John D Salt

With the possible exception of some of the special forces blokes in the long-duration OPs (some of whom were too weak to stand unaided when finally extracted, IIRC) I doubt that any of the British forces in the Falklands went especially hungry. Resupply was never as far as I know interrupted, and British infantry should always be carrying a day's food, and possibly three (though the Royal Marines certainly used to train to make a 24-hour rat-pack last 3 days). Also, the compo Arctic rations were issued, which have the honking great calorific content required for physical activity in cold conditions. Nobody should have been short of blood glucose, either -- the compo ration packs at the time came with plenty of dextrose tablets and boiled sweets, it being known from combat experience that troops in action need sugar but often can't eat anything bulkier than sweeties. I think the little green tubes of delicious sweet condensed milk had just been discontinued by then, but there might have been some of those around too, probably the only ration item worth trading your oatmeal block for. Jason has mentioned the superior morale of the British infantry as a decisive factor, and there can be no doubt that it was. At the time, British Army training classified "administration and morale" as a single subject for instruction; the business of maintaining troops' morale was regarded as intimately tied in with the provision of such banal items as adequate rations, regular mail and dry socks. It was also, as it still is, a principle of leadership that officers were to put the comfort of their men before their own. Contrast the success of the British logistic effort with the Argentine, and the attitudes of the leaders on each side to their men, and much of the difference in battlefield performance is explained, even disregarding the fact that the British were highly-trained professionals and the Argentines largely freshly-inducted conscripts. The Falklands are cold, treeless, and dotted with sheep, in which respects they strongly resemble British training areas such as Woodbury Common, in which the Marines and Army had spent years practicing battles fought "on the side of a hill, in pouring rain, where two maps meet". In many ways, the Falklands was precisely the war the British ground forces had been practicing for over the previous thirty or forty years. All the best, John.

Yes, that's right. Perhaps reading an account of the battle would clear this up for you. D Coy took half an hour to deal with Munoz-Cabrera's pair of 0.5" MGs on Coronation Hill. TF Mercedes had about 300 men in 11 platoons engaged in the direct fire battle, who took almost 50% casualties before the surrender. The thousand or so POWs taken were mostly from troops never engaged. In fact not. In real real life -- as distinct from the real life represented by half-remembered Sun writeups of pool dispatches -- LAA in the ground role halted 2 Para twice. The first time A Coy were "caught flat-footed advancing withour adequate support over open ground against an active enemy" (van der Bijl). Support company was brought up in response. The second time a pair of 35mm Oerlikons firing from the promontory halted 11 Pl and the Patrols until the guns were damaged (and abandoned by their crews) by a Harrier strike. Now, you've chosen an exceptional few battles to try to illustrate what you apparently think should be "typical" behaviour of infantry under fire. The Parachute Regiment have a fair claim to being the most highly-motivated infantry in the world, and in CM terms would be classed as Elite or Crack (my problem in CM with these morale classes is that they keep going until everybody is a casualty, instead of doing the sensible thing and legging it). What's more, both Goose Green and Longdon were VC battles, which are atypical even by Para standards. Even so, you have had to completely misrepresent the actual events of these battles in order to attempt to prove your point. From Burntside House to Goose Green in under six kilometres. If we take the battle as lasting from 02:30 on 28th May to midnight, which was about when the cease-fire was arranged, it took 2 Para twenty one and a half hours to cover rather less than that distance -- in CM terms, well over a thousand game-turns. If the Paras remained as indifferent to small-arms fire as you seem to believe in their attempts to close with the enemy, then I should like to know what explanation you have for the times and distances involved. All the best, John.

Goose Green was the battle with the weakest fire support, and the lesson re-learnt from it was that you need adequate gunner support to make a successful attack without excessive casualties. At Goose Green 2 Para were supported by NGS from Arrow, a Harrier strike, and 900 rounds of 105mm from Black Eight (source: "Nine Battles to Stanley", by Nick van der Bijl). All the best, John.

Not true. As Lord Moran remarked ("Courage is a man's capital, and he is always spending"), and others who have studied the area have agreed since, you never get used to combat. There is value in "battle inoculation" training so that the first experience of combat is not totally disorienting, but if there is any evidence of soldiers becoming desensitized to fire or casualties, I haven't seen it. One of the findings of historical analysis on suppression is that troops with a good knowledge of weapon capabilities are typically suppressed by less fire that troops lacking such experience (the CM morale model is open to criticism on that basis, but I know of no game that gets this bit right). But getting soldiers to close with the enemy is very hard to do. If soldiers really thought the way you think they do, there should be no difficulty at all. Unless you're playing with Conscripts the whole time, sections do not "panic at the slightest incoming" unless you're very, very unlucky indeed. Either you are over-generalising from a single bout of lousy luck, or your minor tactics are dreadful. All the best, John.

