John D Salt

Well, I certainly wasn't aware that building cars confers expertise in casting or rolling big lumps of armour plate. I don't know if you think that qualifies me as a "moron", because I have some difficulty following your reasoning. Perhaps if you could manage to come up with something better than flat assertions of patent tommyrot, I might have less of a problem. Where I come from, "joking" is normally discernible by being funny. You have it backwards. Mass production was used in the armaments industry before the auto industry even existed. Any time you do engineering, you compromise. Can you find a better compromise in the 30-ton class than the Sherman? I doubt it. Thank you, but I have read sufficient books about Centurion even to be aware of how it's spelt. "A kudo"? And you ask me if I'm a moron? OK, so name a more successful one. If you can't, what conclusion do you think you can draw? T-37, T-38, T-40, PT-76, Type 2 Ka-Mi, LVT(A)1, 2 and 4. You owe me a beer. And if counter-factuals are true, I'm the Pope. A greater variety than the T-34. So that would make it "more flexible", using the language we anglophones are habituated to. I can't see that an SU-122 is any better than an M4(105) for the CS job, nor an SU-85 than an M4(76) or an SU-100 than an M-36B for tank killing. If you have any evidence of the superior performance of the Soviet vehicles, go right ahead and post it. It's obviously a better tank-killer. Wouldn't you expect it to be, at 50% more combat weight (and a corresponding increase in shipping space)? It also had less mobiquity than the Sherman, which matters in difficult country like Korea. I'd like to know your source for this. My copy of Zaloga & Grandsen says 45mm for the 1944 model SU-100. The Argentinian Narhuel and the Australian Sentinel both pretty clearly take their inspiration from the Sherman, so I think it's doing better in this respect than Panther or Tiger. Or T-34, for that matter. But Guderian fought to keep up production of Panzer IVs, pretty well comparable to the Sherman, rather than abandon it and go for a bunch of SPs and super-tanks instead. I'm not convinced that the evolutionary pressures of the home entertainment market are very similar to those of the battlefield. Since the Pz IV was the only design from any nation to serve as a front-line gun tank from the first day of the war to the last, I'd say that was quite a recommendation. Yup, that's all it is, just opinion. You'd be much more likely to convince me if you could rise to the level of a coherent argument, based on facts. All the best, John.

I doubt that experience building cars is much help in dealing with large armour castings. Nor am I aware of there being particularly large amounts of car industry experience in places like Lima Locomotive Works, Pacific Car & Foundry, or the Pressed Steel Car Co. (the "car" in these cases meaning rolling stock). Ford and Chrysler, maybe, but I think the railway experience would have been more helpful for heavy engineering. Do you have a source for this? It's the first time I've heard it suggested. Look at a picture of an early production M4. Look at a picture of a late production M4A3. How many parts can you see that are the same, apart from the 0.3 Brownings? I'd love to know what a tank has to do to qualify for "great" in your eyes. You're suggesting that the Sherman was not flexible? I can only assume that you are crazy on acid. The Sherman chassis was used not only for gun tanks, but for tank destroyers, howitzer tanks, assault tanks, self-propelled artillery, mine-rollers, mine-ploughs and flails, APCs, gun tractors, ARVs, BARVs, dozer tanks, flame tanks, rocket tanks, OP tanks, fascine carriers, ARKs, AVLBs, and the most successful amphibious tank ever built. It could do everything the T-34 could do and lots more besides, including walk on water. I defy you to name any other armoured vehicle that has been put to a greater variety of uses. The M46 only scored about 20% better per tank deployed than the M4, and there were a lot more M4s, so they got the majority of the kills. One of the inconvenient facts for people who claim the T-34 is a much better tank than the M4 is that every time the two have met in combat, the M4s have beaten the T-34s like a gong. And how much was the T-34 up-armoured, pray tell? My copy of "Bronezaschita srednikh tankov T-34" (Postnikov, Eksprint, Moscow 2005) shows exactly the same glacis thickness on the latest T-34-85 as on the earliest T-34. The Sherman, on the other hand, was up-armoured over its service life, and in the case of "Jumbo" up-armoured to a degree no T-34 ever came near. As for up-gunning "without too much trouble", for the T-34 this involved either a complete rebuild of the upper superstructure, or a new turret (modified from one originally intended for the T-43). Not much different from the Sherman, then, which took the 76mm turret from the T-23, could have taken the 90mm turret from the Pershing, and did take the 90mm turret from the M-36. Habitability, fightability, availability, ride quality, all those things that don't show up as simple-minded easily-measured numbers, but which AFV designers worry themselves about morning, noon and night. If the Sherman was so much worse than the T-34, why did the Soviets issue Shermans to Guards units? The fact is, in a weight budget of about 30 tons, the Sherman pretty much represented the state of the art in WW2 tank design. No tank in that weight class was very much better. The T-34, Panzer IV and Cromwell all have much the same level of theoretical operational effectiveness as the Sherman, as each nation's engineers came to the best compromise they could. Yes, the Panther and Tiger are better, but if you can't beat a 30-ton design with a 45-ton or a 60-ton design, you aren't much of a designer, are you? And for most of the war the US preferred, rightly, to ship two medium tanks overseas instead of the one heavy tank that would have taken the same shipping space. All the best, John.

