c3k

LOL! Good to hear. If a QB was that good for you, plunge into those pre-made battles. There are some outstanding ones waiting for you. Re: CMBN. It should get a v3 upgrade. I have no idea when, or what it will cost. I don't know if it will jump from v1 -> v3, or if you'll need v2 first.. However, v2 is definitely better than v1.

Reading Spaeter's "Grossdeutschland" books, an early Barbarossa encounter is described. A halftrack mounted flak is specifically used to defend against a Soviet attack across a field. That was within the first few weeks of the campaign. The effectiveness was unquestioned. Mobile autocannon are men-killers, pure and simple.

I'm not trying to defend a possible bug, but adding this for background information: Spotting is "pulsed". The spot checking algorithm runs at discrete intervals. These intervals are different for different units and the start times are different, as well. Hence, one unit in the same action spot as another may not see an obvious enemy that the other one sees. Once spotted by a unit, then the individual with the weapon needs LOS. This is the biggest issue. Vegetation is non-intuitive. Since leaves can be destroyed, the game checks LOS without leaves. Sometimes it will spot an enemy when the camera shows the LOS blocked. (If a breeze blows the bush over, you'd have LOS, for example.) Sometimes a slight rotation would block the gunner's LOS. Then he goes back to the secondary target. But wait! Now that he's looking at the secondary target, the thing blocking the primary target isn't in the way. Rotate to primary! Oh, no... Now that thing is in the way! But, hey! I can see a secondary target! Rotate to engage. Whoa! There's that primary target again! Ignore the secondary, get the primary! Ahhh! What are the odds of that? The primary LOS just got blocked again by my rotation. Back to the secondary... ^^^ Does that explain it? Agreed, it sounds wrong. All the above is just to explain some of how I think the game approaches LOS. Ken

It is now reported. (I don't know if it had been reported before.) Ken

^^^ The interesting aspect of that sight is that the curve which it slides along is a reproduction of the ballistic profile of the bullet. As it should be, to take account of the drop. On topic: I've always thought that "Target Light" is a slower ROF, using fewer automatic weapons, with better/longer aim for each shot. Whereas "Target" is akin to giving it all you've got. If my impression is correct, then "Target Light" would accomplish the desired "aim carefully", especially if the unit is unsuppressed and not tired. Ken

I was not part of the discussion you reference, but there was a definite switch in history about tank riders during WWII. Early war, no riders. Late war, many riders. Why was it not in CMBN/FI? Not modeled yet. Now, the resources enabled it to be coded (it was a much greater part Soviet imagery and use), and it was important to get it into CMRT. I -assume- that when game engine v3 is available to update CMBN/FI, then we'll get tank riders in those games, as well... (I have a picture of ~18 men crammed on a Sherman. Well behind front lines, of course, but they could certainly get a lot on there.)

If I recall, there is a lot of vegetation around the stream in that battle. When you played, did you have the trees toggled all or partially off? The wiggle could be explained by the gunner's vision being obscured by vegetation. Or, it's a bug.

^^^ Too good! The book I have of his is "Warfare in Antiquity". One example: He analyzed the march routes available to Xerxes, coupled with texts of "the Persians marched past for 3 days straight" and came to a conclusion about the bounds of the numbers of men in the Persian army. Then again, I also enjoyed how he got a battalion or two of soldiers to recreate Greek phalanxes and experimented with the best way to use 14 foot spears in massed formations. That's not something the average academic gets to do.

One of the amazing strengths of this game system/simulation engine is how well its modeling at the low level ends up reflecting higher level history. Look at the Italians in CMFI vs. the US. The differences in performance are purely down to unit organization and equipment: TO&E. With the correct TO&E modeled, the Italians become an unwieldy, weak, brittle force of infantry which is easily routed by modern combined arms. (The key there is "modern combined arms". In a pure infantry (bolt-action rifle) vs. similar infantry, they stand up pretty well.) Similarly, you find how important those MG42's really were. (Especially with the v2.11 patch.) In CMRT, the '44 Soviet Army is able to show its strengths. And it does have weaknesses, which can be exploited if the German player is skilled and has the right terrain and support. Or he'll get crushed. As it happened. Again, the impressive thing is how the only difference between the individual pixeltruppen is their artwork. The rest is due to historic TO&E. Oh, and how eager my pixeltruppen are to die for me. They seek glory. Ken

Colonel von Delbruck (sp) has a great book on ancient armies realities vs. myths. He was the military tutor to the young Kaiser. Very interesting read. Nothing like a Prussian Colonel in the royal court to test ancient methods of marching and attacking. He had more resources than the average researcher

Bah. Insulating sheaths are capitalist luxury. Working Soviet man plunges into his work with no sheath. Da.

^^^ I bought that movie. (I enjoy supporting indie's.) If you approach it as it was meant, as a totally over the top spoof, it wasn't THAT bad. Re: Stalin becoming a better judge of his generals. I think he just became self-assured that they were sufficiently afraid of him (and Beria) to fight harder at the front. (The period images of him are, to a Western perspective, ludicrous. A tall man, bigger than anyone around; master of all, etc., etc. Similar to Kim il un's "he played golf once and got 15 holes in one.")

Give the defender more points the longer it is whole.