What's your evidence for this? All the figures I've seen (which are few and far between, but from things like the Fort Sill suppression study) show that the target area you have to get a bullet into for suppressive effect is vastly greater than that required to inflict physical damage. I have a few grouses myself about the way infantry react to bullet fire when there is cover to hand, but I'd have great difficulty naming another game (board, miniatures or computer, amateur or professional) that does a better job of modelling fire effects on dismounted infantry. Can you? All the best, John.

No ****, Sherlock. Astute observers will quickly perceive that this does absolutely nothing to support any of your previous assertions about prisoners being murdered after capture, or the desert theatre being equally as brutal as the Russian Front. Your continued failure to supply any evidence for your statements suggests rather strongly that you don't have any. It's a bizarre question. It indicates numerous failures on your part to understand the basic elements of a situation you so freely offer some pretty silly opinions about. If I were a platoon commander, I expect I would be worrying about controlling my sections, my anti-tank weapon and my 2-inch mortar, and staying in touch with company. I would expect to leave the business of small-arms fire control to my section commanders; that's one of the things they're paid for. Contrary to what you seem to believe, shooting AFV crew abandoning their vehicle is not a violation of the LOAC. However, S L A Marshall reports incidents -- in the much nastier Pacific theatre, too -- of soldiers declining to fire on enemy running away, with remarks like "We'll get 'em some other time". Again contrary to what you appear to believe, soldiers in action are not generally in a state of venegful homicidal rage. As Kipling put it, "What is the use of hating/Those you are paid to kill?". They probably understood, better than you appear to do, that the enemy shooting at you is part of what happens in a war. Peter Ustinov used to tell a story of being on a troopship in the Med, when a fighter started strafing it. Some of the soldiers on deck got quite excited, and their officer was fetched up from below with cries of "They're attacking us, Sir! They're attacking!". "Who are attacking us?", asked the officer. When he received the reply "The enemy", he said "That's all right -- they're allowed to". Now, I'm not saying that the war in the desert wasn't tough; then men who fought it were, on the whole very much harder and braver the you or I will ever need to be. You should not make the mistake of thinking that they therefore behaved in the murderous and illegal ways you so thoughtlessly attribute to them, nor that many other theatres were not very much worse. If the war in the desert was really the video nasty from the Flying Guts War Picture Library you seem to imagine it was, then I invite you to explain why, exactly, Afrika Korps veterans have for many years been made welcome at Eighth Army reunions. John.

Depending on what definitions to use, there's some risk of this being a statement of the obvious. "War" is not normally used to mean merely violence, or even organised violence, but specifically violence between states (currently nation-states are more fashionable than than city-states). It's therefore hardly possible to have wars without nationalism, by definition. You could perhaps have fun discussing how "liberation wars" fit into this; I'd be tempted to say that these have an established nation-state on one side and an entity that aspires to become one on the other. Likewise, economics is to some extent indispensible to warfare. Only after the invention of agriculture and the rise of city-dwelling ("civilization" in the literal sense) could societies generate sufficient surplus wealth (initally, food) to be able to spare effort for organized warfare. It sounds as if your topic is focused narrowly on the proximate causes of individual wars, but it might be worth pointing out that national identity and a degree of economic success are necessary precursors to the whole idea of war. You might be able to make a similar argument for incompetence in leadersip; don't forget to quote Hary Seldon/Isaac Asimov, "Violence is the last resort of the incompetent". All the best, John.

Wrong. Asking for evidence is perfectly reasonable. Elevating your own unsupported supposition to the same level as evidence, as you are doing, is not only not reasionable, it is anti-rational and insane. Have you actually asked any veterans? Even if you are too lazy to do a shred of research, it's not a good idea to presume to know what other people will think without asking them. All the best, John.