Yup. And I notice that the challenge to produce a single account of an FT tank kill has still not been answered, just like the challenge to produce an instance of an FT exploding when struck by a bullet. Still, to add to the steadily-growing pile of evidence about the ineffectiveness of flame attacks against tanks, consider the following from John Weeks' excellent "Men Against Tanks", pp. 42-43, discussing anti-tank methods proposed during the invasion scare. We start with the four-man tank-burning team: "Optimism was paramount in this method of attack, but it was later expanded into a proper drill using a team of four men, two holding the metal bar, one carrying a bucket of petrol, and the last one having either a Very pistol or fusee matches. As the tank passed, numbers one and two pushed the bar into the tracks to stop it; number three threw petrol on to the side, in some cases adding a blanket to soak up the petrol and keep it in one place; and number four came up and ignited the vehicle. The tank was then supposed to blaze merrily and the crew would be shot as they tried to get out." Fortunately, this method was never tried for real. I think "optimism was paramount in this method of attack" is a nice piece of English understatement. The idea of shoving metal bars into tank suspensions to stop them gives a good idea of the level of practicality involved. The next paragraph on p. 43 begins: "Flame recurs frequently in the Home Guard manuals of this time, although Tom Wintringham was not enthusiastic about Molotov Cocktails saying that they were overrated and claiming that 10 per cent of the men using them ended up with serious burns." Tom Wintringham had combat experience as CO of the "English Battalion" at the battle of Jarama (recounted in his book "English Captain") and was in charge of the Home Guard anti-tank school at Osterley Park. His thoughts on tank fighting are contained in his "New Ways of War" -- he prefers big lumps of HE, and I think he's right. Moving on to pp. 46-50: "Finally there was flame. Although petrol stocks were not large in 1940, there was far more petroleum than there was explosive or guns and several minds bent themselves to the task of determining how best to use fire as a deterrent to armoured vehicles. The best and simnplest way was not to try to ignite the tank because it was known that that was difficult -- despite what the Home Guard were being taught -- it was better to surround the vehicle with a sea of fire and literally starve it of oxygen. Oxygen for the engine and oxygen for the crew were both needed in large quantities and a big enough fire would use up all that was in and around the tank. It took less than six seconds to stop a 1940 tank through oxygen starvation and the planning was based on this figure. Obviously it was difficult to provide for mobile flame projectors that could throw as much fuel as would be needed for six seconds of burning time, so most of the devices were static and intended to be pure ambush weapons. In the main there were four types: Static Flame Traps Flame Fougasses, Demi-Gasses and Hedge-Hoppers Beach Flame Barrages Home Guard Flame Throwers The Static Flame Traps were self-explanatory. They were some system of projecting fuel on to a road or track and igniting it. Most of them consisted of large drums of fuel dug into hillsides about 200ft from the track with pipes leading to the verges. Nearly all were gravity fed, but there were a few which needed pumps to force the fuel to the jets. The fuel was 25 per cent petrol and 75 per cent gas oil. Ignition was by using a Very pistol or a Molotov Cocktail, and to cover 60ft of road 30 gallons of fuel was needed every minute. By June 1941 there were 168 of these traps up and down the length of Britain, some of which had enough fuel for twenty minutes burning. Fougasses were a variation on the flame trap in which the fuel was projected by explosive. A Fougasse was generally made by burying a 40-gallon oil drum into a road bank and installing a pound or two of guncotton behind it, together with some incendiary mixture. On firing, a sheet of flame 10ft wide and 30yd long was fired across the road. A Demi-Gasse was the same as a Fougasse but was sited in the open without the advantage of the cover of the bank. On firing the barrel was blown apart and flame spread for an area of 36 sq yd. It was less efficient that the proper Fougasse, but useful in confined spaces. The Hedge-Hopper was a barrel standing on end with a charge placed off-centre beneath it. When fired, the barrel jumped 10ft into the air and travelled 7yd horizontally, flooding its landing area with blazing fuel. These unpleasant devices would obviously not work well against moving tanks and for success it was intended that the enemy vehicles would have to be halted by other means, such as the famous soup plates in the road, or a mine in the tracks of the leader, or a barrier of some sort. The Fougasse would then be sprung and before the hapless enemy could back away, the fatal six seconds would have elapsed and the engines would stop. Whether it would always have worked so well is highly problematical, but the psychological impact of sheets of flame pouring around the tank would probably have been good enough. [snips] The fourth and final flame weapon was the Home Guard Flame Thrower. This was not quite what its name might lead one to believe. It was both crude, simple and probably dangerous; it was made with the available stores by the Petroleum Warfare Department and issued by them direct to Home Guard units. It consisted of a 65-gallon barrel containing 40/60 petrol/diesel mixture, a semi-rotary hand pump, and 100ft of hose all mounted on a two-wheeled barrow or trolley. It was designed to be used for the static defence of a strong point or road block and its mobility was limited to a movement of a few yards pulled or pushed by its team of four or five Home Guard operators. The range was about 15yd and the flame could be kept going for two minutes or so. In use the jet at the end of the hose was connected to a stand pipe or similar support and ignition was by lighting a piece of oily rag or by throwing an Allbright and Wilson bomb. It was a clumsy and inefficient weapon which could only be justified by the urgent need to give the Home Guard something with which to meet the expected armoured invasion. Only 250 were issued and these were withdrawn by the end of 1942." None of these weapons ever got any tank kills, because, thank goodness, they were never used. The people who planned to use them were not lacking in either courage or ingenuity, but it should be obvious from the foregoing that their effectiveness would have been marginal at best. Yet, note that these desperate improvisations typically use about ten times as much fuel as the full load of a manpack flamethrower. Nor, despite the degree to which "optimism is paramount", does there seem to be any mention of flame being able to crack welds or damage fasteners, or roast the crew, or any other such exotic kill mechanisms. All the best, John.

