OBJ

To be fair, it is objectively difficult to distinguish between a Russian airfield and a construction waste dump.

Still waiting for a coherent explanation of what is happening.
 

Another interesting article haven't seen posted here yet. 
US weapons exports up 50 percent in 2023 as Washington challenges Russia, China
"The Russian defense industry is failing and continues to fail," said a top State Department official.
Read in POLITICO: https://apple.news/AcumTh4SiRpmY0NrPqH7meA

The world's war colleges are busy analyzing what's going on in Ukraine and writing about practices that will shape future CM level battles.
Link to US Army War College
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/
USAWC has a Russia-Ukraine War Study Project
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/5/
The first output I could find is linked below, Ukraine War experience relative to Recon-Strike-Complexes (RSCs), integrated AI, distributed ISR, deep strike attrition of enemy RSC to enable effective concentration of mass, and integrating relevant UAS ISR lessons from Ukraine, for near future major power conventional war. Multiple forum members individually have already some of these points.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/9/
'Implications for the US Army' starts at the bottom of page 31. - The lead para is on what is judged unique to Ukraine
"While the Russia-Ukraine War is an illustrative case, it is unique  in many respects. Both sides derive their doctrine from similar sources and  employ similar or identical weapons. Neither side can break the other’s  integrated air defense network—Ukraine for lack of modern airframes, Russia for lack of enough precision-guided munitions—meaning deep strike is primarily a missile-based phenomenon. Russia and Ukraine also field  armies with far less overall experience than anticipated before the war,  having gone through several rounds of mobilization, making logistical and command centralization all the more appealing and strikes against logistics and C2 nodes more fruitful. Russia has refused to deploy  kinetic anti-satellite interceptors, nor is there much available in the open source about satellite jamming, an undeniably relevant factor in future wars. Ukraine and Russia both defend some of the world’s most extensive ground fortifications—in the Ukrainian case, built over years of positional conflict in the Donbas. The US Army should not plan to fight the last war, let alone a war it has not actively fought."
The last two sentences are worth a repeat. Presumably the same would apply to US allies, some of whom experienced enemy attacks on their territory in the last super power conflict (WWII), some of which did not.
"The United States is unlikely to face an adversary it can defeat absent some consideration of strikes on its territory, at least if it hopes to win on a timescale more closely approximating months or years than a decade.  Two equally sophisticated RSCs, then, can increase the likelihood of mutual territorial strikes and the potential for escalation."

Maybe, your thoughts on the comparison between the machine learning data base set for high intensity major power conflict targeting vs that for driverless vehicles?

I lead a complicated life.

Have western militaries decided to do this? I agree machine learning is amazing compared to human, no comparison really, but, fast is too late if implementation comes after need.
How long for humans to assemble, vet and configure the data sets to be used to train offensive military AI?
If AI creators can't explain how their creations work, how long to build human confidence, at least in the west, in offensive military AI before going beyond proto types? After that, how long for fully integrated fielding?
Maybe just simple instantiation but guessing offensive AI will be used on multiple platforms, and uses, i.e. single vs swarm, so need for some platform specific customization - Key Dan and concerns about those perfidious DoD contractors.
and I'm sorry, when I said training, I was thinking more of training the initial set of people in the military organizations that will need to perform all the tasks associated with autonomous offensive military AI operations, everything from commanding units employing offensive AI assets, to updating learning data sets, to software versions, to writing operations and support doctrine, to assigning missions, to ISR networking, to BDA, to rearming, to repair and maintenance for the reusable platforms, etc, etc.
 
Did you know in the first naval night battle off Guadalcanal 8-9 Aug 1942, some of the US ships had radar (the Japanese did not but did have superb night training and optics), but the commanders didn't know how to use it and discounted it's value? Many factors but still result, major allied defeat.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Savo_Island
As late as Nov 1942 US Navy task force commanding admirals placed the ships with the most capable radars at the rear of their formation rather than the van. Many factors but result, major allied defeat.
https://usnhistory.navylive.dodlive.mil/Recent/Article-View/Article/3207198/radio-over-radar-night-fighting-chaos-at-guadalcanal-12-13-november-1942/
Fun fact - The US Navy actually had more sailors killed in the naval battles off Guadalcanal than the marines did on Guadalcanal.
 
