and short of it, I got from that book that learning on the job in a war is bloody difficult and complex. 

A response from Mick Ryan regarding the reports of the Russians modifying their assault tactics
Basically, he's comparing it to the German Stormtroopers of 1918 and positing that without changes to the operational level it won't make that much of a big picture difference. If there is no capability to exploit, then 'chopping a hole' as Ludendorff called it will lead to nothing. And he doubts that RA will be able to create the capability as it's not just equipment that would be needed, but training, changes to doctrine etc, etc. which is difficult at the best of times, let alone in a war. And of course the Ukrainian have a say as well.

This is correct. It took the widespread integration of vehicles with the internal combustion engine to exploit tactical gaps in the Allied lines. Not ready in WW1. But in WW2, they brought German troops and supplies forward to critical points faster than the enemy could by foot, rail or horse. This is one key component of 'blitzkrieg". However, this could be defeated by strategic depth even by less mobile forces like the Soviets in 41-42. So even if the RA today can modify its tactics, it still has to maintain momentum into the strategic depth of sector they intend to capture. Fortunately, the RA lack the logistic robustness to do so and Ukraine has plenty of strategic depth to utilize in parrying offensives should they breakthrough.