Well, apart from the complete lack of evidence, your argument suffers from being inconsistent, and so ill-formed. As Wolfgang Pauli would have put it, it's not even false. OK, fine. This is the standard excuse for not being able to produce any evidence, and gives you a free pass to believe in exploding flamethrowers, UFOs, the Laffer curve, Raelianism and the tooth fairy. But let's consider it legitimate, just this once, for the sake of argument. Here you are clearly taking absence of evidence [but see footnote 1] to be evidence of absence. Now, either you can take the position that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, or you can reject that position. What you cannot do, and still have a well-formed argument, is to take both the position and its contrary. But that's what you've just done. KABOOSH! Your argument explodes with a blinding flash, leaving you sizzling in a fiery mess of broken logic. All the best, John. Footnote 1: Of course this "absence of evidence" only appears to be so because you have moved the goalposts about what you wanted evidence of. Your initial position was that there were no Japanese flamethrower attacks against Marines at this time. It took a few minutes to google up a counter-example. You then switched the criterion to be flamethrower attacks "with results so terrible". Exactly why the original incident can be taken as evidence of an exploding flamethrower (of which no other incidents have yet been reported) instead of a Japanese flamethrower attack (of which other incidents have been reported) is not explained. But let's not get into questions of Bayesian priors before you have mastered the principle of non-contradicton.