Realizing the full potential of new military technology takes time, best not to be figuring out how the dang thing works when you're getting shot at.

I think it's a great question.
Just me but I think fully integrated drone warfare is about where tank and anti-tank development were in 1916 on the western front, or the airplane as @The_Capt pointed out. We also have to account for the limited and unique nature of the war in Ukraine relative to super power conventional war. 
To me from a future technical and tactical practice perspective, Ukraine is more like Spain 1936-39.

Getting into part of what I do for a living here and actually, the job driverless car sensors and software must handle is literally the opposite of an autonomous suicide drone. The former must navigate every highly complex driven environment and avoid hitting anything. An autonomous suicide drone can be geofenced and must just hit the likeliest right thing most of the time. It's an order of magnitude easier. 

If you look at this video around the four minute mark, the tech to do rather good target ID discrimination at the approximate range and viewpoint of a drone already exists. And it has for a while. The Pentagon dodged the whole autonomy issue on this by saying the man in loop level was handled at the decision to drop the whole bomb. It is now completely practical give every submunition its own custom quadcopter ride. What I am trying say is that the military effectiveness of giving said quadcopters a kill box and a set of targeting priorities is going to be at least an order order of magnitude more effective than making each of them phone home for permission in a high EW environment. I am just saying a we should apply a bit of realism now, and not after we have gotten a couple of heavy Brigades cut into little tiny pieces. At which point we will do it in a panic, badly.

Agree, and the only serious reading I did on it was:
https://www.amazon.com/Spanish-Civil-War-Hugh-Thomas/dp/B002ADRJB8
It is a heavy read.
The one thing that stuck with me was the Luftwaffe's affirmation/refinement of their fighter tactics, finger four flight, two plane elements, lead and wingman, loose formation, shooter and defender, which hurt the Allies when they were still flying in close formation three plane 'Vics' with the wingmen out of necessity focused on not running into the lead.
Of course I also read 'For whom the Bell Tolls' but did not take away a lot of tactical insights from that one

Glad you liked it.  
Gotta agree, although interested in your references, and if you say you have to kill me to tell me...  
Below is what I got from a quick look. For those that are interested:
1. May 22
Moskva's location provided
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61343044
2. June 23
but the link in this section is to NYTs early war article (Mar-May 22) on providing location of Russian Generals.
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-russian-way-of-war-in-ukraine-a-military-approach-nine-decades-in-the-making/
"The Ukrainian Battlefield
Although not always portrayed as such, the war in Ukraine is, or at least has become, a peer conflict, largely because of the extent of Western and especially US support, providing Ukraine with significant amounts of advanced weapons systems—not to mention real-time battlefield intelligence to help identify Russian targets for Ukrainian long-range precision strikes. As a result, this is the first war in history in which both sides are capable of striking throughout the opponent’s tactical and operational depth with a high level of accuracy."
3. Oct 23
I can't find anything on current battlefield deep strike support, but CIA ties going back to 2014, direct intell support leading to string of assassinations in Russia, so hard not to believe UA deep strike being assisted, probably by multiple western intelligence agencies
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/23/ukraine-cia-shadow-war-russia/
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-russian-way-of-war-in-ukraine-a-military-approach-nine-decades-in-the-making/
Same article from 2. above, definitely supports decade of prior trending, actually claims related Russian military thinking from much earlier.
Fighting China directly might not be something the Canadian military is worrying about or preparing for. The US military is doing both.

What I am trying to say is maybe we shouldn't write a new set of rules that guarantee we lose the next war. Just as a first pass proposal. 

Always tricky to pick out the right lessons though, and even harder to do so if they contradict your existing doctrine. The then Chief of the Air Staff(CAS), Sir Cyril Newall, described the Luftwaffe's support of ground operations in Spain as a gross misuse of air-power!
To be fair to Newall he was subsequently CAS during the Battle of Britain so perhaps deserves some of Dowding and Park's reflected glory.
 