Not so. RPG-1 is the designation for what was originally known as the LPG-44, developed under the auspices of G. P. Lominskiy of the main artillery directorate in 1944. This is the precursor of the RPG-2 (originally designated DRG-40, developed under A. V. Smolyak), to which it bears a substantial visual resemblance -- more so that the PZF-150 (which I've seen illustrated without the pistol grip). As far as I'm aware, the PF-150 only reached the state of troop trials by the end of the war. The PG-2 (originally PG-80) warhead of the RPG-2 bears a striking resemblance to the PZF-150 warhead, and the similarity in performance suggests that some copying may have gone on here. But to suggest that all RPGs were developed from the PZF-44 is quite wrong. Sources: Small Arms, Artillery & Special Weapons of the Third Reich, Gander & Chamberlain, MacDonald & Jane's, 1978. Panzerfaust, Fleischer, Schiffer Publishing, 1994. Protivotankoviye granatomyotniye kompleksi (Anti-tank launcher systems), Lovi, Koren'kov, Bazilevich & Korablin, Vostochniy Gorizont, 2000. All the best, John.

Then either post evidence that supports this belief, or admit that your opinion is unsupported and therefore worthless. All the best, John.

...which is why I said "Merlin Spit" rather than "Griffon Spit". All the best, John.

OK. So, moving on from your penultimate post, does anyone know the correct Latin for "potato"? Solanum tuberculosum seems a bit clumsy. Also, I would be interested to know the Latin for chips, crisps and bacon-flavoured cheezy wotsits. All the best, John.

Ever heard of "you are what you eat? We are all vegetarians, cos everything we eat started with vegetables as the loest part of hte food chain. </font>

Ever heard of "you are what you eat? We are all vegetarians, cos everything we eat started with vegetables as the loest part of hte food chain. </font>

I think we've all understood what your point is, and we are now quite familiar with your opinion. If ever you feel able to support your opinion with any actual evidence, go right ahead and do so. Until then, Andreas' suggestion that you inform yourself a bit better seems to me an excellent one. All the best, John.

Naah. Ridgeback Merlin Spit. Nothing else in the world has wings that shape. All the best, John.

Do you mean "Aggressors, Vol. 1: Tank Buster vs. Combat Vehicle", by Alex Vanags-Baginskis and Rikyu Watanabe (Airlife, 1990)? If so, I can't find any specific mention of tactics used by German aircraft, apart from a bit about how to attack using Panzerfausts from a Bücker Bestmann (Approach on the deck, climb to 20-30m at 500m from the target, attack in a shallow dive firing at 150-200m and making an immediate steep evasive turn) and the implication that Schlachtgeschwader aircraft usually made multiple passes (which would not have been fashionable on the Western front). Close; according to http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LRG/bombs.html the SD2 was the butterfly bomb, SD50 being a conventional bomb of (as the designation suggests) about 50Kg. All the best, John.

Do you mean "Aggressors, Vol. 1: Tank Buster vs. Combat Vehicle", by Alex Vanags-Baginskis and Rikyu Watanabe (Airlife, 1990)? If so, I can't find any specific mention of tactics used by German aircraft, apart from a bit about how to attack using Panzerfausts from a Bücker Bestmann (Approach on the deck, climb to 20-30m at 500m from the target, attack in a shallow dive firing at 150-200m and making an immediate steep evasive turn) and the implication that Schlachtgeschwader aircraft usually made multiple passes (which would not have been fashionable on the Western front). Close; according to http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LRG/bombs.html the SD2 was the butterfly bomb, SD50 being a conventional bomb of (as the designation suggests) about 50Kg. All the best, John.