Here goes, based on Chamberlain, Doyle & Jentz' "Encyclopedia of German Tanks of WW2": 7.5 cm pak 40 raupenschlepper ost Troop trials with AG South, early 1944. [C, D & J 78] p-40 5 pre-series vehicles to Pz Ausbildung Abteilung South, AG C. [C, D & J 78] pz I 37cm aa No information. panzer II ausf g No evidence of comat use; 27 turrets used in pillboxes. [C, D & J 78] panzer II ausf J 7 issued to 12th PD, service on East Front 1943, by 1944 one converted as ARV. [C, D & J 78] panzer 38t neuer art None. [C, D & J 78] panzer I ausf c 2 issued to 1st PD early 1943, taken to Russia for troop trials. 38 issued to LVIII Pz Res Korps by D-Day. [C, D & J 78] panzer I ausf f 8 issued to 1st PD early 1943, taken to Russia for troop trials in summer. [C, D & J 78] sturmgeshutz flame thrower sd kfz 251/23 3.7 cm pak 35 zugkraftwagen It 5 cm pak 38 zugkraftwagen 1t maultier aa No information. sturmgeshutz m43 75/46 Used in Italy, late 1944 and 1945. [C, D & J 78] somua 7.5cm pak 40 No information. b-2 flamm 2 platoons issued to 213 schwere Pz Abteilung for occupation duties in the Channel Islands. 223 schwere Pz Kompanie took 12 to the Crimea in summer 1942, and still had 9 in service on 30 Dec 1944. SS Gebirgs Div "Prinz Eugen" used them in the Balkans. 14th and 21st Pz Fivs were issued them while re-forming in France in 1943, but returned them to store before seeing action. [C, D & J 78] b-2 Heeres Panzer detachments in France in 1941, occupation duties in the Channel Islands. 223 schwere Pz Kompanie took 4 to Russia. SS Gebirgs Div "Prinz Eugen" took 7 of them to the Balkans. [C, D & J 78] b-2 10.5cm lefh 18 Issued to Pz Artillerie dets in France in 1942. [C, D & J 78] fcm 10.5 lefh 16 fcm 7.5 pak 40 Both "served in France". [C, D & J 78] matilda II 5cm kwk L/42 3.7cm pak universal carrier 10.5cm lefh 16 mkIV (British) No information. panzerjager Bren Some served with 3rd Pz Gren Div. [C, D & J 78] geschutzagen IV 10,5 cm lefh 18 Troop trials in Russia. [C, D & J 78] All the best, John.

forgot to ask; is that source anywhere available in the net? (I might have stumbled upon it under different name in the past) </font>

If you can't spell Nietzsche You'll never be a tietzsche. All the best, John.

It's "survey" rather than "surveillance", but you're basically right. As the name implies, the primary task of a survey regiment is to much about with theodolites and measuring tapes to survey guns and OPs on to the grid. 4th (Durham) Survey Regiment RA had a survey battery, a sound ranging battery and a flash spotting battery, outline organization as follows: RHQ - Survey Battery: -- HQ survey section -- X Troop --- A section --- B section -- Y Troop --- C section --- D section - S-R Battery: -- R Troop -- S Troop - F-S Battery: -- A Troop --- A OP --- B OP --- C OP -- B Troop --- D OP --- P OP --- T OP For Op Veritable, assigned to 51 (H) Div were: Survey section X Troop No. 1 4-pen recorder section S Troop S-R recce party B Troop short-base F-S party Tac BHQ, 48 Battery I believe that 48 Bty is the survey battery, but it is not entirely clear from my reading of my source for the above, "Z Location, or Survey in War, the story of the 4th Durham Suvey Regiment Royal Artillery", by Whetton & Ogden. My father was a Royal Artillery surveyor when he did his national service just after the war, and was instructed by some of the veterans of 4th Survey Regt. It's his birthday today. All the best, John.