It seems that at least some Russians have come to similar conclusions about war as this forum:
https://www.armystandard.ru/news/2024129114-TnO1s.html
No comment really, except that we should not stereotype the Russian general staff as a bunch of drunks and incompetents stuck in the soviet past. They are learning, even if implementation is the hard part, not theory. 

To me, the evolution of drone warfare in this conflict seems to mirror the introduction of aircraft during the First World War. At the beginning, aircraft were mostly thought of as a tool for observation and artillery direction, similar to drones. Then one guy brings a pistol one day and shoots at the other guy. The guy who got shot at was understandably irritated and figured out a way to strap a machine gun to his aircraft. The next thing you know, there are massed arial dogfights with dedicated fighter aircraft, mult-engine heavy bombers (by WWI standards), specialized recon aircraft, etc. When you compare 1914 to 1918, it's hardly recognizable as the same conflict. Then if you compare WWI aviation to the advancements in aerial warfare just within the 20th century, it looks more like what one might expect from an alien invasion.
I have the, uninformed, feeling that drone warfare today (I include unmanned ground vehicles in this as well), will be nearly unrecognizable in as few as twenty or thirty years.

I think it's a great question.
Just me but I think fully integrated drone warfare is about where tank and anti-tank development were in 1916 on the western front, or the airplane as @The_Capt pointed out. We also have to account for the limited and unique nature of the war in Ukraine relative to super power conventional war. 
To me from a future technical and tactical practice perspective, Ukraine is more like Spain 1936-39.

The world's war colleges are busy analyzing what's going on in Ukraine and writing about practices that will shape future CM level battles.
Link to US Army War College
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/
USAWC has a Russia-Ukraine War Study Project
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/5/
The first output I could find is linked below, Ukraine War experience relative to Recon-Strike-Complexes (RSCs), integrated AI, distributed ISR, deep strike attrition of enemy RSC to enable effective concentration of mass, and integrating relevant UAS ISR lessons from Ukraine, for near future major power conventional war. Multiple forum members individually have already some of these points.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/9/
'Implications for the US Army' starts at the bottom of page 31. - The lead para is on what is judged unique to Ukraine
"While the Russia-Ukraine War is an illustrative case, it is unique  in many respects. Both sides derive their doctrine from similar sources and  employ similar or identical weapons. Neither side can break the other’s  integrated air defense network—Ukraine for lack of modern airframes, Russia for lack of enough precision-guided munitions—meaning deep strike is primarily a missile-based phenomenon. Russia and Ukraine also field  armies with far less overall experience than anticipated before the war,  having gone through several rounds of mobilization, making logistical and command centralization all the more appealing and strikes against logistics and C2 nodes more fruitful. Russia has refused to deploy  kinetic anti-satellite interceptors, nor is there much available in the open source about satellite jamming, an undeniably relevant factor in future wars. Ukraine and Russia both defend some of the world’s most extensive ground fortifications—in the Ukrainian case, built over years of positional conflict in the Donbas. The US Army should not plan to fight the last war, let alone a war it has not actively fought."
The last two sentences are worth a repeat. Presumably the same would apply to US allies, some of whom experienced enemy attacks on their territory in the last super power conflict (WWII), some of which did not.
"The United States is unlikely to face an adversary it can defeat absent some consideration of strikes on its territory, at least if it hopes to win on a timescale more closely approximating months or years than a decade.  Two equally sophisticated RSCs, then, can increase the likelihood of mutual territorial strikes and the potential for escalation."

