John D Salt

Does this mean that you now accept the point that it was the ammunition stowage policy, rather than any magical effects of tiny HE bursters, that produced the disparity in brew-ups when penetrated between British and German tanks in the Western Desert? All the best, John.

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AIUI the main characteristic favouring good hull-down positions is main gun depression. In this respect the Sherman has a very slight advantage over the German mediums; 10 degrees against 8. All the best, John.

I'd recommend Charles Messenger's "The Tunisian Campaign", Ian Allan, 1982. It's slightly marred by some dodgy proof-reading (General Fredendall's name is misspelt "Fredenhall" throughout), but is a clear and concise description of who went where and did what in what order. Amazon have cheap second-hand copies available. "An Army at Dawn" is good, but much longer, and focused very much on the Americans (and marred for Mr. Picky by the author's bizarre belief that VT fuzes were available in 1943). For an interesting comparison, another book -- though narrower still in focus -- written at the time about the US Army learning on the job is Ralph Ingersoll's "The Battle is the pay-off". As far as I know it has never been re-printed, so good luck finding a copy -- mine cost me quite a bit. Alan Moorehead's "African Trilogy" is I think still good reading, and the best writer of that period of the war was probably Keith Douglas, whose "Alamein to Zem-Zem" is available in paperback. All the best, John.

Great stuff! Did the (apparently) dead crewman in the picture turn out to be posed? Or do we have to wait to buy the book to find out? It's such a beautifully composed picture that I'm afraid my first thought was that it must be another production from "Chet's Circus" -- lovely photography, but totally fake. All the best, John.

Yes, of course. I doubt there was any field gun in any army in WW2 that didn't. Yes it does. And before it did, the Gunners performed thoroughly effective tank shooting with HE shells, leaving the transport plug in instead of inserting the fuze. Given the number of well-attested occasions on which 25-pdr regiments engaged tanks with direct fire, it seems odd to discount the possibility; although it had doubtless become rarer by Medenine, it didn't cease until 155 battery's classic stand at Sidi Ndir in February 1943. All the best, John.

I've not read "Pershing", but "Sherman" is superb, and his "Half-track" very good indeed. The reason this author's books don't come cheap is that they are worth the money, and people who have copies are hanging on to them. There is probably always more to say about so prolific a tank as the Sherman, so I would recommend Mark Hayward's "Sherman Firefly" as a very useful supplement on 17-pounder Shermans. All the best, John.

My point was that something that does not follow the method or discipline of OR should not be misrepresented as being an OR study. Oh, doubtless they were. However, that APHE was effective in setting unprotected ammunition on fire does not necessarily imply that AP was less effective, which is the inference you seem to be drawing. Yes indeed, I rather fancy I raised this point myself. Indeed, but this was a considerable time before the 1941-42 experience on which ammo stowage policy was later based, was it not? Nor do I. But I should be grateful if anyone who thinks that Jentz is supporting John K's portrayal of APHE as a wonder-weapon could point out where, precisely, Jentz claims that the fires suffered by British tanks when hit were due to the ammunition nature rather than the ammunition stowage policy. This seems to directly contradict Hogg's statement about the apparent lack of improvement in BAE with the 2-pounder. No, anyone who has spent any time arguing with John K knows perfectly well that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. They also know where that line of reasoning ends up, sooner or later. If it was as effective as John K claims, then I find it very surprising indeed that it has escaped comment to the degree it apparently has. Or maybe there are such comments, and I've missed them. Maybe. In which case, one would expect to see figures showing a higher proportion of crew casualties in knocked-out British tanks than German ones knocked out by British shot. If anyone has such figures, I'm all ears. The figures I have on percentage crew casualties from British vehicles do not seem to show significantly higher lethality from penetrations by German ATk guns (most of them presumably firing APCBCHE) than from "Bazooka" (Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust). That may not be a fair analogue to AP, as the HEAT penetrator is going in very much faster than any AP round would. It would be interesting to know if the Germans suffered less than an average of about one killed and one wounded per tank knocked out by solid shot. That's not all I was doing, I was also pointing out that merely counting fragments disregards their distribution in time and space. Because the British were the only power to try both natures, and abandoned APHE? As far as I know, everyone else went for APHE all through, although the Russians filled in the BR-240 burster cavity to produce BR-240SP, which suggests to me that they didn't think the burster worth the trouble in 45mm calibre. Although British policy on ammunition natures (and other things, too!) looks idiosyncratic, I don't personally think that the behaviour of delay fuzes and bursting charges undergoes enormous changes from one nationality to another. It may be that the 2-pounder APHE was simply a bad design, from which an over-general conclusion was drawn and then never changed (like the British Army's habit of breaking step when crossing bridges, a pointless practice based on a single unpleasant experience). However, given one data point that clearly says APHE was no better than AP, and as far as I can see none that clearly say the reverse, it seems to me obvious what the sceptical observer would conclude. As ever, we need more data. All the best, John.