I think it would be interesting to model at least the difference in effects between thin and thick fuels. Thin fuels give better flash-burn, and produce billowing flame that gave considerable obscuration (so protecting the operator in the case of man-packs) and, the Russians at least considered, better morale effect. Thick fuels give a clean flame rod, and better continued burning on the ground. All the best, John.

Look harder. Three minutes with Google gave me this, from page 325 at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/okinawa/chapter13.htm "Capture of Dakeshi Ridge, 10-13 May [...] When one marine was set on fire by a Japanese flame thrower, several of his comrades tried to cross open ground to put out the flames,..." All the best, John.

616 is (according to some sources, if a footnote in the New English Bible is to be believed) the number of the mark of the Beast. Clearly, you have just benefited from the little-known Beastly range bonus. This is why range-finidng is so important -- to make sure the gunners only open fire at ranges that are lucky numbers. All the best, John.

There's nothing there that even suggests that this was the result of a hit on an FT fuel tank, and the Japanese fielded at least two patterns of manpack flamethrower. All the best, John.

Think how much more fun the training would have been if you got to chuck a thermite grenade at it. All the best, John.

Hmmm, an animated sequence. I think I would be more inclined to believe it if you could post a reference to a written combat account in which a flamethrower operator has met such a spectacular end. I cannot recall ever reading one. If you can find one, please post it. Obviously this may depend somewhat on the fuel used. I believe that German and Russian flamethrowers normally used diesel or fuel oil, which are not that easy to start burning, and I would imagine are jolly difficult to persuaded to explode. Thickened petrol obviously represents a bit more of a hazard, but consider the account of flamethrower operation in the PTO given in: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/chemsincmbt/ch14.htm (which account, I notice, never mentions the danger of flamethrowers being exploded by enemy bullets). If it so easy to persuade flamethrower fuel to ignite using, e.g., tracer bullets, then I would very much like to know 1. Why flamethrowers were so often out of action with defective ignition systems and 2. Why flamethrower crews carried thermite grenades (is the substance familiar? It burns very, very hot indeed) to ignite unignited flamethrower fuel. Of course, the fuel in this case is spread around in the open air, with plenty of available oxygen, whereas the stuff in manpack cylinders is sharing the tanks with nitrogen propellant, so it seems to me it should be harder still to ignite. Intriguing, but I rather suspect that the studies in question were of a theoretical and toxicological nature, rather than being based on operational experience. I would believe that there is no practicable defence against a high concentration of CO, but one has to doubt any source that claims that unconsciousness would be almost instantaneous when people are deprived of oxygen, or suggests that fifteen seconds without oxygen presents even the mildest kind of hazard. You can perform this simple experiment at home; first, hold your breath for fifteen seconds. Then check to see if you are dead (and if you are, write in to say so). It would also seem that the official US view on protection against flamethrowers has at some time become much more like the one the British arrived at through operational experience. Consider http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/fm8-9/3ch8.htm which says, in para 829, on the subject of defence against flamethrower attack, "A wool blanket is excellent". Still, if people have any evidence of flamethrowers exploding when hit by bullets or fragments, or flamethrowers destroying AFVs in combat, please, let's hear them. All the best, John.