The world's war colleges are busy analyzing what's going on in Ukraine and writing about practices that will shape future CM level battles.
Link to US Army War College
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/
USAWC has a Russia-Ukraine War Study Project
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss3/5/
The first output I could find is linked below, Ukraine War experience relative to Recon-Strike-Complexes (RSCs), integrated AI, distributed ISR, deep strike attrition of enemy RSC to enable effective concentration of mass, and integrating relevant UAS ISR lessons from Ukraine, for near future major power conventional war. Multiple forum members individually have already some of these points.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss4/9/
'Implications for the US Army' starts at the bottom of page 31. - The lead para is on what is judged unique to Ukraine
"While the Russia-Ukraine War is an illustrative case, it is unique  in many respects. Both sides derive their doctrine from similar sources and  employ similar or identical weapons. Neither side can break the other’s  integrated air defense network—Ukraine for lack of modern airframes, Russia for lack of enough precision-guided munitions—meaning deep strike is primarily a missile-based phenomenon. Russia and Ukraine also field  armies with far less overall experience than anticipated before the war,  having gone through several rounds of mobilization, making logistical and command centralization all the more appealing and strikes against logistics and C2 nodes more fruitful. Russia has refused to deploy  kinetic anti-satellite interceptors, nor is there much available in the open source about satellite jamming, an undeniably relevant factor in future wars. Ukraine and Russia both defend some of the world’s most extensive ground fortifications—in the Ukrainian case, built over years of positional conflict in the Donbas. The US Army should not plan to fight the last war, let alone a war it has not actively fought."
The last two sentences are worth a repeat. Presumably the same would apply to US allies, some of whom experienced enemy attacks on their territory in the last super power conflict (WWII), some of which did not.
"The United States is unlikely to face an adversary it can defeat absent some consideration of strikes on its territory, at least if it hopes to win on a timescale more closely approximating months or years than a decade.  Two equally sophisticated RSCs, then, can increase the likelihood of mutual territorial strikes and the potential for escalation."

With all respect to those with direct urban combat experience of being ordered as an infantry leader to clear a building, not quite sure why clearing a building top down is controversial, peace time thinking or practically infeasible. From recent 2003-2011-2016 direct US combined arms experience, it seems to be the preferred method, and the proven preferred method over the last ~70 years. Indications are this is the first option any CQB leader should consider with a mission involving clearing buildings.
@JonS example, Canadians fighting Fallschirmjäger in WWII, emphasis added
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-5-battle-of-ortona/
"Finally, the use of the mouse-holing method was another tactic that heavily influenced the battle’s outcome. It enabled the Canadians to avoid having soldiers cut down on the open streets by remaining and moving inside buildings and allowed them to fight from the top down instead of from the bottom up. Although it was not invented by the Canadians—the method was actually already formalized in British doctrine and called “the vertical technique”—mouse-holing was a common-sense tactic to apply to avoid casualties, advance under protective cover, and surprise the Germans by attacking from above.
More on Urban warfare in general, a number of case studies and essays on present and near future urban warfare, US perspective, including observations on urban combat experience in Ukraine
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project/
 

"A whale is a shark built to Admiralty specifications."
-Old Royal Navy saying.

Bias…exactly.  Something is definitely happening, that much I can feel in my bones…exactly what remains kinda opaque.  What do we actually “know?”  Well:
- Mass does not seem to work like it used to.  ISR appears to be having a disproportionate effect on mass.  This is not just drone feeds but AARs and deeper reporting.  Weird densities, weird groupings and sometimes just bizarre packaging.  These all point to some serious pressures on military mass but the exact mechanisms remain largely unknown.
- C4ISR, first war in human history with these levels of C4ISR.  This effecting a lot more than just mass.  How deep this rabbit hole goes remains unclear.
- Artillery is still doing the majority of the killing.  We also know that “precision” appears to be making artillery more effective in rounds per effect (but that is still not proven), but both sides are still using an ungodly amount of fires, as demonstrated by ammo strain.
- Heavy is in trouble.  I think we have seen enough indicators that heavy forces are struggling. Enough reports of tanks and mech being held back or blunted have surfaced to call that one.  But is this forever, or just a temporary condition?
- Unmanned is definitely a thing and is accelerating.  But at this point I am still not sure how much is strike, and how much is ISR.  If we see some sort of data on just how much damage drones are actually doing in comparison to artillery it would help immensely.
- Corrosive warfare (or something like it) is a thing, but we still do not know its full parameters, assumptions, constraints and restraints.  We have seen it happen more than once but “why” it happened is still a bit of a mystery.  Was it projected friction, or was it simply Russian over-extension?
- Denial.  Definitely on the board, particularly in the air.  Some pretty good analysis on this out there.
- Deep Strike.  Appears to be a new form of manoeuvre.  Formerly it has been used to shape and set preconditions but en masse it appears as though it can directly create results, not simply enable them.
I am probably missing something but you will note most of these are only partially visible.  We have seen some possible indicators but no one has been able to pull up the entire UA summer offensive and show that 90% of the time they were using micro-groupings because if they massed above company level they were spotted and hit 82% of the time.  Nor can we see that UAS have outstripped casualties caused by direct fires and artillery by 23%.  All we really see by this point are shadows and hints.
So while I have working theories, they are pretty fluid.  I am getting firmer on some aspects… but watch that will be when things shift again and they are totally blown out of the water.  There was no way the RA was supposed to withstand the Summer offensive.  They were a shattered force that had bled all over Bakhmut at WW1 loss levels…but here we are.
Anyway…strap in, this ride ain’t over yet.

