gunnergoz

Ben's gay? Or been gay? You guys are getting me all confused.

Building on what Bigduke6 contribued: If Delta Force (SF/Rangers) was involved, the "geronimo" code name may well have been one of their contributions. I've heard there were some Delta guys on the team. After all, the SEALs probably got to name the op "Neptune's Spear" and so the leftover code for success got to be picked by Delta. But I wonder who got to pick the "awsh!t" code word if they failed to find Bin Laden and what it would have been...160th Special Operations Squadron; maybe "Hoffa?" (They never found him, either.)

One man's hobby is another's indictable offense...

Orange juice, hell, better some brew or lambrusco...

You're describing the dreaded "Blubbermensch" assault troops, right? :D The US has their "Chairborne Infantry" too.

Eh? What did you say? Where am I?

If you read this source, and other contemporary documents evaluating Tac Air effectiveness, you will for certain find that they knew even then that pilot claims of strafing kills were exaggerated. But there was ample evidence that Tac Air was having an extremely negative effect upon the enemy. Not only were assets being destroyed, but German operations and even strategy at high levels were being affected. Even if one grants that not every Tac Air sortie resulted in a kill, enough were flown, often enough, that over time serious materiel casualties were inflicted on the Germans in the months following D-Day. And that is my point. This revisionism would have it seem that the Germans actually shrugged off the Tac Air offensive since it did not really hurt them that much. Nothing could be further from the truth. Even apart from the significant morale and C3 impacts the strikes were causing, they were steadily depleting the numbers of German combat assets available to fight with and the logistical tail to support the combat assets was similarly being eroded. BTW, that's my final post on the subject since I can't set it out any plainer than I have.