But merely counting the number of effective fragments doesn't give you the whole story. It also matters how they are distributed in space (viz. John K's own example of the poor side-spray from a 20mm round) and in time. As to the time element, according to Nathan Okun's page: http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-020.htm ...the minimum delay to be expected from a mechanical fuze is of the order of 0.003 sec; I don't know what the actual fuze delays from PzGr39 would have been, but I imagine that a mechanical fuze would not have an extended zone. If anyone has any information, please let me know. Taking this figure, and assuming a projectile moving at 2,000 feet per second, this corresponds to a distance travelled before detonation of six feet. I find it hard to imagine where, inside a WW2 AFV, one could trace a shotline six feet in length without hitting all sorts fo things. Of course the residual velocity after penetration could be much less, in fact could be anything down to zero (if it embeds in the armour). Given the reduced distance of travel before detonantion, and the reduced forward throw of the fragment spray, I would expect the relative value of a burster charge to increase as the residual velocity of the projectile fell. We also know that the fragmentation produced by penetration of non-exploding projectiles increases as the square of the velocity. So I would expect both the value of APHE and the need for it to decrease as residual velocity increases. In other words, I would expect that it might have some value in converting marginal cases to kills (viz. Jarret's mention of incomplete performations), but, especially in small calibres, I see no reason to disbelieve Master Gunner Hogg when he says that it isn't worthwhile. The passages from Jarrett John K seems to have agreed are his source are, let us be clear, not OR studies (MELF stands for Middle East Land Forces, btw, John), they are personal observations. When I read them I took them to be an indication of the need to improve ammunition stowage to prevent "brew-ups", and on re-reading they still seems to say the same. British tank desgners took up a policy to deal with this problem, adding armoured stowage bins and declining to stow ammunition above the turret-ring. If the passages were really intended to convey the message that APHE is a crew-killing wonder-weapon, then I am at a loss to explain why nobody in the OR or tank design communities ever (as far as I know) called for APHE to be adopted for land service, or why the supposedly fearsome destructive qualities of APHE mysteriously escape mention in all the personal recollections of British tank crew members (Joly, Crisp, Tout, Foley, Wilson, Farrell, Hills, Dyson -- there are quite a few of them). All the best, John.

Well, yes, if you believe that fuzes are ordered into production without checking that they function properly. It would be nice to think that British defence procurement didn't do things like that, but... Nope, I'm afraid the Hogg piece I quoted is my only source for this (and he doesn't specifically say "trials", although I can't imagine where else "experience" would come from). There are a couple of things in the WO32 series that look as if they might be helpful, and I'll try to remember to take a peek at them next time I'm at the PRO, but that will probably not be for quite a while. All the best, John.

So would I listen, if I could hear what he has to say in his own words. All the best, John.

Partly, but not entirely, it would appear. The following is quoted verbatim from the description of 2-pdr ammunition on page 75 of Ian Hogg's "British and American Artillery of World War 2", A&AP, 1978: "Shell, AP, Mk. 1. This shell was part of the original specification for the gun, and was a piercing projectile with a tiny filling of Lyddite and the Base Fuze No. 281, which carried a tracer. Experience revealed that on impact, the fuze tended to part company with the shell and thus fail to initiate the filling. Moreover, even when it worked correctly it appeared to do no more damage than a plain steel shot, which was easier to manufacture. As a result, the AP shell was withdrawn." Recall also that the British Army had already had an APHE round in service with the 3-pdr, so I doubt that they were not used because British industry was incapable of manufacturing them. All the best, John.

Excellent find. Now, is this the source document John K had in mind? If so, I can't find anything in it to justify his remarks about HE bursters. If not, it looks as if we are once again left waiting for an accurate reference. All the best, John.

Excellent questions. I believe that an expectation of about one dead and one wounded per tank knocked out remains fairly constant over a considerable period of military history. If John K can recall a reference to his source, I'll check it out when I'm next at the PRO. I assume it was a MELF paper, whereas almost all the OR papers I have seen were from 21AG, and it is not unheard of for different OR groups to disagree; but the only OR paper I've seen on estimating BAE neglects burster charges entirely, and merely calculates the weight of metal shot into the tank. Three main reasons, I think. First, in the initial stages of the invasion 21AG had almost all the armoured divisions (and tank brigades) in the Allied line-up. Second, knocking off the "hinge" at Caen was for a long time seen as the Allied main effort. Third, the Brits are simply closer to where a lot of the German armour reinforcements are coming from, and given the difficulties of mobility the Germans had, it might be not so easy to drive over and thump the Americans even if you want to. As an example of this, consider how German armour intended to go and nip off the Cobra breakout was sucked into the battle of Periers ridge in the final stages of Operation Bluecoat. I don't know that it's possible to give much useful advice on how to tackle Tigers with a 2-pdr. Make sure the next-of-kin entry in your paybook is up to date, I suppose. I believe that the accepted doctrine at the time, though, would be to hold fire until you get a worthwhile shot; at least from Hunt's Gap onwards, and probably earlier, the mission of anti-tank guns is to destroy armour, not to protect the infantry. Easier said than done with a 2-pdr, though. All the best, John.