That's a great point. It took, for example, 40-odd years to unpack and deconstruct "blitzkreig" from a mythically wondrous imagined doctrine to its actual reality as a marketting elevator pitch. And, frankly, 40 years after that epiphany there are still plenty of folks who continue to prefer the marketting take.
One concern I have about analysis of this war is availability bias: drone feeds are new and exciting and ubiquitous, but are they representative? I wonder if we give drone's effectiveness too much weight due simply the the large supply of feed videos.

Ironically, the US tactical & operational solution to the Pacific assaults was mass - massed fires and massed infantry. 
The strategic solution seems like it was to out-tech the Japanese at a rapid rate of increment. The gigantic, expansive and (relatively) efficient R&D base allowed the US to develop and implement steadily better Op/Tac solutions at an exponentially increasing rate - but the Japanese R&D base was limited by materials, culture and politics. So going from near parity in tech to a large cumulative op/tech advantage became inevitable - with the ultimate strategic advantage detonating over Hiroshima.
Japan by contrast lagged the US early and consistently, further exacerbating the difference in pace and depth of their respective R/D/I cycles. The death of the Japanese Navy (and its Naval Air Force) as an ocean going force was a direct result of this technological race.
Innovate the fastest or die.
WRT to Ukraine, it has a very innovative, lively and imaginative R&D culture, lead by a relatively democratic government, coupled with an extremely motivated workforce. With sufficient support they could probably outpace Russia in several important areas. They already heave, but the scale isn't there yet.
Russia, to me, has a comparatively less actively innovative and more sluggish cycle, burdened with inefficient political process and heavy corruption but it does have enormous scaling potential and state direction can really push hard in certain areas giving heavy advantages (eg air, manpower).
I suspect that until Ukraine can accelerate past Russia's RDI cycle it will never really win/be safe. It'll just achieve an unstable state, vulnerable to external shocks and imbalances. To some extant it appears to be in that framing already.
The true power of the EU is always economic. If/when UKR can properly tap that power and expand on it will when it becomes truly secure. Work like Rheinmetall setting up plants in Ukraine is a good signifier but its the research area that really needs to be developed, modernised and expanded. UKR drone progression and their Amazing Adventures in AD show just how goddamn fast and hard they can work.
To circle back to the Pacific - the early assault failures lead to rapid development and implementation of solutions (both technical & organizational) in time for the next island. Each assault iterated on the previous until by the end the US could contemplate invading Japan proper, a truly insane proposition. But they thought they could do it and I personally feel they would have eventually, bloodily, "won". 
Ukraine could potentially outstrip Russia in the RDI cycle, but its still pretty far off. When it does I think we'll see a gradual climb then a sudden and drastic shift to offensive primacy.
TBH, that's when the truly scary **** is going to start happening...

Thanks Capt.
I share your concern for western casualty sensitivities. They have and remain a major constraint on western operations. I worry politicians and the public in democracies will not adjust their thinking as fast as a successful peer level campaign would require.
I am hopeful in this war an eventual combination of new technologies, organization and doctrine will restore battlefield mobility, the ability to successfully execute offensive operations. I do worry it is possible the war could get stuck like Korea before this happens, leaving it to theory until conflict resumes in Ukraine or elsewhere.
I also hope none of the western democracies reach a Maginot conclusion. Adopting isolationist policies looks like that to me.