I'm not sure all this will go in, but here's something to chew on: My source: http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1488&REC=3 The Ninth Army qualified this, stating that "The air attacks have not generally achieved the desired degree of neutralization. The expected degree of neutralization, however, — has usually been achieved." They list the following reasons for failure to be all that was desired: "(1) too little air effort available for a specific job; (2) inaccuracy; and (3) the time lag occurring between the end of a major air attack and the assault on the objective by the ground unit." In evaluating the effectiveness of air attacks against specific targets, the comments received from ground units agrees in general with the observations made by air units. Attacks against troops varied in casualties inflicted. While the percentage of dead and wounded was frequently not high, temporary casualties due to shock and demoralization resulted in large numbers in most cases. General Bayerlein reported that fewer men wounded by air attack returned later to duty than those wounded by ground weapons. He also stated that "strafing is more unpleasant for ground troops than bombing, because of better and more exact results, even in trenches. An increase in this type of attack would have been advantageous." Trucks and other unarmored transport were particularly vulnerable to air attack, as the claims (see Part I-A) indicate. There is more difficulty in assessing the effectiveness against tanks and armored vehicles. The Ninth Army reported that "Excellent results have been obtained when tanks have been hit or a near miss has been scored with 500 pound bombs". Most units reported that the aircraft rocket was the best weapon against tanks although a direct hit, involving high 35 Part I-B Evaluation accuracy, was necessary. Instances of claims against tanks have been questioned by some ground units (26th and 29th Inf. Divisions) but many other instances have been proved where air attacks have disabled or destroyed many more tanks than were claimed. P/W's have also reported a high rate of loss of tanks due to air attack and confirm the effectiveness of rocket fire. From unit commentaries, part II of same source: XIX CORPS. "Column cover for the 2 Armd. Div. was vectored to a troop concentration at A780444. Bombed with good results and controller asked if they could strafe the woods where other enemy troops were. Our troops at that time were 200 yards away and the planes were ordered to strafe in one direction only. They worked over the woods and 100 prisoners came out with their hands up to surrender. Controller said it was the closest cooperation they ever saw. "Another instance of the effect of a strafing attack was a wooded hill strongly defended by MG, AT guns, and small arms. A squadron of F/Bs bombed the defenses but still the light tanks attacking the hill could not advance. The squadron was asked to come down again and strafe the positions after which the position was taken. PW's said the bombing was not so bad, but when the "Jabos" strafed them they lost all will to fight and tended to make the men scatter for protection regardless of orders. Many were found hiding below the ground and they didn't offer much resistance. Many were killed at their guns and in their foxholes by the strafing." Ill CORPS. "The use of fragmentation bombs on enemy troops in woods west of Nancy, France, produced a great slaughter. One company commander reported that about nine tenths of his company was destroyed and the remainder rendered unfit for combat." COMBAT COMMAND "B" 4TH ARMORED DIVISION 5 October 1944 SUBJECT: Unit Commendation. TO: Commanding Officer, 409th Fighter Squadron, 9th Air Force. THRU: Commanding General, 4th Armored Division, APO 2 54, U. S. Army. 1. The Commanding General, Combat Command "B", 4th Armored Division, desires that the 409th Fighter be commended for outstanding and exemplary action in the vicinity of Fresnes-en-Saulnois, on 24 September 1944. 2. Planes from this squadron in close support of the Combat Command succeeded in relieving a tense situation in which our ground troops were under heavy enemy tank and artillery attacks. They succeeded in pressing home strong attacks under the most adverse weather conditions and in the face of concentrated enemy AA fire which cost them one of their planes. 3. As a result, six enemy tanks were knocked out by the air and the enemy attack was broken up. 4. The Commanding General, Combat Command "B", 4th Armored Division wishes to convey his congratulations to the personnel of the 409th for their courageous flying and tactical skill in this engagement. S/S H. E. Dager, H. E. DAGER, Brig. General, U. S. A. Commanding. SUBJECT: Commendation. TO: The Officers, Men and Women of the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional), APO 374 U. S. Army. (snip) 4. A most severe obstacle to your performance of duty has been the interminable weather on our front which has made every mission a hazardous one. In defiance of freezing conditions, poor visibility, uncertain winds, and treacherous snowstorms, your medium-bombers have attacked key targets with repeated success. During the period from 21 December 1944 to 6 February 1945, your bombers conducted over 9300 sorties, and dropped more than 6200 tons of bombs. In these operations, 148 locomotives and 1893 railway cars were destroyed. Over 500 military vehicles, including 61 tanks, were knocked out. Fifteen bridges were completely destroyed and railway lines were cut in 301 places. The relentless bombardment, which was carried out in the early stages of our operation against the Colmar pocket, was in keeping with the finest tradition of the Army Air Force; and the demoralization of the enemy, which resulted, greatly assisted the First French Army to attain a major victory. 5. The ground units of your Air Force have also shown outstanding devotion to duty, by maintaining your aircraft and your airfields with such efficiency that your pilots have always been able to answer our calls for assistance on a moment's notice. 6. Your achievements in the past have brought you the highest credit, and I am confident that your efforts in the future will continue to win for you the everlasting thanks of myself, my officers and my men. I commeno you and congratulate you on your inspiring deeds. S/S Jacob L. Devers Lieutenant General (3) German Comments. Lt. Gen. Bayerlein, Commanding the Panzer Lehr Division, stated that "Lightning (P-38): Unpleasant for ground troops because of its quiet, almost noiseless approach, its maneuverability and speed, its heavy armament and bombs, exact aiming and hitting. Particularly effective against tanks. Direct or near hits destroy the tank. "Thunderbolt (P-47): Armament and bombs; noisier, easier to identify from the ground, also very maneuverable and fast. Otherwise, same effect as Lightning, probably lighter bombs. (I, myself, was hit by Thunderbolts five times). Direct or close bomb hits destroy the tank. Weapons penetrate all tank armor except that of the "Koenigstiger". "Spitfires and Mustangs (P-51): Have not impressed me particularly in their effect." More from Bayerlein's debriefing (he is referred to as "P/W" i.e. Prisoner of War) The 27th dawned "wonderfully quiet", as it seemed to P/W. He had gotten 14 tanks together, just in time for an attack which came about 0900 with no artillery preparation, but was again preceded by swarms of fighter-bombers, which led the way. P/W's CP at Dangy was repeatedly raked byfighter-bombers, and by noon it was necessary to pull out. US tanks appeared in front of him in strength for the first time at Dangy. About 1600 or 1700 a messenger rushed up and reported that US tanks were within 300 yards of the CP. The fighter attacks had ceased as the tanks approached; further evidence of what P/W notes as obviously close cooperation between air and ground forces. P/W walked, keeping to woods and byways, almost to Percy, until he ran into a German mobile radio station and was able to report to corps that of his Panzer Lehr Division nothing remained. Its armor was almost completely destroyed, its combat personnel killed, wounded, captured or scattered, all the headquarters records, papers and equipment were lost. Its general had escaped with nothing but the clothes he stood up in, and even these were in a sad state. On the 27th, Gen. Bayerlein got together the remnants of his division, pioneers, signalmen, repair-shop workers, and the like, and recovered some 8 tanks, mostly from the shops. On the 29th he reached Percy, on the 2/3 August, Vire, slowly moving east with a front to the south against Patton's speeding tank columns. On Sunday, 13 August, the "Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr", as the remains of the original division were called, was near Habloville, some 10/11 km. northwest of Argentan and P/W had his headquarters in a small house on the outskirts of the village. Traffic was in a terrific snarl in the village, moving north and east to get out of the Falaise-Argentan trap. Many vehicles were parked in woods and orchards on all sides of it. There had been severe attacks on road traffic east of the town the night before, and this had added to the confused condition. Punctually at 0900 on the morning of the 13th came the fighter-bombers. They swept in very low over at least 250 motor transport, trucks, cannon, and nebelwerfer on the roads in and around the village and in nearby fields and orchards. They hit a truck train of rocket ammunition right off the bat, and this started exploding and throwing rockets in all directions. The streets were littered with burning autos. Gen. Bayerlein's wire and radio communications went out, and he got out of there, diving into a slit trench in a nearby orchard. This went on until 1300 practically without interruption. P/W then wormed his way back into town, but with no communications he could exercise no command functions, and at 1400 when the fighter-bombers returned he was glad to dive back into the trench. The streets of the town were so littered with the burning remains of trucks and equipment as to be impassable, yet the fighters kept on until it was practically dark, after which 2-motored bombers came in and bombed intermittently all night long. The group was then at last withdrawn to Heilbronn for refitting. At Heilbronn, then, at the end of September, Gen. Bayerlein got together some 5000 of his rear echelon troops, practically all that was left of the original complement of 17,000 men of the Division. Of the 8000 combat troops originally with the Division, far fewer than 1000 were left, and the 1000-odd combat troops he had with him at Heilbronn were practically all new replacements. In this connection, P/W notes that his losses from air attack had this further ominous note — that far fewer of the men wounded by air attack returned later to duty than those wounded by ground weapons. Of those wounded in air attacks, he estimates that 80% never returned to duty, whereas in the case of ground attacks it was only 50-60%. This he explains by the heavier caliber of airplane machine-guns and cannon, and the decompression effect of large high-explosive bombs, as compared with light machine guns and artillery shelling on the ground.