Commo wire. Modeled. Soviet 4mm wire weighed 1 ton per km. I want guys with wire spools running about. I want copper colored comm-lines. Just like the red command lines, but copper! Not sienna. Copper. They'd follow them around and link one unit to another. And then they'd jam tank tracks. And conscripts would cut lengths to help hold their bedrolls together. And artillery would break them. And repair teams would fix them. Lightning would shock the men. Enemy could sneak next to them and listen in.

Early '41 figures are grossly distorted by the various "pocket" battles. I'm not saying the casualties don't count, but, rather, the enormous Soviet losses skew the results of away from combat effectiveness ratios. If we subtract out the Soviet captured from Minks, Kiev, Bryansk, and Vyazma, that's roughly 2 million Soviets who didn't really fight. (Big approximation, that.) By "really fight", I don't mean to diminish the hell they faced. But, it is far different being pocketed and trying frantically to break out than it is to sit in prepared defenses or partake in a planned attack. Many of the German forces trying to contain the pocketed Soviets on the east side of the pockets were decimated. Or worse. (See Stahel's books for good examples of this.) Of course, in early '44 and on, many German units were pocketed and facing the same issues the Soviets faced in '41 and '42. Both sides have historically skewed the casualty figures in their own favor for various reasons. Germans to show their prowess against uncountable hordes, Soviets to show they faced more Germans and lost fewer than what the West thinks to show their mastery of the operational art. And to save the reputations of many who fought those bloody battles and then gained political power. Can't be saying our president was an incompetent butcher of our soldiery, can we? Regardless, I do support the general thrust of your statement: loss ratios to force ratios started one way and then went the other. That does feed into the Wehrmacht tenet that offensive is the superior form of fighting and is always preferable to the defense. (Your numbers show the attacker always had a better loss ratio, looking at it from a strategic perspective.) That ignores many, many, many factors. Kind of like how the German leadership ignored them...

Pointed questions are also welcome. The "one-size up" would apply to FULL size TO&E. That would be due to command and control, command push, type of tendencies. Add yet another step up for depleted TO&E. FWIW, reading Bartlett's book about the Soviet Zhitomir Berdichev Op of December '43/January '44, some German infantry Regiments had fighting strengths of 40-80 men (seven regiments in this range, just in one corps), and several had 80-150 men. To translate, that is not even the strength of a company. Two steps down, and weak, even at that. That was how devastatingly bloody the attrition on the East Front was for both sides.

One word: commissars.

That was the buffed up strength achieved during the buildup just before the operation kicked off. 70 to 80 is the number reached by sweeping up every able-bodied man in the rear areas (civilians), getting normal army replacements and convalescents, and new units from the army training program. These replacements "swelled" the ranks to the number of 70-80 per company. You can understand why Soviet offensives ran out of steam after a few days and whole new echelons had to be introduced into the battle. (Same for the Germans: that's why their vaunted counter-attacks never got anywhere. When an entire panzer division has 18 tanks and loses 12 in one attack, that loss negates it from taking a meaningful part in any future part of the battle.)

Just to put it in perspective, during Op Bagration the normal Soviet infantry company numbered 70 to 80 men. (L'vov Sandomiercz Soviet General Staff Study; edited by Glantz). They seemed to think that was pretty good, actually. ("A lot of the recruits were from recently liberated zones." ) Of that 70-80, about 30%-50% would be conscripts. 3 platoons divided into 75 men means about 25 men per platoon. 3 squads? Okay, 8 men per squad. Splitting gets pretty exciting after that, especially if 4 of your 8 are conscripts. Soviet Battalion = Western Company (~250 men) If the west would use a company to achieve a goal, well, if it takes 250 men, it takes 250 men. The late war Soviets would have to use a Battalion. (And to keep it balanced, recognize that many German Panzer divisions would be down to ~2 dozen tanks after a few days of combat. An entire Regiment would be a western company or so.) A meatgrinder.

Carrier pigeons. The release is very quick. It takes a lot of pausing and rewinding to catch it, but the key is to focus on the HQ riflemen, NOT the CO. He only dictates the message. The bloke who keeps putting breadcrumbs into his suspiciously cooing pocket is the one who will release the pigeon. Depending on skill level, you may not see it. Test with conscripts first.

Morale state will have a huge impact on accuracy, IMO, in game. As an aside, during the blackpowder days, the commander would order the regiment which distance to sight at and what aimpoint to use. For example, "300 yards! Aim at their feet! Ready...Fire!" (That would be useful if the enemy were closer than 300 yards.) It was a bit of skill to estimate the range, the sight, and the aimpoint, and then time the order so the volley fired at the right time. (Anyone who's ever used voice commands for several hundred at once in a parade ground environment will understand the difficulties involved...) Careful aim? How much incoming, how tired, how many quarts of adrenaline have I used up already? Ken

Hmmm. I have found that my men respect my leadership a bit more if I -read- the objectives in the briefing before the battle. Okay, who am I kidding? Excellent initiative! Keep charging them back and forth over the mines until that satisfying squelch break interrupts their annoying little screams.

The ad hominem vituperative comments do nothing except allow me to use high fallutin' words like "vituperative" and "ad hominem". It really does not reflect well on the validity of the position you're espousing. Just saying.

Shellholes? No... it was worms. Big, ostfront-sized, epically Russian, worms.

The Soviets did a fantastic job of adapting to the conditions they faced. Their tanks were the right tool for the right job for the men using them. They were better than a lot of early post-war literature made them out to be. A Patton vs. Zhukov "what if" would be very interesting to model. (That would, unfortunately, ignore logistics...) Ken