Russian engineering, dontcha love it. Clean the mud and gunk out of the cylinders, give it a squirt of WD-40, and the engine will probably start... All the best, John.

You should say "armour" for armoured regiments, and "tanks" for tank battalions (or, later, regiments). For those you should say "tanks". ...and you should definitely say 2-pdr or 2-pr. I suspect that CM underestimates the behind-armour effect (BAE) of small-calibre projectiles, and I am dam' sure it underestimates the effect of AP when compared to APHE. Trials with the 2-pdr found not a ha'porth of difference between AP and APHE rounds, so the APHE was never ordered into full production. According to Zetterling, the total counts of each type in Normandy would have been about 126 Tiger Is and 623 Panthers, as against 897 Pz IVs. British forces would have faced most of them at one time or another. There was probably a good deal of misreporting of Shurzen-equipped Pz IVs as Tigers; 7 Armd Div 'G' war diary notes Schurzen as being intended to make a Pz IV look like a Tiger. All the best, John.

What a shame ol' Hyazinth never served in the Western Desert or Italy, where he might have met the Bays. What a great name for a scenario -- "Hyazinth Graf Strachwitz von Groß-Zauche und Camminetz v. Sir Ranulph Twisleton-Wykeham-Fiennes (Bart.)" Still, AIUI the Baronet was killed at Cassino -- I don't know which battle, but it might be possible to have "Frido von Senger und Etterlin v. Sir Ranulph Twisleton-Wykeham-Fiennes (Bart.)" All the best, John.

Probably me -- there was a "cutting out" mission during the night by matelots from a British and a Polish destroyer against the flak ship in the harbour, and the Royal Marine Commandos reported that they could tell when British sailors were in action from the sound of swearing drifting across the water. I wasn't aware that Port-en-Bessin even got a mention in the official history, I shall have to get a copy from the library and copy it down. What few things I have been able to track down to date are mostly very slight, and sometimes I think so slight as to be entirely misleading; there are brief descriptions in Neillands' history of the Royal Marines and St-George Saunders' and Messneger's histories of the Commandos. Far the best single account is that in "Doc" Forfar's "Omaha to the Scheldt": He was the MO of 47. Unfortunately, some lummox at the Admiralty lost the unit war diary for June, so the archives I have been able to see at the PRO are pretty thin as well. I think this is a great shame, as this action IMHO ranks as an achievement at least as high as the assaults on Pegasus and Horsa bridges, the Pointe du Hoc and the Merville Battery, all of which have been well written-up. If anyone has anything that will improve on the sources above, I'd be very interested to hear it. I'm aware of the oral history archive at the Hemingway School at Port-en-Bessin, but have had no access to it. Maybe a long research holiday in Normandy is indicated for next year. All the best, John.

Can I briefly misdirect this thread into a side-road, and ask if you have (or for that matter anyone else has) anything on the action of 47 Royal Marine Commando at Port-en-Bessin on D+1? I visited the memorial stone to 47 in the Garden of Remembrance at Eastney Barracks yesterday, and I think it's about time I started on some serious archive-thrashing to try to get the whole story. All the best, John.

"Buffy" skills? JasonC can slay vampires? I didn't think he was that kind of SMG grog, but what do I know? All the best, John.

A Type 95 light tank, I should say. All the best, John.

Oh, you wrote "snippers". In the British Army, only officers of at least field rank (Majors and above) can be trusted not to run with scissors. All the best, John.

The figure of 16 comes from the copy of the "Sandhurst precis" I was issued as an Officer Cadet in Exeter UOTC in about 1982. I can't find my copy of "Sniping in France" at the moment, but I seem to recall a similar figure being mentioned there. It's not a section, in current establishments it is a platoon. I've never heard of it being referred to as a section. I'm wondering if we have a case of "half-counting", treating a sniper pair as one sniper and one observer, thus halving the number of "snipers". Wossname Bull's nice new glossy Osprey book on WW2 tactics gives 8 as a battalion sniper establishment, but says this is typical rather than the maximum, and in any case also mentions snipers in sections, who are rather clearly not snipers in the wear-a-ghillie-suit, passed-the-long-course sense. Given that people who've passed the sniper course are normally sergeants, the proportion of NCOs is all to cock whatever you do. You have an odd view of the British Army if you think it pays the slightest attention to laid-down scales of anything (exempt officers who have just passed the staff course and the doctrine nazis from Upavon). All the best, John.

Never mind that. Where's my beer? And not that Molson slops, either. All the best, John.