That's plain bogus, Jon, since those were all built before the war or before production could be altered to more modern designs, while much of the Russian wartime air production was devoted towards building those Il-2's - for good reason...they were effective killers of German assets on the ground.

I never defended the idea that all pilot-claimed kills were actual kills, only that there were significant losses to Tac Air attacks from fighter bombers, particularly in France after the breakout. Now it is being made to sound like the entire Tac Air campaign was bogus, worthless and fruitless because, as "everyone" knows, one A/C pass could not possibly be very accurate. I beg to differ. Air power WAS devastating, when it connected and in the crowded confines of the Falaise in particular it connected often. Somehow, I doubt the Soviets would have built 42,000 purpose-designed Il-2's if Tac Air and strafing was ineffective as some seem to think it was. One poster mentioned the psychological effect - terror, more accurately - instilled in the Germans by the threat of Jabo attacks. That had a basis in fact. Drive by a burn out hulk with smoking human remains in it right after a Jabo attack and that just might affect the old morale. Such stories are not out of fairy tales. I spent some time looking on the web last night and found ample contemporary documentation about the subject, that even during WW2 was doubting the extent to which pilot ground attack kill claims could be proven, but at no time was it ever said that the attacks were fruitless or useless. Revisionists would have you believe that Tac Air kills were minimal and I'm just not buying into it. I'm not sure what the payoff is for taking the revisionist stance is, but it is no closer to the truth than are the pilot claims of .92 targets hit per mission, which is what some wartime squadrons were (wrongly) claiming. Even if it was 1/3 or 1/4 of that number, it was massive in terms of overall casualties to the Germans. One German general in the documents I was reading last night estimated "30,000" German logistics trucks were destroyed from D-Day to the Rhine. The Germans knew best of all what those Jabos were doing, and were capable of.

One can only wonder what the 12th SS Hitlerjugend would have fought like had they been raised on videos games like these.