The best I can do is some old snippetry from WO 232/24, "German weapon development", which is mostly about air weapons. A report on the effectiveness of the Hs 129 considers it vulnerable to AA and fighters due to its low speed. From this account it appears that the Stuka with 37mm guns was developed after the Hs 129. Some Hs 129 pilots had the MK 101 3cm cannon replaced by additional bombs. It is stated that pilots in training with the anti-tank Staffel of JG51 obtained 60% hits with the MK 101. The achievements of II SG 1 during 1942 are summarized as: 6508 sorties (average of 17 to 18 every 24 hours) 3138 sorties by Hs 129, 1532 by Hs 123, 1838 by Me 109E. 1386.5 tons of bombs released, 52 Soviet aircraft shot down and 55 destroyed on the ground. Casualties in Gruppe: 20 Hs 129, 5 Hs 123, 16 Me 109E. Claims of destruction for 91 tanks, 1081 light MT and 273 vehicles. German strafing attack tactics for the Me 109F are described as follows: "The target is approached at almost vertical angle at a speed of approximately 375 m.p.h. The attack is delivered and a steep climb made immediately. The method of low parallel ground strafing is not favoured." "Cannon attacks on M.T. have been made from as low as 250/300 feet. The method is to approach at a height of about 2,500 feet from which altitude the bombs are dropped. After release of bombs a final dive is made down to about 300 feet and the M.G. armament brought into action." For the Hs 129 a maximum dive angle of 70º, and speed should not exceed 340 m.p.h. Mention is made of SD2 and SD50 anti-personnel bombs. The dive angle for bomb release is 60º. Ju 87s generally carry one 250 Kg SC or SD, or 500 Kg for dealing with heavy tanks. They approach at 7,000–9,000 feet, and pull out of their dives at 2,500–4,000 feet to stay out of range of MG fire. "It has been noted from several sources that not only German infantry but also German tank formations have often been unwilling to attack unless preceded by Stuka bombing and several indications have been received of the enthusiasm with which the presence of Stukas is received by German troops and of their anxiety that Stukas should assist them in their assaults." All the best, John.

The best I can do is some old snippetry from WO 232/24, "German weapon development", which is mostly about air weapons. A report on the effectiveness of the Hs 129 considers it vulnerable to AA and fighters due to its low speed. From this account it appears that the Stuka with 37mm guns was developed after the Hs 129. Some Hs 129 pilots had the MK 101 3cm cannon replaced by additional bombs. It is stated that pilots in training with the anti-tank Staffel of JG51 obtained 60% hits with the MK 101. The achievements of II SG 1 during 1942 are summarized as: 6508 sorties (average of 17 to 18 every 24 hours) 3138 sorties by Hs 129, 1532 by Hs 123, 1838 by Me 109E. 1386.5 tons of bombs released, 52 Soviet aircraft shot down and 55 destroyed on the ground. Casualties in Gruppe: 20 Hs 129, 5 Hs 123, 16 Me 109E. Claims of destruction for 91 tanks, 1081 light MT and 273 vehicles. German strafing attack tactics for the Me 109F are described as follows: "The target is approached at almost vertical angle at a speed of approximately 375 m.p.h. The attack is delivered and a steep climb made immediately. The method of low parallel ground strafing is not favoured." "Cannon attacks on M.T. have been made from as low as 250/300 feet. The method is to approach at a height of about 2,500 feet from which altitude the bombs are dropped. After release of bombs a final dive is made down to about 300 feet and the M.G. armament brought into action." For the Hs 129 a maximum dive angle of 70º, and speed should not exceed 340 m.p.h. Mention is made of SD2 and SD50 anti-personnel bombs. The dive angle for bomb release is 60º. Ju 87s generally carry one 250 Kg SC or SD, or 500 Kg for dealing with heavy tanks. They approach at 7,000–9,000 feet, and pull out of their dives at 2,500–4,000 feet to stay out of range of MG fire. "It has been noted from several sources that not only German infantry but also German tank formations have often been unwilling to attack unless preceded by Stuka bombing and several indications have been received of the enthusiasm with which the presence of Stukas is received by German troops and of their anxiety that Stukas should assist them in their assaults." All the best, John.

Mark Hayward's magnificent book "Sherman Firefly" (Barbarossa Books, 2001) is probably the best source on this. On p. 20 he has a table of Sherman C conversions by month, and they peak in September 1944. On p. 23 is a table showing holdings in 21AG for Jun 44, Dec 44 and Jun 45. Of the ten or so British, Canadian and Polish Sherman-equipped armoured brigades/divisions shown, six have their full allocation (36, enough for 12 per regiment or about 1 per sabre troop) in Jun 44 and the lowest allocation is 22. By December, everyone has at least 40, and four of them have enough or more than enough for two per troop. There isn't any detailed data on holdings between June and December, but another table on p. 27 notes that the unit establishment as at Sep 44 was 45 17-pdr tanks per brigade, plus 11 in the Armoured Replacement Group (ARG), and this was expected to be exceeded by holdings. All the best, John.

I have in mind a nice round number. All the best, John.

I have in mind a nice round number. All the best, John.

I'm going to go out on a limb here, and say that US Typhoon pilots probably made fewer false claims than practically any other class of ground attack pilot. All the best, John.

I'm going to go out on a limb here, and say that US Typhoon pilots probably made fewer false claims than practically any other class of ground attack pilot. All the best, John.