My collection of PRO-based snippetry includes a number of items on flamethrower effectiveness. These may perhaps dispel some of the sillier myths about this weapon. It is nothing like as fearsome as popular imagination and "Squad Leader" paint it. Jason's statements about its ineffectiveness against AFVs are entirely correct, and backed up here by WW2 operational research. First of all, flamethrowers do not spontaneously combust in combat. WO 208/2112, "Translation of German flamethrower manual", says: "In order to give the men a greater sense of security attention should be drawn to the fact that should the weapon be struck by an infantry bullet or shell splinter it will not explode." Second, the main effect of flamethrowers is on enemy morale, rather than by any particularly destructive effect of flame. The disproportion between prisoners and casualties resulting from flame attacks is mentioned in WO 291/308, "Effect of flamethrowers on military personnel", which says that information from flame actions showed an average expenditure of 270 gallons per death, 9 gallons per prisoner. Physical effects of flame against field fortifications are not as great as you might think. WO 231/32, "Notes on Wasp and Lifebuoy", says: "An attack by flame depends largely on its terrifying effect for its success. Troops familiar with Flame Throwers will offer greater resistance than those inexperienced." "It is difficult to get large quantities of burning fuel in through the slits in a pill box. Anti-ricochet slits and flaps afford additional protection." "The occupants of a pill box are fairly safe if they retreat behind the partition wall." The report advises that woollen blankets and greatcoats, especially if wet, give good protection against radiant heat, but should be easy to remove in case they do catch fire. WO 291/986, "The operational effectiveness of the flamethrower tank (Crocodile)" says: a) "Flame was most effective against houses and fortified buildings. There were invariably set on fire and gutted. Open defences among woods, hedges and undergrowth provided good targets as the vegetation was easily set on fire. c) As would be expected, flame was least effective against pillboxes and the like; only if it could be projected through apertures to the inside did the occupants suffer." The difficulty of using flame against entenchments is commented on in WO 291/1060, "The A45 flame gun versus the Panzerfaust". This report refers to earlier research using the Wasp flamethrower, which it says shows that "a frontal shot of ignited fuel does negligible harm to men in a slit-trench providing they keep their heads down." The trench should either be enfiladed, or an unignited ("wet") shot fired first. Because of the different ballistics of ignited and unignited fuel, it is likely that two unignited shots may be needed. It is also stated that, if wind conditions are such as to affect shooting, the first shot will usually be wasted, used for indicating wind direction. The number of manpack flamethrowers required to reduce a pillbox or bunker seems considerable. WO 232/70, "Flame throwers – Exchange of information with Red Army" says "The number of flame throwers allotted to an assault group formed to attack a pillbox depends on the number of embrasures. On an average 3–4 flame throwers are allotted per pillbox." Nonetheless, WO 232/35 "Reduction of Japanese bunkers" says that "At Tarawa M3 tank flame throwers reduced pill boxes when all other attempts had failed." Finally, on the main topic of the thread, effectiveness against AFVs was known to be poor. WO 291/1139, "Drop tank incendiary bombs used in the anti-tank role", mentions that trials of flamethrowers against AFVs showed that it was difficult to get fuel inside the AFV. An open driver's hatch would admit fuel; an open commander's hatch with more difficulty, as it was harder to "loft" the fuel to turret height. Hits on the (internal) mantlet area of the Churchill admitted fuel. Vehicles with engine louvres on the rear deck could be disabled by flaming from the rear, which ignites fan-belts and damages ignition wires. It is pointed out that attack from above, as with an air attack, seems to be the most favourable aspect when using flame. All the best, John.

See if it matches this: CRA 30 Corps (Rawlins) 2 Cdn AGRA (Leggat) 3 Cdn Med Regt 4 Cdn Med Regt 7 Cdn Med Regt 10 Med Regt 1 Hy Regt 3 AGRA (Cleeve) 13 Med Regt 59 Med Regt 67 Med Regt 72 Med Regt 59 Hy Regt 4 AGRA (Hambleton) 53 Med Regt 65 Med Regt (less 1 bty) 79 Med Regt 51 Hy Regt (less 1 155mm bty) 5 AGRA (Yates) 7 Med Regt 64 Med Regt 84 Med Regt 121 Med Regt 52 Hy Regt 9 AGRA (Crosland) 9 Med Regt 11 Med Regt 107 Med Regt 53 Hy Regt Additional arty: 74 AA Bde (Smith) 106 AA Bde (Jones) 6 Fd Regt 19 Fd Regt 86 Fd Regt 147 Fd Regt 73 A Tk Regt 27 LAA Regt 1 Cdn Rocket Unit 3 Super Hy Regt Div Arty for 51 (H) Div (Rennie) CRA (Shiel) 126 Fd Regt 127 Fd Regt 128 Fd Regt 61 A Tk Regt 40 LAA Regt The total number of weapons, by type, in the Corps arty appears to be: 1 A Tk Regt --> 48 17-pdr 1 LAA Regt --> 54 40mm Bofors 2 AA Bdes --> 144 3.7-in AA 4 Fd Regts --> 96 25-pdr 18 Med Regts (less 1 bty) --> 32 4.5-in and 248 5.5-in 5 Hy Regts (less 1 bty) --> 36 155mm and 40 7.2-in 1 Super Hy Regt --> 2 8-in and 4 240mm 1 Rocket Unit --> 12 32-barrel Land Mattress ...all from the Staff College battlefield tour guide for Veritable, 1947. They really shouldn't be short of indirect fire support. All the best, John. [ October 28, 2006, 10:36 AM: Message edited by: John D Salt ]