I swear like a trooper when I'm at home or only with my wife, particularly while driving on the freeway, but it still jars me to hear all the coarse language in TV and movies these days. Even worse when I hear young people dropping the F word or worse in stores and malls, with nary a concern for who's walking nearby them. I guess you could say its a double standard, but actually, I wish that the consideration I show others (by moderating my speech around them) was returned in kind. Its about politeness and culture, showing some breeding, having a little class: whatever you choose to call it, it makes you feel a bit more refined when you hold yourself back, than when you let yourself go. Restraint is supposed to be the best demonstration of true power, after all. And you can bet when my pixeltruppen start getting creamed in CM:N, I'll be turning the air blue for yards around my PC.

As far as blaming politicians goes, I place the real blame on one facet of our society that has brought more problems to us than any other - the way we fund elections. Our system has become corrupted by its massive appetite for campaign funding for virtually any and every election, at every level. We have allowed the dollar tail to wag the political dog. Elected officials are increasingly beholden to those who will fund their campaigns, be they interest groups, corporations or wealthy individuals with deep pockets. As a result, most legislation is warped by the demands of these influence groups. This has gotten to the point where we now have courts stacked in accordance to these same alignments, due to elected officials picking judges based not on legal expertise, but upon likely ways of voting on selected issues. Judges no longer recluse themselves when they have a direct interest in the vote's outcome. It has all become one big influence peddling game. The end loser is the voter. While his/her vote is essential to the elected official, the amount of money spent on campaigns and the amount of propaganda vs fact being thrown around makes it very hard for voters to discern what is truth from what is spin. In the end, you have a situation where those who shout loudest, get heard. The only solution in my mind is major campaign funding reform, which would serve to separate the political candidate from the funding sources; in other words, campaign funds anonymity. They would probably have to be pooled in some system and shared out equally to all candidates. Self-funded candidates would basically be out in this system, so that no one had the advantage of more funds than the other candidates. And obviously, no candidate would be beholden to any one source of funding, other than the pool. No corporation or lobby could come up to them and say, "Hey, remember us, it's time to vote our way since we paid your way." No one is perfect, least of all those inclined to run for public office, but this is the only way I see to get elected officials who might, just might, think about what they are doing in terms of what is best for their constituents and not simply in terms of what is best for those who paid for their campaigns.

Revisionists. Gotta love 'em. Believe what you will. I'm not saying every flyboy killed 100 tanks, nothing like that. But I'm also not buying into the story that Tac Air killed very few. Too bad Rommel's not around to ask about it. I've seen too many photos of the havoc wreaked by WW2 fighter bombers, both in the East Front and the West, to give credence to all this talk that their damage was insignificant and a myth. Read one too many memoirs of WW2 ETO GI's who walked past wrecked vehicles and AFV's for miles on end, particularly after Falaise, in places were there had been no land battles. Sorry, just ain't buying it.

You're saying that the destruction of German forces by Tac Air in the Falaise Gap never happened? You have one book to present in refutation? And no quotes? I don't have the book, sorry. And its not going to counter the many books I've read on the subject and the 5-10 supporting articles I found on the web in just a couple of minutes. You'll have to try better than that to convince me that hundreds of published books and articles about the subject since WW2 are all wrong.

That's funny - I for one was planning to make a career of this game.

Just because my brain is wired to see patterns resembling faces in random visual noise, does not make the patterns real. No, I don't see anything. See, it's all in one's attitude.

Tell that to the hundreds of German AFV's and vehicles that were destroyed by Tac Air during the Breakout and in the Falaise Gap. That was the original "highway of death." There was good reason for the Germans to be scared witless by the "Jabos;" if caught in the open, they stood an excellent chance of being strafed, rocketed or bombed to smithereens. Just one citation: http://www.aero-web.org/history/wwii/d-day/15.htm

Brilliant, BD6. History is seldom as clean and obvious as we would like it to be. (Silly me - I thought "geronimo" was a tribute to the WW2 paratrooper battle cry.) I can't be sure that whomever picked the code word was thinking along your line of reasoning, but it makes far more sense than my first interpretation.

This will only continue over time...eventually we will be the tail of the dog, given the US debt ratios and the Chinese' economy potential to grow over time. The question is, can the planet's ecology support billions of Chinese aspiring to an American standard of living and consumption?

Think of playing (comprehending/mastering) it as your hobby and not as a game you turn to now and again, and the investment of your time and energy will make more sense and probably be more rewarding. My impression from a few hours of play is that it returns what you put into it.

I don't see government as the big bad boogeyman that you apparently do, and that says something since I've been around a while and I by all rights should hold a grudge, since that same government tried to deport me when I was 5, separating me from my parents in the process. Regardless, I accept that bureaucracies are only as good as the political leadership that heads them, and some are better at what they do than others. In other words, I have faith in the government, or at least in my ability to influence it towards improvement. What I find more a more horrifying prospect is the idea that some insurance company bean counter will determine whether or not I or my loved ones will get some medical procedure, based upon his/her calculation of how that will affect insurance company profits and the CEO's annual bonus. You see, I own no insurance company stock, attend no board or stockholder meetings, and thus have ZIP opportunity to have my complaints heard. With a government run healthcare system, I at least have (in the end) my vote, and other tools as well, to influence how it comes to be operated. In other words, I am VESTED in my government, and it in me. A medical insurance company, on the other hand, is NOT VESTED in me or my health: it is interested only in its profits...and it profits most when it serves me when I do not need it, and ignores me or rejects me when I need it most. And I don't find most government services appallingly inefficient, as you seem to do. Actually, they were doing pretty well until deregulation and underfunding made the whole government services setup (federal, state and local) start to wobble and wheeze for lack of revenue with which to operate. Finally, one more thing: for over 25 years I was a bureaucrat myself, in local county government, and I know for a fact that my co-workers and I worked long, hard hours to serve the taxpayers that were our clients and ultimate bosses. I know that simply being a civil service employee does not make one a money-grubbing, lazy leech, as the right likes to depict them now. I have a modest pension (which I paid into) and NO MEDICAL until Medicare kicks in, so in that respect I'm no better off than most retirees from business and industry. This whole argument that government is the ultimate evil and should not be involved in public medical care is hooey; unfettered, unrestrained greed is what is the problem and that is what is presently running the medical insurance industry.

Their version of "time off" would probably fill our britches...If a laconic "combat all day" was all they had to say about what they were experiencing. A computer game it wasn't.

...vs the Sanctity of Life. Yes, you summed it up pretty well. War does that supremely, turning everything on its head. Survival becomes primary, everything else, secondary. Unless, of course, you have a "mission." Then your survival may not matter as much as that duty. And when others get in the way of your mission, then they too may be sacrificed in the name of that objective. The whole deck of cards keeps building and building, until there seems precious little logic to it. Maybe that's why I prefer killing photons and electrons in my little war games...

The American WW2 experience with "elite" units was mixed. Certainly, the army deliberately created units that were "special" and unique, such as the paratroopers, rangers, 1st Special Service Force and a few others. Generally these units performed an an above standard level, but there was some feeling in the army leadership that said that the extra attention, time, training and effort that went into these units could have been better used to even out the overall force. This was particularly true when infantry losses in the ETO made it clear that they couldn't keep on sending the dregs to the infantry while the best and smartest soldiers went to the air corps, airborne, officer schools, tech schools, etc. The infantry had its own need for bright, capable soldiers and this was only learned fairly late in the war. In a draftee army, there was little patience with prima donna outfits, as they were seen by some at the time. There was a real need for ordinary footsoldiers and it sometimes seemed that there were never enough bodies to go around, at least of the better qualified ones. There is no question, though, that these special units did perform well and were in the end worth the effort to raise and maintain them. They were not always appreciated by the line units alongside them, at least until they proved their worth in battle. The Marines were a special case of course. They were unique in that the whole lot of them felt themselves to be better than the army, or anyone else for that matter. For that reason, they were used as a battering ram in the Pacific, which was by and large run by the navy as opposed to the army. Army units did participate, but it seemed that the Marines were the ones usually selected for the toughest jobs and accordingly took the highest casualties. That was true until Okinawa, when we began to comprehend what a battle for mainland Japan might be like. By then it was clear to all that the Marines would not be enough and the Army had to be there in numbers if Japan was ever to be invaded. Fortunately, many Army units in the Pacific had become quite battle hardened and nearly as capable as the Marines at amphibious warfare, so experience in part made up for those Army units, what elan provided for the Marines. There is, then, a real balancing act to the creation of armies in wartime. If you create elite units, you may find them beneficial, but you have to be aware of what those units are costing in terms of the efficiency of your overall force. It seems to me that the Germans, in creating the SS, gained some benefits, but also paid a big price in that they diminished their regular army to get and maintain those elite units.