If it did, I've never heard of such a thing, although I think some post-war airborne bn orgs had a "patrols" platoon. And all the first ten pages of google hits for "scout and sniper platoon" seem to refer to either the USMC or the Canadian Army. It's probably fair to say that both organizations have been more successful in staying obsessive about individual marksmanship than most other armies. When I was in the TA, the bunch of odds and sods fielded by HQ company on training weekends were at various times designated "Defence platoon", "Recce platoon", or "Intelligence section". None of those really described our job, which was usually to provide enemy for the rifle companies (one of our O/Cdts made up some shoulder-slides saying "PLA"; I wore a Lenin badge in my hat). Sometimes there were rumours that we were going to get a couple of 81mm mortars or a MOBATs and become mortar platoon or anti-tank platoon, but we never did while I was there. Given that HQ company's defence-recce-int-odds'n'sods platoon made a disportionate contribution towards the shooting team, it could probably have been designated "scout and sniper platoon" no more inappropriately than its other designations, but it never was. All the best, John.

"Motorised/lorried battalions (independent or in the infantry brigades of armoured divisions) were on the standard establishment but had dedicated troop carrying vehicles provided by RASC." Source: http://members.tripod.com/~nigelef/Divorg.htm ...from Nigel Evans' excellent RA pages. A Gunner site might be an odd thing to consult on infantry organisation, but Gunners are just generally useful people, aren't they? All the best, John.

The lorried inf bde gets an independent MG coy all of its own, instead of takling a one-third share in the divisional MG bn; but that hardly seems to make much difference. All the best, John.

Apologies for the delay in replying, I've been dealing with stuff. Sniper establishments have always been a bit subject to fashion and personal taste in the British Army. A good general rule is up to 8 sniper pairs per battalion, raised on the authority of the CO. Current W/Es (which aren't called that any more but I forget the TLA) have a properly-established battalion sniper platoon, but this is a recent innovation, I've not seen it until recent years. 16 snipers max per unit has, however, been a good rule of thumb fairly consistently since about 1916. Variation is not between theatres so much as between battalions. Vickers MMGs are not integral to most battalion W/Es, but in a normal inf div might well be loaned from the divisional MG battalion. By 1944 this would have 1 coy of 4.2" heavy mortars and 3 coys of Vickers MMGs, the Mor coy having 3 or 4 (depending which source you believe, Joslen is compatible with 4) platoons each of 4 mortars, and the MMG coys each having 3 MMG platoons each of 4 MMGs. That amount of support for a div suggests, on a even-handed basis, one MMG coy per brigade, and a platoon (4 MMGs) for a battalion, but it all depends on how the commanders want to task organise. A lorried inf bde in an amrd div has an independent MG Coy, which has something like 4 4.2" Mors and 12 MMGs. All the best, John.

Any recommendations for a book that goes into more detail about this? </font>

I've just finished reading the thing, having ordered a copy out of curiosity. I read it fairly quickly -- it's not written in a style that rewards leisurely reading. In the first place, it consists of large dobs of Soviet offical prose, which can be turgid at the best of times, and in the second, it is poorly translated -- I suspect the authors did their own translation rather than employ a professional. Even with these disadvantages, it could have been a good deal more worthwhile than it actually is. Unfortunately, the authors seem to have been so determined to let the reader make up his own mind from the evidence presented that they completely fail to provide any sort of narrative structure at all. I have come across some pretty dull books in both military history and computer science that were essentially PhD theses with a false beard and stuck-on nose. This book seems to have taken the trend to its illogical conclusion; it reads like a bunch of raw research material, before it is edited and organised to form a coherent thesis. There is hardly any technical detail. The documents presented are not technical or tactical reference or instructional materials, which might have been interesting to the averagely-obsessive wargamer even with no attempt at narrative. They are inter-departmental administrative correspondence, and about as interesting as tepid dishwater. They are also remarkably hard to follow, as various code-names are not glossed and passing descriptions of devices under development are not followed up. The publishers have made some pretty wild claims for the book in the back-flap blurb, which the text simply does not match. It seems quite clear that the Red Army did not do all that much to create the Wehrmacht; collaboration had ceased by the time Hitler seized power, and even during the heyday of German-Soviet cooperation there seems to have been a strong impression on the Soviet side that the Germans were the experts, and were not sharing their best stuff with the Sovs, either. It is also clear that the Reichswehr did as well, if not better, in technology transfer out the Americans (a visit to Edgewood Arsenal is mentioned) and the British (Napier Lion engines and Vickers tanks feature prominently, irritatingly mis-transliterated as Napir and Vikkers). What might perhaps be surprising to some is that the possibility of a future war between Germany, Poland and France was clearly foreseen in the 1920s, and the Reichswehr was preparing for a "best-of-two" revision of the Versailles Treaty long before Hitler came to power. The book might be of some value to someone who has a need for rough translations of a bunch of original Soviet secret archive material from the era. The absence of any coherent narrative makes it pretty much useless for anyone else. All the best, John.

The trouble is, "3-ton lorry" covers vehicles that will turn up all over the place, and Joseln doesn't go into detail, but I shouldn't be surprised if lots of them weren't included in the RA establishments. I expect that something over half the tonnage of supplies being lifted by the RASC would be artillery ammunition, too. As the armd div has 2 field regts (one SP and one towed) and the inf div has 3 (all towed), the excess of 3-tonners in the armd div is, I think you'd be right to infer, caused by the inf having more MT. All the best, John.

I was always under the impression that an inf bde being designated "lorried" implied that it had sufficient TCVs of its own to move everyone in one lift. I can't think of an authoritative source for this, but Joslen gives the 1944-45 W/E of an armd div as containing an Armd Bde Coy and an Inf Bde Coy RASC, and a 1944-45 inf div three Inf Bde Coys. The total count of "lorries, 3-ton" is 1,309 for the armd div, but only 1,056 for the inf div. I find it very hard to imagine what could account for such a large difference between a 2-bde and a 3-bde organization if not the TCVs for the lorried inf bde. I imagine that the RASC Bde Coys were mostly doing the same job as an RLC CS Coy would do these days, hauling bullets, biscuit and beans. That there was some important difference between a lorried inf bde and an ordinary one is indicated by the fact that Joslen mentions the dates when e.g. the Queen's Brigade changed designation from one to another. All the best, John.

The ATk platoon is scaled for six 6-pounders, and has 6 Loyd Carriers as towing vehicles, a Universal Carrier for the platoon commander, and 15cwt trucks for ammunition supply and the REME fitter section. The mortar platoon has six 3-inch (81mm) mortars, which I assume you will have off-table. If you want it on-table, you need a Universal Carrier for each mortar detachment, another for the platoon commander, 3 15cwt trucks and a 3-ton lorry. The carrier platoon has 4 sections each of 3 Universal Carriers, plus a carrier for the platoon commander and a couple of 15cwt trucks. Each carrier has a Bren gun, each section has a PIAT, and I would give each section a 2-in mortar as well. The Assault Pioneer platoon has two assault sections and one pioneer section, and a total strength of 1 officer and 28 men. I assume you will not be bothering to represent the signals and admin platoons. The above is mostly drawn from George Forty's "British Army Handbook 1939-1945". Obviously the se are the nominal strengths, and what was actually fielded might be quite different. Only inspection of the unit war diary for the action concerned is likely to tell you exactly what they had on the day. All the best, John.